Gyrodyne Model QH-50D DASH

Michel Van

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i found Little Homepage about

DS-1751_with_sensor_spread_on_Ground-In_Color.jpg

the Gyrodyne Model QH-50D
http://www.gyrodynehelicopters.com/qh-50d1.htm
(of course also the Other model QH-50 A to Nite Panther)

A Navy Drone from 1966

original used as Sonar detection Drone

later ARPA's weaponization of the QH-50D; program ATTACK DRONE and GUN SHIP!
QH-50_ARPA_Bird_with_Bomblets__Grenade_Launcher.jpg

look a very nasty Bug ...
QH-50_bottom_with_Gattling_Gun.jpg

... with Gunporn

Nite%20Panther-7.jpg

the big Remote control
 
Interesting. I seem to remember reading somewhere that the reason why the Dash helicopter drone was abandoned was because of its rather alarming propensity of returning to the ship that launched it, inverted because of some sort of glitch in the control system. I understand the JSDF-Navy however adoped the system and ironed out the kinks. Or have I got the story wrong?
 
An early example of the problem with relying on COTS. From what I've heard, the (very reliable) airframe and engine were built to military specification, but, in what was in hindsight an extremely bad idea, in order to save money the avionics were constructed using cheap commercial of the shelf components. The result was that far too many drones were lost to control/ guidance failures and any cost savings on using those components were easily erased.

Correction: The engine was modified to military requirements.
 
Training was also a big issue. DASH could be unforgiving, the mishap rate got to the point where the Navy went to LAMPS. The Japanese operated the DASH for many years, but had better-trained crews.
 
Can anybody explain what the yellow-and-red "barber's pole" device is that hangs under the skids on some versions of the QH-50, particularly the later ones? If you click on the link in the first post and scroll down the page, look at the first photo in the "What about surveillance" section. I believe it is some kind of sensor to assist in landing. There is at least one video on youtube that shows a QH-50 landing with the sensor deployed. It seems to be some kind of telescoping device that closes as the helicopter lands. It closes similarly to how an ASP extendible baton is closed. Thanks for any information anyone can share on this query.


500 Fan.
 
altitude contact switch?
unlikely, but could also it be a harpoon to engage a grid on the ship's deck. Does anyone know how the DASH was secured upon landing?
 
From what I can see, there was no automatic system to secure the QH-50 when it landed. After it touched down, the rotors were slowed to flight-idle speed and two sailors ran out, crawled under the rotor disc and manually tied the airframe down with straps. One or two QH-50s were lost after touch-down as they slid of the heli-deck.


500 Fan.
 
I understand the idea of dumping a couple homing torpedoes (and especially - a nuclear depth charge) at a distance from a destroyer using remote control. It makes a great deal of sense.

However, what were the rockets and guns for? How were they to be aimed?
 
Further to my earlier query about the spring-loaded "pole" that extended down below the skids, it appears this item was an antenna. Presumably it was some kind of up-link antenna. Some of the "special" QH-50s used in Viet Nam were fitted with two antennae and they were fitted with cameras and other sophisticated electronic gear - one up-link and one down-link antenna maybe.

500 Fan.
 
I haven't been able to find much information about how good these things were at there actual jobs. Like how good were they at asw compared to say a regular helicopter.

Also considering the contortions the Canadian navy whent though inorder to get there asw helicopters on their small ships I'm surprised they didn't try these.
 
I haven't been able to find much information about how good these things were at there actual jobs. Like how good were they at asw compared to say a regular helicopter.

Also considering the contortions the Canadian navy whent though inorder to get there asw helicopters on their small ships I'm surprised they didn't try these.
The biggest limitation with using drones to search for submarines is the data link back to the combat control center onboard the ship. Until circa 2000, these were simply too small and too slow to chase submarines.
 
I haven't been able to find much information about how good these things were at there actual jobs. Like how good were they at asw compared to say a regular helicopter.

Also considering the contortions the Canadian navy whent though inorder to get there asw helicopters on their small ships I'm surprised they didn't try these.
The biggest limitation with using drones to search for submarines is the data link back to the combat control center onboard the ship. Until circa 2000, these were simply too small and too slow to chase submarines.

But that's exactly how LAMPS worked from the 1970s -- a datalink from a helicopter to the mother ship to pass sensor data for off board processing and analysis. How hard would it be to put Hawklink on a drone instead of a Seahawk?
 
@Cjc @riggerrob @TomS

On the Gyrodyne website there is an aptly named page "How the Navy Failed DASH" that's about a ~10 minute read, I quoted one of their sections below. Mind you, the Japanese Navy took exceptional care of their drones and continued operations until spare parts were exhausted in 1977!

Some of the problems that have plagued the QH-50 drone were caused by:
(a) Rapid turnover of experienced people, both officer and enlisted. Naval Aviation also has such rapid turnover but their people at least remain aviators.
(b) Quickly trained, totally inexperienced officer controllers who have been used for an average of two years as purely DASH controllers (for which they have been well qualified) and then have been lost forever to the system.
(c) Lack of training devices. Controllers have been exposed continually to classroom lectures on emergency procedures but no facilities have existed for giving training in in-flight emergencies. Reference here is made to an aircraft simulator such as the ANT-18 or C-11 Link trainer.
(d) No centralized authority. The system has been operated by surface types and administered by aviators. NAVAIRSYSCOM has been required to fund a system, which was not under its operational control. COMCRUDESLANT/PAC have been required to operate a system, which was last in line for aviation money. There have even been arguments as to whether the drone is an aircraft (hear-say).
(e) Lack of familiarity with the capabilities/limitations of the system on the part of people in authority has resulted in limited or improper use of the drone. Three days at the training command could have made them knowledgeable not only in tactics but, also in the avionics/mechanics of the system.
(f) PMS (Program Management Systems) has been a bone of major contention and despite the efforts of several conscientious and talented-people it has remained a problem because a special system (combination of surface and aviation systems) was originated for the drone. Refer to last sentence of paragraph 5(d) above.
(g) Poor logistics support as a result of (a) through (f) above.
 
Some more photos of the ARPA "Nite Gazelle" QH-50D, Avweek 19 July 1971. Second photo is particularly interesting, Martin LARS laser-guided 2.75" rocket. 40 years later APKWS re-invented the same idea.

 

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is there an account anywhere of the Japanese experience of using DASH until 1977.
Presumably the absence of nuclear weapons must have made their job a bit easier.
Canada led the way by getting Seakings on to its frigates. The UK used Wasp helos and then Lynx. Later T22 and T23 were designed for Seaking/Merlin.
The USN followed the UK with Seasprite then Seahawk.
The UK has replaced all its MCM ships with unmanned vehicles so maybe it will do the same with Lynx
 

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