It probably could penetrate most battleship's main belt, historically. My point is that against a modern day thin skinned escort, penetrating 2 meters of steel reinforced concrete is basically a lot of dead weight. So the warhead will be completely effective at penetrating the target but not have a lot of bang for the weight. DARPA kept the warhead as a time and cost saver, and it was retained when it became a project of record for the same reason. But it is a sub optimal use of nearly half the launch weight of the missile in this application.

Depends. It's going to detonate well inside a ship instead of opening a big hole to the air. And if you're going after something bigger, like a carrier, cruiser, large amphibious ship, you want to get to the important stuff before you blow up.
 
Will the frigate not also have Hellfire longbow missiles on board?

Not in the current configuration. That's for the LCS surface warfare module and whichever LCSs were to be designed/redesignated as FFs (not sure if that is proceeding now that FFG(X) is going ahead).
Longbow may end up on the FFGs (maybe even a few DDGs) as there are those pushing for wider adoption. But it's waaaay down the priority list at the moment.
 
It probably could penetrate most battleship's main belt, historically. My point is that against a modern day thin skinned escort, penetrating 2 meters of steel reinforced concrete is basically a lot of dead weight. So the warhead will be completely effective at penetrating the target but not have a lot of bang for the weight. DARPA kept the warhead as a time and cost saver, and it was retained when it became a project of record for the same reason. But it is a sub optimal use of nearly half the launch weight of the missile in this application.

Depends. It's going to detonate well inside a ship instead of opening a big hole to the air. And if you're going after something bigger, like a carrier, cruiser, large amphibious ship, you want to get to the important stuff before you blow up.

It clearly depends on your target set, but for the US, it is all thin skins and exactly two Soviet vintage carriers right now. It is possible that the PLAN will attempt to armor their future carriers, but that seems highly doubtful. US carriers have no side armor to speak of above the water line as far as I know from open source, and below the water line it isn't armor so much as layers of voids and fluid storage areas that form part of the TDS.

ETA: there may be some kind of Kevlar or thinker hull layering, but nothing like battleship/2 meters of steel reinforced concrete level of protection.
 
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It probably could penetrate most battleship's main belt, historically. My point is that against a modern day thin skinned escort, penetrating 2 meters of steel reinforced concrete is basically a lot of dead weight. So the warhead will be completely effective at penetrating the target but not have a lot of bang for the weight. DARPA kept the warhead as a time and cost saver, and it was retained when it became a project of record for the same reason. But it is a sub optimal use of nearly half the launch weight of the missile in this application.

Depends. It's going to detonate well inside a ship instead of opening a big hole to the air. And if you're going after something bigger, like a carrier, cruiser, large amphibious ship, you want to get to the important stuff before you blow up.

It clearly depends on your target set, but for the US, it is all thin skins and exactly two Soviet vintage carriers right now. It is possible that the PLAN will attempt to armor their future carriers, but that seems highly doubtful. US carriers have no side armor to speak of above the water line as far as I know from open source, and below the water line it isn't armor so much as layers of voids and fluid storage areas that form part of the TDS.

ETA: there may be some kind of Kevlar or thinker hull layering, but nothing like battleship/2 meters of steel reinforced concrete level of protection.
Doesn't matter. It's not like a frigate would be able to walk it off.
 
I think it is perfectly lethal; it just has a negative effect on range and topside weight to add quarter ton /25% of launch weight into a missile. If I said "hey, lets take the 500lb blast frag in Harpoon and make it just 150lbs and make the rest fishing weights!", you'd probably say that was a bad idea.
 
It clearly depends on your target set, but for the US, it is all thin skins and exactly two Soviet vintage carriers right now. It is possible that the PLAN will attempt to armor their future carriers, but that seems highly doubtful. US carriers have no side armor to speak of above the water line as far as I know from open source, and below the water line it isn't armor so much as layers of voids and fluid storage areas that form part of the TDS.

ETA: there may be some kind of Kevlar or thinker hull layering, but nothing like battleship/2 meters of steel reinforced concrete level of protection.

I wonder at what point the United States will go back to reinforcing their naval hulls in anticipation of a confrontation with China. Or do we roll the dice and wait?
 
It clearly depends on your target set, but for the US, it is all thin skins and exactly two Soviet vintage carriers right now. It is possible that the PLAN will attempt to armor their future carriers, but that seems highly doubtful. US carriers have no side armor to speak of above the water line as far as I know from open source, and below the water line it isn't armor so much as layers of voids and fluid storage areas that form part of the TDS.

ETA: there may be some kind of Kevlar or thinker hull layering, but nothing like battleship/2 meters of steel reinforced concrete level of protection.

I wonder at what point the United States will go back to reinforcing their naval hulls in anticipation of a confrontation with China. Or do we roll the dice and wait?

Presumably the US will 'reinforce' its hulls as soon as it has any practical benefit. Given that the US introduced three different anti surface systems in the last eighteen months...I wonder when China will 'reinforce'?
 
Presumably the US will 'reinforce' its hulls as soon as it has any practical benefit. Given that the US introduced three different anti surface systems in the last eighteen months...I wonder when China will 'reinforce'?
Is that like waiting until our troops were getting shot up & blown up in Iraq before giving them vehicles with heavier armor?
 
Its more like giving all the troops heavy sweatshirts for body armor. A LRASM can penetrate 2 meters of steel reinforced concrete. If you want to discuss the merits of armoring ships I suggest starting a different thread.
 
I think it is perfectly lethal; it just has a negative effect on range and topside weight to add quarter ton /25% of launch weight into a missile. If I said "hey, lets take the 500lb blast frag in Harpoon and make it just 150lbs and make the rest fishing weights!", you'd probably say that was a bad idea.
Except the rest isn't "fishing weights". It's not that difficult to understand.
 
Depends. It's going to detonate well inside a ship instead of opening a big hole to the air. And if you're going after something bigger, like a carrier, cruiser, large amphibious ship, you want to get to the important stuff before you blow up.

Wouldn't the average shaped charge/HE warhead with delayed fuse be more effective?
 
I wonder at what point the United States will go back to reinforcing their naval hulls in anticipation of a confrontation with China. Or do we roll the dice and wait?
s that like waiting until our troops were getting shot up & blown up in Iraq before giving them vehicles with heavier armor?

USN find out the total lack of future for naval armor as early as in 1945, when they tested the shaped-charge 1000-pdr bomb against the full-size model of battleship's armor protection. It was composed from 11-inch hardened cemented armor plate on the top, 4-inch cemented plate below, and three 0,75-inch STS plates below. All plates were divided by eight-feet air spaces. The whole rig imitated the situation of shaped-charge bomb hit into the roof of battleship's turret.

Well, the 1000-pdr shaped charge punch through all the test rig. In actual combat, the jet would came through the turret and hull right into magazines, causing battleship-shattering KABOOM.

That's why USN lost any interest in thick armor plating immediately after WW2...
 
Depends. It's going to detonate well inside a ship instead of opening a big hole to the air. And if you're going after something bigger, like a carrier, cruiser, large amphibious ship, you want to get to the important stuff before you blow up.

Wouldn't the average shaped charge/HE warhead with delayed fuse be more effective?
At armor penetration? Probably. At killing/disabling ships? Probably not. You want to put all the explosive energy inside the ship if possible, not spend it drilling a hole through the ship.

Fusing will be important. Too sensitive, we burst before penetrating thicker targets. Not sensitive enough, and we go through the thin-skin target and out the other side before detonating.
 
At armor penetration? Probably. At killing/disabling ships? Probably not. You want to put all the explosive energy inside the ship if possible, not spend it drilling a hole through the ship.

Well, if I recall correctly, some missiles solve this problem by having several shaping cones on warhead, slightly angled - sort-of metal jet shotgun blast through the ship hull.
 
USN find out the total lack of future for naval armor as early as in 1945, when they tested the shaped-charge 1000-pdr bomb against the full-size model of battleship's armor protection. It was composed from 11-inch hardened cemented armor plate on the top, 4-inch cemented plate below, and three 0,75-inch STS plates below. All plates were divided by eight-feet air spaces. The whole rig imitated the situation of shaped-charge bomb hit into the roof of battleship's turret.

Well, the 1000-pdr shaped charge punch through all the test rig. In actual combat, the jet would came through the turret and hull right into magazines, causing battleship-shattering KABOOM.

That's why USN lost any interest in thick armor plating immediately after WW2...

Interesting, thank you!
 
USN find out the total lack of future for naval armor as early as in 1945, when they tested the shaped-charge 1000-pdr bomb against the full-size model of battleship's armor protection. It was composed from 11-inch hardened cemented armor plate on the top, 4-inch cemented plate below, and three 0,75-inch STS plates below. All plates were divided by eight-feet air spaces. The whole rig imitated the situation of shaped-charge bomb hit into the roof of battleship's turret.

Well, the 1000-pdr shaped charge punch through all the test rig. In actual combat, the jet would came through the turret and hull right into magazines, causing battleship-shattering KABOOM.

That's why USN lost any interest in thick armor plating immediately after WW2...

I'm not sure if that is actually correct. They weren't able to replicate the result of the initial test (the test article may have been flawed). What killed that program was actually Truman's post-war defense cutbacks. Incidently, I believe they were also looking at that armor for possible use in next generation USN carrier designs; the navy had been impressed despite themselves by the survivability of British armoured carriers, but wanted a more flexible armor scheme.
 
m not sure if that is actually correct. They weren't able to replicate the result of the initial test (the test article may have been flawed).

Well, the USSR obviously came to just the same conclusion while developing the shaped charge warheads for ASM in 1950s, so I really doubt that the test was flawed; the independent confirmation (which USSR apparently never doubted, since shaped charge warheads were used on 1980s missiles also), indicates that the test was indeed correct.
 
Interesting, thank you!

I found this data in "Guided missiles and techniques" (NDRC report, 1946), in the section about AZON radio-guided bomb. Apparently the idea was to create version of AZON/RAZON that could be used against armored ship; since the radio-guided bomb undulated along the flight pass, it did not have enough speed or angle for average AP to work. So they decided to try shaped charge - to see how its works - and stumbled upon the much more impressive results than they expected.
 
Later tests were not nearly so impressive. Also, didn't the ASM tests using the hulk of Stalingrad end up rather severely embarrassing Soviet missile advocates, including Khrushchev?
 
As far as I know the most effective ship killer is the one that breaks its back from below. With that sort of shock, how many systems shipboard, will be disrupted turning the ship into a place holder at sea.
 
We are straying rather far off topic at this point.
 
is it safe to say the LCS and perhaps the Zummwalt destroyers were failures?

although on the one hand I like that the USN is willing to try new ideas and approaches
it seems in this case going the conservative route, like the European naval ships, was the better idea?
 
Also, didn't the ASM tests using the hulk of Stalingrad end up rather severely embarrassing Soviet missile advocates, including Khrushchev?

Er, no. It punched right through her belt, just by sheer kinetic energy of impact.

As far as I know the most effective ship killer is the one that breaks its back from below. With that sort of shock, how many systems shipboard, will be disrupted turning the ship into a place holder at sea.

Yep. And this direction of efforts - the "plunge warhead", that dive into water near target and exploded below it - was also tested quite throughout in 1940-1950s. USN developed "Puffin" missile as part of "Kingfisher" effort; Soviet Navy deployed KSCH missile with detachable diving warhead (after entering the water, it was supposed to follow the upward curved trajectory, and hit enemy right into the bottom). So, in essence; give missile engineers the armored warship, and they would deploy missiles capable of killing him long before the warship itself would be launched)
 
is it safe to say the LCS and perhaps the Zummwalt destroyers were failures?

LCS essentially were... not as good as planned. They are still useful little corvettes, but the whole idea of swapping modules just did not work as planned.

Zumwalt's are much better. They have their issues, but they are sill very big, very stealthy ships with formidable self-defense capabilities.
 
is it safe to say the LCS and perhaps the Zummwalt destroyers were failures?

LCS essentially were... not as good as planned. They are still useful little corvettes, but the whole idea of swapping modules just did not work as planned.

Zumwalt's are much better. They have their issues, but they are sill very big, very stealthy ships with formidable self-defense capabilities.
did you think the US should not have cancelled that zumwalt?
if the wikipedia page is to believed
it seemed that it tried to do too much in a single frame
 
did you think the US should not have cancelled that zumwalt?

I think, that if you rip off its unworkable guns and replace them with additional Mk-41 cell, you would have excellent battlecruiser, perfectly suited for serving as carrier groups vanguard, in close contact with the enemy. With additional VLC, she would be a formidable missile platform - stealthy, with excellent self-defense systems, and large ammo capacity.
 
In Falklands war
It probably could penetrate most battleship's main belt, historically. My point is that against a modern day thin skinned escort, penetrating 2 meters of steel reinforced concrete is basically a lot of dead weight. So the warhead will be completely effective at penetrating the target but not have a lot of bang for the weight. DARPA kept the warhead as a time and cost saver, and it was retained when it became a project of record for the same reason. But it is a sub optimal use of nearly half the launch weight of the missile in this application.
In Falklands war one bomb passed thru HMS Glasgow and exploded in the sea, so thought high probability that the penetrating warhead might do same, presume depends on fuze.
 
did you think the US should not have cancelled that zumwalt?

I think, that if you rip off its unworkable guns and replace them with additional Mk-41 cell, you would have excellent battlecruiser, perfectly suited for serving as carrier groups vanguard, in close contact with the enemy. With additional VLC, she would be a formidable missile platform - stealthy, with excellent self-defense systems, and large ammo capacity.
thanks. havent kept up with naval technology in like 20 years. always thought the LCS and Zumwalt designs looked 'cool', so a bit saddened that the LCS didnt work out in the end. still trying to learn more about how unimpressive its ability to swap modules were
but in the end, i hear the ships were too under performing and vulnerable for wartime roles.
 
bit saddened that the LCS didnt work out in the end. still trying to learn more about how unimpressive its ability to swap modules were

The LCS was essentially a modern iteration of colonial gunboat - a relic from 1990-2000 era, when "the end of thw history" was in full swing, and US military role was envisioned as "global policemen" for foreseable future. With the doctrine changes in 2010s and return of USN to more traditional sea control role, the LCS found itself not well-suidet for it. Also, the "module swap" idea simply dudn't work; her proponents underestimated the problems with swapping the crews also - they did not realise, that one small crew could not be well-trained to operate numerous completely different modules.

Currently, the LCS most probable role is to serve as modern anlogue of old Soviet MRK - "small missile ships", essentially sea-capable missile bots. With NSM missiles and small radar signature, they would be really useful for Pacific Island Chain operations.
 
Er, no. It punched right through her belt, just by sheer kinetic energy of impact.

Are you sure about that? The trials were considered to be an utter and total failure.
 
is it safe to say the LCS and perhaps the Zummwalt destroyers were failures?
Quite objectively. Wonder why is that even a question.

As above. Both in program execution and fundamental doctrine, neither ship is particularly effective at anything and it's hard to see how they ever could have been. Both will likely be retired early; the first four LCS are already being taken out of service. The LCS might have been salvageable as a corvette for low threat duties even with the failure of their various swap out packages (MIM, ASW, etc) but suffered from the ridiculous speed requirement that compromised their hull shapes and range. The Zummies were just one bad idea after another painted onto one ship class for the sake of transformation. About the only technology that might be salvaged from that abortion is the power management system.
 
They have an excellent sonar suite. Their larger VLS is quite capable. Their remaining large radar, the X-band SPY-3 MFR, is quite good and I wouldn't rule out a -B model or some similar development of the family taking on the AMDR-X role. The huge command space will probably be closely studied for the LSC, while TSCE itself may not get much use beyond the 3 hulls the way it ties everything together and commands it will certainly influence future classes. People get way too hung up on the problems created by cost-cutting and try to paint the whole thing as failed.
 
Can somebody explain why NSM launchers are not hidden away? 4 clunky boxes on top of the deck?!!
A bit more metal to fence them away cant be too expensive?
 
As fielded now, Zummwalt seems to be a short range air defense ship with two non functional guns. My understanding is that they are not equipped with SM-2, at least currently. The SPY-3 seems to have been superseded by SPY-6, so sans SPY-4 it seems the AD system is a technological dead end. Why on earth the naval gunfire requirement was dropped on top of that AD requirement I'll never know. Some technology might be salvaged, but the platforms themselves are pretty clearly failures.
 
SM2-BLKIIIAZ rounds/modifications have been ordered for both the IOC, and planned FOC for the Zumwalt class ships. The Zumwalt class is not yet ready for a deployment. IOC is expected late next year. FOC after that. SM-2 and ESSM are going to be more than capable to defend the ship. What is going to be more important is the offensive capabiltiy it gets and how the Navy adapts it into its future architecture. A mission role change was always on the card when the class was truncated to just three and all the decisions that came as a result of that.

The Navy as per Vice Admiral Boxall is looking for a "less dense" ship with many times the onboard power generation and storage capacity of the current DDG-51 Flight III. Well if they still are looking at something like that, they have a platfrom that is larger, less dense, and generates a ton of more power. And it isn't a paper design with ships deployed before the LSC is even put on contract. No reason not to replicate a parent design approach on the LSC given that so far the Navy seems to be happy with it on the FFG(X). AEGIS combat system with 18 ft SPY-6 and FXR, large diameter VLS and perhaps even VPM are probably all possible within the size limits of the current design. You don't need those guns on the LSC. You can design it for technology and construction to be more affordable in the late 2020's / early 2030's.

If the naval leadership was proactive, and had political backing, they could advocate pulling the last ship out of the fleet and modifying it to support future LSC technologies. Talk about a perfect opportunity to de-risk a future ship class. This is the only medium-term opportunity the Navy has to put a MW class DEW on a surface ship and significantly larger diameter tubes for hypersonic weapons. They can keep making statements and studying concepts but if they want all this in one ship before the mid 2030's (deployed) then there are few parent designs that can get them there.
 
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The Zumwalts appear to have a decent hull and power systems with the potential for a lot more. Throwing it all away seems like an exercise in crass stupidity. Updates and changes in tasking could lead to a much needed boost for the USN, especially important considering the prc and the remaining life expectancy of a certain cruiser class. If they do not do this they will regret it.
 
It needs some very strong leadership. Imagine what would happen if someone in the Navy leadership wanted to pull one ship out of the class and modify it. The political and even institutional ramifications would be probably too great for them to get anything else done on their agenda. Media will go bat$hit crazy. So, barring a really strong leader who has vocal and influential political cover no one is going to do anything besides kicking the can further down the road and let the process play out organically over the next few years - time where they could have been building stuff using a fresh hull as opposed to working on paper designs and proposals. Some of the high risk items vis-a-vis the LSC are already solved by the parent Zumwalt class design. More space, more power, lower signature, and a hull that is in advanced stages of testing.
 
is it safe to say the LCS and perhaps the Zummwalt destroyers were failures?

although on the one hand I like that the USN is willing to try new ideas and approaches
it seems in this case going the conservative route, like the European naval ships, was the better idea?
No.
 

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