I'm not sure that would help much ...
Slowing things down initially but being transparently reciprocal, proactive and supportive, i.e. being methodical and resolute, is possibly a way to arrive at a better end result further down the line. This is thinking numerically, of course, which only goes so far e.g. Ukraine proving that motives, values and such matter a whole lot also. But staying rather superficial, on hindsight I find it rather hard to imagine still how to arrive at greater (effective) reductions on the European NATO side than what actually occurred due to neglect, mismanagement, counterinsurgency focus and naïvete already.
Given the 1991-2014 period I supposed the framing was Eurocentric. That may or may not have been the intent of Reuben James. Certainly China experienced immense changes at the same time, coinciding with what is generally perceived "momentous" in the "West". Market reforms, opening up to commerce, integration into international organizations, becoming the World's second largest economy, culminating thus far in the start of Xi Jingpin's reign. Certainly there's some alignment between CCP's and a Putinist view in that the fall of the Soviet Union was "the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the (20th) century" albeit the Russian and Chinese elite arrive at that conclusion from very different viewpoints. Russia's is revanchist, imperial, spiteful, cynical, zero-sum and China's is more doctrinaire, ideological, self-assured, for example.
But as Soviet Union's fate as an empire is baked in the prerequisites here, I guess the question is how to integrate China into the Global fold without them thinking they would have had to go quite this far in hard power projection as required by their particular brand of communism/authoritarianism. Certainly from geopolitical experts and the Chinese themselves in this year's Davos the message is that Europe and its troubles are a bit of a side show as seen from Beijing, albeit a useful one as Russia is kind of conveniently their client state now. Guess it's not out of the question that China might've told Putin to knock his antics of in order for them to build the "new silk road" but that didn't happen either.
Historian Adam Tooze has been developing truly a truly interesting framework of understanding our recent history (and future trajectory), speaking about "petrostates" and "electrostates" and how they're in geostrategic competition. There, the EU and China have many common interests in decarbonizing which, more consciously employed and better coordinated, might have shaped the Global order in a different direction. But the EU's green new deal, its self contradictory implementation and China's initial (quite direct) emulation of it by Tsinghua university and Xi is post 2014. Between 1991 and 2014 China quite consciously drastically increased its greenhouse gas emissions and it requires a good imagination indeed how this part of their evolution might've been leapfrogged and transformed into disarmament also (if only relative to current levels, some modernization is a given).
Then there are the questions of the "nine (or ten?) dash line" in the South China Sea and Taiwan, both of which seem quite at odds with China's current economic interests and even irrational. And speaking of these, the level of outsourcing to China (post 1994) could have also been checked at least somewhat, guarding against degradation of capabilities and social disruption in the US and EU alike; these matters could have been tied to restricting proliferation and generally finding more solid common ground where possible. But as my meandering from one theme to another betrays, finding a way in to consider a plausible alternative history (or at least a full narrative of one) is quite challenging for me here.
Why does this thread (notwithstanding its purported title) just seem to be a 'how can we justify rearming bs. and seeing other states as a percieved 'enemy' ignoring any potential 'peace dividend coming from genuine 'arms reduction' ?
Having lived through the 70/80's 'cold war' and done my time a decade or so later, I guess I'm becoming a cynical pacifist in my old age
I guess it's somewhat hard (for me) to look past the current sorry state. Also, since 2007 at the latest I just recoil from our (often willful) naïvete about Russia's trajectory, intentions and the formation of the global authoritarian project. Hence starting on a somewhat different foot much earlier on. On my part it's also observing real, experienced, dedicated arms control experts' controlled frustration and even (relative, not universal) bellicosity. But if you want to explore alternative histories from this era, they just might the treasuriest of troves of disarmament roads not taken. I'm not sure if it's in every
Arms Control Wonk podcast/article but it sure is a recurring theme there.
So I think I may kinda feel you.
Timothy Snyder does point out that real freedom is not (solely) freedom from but most importantly freedom to; it requires being for things, not only against, something (a more agreeable future) to work for. Psychologists note that the perception of progress towards a better future is more important for motivation and well-being than one's current circumstances.
I'm not sure that alternative pasts are the most productive way to work toward pacifism and disarmament but I don't exclude them being a way either. Due to the internet, social media and LLMs we're also experiencing a very particular simulation of an overview effect; our shared experiences' fragmentation may be evolving in ways that make us more oblivious to our ignorance. In the grand scheme, though, it's not required of us to do everything but everybody doing something.
