Disarmament done right? - Alternative Approaches to Arms Reduction in the period 1991-2014

Reuben James

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Pretty much what is says on the tin. With many commentators tracing the route of current British and American military procurement woes back to these two decades, and the disarmament that went along with it, I wonder if there are suggestions of what might have been done instead.

Stipulations include that your plan must represent an overall decline in military strength correspondent to the decline and uplift in military spending as seen in this period. So, no declaring a spending increase to force your plan through.
 
I'd be fine with "disarming" if the US kept BRAC opened and the line for Abrams and Bradleys rolling warm ish. Among various other goverment owned institutions. Like shipbuilding.

The production line and contractor base was practically paid for so a reduction in planned buy should not increase unit cost.
 
I'd like to see the theses of some real arms control researchers on this (and I can think of a few)!

Starting from 1991 I'd say, from a NATO perspective, that all reductions should've been made commensurate with and contingent upon an actual dismantling of Soviet/Russian arms production capacity and the irreversible destruction of their armament stocks (witness for how long Soviet era equipment has on its part still sustained Russia's attack on Ukraine). Ditto for their progress (or not) on democracy and human rights indices. Sort of a bare minimum version of something that needs to be considered and prepared for post Putin also, in the long term.

Not taking a Russia centric approach to dealing with former Soviet republics but dealing with them individually and directly and on their own terms as truly sovereign states (with regard to legacy nuclear weapons also); establishing good and deep bilateral working relations with them and former Warsaw pact countries much earlier. Forging a clear and unambiguous path for them to full NATO memberships (perhaps auxiliary but with full security guarantees at first) at their earliest possible convenience, something many of them sincerely and publicly wanted immediately post 1991. Legacy equipment donated toward these states while commissioning defense contractors to design for future force requirements to be adopted at the time of obsolescence.

Creating a decadal pivot mechanism with clear criteria where the EU and/or European NATO nations would've methodically become an (almost) co-equal partner in NATO with the US as far as it comes to the European continent. Establishing NATO open source armament designs and production systems and embedding those with all-of-society resilience structures, enabling industries to rapidly shift gears in times of future emerging crises. Seeing to it that pan-European civilian infrastructure projects, e.g. transport, that may have benefitted from a peace dividend, were designed as defense enablers also.

But this is just riffing off the top of my head. All savings in these scenarios are dependent on these actions effectuating a more positive global/European security environment than what was actually to be.
 
I really dislike Alt History and what if scenarios but here goes, I guess by the tone of the posts we are looking at a pro. NATO. Western centric with this one ?
How about the acceptance of Russian overtures to join NATO. after the dissolution of the WP. bringing them and former umbrella states into the organisation in a true hemispherical alliance ?
We would quite probably see a very different post Cold War timeline :)
 
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I really dislike Alt History and what if scenarios but here goes, I guess by the tone of the posts we are looking at a pro. NATO. Western centric with this one ?
How about the acceptance of Russian overtures to join NATO. after the dissolution of the WP. bringing them and former umbrella states into the organisation in a true hemispherical alliance ? we would quite probably see a very different post Cold War timeline :)
Russia never seriously wanted to enter NATO. It's delusional to think otherwise, man. If you can get one of those suicidal mega liberal woke furry poets, unironically, into the seat of the President, then sure, but realistically anyone that can get past the russian mobsters and old KGB and central committee camp is going to have deep ties to them. Not pedophilic but could be equally bad, with an unanimous vehement angst and hatred towards the west and equally massive greed toward their oodles of dollars.

Best we can get is NATO aggresion in the early 2000s to bring most of Eastern Europe into NATO, including Ukraine. Finland Sweden et probably stays neutral.
 
For disarmament to actually work, and the peace dividend to pay off, the continued presence of a military coalition on Russia's doorstep has to disappear. So everyone has to buy into it, NATO needs to be disbanded, and nuclear stockpile reduction needs to go up a couple gears. But then I suspect the push to economically dominate would be even stronger than it actually was, so OTL is the only likely result anyway.
 
I really dislike Alt History and what if scenarios but here goes, I guess by the tone of the posts we are looking at a pro. NATO. Western centric with this one ?
How about the acceptance of Russian overtures to join NATO. after the dissolution of the WP. bringing them and former umbrella states into the organisation in a true hemispherical alliance ? we would quite probably see a very different post Cold War timeline :)

I usually also steer clear of alternate histories; recently, having listened to prof. Timothy Snyder on central European history and historical biases/delusions (post fact inevitability being one) I can sort of entertain options, even so as to not fall into determinism.

The Clinton administration wasn't initially adverse to Russian NATO membership, to a YOLO degree I found at least somewhat shocking upon reading about it. Russia's position, even at that time, was that they should've been exempted from any accession criteria applied to others which speaks to their self-image (still an imperial, latently revanchist, peer "superpower", at least a local hegemon). Let's just say that this wouldn't have gone over well with all the other nations who Russia (in whichever of their guises) had just subjugated, looted and left in a poor state.

Thus I view Russia's NATO accession as a "separate alternate history" requiring much more radical preconditions than mere arms reduction and circumstantial detente, either internally on the part of Russia (compete purging of the security apparatus from Russia's governance and economy, for one) itself or how the Cold War ended, if that makes sense. The best that could've been achieved in a sustainable disarmament scenario, I feel, is that Russia could've been dissuaded from rearming for overt aggression through strength and then slowly and empathetically made to confront its history. But that's terribly speculative, I'm only remotely comfortable staying close to 1991 here and not projecting much further.

Russia never seriously wanted to enter NATO. It's delusional to think otherwise, man. If you can get one of those suicidal mega liberal woke furry poets, unironically, into the seat of the President, then sure, but realistically anyone that can get past the russian mobsters and old KGB and central committee camp is going to have deep ties to them. Not pedophilic but could be equally bad, with an unanimous vehement angst and hatred towards the west and equally massive greed toward their oodles of dollars.

Best we can get is NATO aggresion in the early 2000s to bring most of Eastern Europe into NATO, including Ukraine. Finland Sweden et probably stays neutral.

They would've, had it reflected their self-perception as a "naturally dominant imperial power" within NATO or just to attempt to ruin the whole thing from within. Steering clear of very definite statements on alternate histories (as you bring up Sweden and Finland), I've often wondered whether Ukraine could've been brought into NATO's fold soon enough (i.e. before 2014) to prevent Russia's aggression had Sweden and Finland joined the alliance simultaneously with the Baltic states already. It was a natural conjunction to do so and Russia couldn't have opposed it directly (2004); Putin's overt hostility towards NATO only began at Munich in 2007. A rational disarmament argument would've probably been at least somewhat welcomed in Nordic nations whose identity is at least somewhat based on (informed) pacifism and (advised) neutrality, though the whole Iraq war thing really wasn't a convincing contemporary backdrop to that.

For disarmament to actually work, and the peace dividend to pay off, the continued presence of a military coalition on Russia's doorstep has to disappear. So everyone has to buy into it, NATO needs to be disbanded, and nuclear stockpile reduction needs to go up a couple gears. But then I suspect the push to economically dominate would be even stronger than it actually was, so OTL is the only likely result anyway

That's pretty close to Russian boilerplate statements, trying to have a buffer zone, reduced sovereignty for their "near abroad" and regional hegemony through reflexive control (among other things). It's Russian imperial tradition to be opportunistically adversarial, NATO or no NATO. Given that states, peoples and nations bordering Russia and even further afield have been invaded by them every generation or two, most of them now stand pretty darn clear when it comes to their preferences about defense alliances and were very clear on that in the 1990s when they could freely do so and in the aughts also.
 
Russia never seriously wanted to enter NATO. It's delusional to think otherwise, man.
Russia considered this pretty seriously, as radical way of removing NATO threat - by joining. The prevalent ideas in 1990s and even early 2000s was that American-centric world would last long, and joining the system as "high-ranking retainer" is better than trying to oppose it. The situation started to change after 2003 Iraq, when it was demonstrated that America did not consider rules it established as binding - basically declaring that there are no rules, but only Washington DC whims. That wasn't what Russian elites expected; they were willing to fit into the system, but they wanted a firm set of rules for everyone.

In other words, Russia wanted to fit into system preceived as some sort of national-scale constitutional monarchy, with USA on top, makind decisions, but with a set of laws binding everyone. Instead they saw a tyranny, with USA declaring "screw the rules, we are doing what we like".
 
had just subjugated, looted and left in a poor state.
Sorry, whom exactly? The only nation that fit that criteria would be Russia itself. Because the centerpoint of Soviet ideology was always "Russians should help smaller nations", and trade balance even inside USSR was heavily shifted in favor of Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, ect. With the exception of big cities like Moscow and Leningrad, the average Russian during post-war times lived worse than Ukrainean.
 
Let's just say that this wouldn't have gone over well with all the other nations who Russia (in whichever of their guises) had just subjugated, looted and left in a poor state.
What most Westerners didn't realize - because it didn't fit into their standard perception of empire - is that USSR was an empire reversed. Instead of periphery supplyi g the center, Soviet leaderships used the center (Russia) to supply the periphery. This concept was deeply rooted in the core of Leninist ideology, which claimed that since Tsars robbed minor nations to make Russian capitalists rich, then Soviets must compensate for that, by giving priority to national minorities.

That's why Soviet periphery - like Ukraine, Georgia or Baltic states - were generally allocated higher priority in supplies than inner Russia. With the exception of "first priority cities" - Moskva, Leningrad, and several others (most of which were "closed" cities), the majority of Russia have less supply priority than national republics.

P.S. Part of modern Russian nationalism, incidentally, rooted in the idea that "bloody commies robbed Russians to feed Ukraineans" and other stuff like that.
 
I really dislike Alt History and what if scenarios but here goes, I guess by the tone of the posts we are looking at a pro. NATO. Western centric with this one ?
How about the acceptance of Russian overtures to join NATO. after the dissolution of the WP. bringing them and former umbrella states into the organisation in a true hemispherical alliance ? we would quite probably see a very different post Cold War timeline :)

Su-25s would have been appreciated at Tora Bora, and CIA may have been able to capture bin Laden earlier at Tarnak Farms, had it happened!

What most Westerners didn't realize - because it didn't fit into their standard perception of empire - is that USSR was an empire reversed. Instead of periphery supplyi g the center, Soviet leaderships used the center (Russia) to supply the periphery. This concept was deeply rooted in the core of Leninist ideology, which claimed that since Tsars robbed minor nations to make Russian capitalists rich, then Soviets must compensate for that, by giving priority to national minorities.

Don't forget that two of the centers of naval technology and aviation were in Almaty and Tbilisi. So rooted is this even to an extent Putin maintains this arrangement, such as with Kalmykia, to this day.
 
Don't forget that two of the centers of naval technology and aviation were in Almaty and Tbilisi.
Exactly. The idea was that central Russia is "developed enough" and thus priority was given to building industrial facilities in "underdeveloped" areas. Also, it have a secondary goal of ensuring that vital industry is well-disperced, and could not be knocked out alltogether in case of new war.
 
Sorry, whom exactly?

So, ingrates, are they? (Cough, Holodomor, cough.)

I don't know if some Soviet economists' (nor ideologues') conceptions about resource allocation during some of the communism era is quite the flex you think it is. That that period left a whole bunch of nations in an overall poor state does not exclude that some areas might've been poorer than others. And even so, you must know that whatever investment went where in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, party affiliation and different areas' cultural and ethnic diversity caused that allocation to be more or less unequal within those areas also. Perhaps not unlike most Russian contract soldiers occupying parts of Ukraine are mostly coming from the "periphery" and not so much the environs of places like Rublyovka.

Even today the number of residences w/o indoor plumbing in Russia is regularly trotted out in relation to the inordinate investment Russia's ruling class is devoting in its futile pursuit of trying to convince Ukrainians they're Russian, or something. I wouldn't call that "investment" in Ukraine, though, while in some fanciful (-ly gruesome) metric someone might deem it as such. Ostankino has been quite flexible in its framings of the present and history like that.

However we got to 1991, we had a bunch of post-communist states in Europe (newly free to join unions and alliances, regaining independence or achieving it, all duly recognized) strapped for contemporaneously relevant resources, some justified resentment at having been deprived of agency before and looking at their security statuses to be enhanced to a satisfactory level. As the question was about "disarmament done right" from 1991 to 2014 I thought the discussion would've been remiss of addressing the contradiction of the considerable investment needs of these states in defense while also seeking to diminish that spending overall, enabling a new virtuous cycle of stability.

In any case, in the real World most European NATO nations (and even the US) did unilaterally divest from defense well past Munich 2007 and even Crimea 2014 against ample evidence with regard to Russia that it had become a fools' errand. In this alternative history I tried to bring in fmr Warsaw Pact and Soviet nations' viewpoint exactly because the habit of assigning relatively more agency to Russia was seemingly so hard to break (US/NATO academia was highly biased towards that due to the Cold War) and perhaps taking their experience and expertise more seriously (or on a more equal footing to Russia's) would've produced a more sustainable and stable path forward. Outhouse metrics notwithstanding.
 
I'd like to see the theses of some real arms control researchers on this (and I can think of a few)!

Starting from 1991 I'd say, from a NATO perspective, that all reductions should've been made commensurate with and contingent upon an actual dismantling of Soviet/Russian arms production capacity and the irreversible destruction of their armament stocks (witness for how long Soviet era equipment has on its part still sustained Russia's attack on Ukraine). Ditto for their progress (or not) on democracy and human rights indices. Sort of a bare minimum version of something that needs to be considered and prepared for post Putin also, in the long term.
I'm not sure that would help much, unless you mean this as a roundabout way of saying "don't disarm." If the Russians did do that stuff, then the West would have shut down their arms production and still get fucked by China, which is by far the bigger threat today. But the Russians wouldn't do any of that, and most likely the public would protest that NATO was still spending like they hadn't won, and Western weapons industry would shut down anyway.

The important part is to avoid selling off capital and invest properly in new systems. Don't design a military industry around 400 missiles a year or 50,000 shells, you have to aim for a high max rate from the ground up. Don't invent the best missile or plane you can't afford, design a good missile or plane and set up a factory with surge capacity. Should probably be government-owned for that reason, private industry will always want to get the risk off their books.
 
Why does this thread (notwithstanding its purported title) just seem to be a 'how can we justify rearming and seeing other states as a percieved 'enemy' ignoring any potential 'peace dividend coming from genuine 'arms reduction' ?
Having lived through the 70/80's 'cold war' and done my time a decade or so later, I guess I'm becoming a cynical pacifist in my old age :)
 
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I'm not sure that would help much ...

Slowing things down initially but being transparently reciprocal, proactive and supportive, i.e. being methodical and resolute, is possibly a way to arrive at a better end result further down the line. This is thinking numerically, of course, which only goes so far e.g. Ukraine proving that motives, values and such matter a whole lot also. But staying rather superficial, on hindsight I find it rather hard to imagine still how to arrive at greater (effective) reductions on the European NATO side than what actually occurred due to neglect, mismanagement, counterinsurgency focus and naïvete already.

Given the 1991-2014 period I supposed the framing was Eurocentric. That may or may not have been the intent of Reuben James. Certainly China experienced immense changes at the same time, coinciding with what is generally perceived "momentous" in the "West". Market reforms, opening up to commerce, integration into international organizations, becoming the World's second largest economy, culminating thus far in the start of Xi Jingpin's reign. Certainly there's some alignment between CCP's and a Putinist view in that the fall of the Soviet Union was "the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the (20th) century" albeit the Russian and Chinese elite arrive at that conclusion from very different viewpoints. Russia's is revanchist, imperial, spiteful, cynical, zero-sum and China's is more doctrinaire, ideological, self-assured, for example.

But as Soviet Union's fate as an empire is baked in the prerequisites here, I guess the question is how to integrate China into the Global fold without them thinking they would have had to go quite this far in hard power projection as required by their particular brand of communism/authoritarianism. Certainly from geopolitical experts and the Chinese themselves in this year's Davos the message is that Europe and its troubles are a bit of a side show as seen from Beijing, albeit a useful one as Russia is kind of conveniently their client state now. Guess it's not out of the question that China might've told Putin to knock his antics of in order for them to build the "new silk road" but that didn't happen either.

Historian Adam Tooze has been developing truly a truly interesting framework of understanding our recent history (and future trajectory), speaking about "petrostates" and "electrostates" and how they're in geostrategic competition. There, the EU and China have many common interests in decarbonizing which, more consciously employed and better coordinated, might have shaped the Global order in a different direction. But the EU's green new deal, its self contradictory implementation and China's initial (quite direct) emulation of it by Tsinghua university and Xi is post 2014. Between 1991 and 2014 China quite consciously drastically increased its greenhouse gas emissions and it requires a good imagination indeed how this part of their evolution might've been leapfrogged and transformed into disarmament also (if only relative to current levels, some modernization is a given).

Then there are the questions of the "nine (or ten?) dash line" in the South China Sea and Taiwan, both of which seem quite at odds with China's current economic interests and even irrational. And speaking of these, the level of outsourcing to China (post 1994) could have also been checked at least somewhat, guarding against degradation of capabilities and social disruption in the US and EU alike; these matters could have been tied to restricting proliferation and generally finding more solid common ground where possible. But as my meandering from one theme to another betrays, finding a way in to consider a plausible alternative history (or at least a full narrative of one) is quite challenging for me here.

Why does this thread (notwithstanding its purported title) just seem to be a 'how can we justify rearming bs. and seeing other states as a percieved 'enemy' ignoring any potential 'peace dividend coming from genuine 'arms reduction' ?
Having lived through the 70/80's 'cold war' and done my time a decade or so later, I guess I'm becoming a cynical pacifist in my old age :)

I guess it's somewhat hard (for me) to look past the current sorry state. Also, since 2007 at the latest I just recoil from our (often willful) naïvete about Russia's trajectory, intentions and the formation of the global authoritarian project. Hence starting on a somewhat different foot much earlier on. On my part it's also observing real, experienced, dedicated arms control experts' controlled frustration and even (relative, not universal) bellicosity. But if you want to explore alternative histories from this era, they just might the treasuriest of troves of disarmament roads not taken. I'm not sure if it's in every Arms Control Wonk podcast/article but it sure is a recurring theme there.

So I think I may kinda feel you. Timothy Snyder does point out that real freedom is not (solely) freedom from but most importantly freedom to; it requires being for things, not only against, something (a more agreeable future) to work for. Psychologists note that the perception of progress towards a better future is more important for motivation and well-being than one's current circumstances.

I'm not sure that alternative pasts are the most productive way to work toward pacifism and disarmament but I don't exclude them being a way either. Due to the internet, social media and LLMs we're also experiencing a very particular simulation of an overview effect; our shared experiences' fragmentation may be evolving in ways that make us more oblivious to our ignorance. In the grand scheme, though, it's not required of us to do everything but everybody doing something.
 
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So, ingrates, are they? (Cough, Holodomor, cough.)
This example is inappropriate. It was a Soviet famine, not just a Ukrainian one. That is, it affected Russia and Ukraine simultaneously, not Ukraine alone. Likewise, it impacted both Ukrainian and Russian ethnic regions in Ukraine (with Russian areas suffering no less).
 
The U.S. downsized after WWII, after the Korean War, after the Vietnam War, and, after the Cold War ended.

But why did post-WWII downsized not hinder the U.S. military's subsequent expansion and modernization? Why did the downsized after the Korean War not stop it? Why did the downsized after the Vietnam War not stop it? Why was it different after the Cold War ended?

Better to wish the Soviet Union still existed than to wish for keeping a few weapons production lines, or for producing and retaining more weapons the U.S. military won't need for the next two decades.

Oh, and pray that the neoliberal wind doesn't blow through the military-industrial complex... well... that's even less likely.
 
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Honestly the arms are the least important element of what happened in the early 21st century.
A different approach to world order would have been necessary to maintain peace.
Even in the 1980s, it was generally considered inevitable that the relative power of the US was likely to decline, given the structural uplift of the rest of the world with industrialization of first Japan and Europe, then China and the Global South
Looking back to Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall, three things stand out about the 1990 to 2014 period that were outside context, as it were.

1) the Japanese economy stalled out in 1990, resulting in a weakening of the balance of power in East Asia, exacerbated by IMF shenanigans in East and Southeast Asia.
2) the US stepped into a trap in the Mideast, laid by Osama Bin Laden, sapping off power for mediocre gains
3) the EU fell off its growth pathway after 2008
4) Wall Street - the key to long-term American power given the inexorable industrialization of the Global South and China - lost credibility in 2008; and US grand strategy was thrown into disarray by domestic political unrest
5) the USA did not sign the TPP and bind itself closely to East and Southeast Asian economies

If these five things do not hold, the relative balance of power is much strengthened and the problems of the modern world are far lesser--the world is a richer and more stable place, even if perhaps US power is relatively reduced (because EU and Japan and parts of SEA add much more power to the Western-led world order), because Chinese or Russian power is relatively reduced as well.
The inevitability of the above, of course, is very much up for grabs.
 
Can we ever achieve disarmament again, even to the point of concluding a disarmament treaty?
It is foolish to remain militarily hostile while being tightly bound economically by our neighbors. As you have said, the peace dividend did not function economically in many ways.
However, didn't the peace dividend also provide a cultural aspect (through the relaxation of censorship) that is not discussed in terms of economics or military matters?
 
Starting from 1991 I'd say, from a NATO perspective, that all reductions should've been made commensurate with and contingent upon an actual dismantling of Soviet/Russian arms production capacity and the irreversible destruction of their armament stocks (witness for how long Soviet era equipment has on its part still sustained Russia's attack on Ukraine). Ditto for their progress (or not) on democracy and human rights indices. Sort of a bare minimum version of something that needs to be considered and prepared for post Putin also, in the long term.
It's what happened. An equal or larger part (depending on sector) of Ru arms industry was dismantled, often in a far more complete fashion.
Whatever survived was either due to absolute priority (nuclear), a combination of luck and social stability, or exports. As late as COVID, core Russian enterprises were still going out of business, with irrecoverable consequences for war production. (The most famous example is Sterlitamak Machine Building Plant).

Russian disarmament happened in conditions of endless instability, peripheral/internal wars and risk of secession. I.e. there was perpetual incentive/need to keep things running.
For almost all of NATO, most wars are wars of choice (without diplomatic speak - aggressive interventions), i.e., there is just no connection between national security and wars they take part in.
Not taking a Russia centric approach to dealing with former Soviet republics but dealing with them individually and directly and on their own terms as truly sovereign states (with regard to legacy nuclear weapons also); establishing good and deep bilateral working relations with them and former Warsaw pact countries much earlier. Forging a clear and unambiguous path for them to full NATO memberships (perhaps auxiliary but with full security guarantees at first) at their earliest possible convenience, something many of them sincerely and publicly wanted immediately post 1991. Legacy equipment donated toward these states while commissioning defense contractors to design for future force requirements to be adopted at the time of obsolescence.
That's exactly what happened IRL. And it led to the exact consequences we live in.
Putin, for all his reputation in the West (not unlike Khamenei the elder), is a rather moderate and passive actor, who, for the most part, is busy keeping his own game. Yeltsin or Medvedev could've (and likely would've) answered very unambiguously right there and then.

And note that while the overall state of Russia and its armed forces was worse, the potential was continuously going down with time. Soviet equipment stocks grew less relevant, role of new approaches in warfare grew up (to become decisive and outweigh said stock), and, above all else, "dealing with former Soviet republics individually" gradually moved them away from Russia. Before the mid-late 2000s, the process wasn't there, and CIS states in all likelihood would've directly sided with Russia.

Basically, you suggest all that was done IRL, but in a rush, which would've led to a far worse military stand off, and may have in fact resurrected the Soviet Union.
 
It's what happened.

I would hardly have merely described what happened. You seem to take it (or suggest) that I implied NATO and Russia should've disarmed equally, numerically or in capability. As large numbers of fmr. Soviet materiel have only been/is being disassembled recently in Ukraine, obviously stocks weren't reduced between 1991 and 2014 in a thorough enough manner. In the Sipri arms transfers database alone, Russia is #2 at 20% of global exports during the period in question, reflecting intent, identity and priorities.

NATO as such has undertaken kinetic action only after the Cold War, in fmr. Yugoslavia under various UN resolutions from 1992 to the present, and in responding to 9/11 when the U.S. invoked the 5th article in Afghanistan (plus perhaps the no fly zone in Libya). These were/are responses to an event in a NATO country, or events (genocide, humanitarian crises) in countries bordering NATO. Hardly the stuff of choice or unbridled imperialism, though I'm reminded of a story how in 1999 Capt./singer James Blunt (heading a recon unit) confronted Russian forces who were acting very much outside their mandate and the spirit of peacekeeping in general at the Pristina airport.

I'd hardly call Putin a moderate, what with his constant terrorism around Europe, propping up authoritarians around the World and, of course, Ukraine. You allude to Russia's "peripheral" wars and "risk of secession" and Putin has made it abundantly clear in his genocidal writings and actions (1.5M casualties in Ukraine) that he views Ukraine a secessionist, not an independent state. Despite Ukraine being universally recognized as such by the UN, for starters. This could've been foreseen and avoiding action could've been attempted (in terms of imposing actual accountability on Russia) between 1991 and 2014 had states that had been annexed by the Soviet Union truly been paid attention to and actually been treated as equals in rights (they weren't).

A very poignant example is a speech by Estonia's then president, Lennart Meri in Hamburg on Feb 25, 1994 (32 years ago, and less than three after the dissolution of the Soviet Union). I'll include it in its entirety as he is more eloquent and grounded about these issues than I am. Why poignant? By its still very relevant content (foresight spanning decades) but also because the then Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg (Russia) was in the audience and upon hearing it stormed out in a huff. Who was that? Vladimir Putin.

Lennart Meri said:
Dear Mayor, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am the president of the Republic of Estonia. When I see before me the pointed steeples of the free and Hanseatic city of Hamburg, I might as well think I am at home, in the old Hanseatic city of Reval/Tallinn on the Gulf of Finland. However, I have an honorable duty to fulfil here today – a duty which I consider particularly important: I have to give you a message from my country which is situated quite near to Hamburg.

The Hanseatic spirit, with which even today, a number of towns in Estonia, besides Tallinn, still feel a rapport, has always been an open-minded spirit. Yet it has also been an enterprising spirit, even a combative one, when freedom and its protection has been at stake.

Back home, on the Tallinn Town Hall there is a sentence in German which illustrates this Hanseatic spirit: "Fürchte Gott, rede die Wahrheit, tue Recht und scheue niemand" /Fear God, tell the truth, do justice, and be afraid of nobody/ – I would like to abide by this centuries-old command and openly tell you the truth as it currently appears to my people and myself.

The freedom of every individual, the freedom of the economy and trade, as well as the freedom of the mind, of culture and science are inseparably interconnected. They form the prerequisite of a viable democracy.

The Estonian people never abandoned their faith in this freedom during the decades of totalitarian oppression. This freedom, the notion of freedom has developed in our country over many centuries, from the relations that we have had and cultivated with the rest of Europe. Without being immodest, I dare say there is hardly any other nation in the eastern part of Central Europe that was, and is, more closely connected with Europe than the Estonian people. Today one can still behold it in the lifestyle of even the most unpretentious of my fellow countrymen.

Because we are a people belonging to Western European society and since, unfortunately, we live in a land which is geostrategically very vulnerable, we have developed a stronger instinct than many a European for discerning the problems and threats that loom in our vicinity. This discernment has been largely lost in our modern world. To illustrate it graphically, it is much like with epidemic germs: they know man all right, whereas the ordinary man cannot recognize them, he is just afraid of them.

Who was it, but the small Baltic nations whom the world had already forgotten, that actually caused the big and mighty Soviet State to collapse – and peacefully, mind you, without a single shot fired or a single drop of blood shed. We acted according to our sound common sense – indeed oftentimes in defiance of not quite selfless, conformist warnings.

I would like to tell you quite openly, as the old maxim on our Town Hall requires me to do, that my people and I watch with a certain concern how little the West realizes what is currently brewing in the expanses of Russia.

From a subjective point of view it is understandable that the breakdown of the Soviet Union caused the West to feel a kind of triumph; it is also understandable, subjectively, that the West concentrated all its hopes and empathies on the true or ostensible forces of reform in Russia. This attitude, however, has brought the West to a risk of wishful thinking.

All of us, including the Estonian people and other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, wish as much as the West [for an] economically and socially stable Russia. Yet when we track the achievements of the latter years, we should be overtaken by an uneasy feeling that we have been moving farther away from our goal.

What is it that worries Estonians, and not only them, in the present development of Europe? We were astounded to see that the West invited Russian troops and tanks to Sarajevo. Ever since Bismarck and the 1878 Berlin Congress, it has been the West's policy, for the sake of peace, to keep Russians as far away from the Balkans as possible. Since World War II the United States and the West have invested over $80 billion to keep Titoism alive and the Soviets away from the Adriatic.

Let us ask ourselves: Is it possible, that a state, which itself is grappling with the hardest unsettled ethnic and ethical problems should be trusted to act as an arbitrator and peacemaker in other states that also have ethnic problems? The unease will be growing when one examines one of the recent documents issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It states there that the problem of ethnic Russian groups in the neighbouring countries cannot be solved by Russia by diplomatic means alone. Those ethnic Russian groups, however, have oftentimes settled down in the wake of occupants and mass deportations of the native population.

One can only conclude from this Moscow memorandum that, if necessary, other measures may also be taken. As to what these measures could be, we Estonians – along with other smaller nations – have had bitter experiences in our recent history.

So I am worried that once again irrationalism is getting out of hand in Russian foreign policy and Russian political philosophy. Years ago Solzhenitsyn called on Russians to bid farewell to the empire and instead concentrate on themselves. He used the word "self-restriction" and demanded that the Russians should solve their own economic, social, and also intellectual problems. Neglecting this imperative of their great compatriot's, responsible Russian politicians have suddenly, once again, begun to speak openly about the purported "special role" of Russia, about a "peacekeeper" function that the new Russia has to fulfil throughout the whole territory of the former USSR. Mr. Karaganov, one of President Yeltsin's closest advisors, recently expressed this in seemingly unobtrusive form but, in fact quite harshly, when he said that Russia was to play the role of "primus inter pares" – the first among equals – in the entire area of the former Soviet empire. This reminds me of a phrase once coined by George Orwell about Soviet communism: "All are equal, but some are more equal than others!"

Why does the new, post-communist Russia, which claims to have broken with the evil traditions of the USSR, stubbornly refuse to admit that the Baltic nations – Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians – were occupied and annexed against their will and contrary to international law, in 1940, and once again in 1944, and subsequently brought to the limit of their national existence through five decades of sovietization and russification? Even today a deputy Moscow foreign minister, Mr Krylov, officially declared in his reply to the Baltic states that, in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had joined the Soviet Union "voluntarily." This is little short of the statement that tens of thousands of Estonians, including my family and myself, had "voluntarily" let themselves be deported to Siberia by the Soviets.

Ladies and gentlemen, how do we fathom all of this calmly and earnestly? Naturally, it is the more or less familiar kind of irrationalism that is born in Russia and that makes Russian politics look unpredictable. However, there is also another equally alarming tendency, which out of convenience is passed off as Realpolitik in the democratic West. That is a proclivity for an approach that can be labelled as "appeasement." With this approach, one unwittingly becomes an accomplice of imperialist forces in Russia who believe that they can solve their country's immense problems by outward expansion and by threatening their neighbors.

All of the free West is outraged and appalled at the well-known statements made by Zhirinovski. But, astonishingly, hardly anyone has taken note of, and no one has protested against, what the Russian foreign minister Kozyrev declared the other day: the government in Moscow regards the continued presence of Russian troops in the former Soviet republics as desirable.

Our consistent approach to the issue of the actual political situation in Europe proceeds from our historical experience and our sense of responsibility: behind our back there is no barren fallow land, there are other free European states.

The social-political or economic processes in Russia, which even today is still more like a supercontinent than a state, cannot be controlled from the outside, as much as one would like to do so. This has been clearly demonstrated by the experience of the recent years: the wide-spread inclination of the free West to regard any leader who happens to be in office in Moscow – be it Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev or Yeltsin – as irreplaceable has lead to tremendously bad investments and misjudgements. Whoever really wants to help Russia and the Russian people today must make it emphatically clear to the Russian leadership that another imperialist expansion will not stand a chance. Whoever fails to do so will actually help the enemies of democracy in Russia and other post-communist states.

As I said, ladies and gentlemen: Estonia is situated very near to Germany and Hamburg. Western, and above all German policy, has to make a fateful choice. Either the neo-imperialist policy of a great eastern power will be tolerated, financed, and in the short term, possibly even profited from; that, dear listeners, would be a policy unable to see an inch further than one's nose. Or the notions of democracy, feedom, responsibility and peace will be helped on the road to success across the whole gigantic area between the Baltic Sea and the Pacific Ocean; if one wants to do that, the democratic West should resolutely contribute to the stability and security of the medium and smaller-sized states to the east of the German border. Here I mean the whole area of Central Europe, which in my view reaches from the Estonian border town of Narva, on the Baltic Sea, to the Adriatic, also including Ukraine.

If we manage to integrate this zone of states into the democratic world, then the model effect of these countries will be felt in the Russian area. We want to, I should say we have to, be safely anchored in the West. From such a safe position, rather than from some kind of twilight zone, we will be able to assume our function of as a bridge between East and West and, at the same time, assist the democratic forces of Russia. Then it will be possible, progressing from west to east, to help democracy, free enterprise, private property, and not least of all the rule of law, on the road to success.

If, however, those states, including Estonia, are left to their own devices and exposed to the potential neo-imperialist appetites of Moscow, the price for it would be too high, even for all Europe, to pay.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have told you about some of the gravest concerns from which it follows that the Baltic states have in fact become the touchstone of the European idea. But if we unite our wills to do away with the reasons for these concerns, we shall have a promising vision of a peaceful future before us. This is based on convincing facts. We can see common interests between Estonia, Northwestern Russia and the entire Baltic and North Sea area. We shall then be able to speak of a natural gas pipeline which will convey Norwegian gas through the Kola Peninsula and the free Baltic states up to Hamburg. We can see a motorway running all the way from St. Petersburg through Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Berlin and further – the "Via Baltica." We can see quite a few free trade zones and development areas for new initiatives. Much like in the past, Reval/Tallinn would then act as an agent between Hamburg and other Hansa cities in the West on the one hand, and Novgorod, that is the Russian area, on the other. Hansa-like cooperation is a natural outlook for the future for all the states lying on the Baltic and the neighboring North Sea.

The Republic of Estonia, which for its domestic, economic and social policies is among the most stable states of the region, could offer you, ladies and gentlemen, good services, solidarity and friendship.

We try hard to understand your situation. My request is: please try to understand our situation too. It is in the interests of all of Europe and hence, in your interests here in Germany and in Hamburg, that Estonia should remain democratic and free.

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