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First of all apologies to all about my Mrs T thread. So here is (I hope) a less contentious way of approaching the subject.
Ignoring the politicians who might or might not have been power in the period 1979 to 1990 I think it is interesting to examine the decisions made in this period on Defence and consider whether the UK got its money's worth.
My own view is that a lot of money was spent but that unlike, for example, the US, Germany and Japan, the resulting capabilities were not value for money and much money went into the coffers of the likes of Vickers and British Aerospace, while the Ministry of Defence was never reformed sufficiently to cope with large scale procurement.
Further, the Falklands War was the result of poor coordination between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which I blame on the way in which Cabinet Government worked in this period and in particular the PM's animosity towards the Civil Service. The previous Labour Government had successfully deterred Argentine aggression in the 70s.
The Royal Navy suffered the turmoil of the Nott Review.
The Royal Air Force never got a decent Early Warning Aircraft (it had to rely on Shackletons for the whole period) or Air Defence aircraft (only 1 squadron of US F4s were leased when more were clearly need to replace Lightnings). It never received the necessary war munitions stocks as the 1991 Gulf War showed.
The Army was forced to acquire British weapons of inferior quality (SA 80 Challenger 1) when off the shelf foreign solutions (M16 and M1 Abrams) were available and cheaper.
The Navy was forced to pay for the Trident nuclear deterrent which distorted its overall configuration. Trident was probably the only option (Jim Callaghan had already accepted it) but others like David Owen argued that a solution based on acquiring US cruise missiles would come into service sooner and be more relevant to the Soviet SS 20 threat to Europe (The US Poseidon/Trident force was more than sufficient for NATO's strategic deterrent requirements- the UK component was of political rather than military significance).
In other words far from being a golden age for our military as some are now arguing, the 80s were a missed opportunity which squandered huge amounts of public money and added little to NATO's overall capabilities. I cite one last example. Helmut Schmidt in the 70s as Defence Minister and later Chancellor reformd the German Bundeswehr so that in the 80s its 12 or so Divisions were the most effectively armed and trained formations on the Central Front. In comparison (as the 1991 Gulf War showed) British Army of Rhine equated to one NATO division in strength and capability despite all the money it received from the Defence Budget.
I hope that this is now relevant to our subject!
UK 75
Ignoring the politicians who might or might not have been power in the period 1979 to 1990 I think it is interesting to examine the decisions made in this period on Defence and consider whether the UK got its money's worth.
My own view is that a lot of money was spent but that unlike, for example, the US, Germany and Japan, the resulting capabilities were not value for money and much money went into the coffers of the likes of Vickers and British Aerospace, while the Ministry of Defence was never reformed sufficiently to cope with large scale procurement.
Further, the Falklands War was the result of poor coordination between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which I blame on the way in which Cabinet Government worked in this period and in particular the PM's animosity towards the Civil Service. The previous Labour Government had successfully deterred Argentine aggression in the 70s.
The Royal Navy suffered the turmoil of the Nott Review.
The Royal Air Force never got a decent Early Warning Aircraft (it had to rely on Shackletons for the whole period) or Air Defence aircraft (only 1 squadron of US F4s were leased when more were clearly need to replace Lightnings). It never received the necessary war munitions stocks as the 1991 Gulf War showed.
The Army was forced to acquire British weapons of inferior quality (SA 80 Challenger 1) when off the shelf foreign solutions (M16 and M1 Abrams) were available and cheaper.
The Navy was forced to pay for the Trident nuclear deterrent which distorted its overall configuration. Trident was probably the only option (Jim Callaghan had already accepted it) but others like David Owen argued that a solution based on acquiring US cruise missiles would come into service sooner and be more relevant to the Soviet SS 20 threat to Europe (The US Poseidon/Trident force was more than sufficient for NATO's strategic deterrent requirements- the UK component was of political rather than military significance).
In other words far from being a golden age for our military as some are now arguing, the 80s were a missed opportunity which squandered huge amounts of public money and added little to NATO's overall capabilities. I cite one last example. Helmut Schmidt in the 70s as Defence Minister and later Chancellor reformd the German Bundeswehr so that in the 80s its 12 or so Divisions were the most effectively armed and trained formations on the Central Front. In comparison (as the 1991 Gulf War showed) British Army of Rhine equated to one NATO division in strength and capability despite all the money it received from the Defence Budget.
I hope that this is now relevant to our subject!
UK 75
