AndersJ
ACCESS: Confidential
- Joined
- 7 November 2023
- Messages
- 90
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Piecing together what information there is regarding this alleged loss (or losses?), it seems that the IAF were caught off guard and were not expecting a long range BVR exchange on that day. It also seems to be the case that both sides initially had ROE that only allowed the use of long range AA missiles if the other side crossed the border. However, following the IAF attack with AG weapons into Pakistan, it seems that the PAF commander in charge of air operation changed their ROE on the fly while his units were still airborne, now allowing the use of long range AA missiles.
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems naïve that the IAF seems to have been caught off guard since by all logic the PAF was bound to do something following the IAF AG attack on Pakistani soil. Maybe they expected (and were hoping to) lure the PAF across the border into India for a more “classic” dogfight type engagement? Who knows?
However, given that there seems to have been no massive launch of AMRAAM’s and METEOR’s from the IAF in response, it looks like the IAF were simply not expecting an exchange of long range active radar AA’s. In some sense this is understandable, since such a missile makes no distinction between military and civilian traffic, and given the close proximity of Islamabad and Lahore, it’s understandable that the IAF were keen to avoid the PR disaster downing a commercial jetliner would have entailed. However, we now know that the PAF diverted civilian traffic shortly before initiating the BVR engagement. But if the IAF had no contingency plan for such a scenario, it may have taken them too long to get this info up the chain of command and back to get the clearance to respond. And this is probably why there appears to be no AMRAAM and METEOR debris in Pakistan, while there seems to be a lot of PL-15 debris in India: The IAF were never cleared to respond before the fight was over.
But whatever the cause of this one-sided BVR engagement was, having established that the PAF launched numerous active radar PL-15’s across the border, the question then becomes exactly when did the IAF become aware of this? The most obvious tell-tale would be PAF locking up IAF jets on radar. But did they? Or were these missiles launched using link data from a SAAB Erieye? This could actually be the case, since some sources claim that the PAF has integrated the PL-15 with the Erieye on their own, and a PAF AWAC seems to have been on a racetrack course in western Pakistan at the time.
Consequently, there are two possible scenarios for the SPECTRA EW suite to handle under these conditions: The first is a radar lock–up by a J-10, which is surely something an IAF fighter would react to under normal conditions. Then again, maybe they had been intimidating each other the whole time? Locking up each other up with radar? If this was the case, then the IAF would at this stage not be aware that anything was amiss, suspecting only that the PAF were just like themselves bluffing and playing a game of chicken. The second is that there was no such warning, and that the missiles were initially guided by link data.
Consequently, it’s not unlikely that the first indication the targeted IAF jets got that they were in trouble was when the PL-15 went active. And if this is the case, then SPECTRA should off course definitely kick-in immediately. However, here it gets interesting: Because you never want to show your hand when it comes to EW. So unless at war, you want to curtail how your EW suite reacts to “provocations”. Because otherwise you divulge your ECM capabilities before they are actually really needed, and your opponent can thus adjust his ECCM and so on. And this is obviously not something you want to do. But I have no idea how French systems handle this, but I would assume that there is switch or procedure somewhere that the pilot can toggle. In addition, some ECM schemes to defeat active radar missiles require certain preparations. What these are, be they certain HW or SW tools, I will of course not divulge here, but even if SPECTRA has these “tools” it’s not certain that the pilot was authorized to activate them given the current ROE and that there was not an all-out war going on.
So again, even if a Rafale or two was lost, I don’t think this reflects badly (at least not yet with such limited info at hand) on either the Rafale or the SPECTRA system. Since again, what would reflect badly on the Rafale aircraft system would be numerous losses in an all-out war where we could suspect that all stops when it comes to EW secrecy had been taken out. But even then, I’m sure that the French provide an “EW SW toolbox” with the Rafale which it is up to the IAF to fill, and the French AF’s own "SW pack" in the Rafale will be very different from that of an IAF Rafale. So there is that as well to take into account before passing any judgement either on SPECTRA or the aircraft system itself for that matter.
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems naïve that the IAF seems to have been caught off guard since by all logic the PAF was bound to do something following the IAF AG attack on Pakistani soil. Maybe they expected (and were hoping to) lure the PAF across the border into India for a more “classic” dogfight type engagement? Who knows?
However, given that there seems to have been no massive launch of AMRAAM’s and METEOR’s from the IAF in response, it looks like the IAF were simply not expecting an exchange of long range active radar AA’s. In some sense this is understandable, since such a missile makes no distinction between military and civilian traffic, and given the close proximity of Islamabad and Lahore, it’s understandable that the IAF were keen to avoid the PR disaster downing a commercial jetliner would have entailed. However, we now know that the PAF diverted civilian traffic shortly before initiating the BVR engagement. But if the IAF had no contingency plan for such a scenario, it may have taken them too long to get this info up the chain of command and back to get the clearance to respond. And this is probably why there appears to be no AMRAAM and METEOR debris in Pakistan, while there seems to be a lot of PL-15 debris in India: The IAF were never cleared to respond before the fight was over.
But whatever the cause of this one-sided BVR engagement was, having established that the PAF launched numerous active radar PL-15’s across the border, the question then becomes exactly when did the IAF become aware of this? The most obvious tell-tale would be PAF locking up IAF jets on radar. But did they? Or were these missiles launched using link data from a SAAB Erieye? This could actually be the case, since some sources claim that the PAF has integrated the PL-15 with the Erieye on their own, and a PAF AWAC seems to have been on a racetrack course in western Pakistan at the time.
Consequently, there are two possible scenarios for the SPECTRA EW suite to handle under these conditions: The first is a radar lock–up by a J-10, which is surely something an IAF fighter would react to under normal conditions. Then again, maybe they had been intimidating each other the whole time? Locking up each other up with radar? If this was the case, then the IAF would at this stage not be aware that anything was amiss, suspecting only that the PAF were just like themselves bluffing and playing a game of chicken. The second is that there was no such warning, and that the missiles were initially guided by link data.
Consequently, it’s not unlikely that the first indication the targeted IAF jets got that they were in trouble was when the PL-15 went active. And if this is the case, then SPECTRA should off course definitely kick-in immediately. However, here it gets interesting: Because you never want to show your hand when it comes to EW. So unless at war, you want to curtail how your EW suite reacts to “provocations”. Because otherwise you divulge your ECM capabilities before they are actually really needed, and your opponent can thus adjust his ECCM and so on. And this is obviously not something you want to do. But I have no idea how French systems handle this, but I would assume that there is switch or procedure somewhere that the pilot can toggle. In addition, some ECM schemes to defeat active radar missiles require certain preparations. What these are, be they certain HW or SW tools, I will of course not divulge here, but even if SPECTRA has these “tools” it’s not certain that the pilot was authorized to activate them given the current ROE and that there was not an all-out war going on.
So again, even if a Rafale or two was lost, I don’t think this reflects badly (at least not yet with such limited info at hand) on either the Rafale or the SPECTRA system. Since again, what would reflect badly on the Rafale aircraft system would be numerous losses in an all-out war where we could suspect that all stops when it comes to EW secrecy had been taken out. But even then, I’m sure that the French provide an “EW SW toolbox” with the Rafale which it is up to the IAF to fill, and the French AF’s own "SW pack" in the Rafale will be very different from that of an IAF Rafale. So there is that as well to take into account before passing any judgement either on SPECTRA or the aircraft system itself for that matter.