UK contribution to the NATO Nike Hawk belt

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The arrival of the Hawk medium and Nike long range SAMs allowed NATO to create two belts in West Germany using these systems provided by Belgium, Netherlands and the US as well as the Germans.

The UK although it operated neither weapon did contribute RAF Bloodhound and RA Thunderbird missiles until their replacement by.Rapier in the 1970s.

While there are accounts of the way in which Nike and Hawk sites fitted into the belt, I have not found any articles explaining how or if the UK systems were integrated into the belt.

I did read somewhere (Flight International?) that withdrawal of Bloodhound and Thunderbird forced NATO to ask Belgium to cover the resulting gap.

Anyone know more?
 
You raised this 4/20. UK systems did not fit into the Hawk/Hercules Belts, nor were intended to.

NATO in the 1956-65 timeframe sought procurement efficiencies by the notion of RSI (Rationalisation, Standardisation, Interoperability). No more incompatible ammo for buddies in one trench. So 49 NATO Basic Military Requirements: for each, Interested Nations would pool their Offtake, to achieve scale economy, fund pro-rata to planned Offtake, and secure workshare juste retour to Offtake. Nations could choose to watch benignly and buy Off-the-Shelf later: the whole point was to avoid R&D/prodn duplication...such as UK fielding 140 live Thunderbird I rounds, junked 4/68 (T-II 9/77) cf Hawk (and I-Hawk) >40,000 rounds built, some now received joyously by Ukraine.

UK took the view that SAMs should cover our Counter Force, not our taxpayers and certainly not those of Belgium, France, FRG, Neths, Italy (later Denmark, Greece, Norway). So we stayed out of NATO Hawk Management Agency (oddly, HSD long enjoyed a repair contract).
3 Thunderbird batteries protected 1(BR) Corps Command & Control; RAF Bloodhound II and RAFR Rapier protected RAFG (bar Gutersloh).
NATO, maybe, sighed at the squander, but there was no gap needing subsidy by Belgium. RSI failed because its ultimate logic was that US scale would vacuum-up almost every piece of kit, so jobs...which happened anyway, only in part because they paid for so much..
 
alertken

as ever really grateful for your detailed knowledge.
 
This is what I know - any medium- and long range SAM, including Bloodhound and Thunderbird, operating in NATO airspace was placed under the operational command of NATO. For Bloodhound and Thunderbird that was the 2ATAF and its SOC. Since Thunderbird did not occupy tactical missiles or operate 24/7, it only came under 2ATAF control when it left garrison and moved into the field. In 1961 when Thunderbird was first deployed to Germany, the Hawk belt in the British sector was not yet formed, nor was there an integrated air defense network. Manual SAM operations over voice communications were used. in 1968 when Belgian, Dutch and German Hawks unit became operational, Thunderbird returned to the UK, ostensibly part of a force reduction. The regiment was initially stationed in Duisburg, but later moved to Dortmund. Both locations were within area of the Nike belt. When Thunderbird returned to Germany in 1971, NATO SAMs were using automated fire control systems. Thunderbird had to fit into that network somehow, perhaps by establishing voice communications with SAM unit that was integrated into NATO's air defense network. It sure would be nice to talk to Thunderbird veterans about that (they are all in the 70s or 80s now)!

Bloodhound, which was stationed at, Bruggen, Wildenrath, and Laarbruch from 1970-1983, also had to be under operational control of 2ATAF. Emplacing them directly on the airbase was sub-optimal as SAM systems are best emplaced between the defended asset and the expected path of enemy air attack. The real expert on Bloodhound is the historian for the Bloodhound Missile Preservation Group.
 

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