DDG(X) - Arleigh Burke Replacement

…the first ship was already supposed be starting construction by now iirc according to the original timelines.

And it looks like 4+ years now.

Edit
In 2028 is when the first was originally supposed to begin construction, but has now been pushed back 4 years to 2032.
It’s pretty sad we can’t go from beginning the program to keel laying in a decade.

And that’s on top of the FSC studies that went on even before the program for another what? 11 years before the announcement of the DDG(X) program?

Seems like those 11 years should have resulted in a pretty good idea of what we wanted and needed, making designing relatively quickly and easy since there’s very little brand new technology involved.

So from future combatant studies in 2010, to current projected date of construction
In 2032 would be a 22 year process…
 
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johnpjones1775 said:
…the first ship was already supposed be starting construction by now iirc according to the original timelines.

And it looks like 4+ years now.

Edit
In 2028 is when the first was originally supposed to begin construction, but has now been pushed back 4 years to 2032.
It’s pretty sad we can’t go from beginning the program to keel laying in a decade.

And that’s on top of the FSC studies that went on even before the program for another what? 11 years before the announcement of the DDG(X) program?

Seems like those 11 years should have resulted in a pretty good idea of what we wanted and needed, making designing relatively quickly and easy since there’s very little brand new technology involved.

So from future combatant studies in 2010, to current projected date of construction
In 2032 would be a 22 year process…
Click to expand...
Please, I am begging you, do the bare minimum amount of research before posting. The stuff you spout is so blatantly wrong.

Accorrding to a June 2009 CRS report, the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) "program" was to be a DDG-1000/DDG-51 derivative. It reads as follows:

"A January 26, 2009, memorandum for the record from John Young, the then-DOD acquisition
executive, stated that “The Navy proposed and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense]
agreed with modification to truncate the DDG-1000 Program to three ships in the FY 2010 budget
submission.” The memo proposed procuring one DDG-51 in FY2010 and two more FY2011,
followed by the procurement in FY2012-FY2015 (in annual quantities of 1, 2, 1, 2) of a ship
called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design or
the DDG-1000 design. The memorandum stated that the FSC might be equipped with a new type
of radar, but the memorandum did not otherwise specify the FSC’s capabilities. The
memorandum stated that further analysis would support a decision on whether to base the FSC on
the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 design.
Secretary Gates’s announcement of April 6, 2009 did not explicitly address the proposal for an
FSC discussed in the January 26, 2009, memorandum. Gates’s stated on April 6 that “the DDG-
1000 program would end with the third ship,” but depending on how the term “DDG-1000
program” is defined, that statement may or may not preclude the option of an FSC based on the
DDG-1000 design."
Page 24

This timeline matches with the completion of the Radar/Hull Study in November, and the cancellation of CG(X) in December 2009, The best I can tell, the FSC program became the Flight III, and never had an independent PEO established under that name. I hesitate to even call it a "program," as all mention of the FSC stops around that timeframe. Also, since HII was busy redesigning the Burke to fit AMDR, that automatically precluded the potential for another LSC design competition until the Flight III contract design was completed.

The first serious mentions of the Large Surface Combatant/DDG Next program begin in the 2017-2018 timeframe, that's the same time period the FNSF and FSCF studies began. They both seem to have concluded around 2020, with the DDG(X) program office being stood up in 2021. Three things I want to point out:

1. There wasn't a formally established Program Office for the LSC program, as shown in this phone directory from 2019: https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Small_Business_Forum/LRAF_19Q2_DPMs.pdf
2. It seems the first RFI went out in 2019 too: https://whitefleet.net/2019/09/05/l...-rfi-issued-place-in-force-structure-unclear/
3. The earliest LSC program-specific CRS report is from November 2020: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-11-04_IF11679_57fd720c6f4e8cdfeff70e1675a0b2cb20bb3b50.pdf

Additionally, the 2018 quotes pushing for the first order in FY23 are wildly unrealistic if the procedding studies didn't wrap up until 2020. Also keep in mind FFG(X) was supposed to be a 5-year program. The push from FY28 to FY32 an largely be blamed on COVID and the FRA.

Edit: Do not call the numbers listed in the phone directory, they've since been changed. Do not inquire how I know this.
 
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So what did i get wrong exactly? The only actual correction you seem to have made was saying the first FSC study was in 2009 not 2010, which makes it slightly worse.

Have we, or have we not been working on figuring out what a burke replacement would look like for over 20 years now?
 
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johnpjones1775 said:
Have we, or have we not been working on figuring out what a burke replacement would look like for over 20 years now?
Click to expand...
We have not. Studies into fleet architecture began in FY18 (not design studies, just figuring out very very rough capabilities and how it would fit in the larger fleet), with the program office was only stood up in FY21. As of writing, it seems they are still setting requirements, or are in the very early stages of conceptual design.

johnpjones1775 said:
So what did i get wrong exactly? The only actual correction you seem to have made was saying the first FSC study was in 2009 not 2010, which makes it slightly worse.
Click to expand...
The way you are portraying these programs is very misleading.

FSC wasn’t a “program,” it was a memo written by the CNO in 2009, and has never been mentioned since. The concept it described became the Flight III, but it was never meant to replace the Burkes.

Like I said earlier, the LSC program did not do much of any design work. They couldn’t have, until at least 2017-2018: https://news.usni.org/2017/12/20/dd...-complete-radar-power-systems-testing-in-2018

Additionally, the lack of a program office suggests it was a paper project to inform future programs, rather than something intended for eventual procurement under that name.
The offhand comments from Admirals talking about a first order in FY23 were wildly optimistic, and never would’ve panned out. Again, they didn’t even create an ICD, or file the necessary paperwork to open a program office. A lot of this can probably be blamed on Congress: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/23/congress-guts-funding-for-cruiser-replacements/

So no, the first serious efforts to design a Burke replacement began in FY21. Even if the first order comes in FY32, that’s a 11 year development cycle, which matches other design programs. None of the pre-DDG(X) efforts really got off the ground, and the earliest they could’ve started was 2018.
 
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that_person said:
We have not. Studies into fleet architecture began in FY18 (not design studies, just figuring out very very rough capabilities and how it would fit in the larger fleet), with the program office was only stood up in FY21. As of writing, it seems they are still setting requirements, or are in the very early stages of conceptual design.


The way you are portraying these programs is very misleading.

FSC wasn’t a “program,” it was a memo written by the CNO in 2009, and has never been mentioned since. The concept it described became the Flight III, but it was never meant to replace the Burkes.

Like I said earlier, the LSC program did not do much of any design work. They couldn’t have, until at least 2017-2018: https://news.usni.org/2017/12/20/dd...-complete-radar-power-systems-testing-in-2018

Additionally, the lack of a program office suggests it was a paper project to inform future programs, rather than something intended for eventual procurement under that name.
The offhand comments from Admirals talking about a first order in FY23 were wildly optimistic, and never would’ve panned out. Again, they didn’t even create an ICD, or file the necessary paperwork to open a program office. A lot of this can probably be blamed on Congress: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/23/congress-guts-funding-for-cruiser-replacements/

So no, the first serious efforts to design a Burke replacement began in FY21. Even if the first order comes in FY32, that’s a 11 year development cycle, which matches other design programs. None of the pre-DDG(X) efforts really got off the ground, and the earliest they could’ve started was 2018.
Click to expand...
Keyword IF the first order comes in ‘32.
I’ll be surprised if it comes before ‘35 just based on how much of a fuck up everything other recent program of the last 20 years has been.

All I’ve said is we’ve been working on future large ships for well over a decade now.
 
johnpjones1775 said:
All I’ve said is we’ve been working on future large ships for well over a decade now.
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Even if we say LSC was a serious program hellbent on getting the first order by FY23, that's not true. My past two posts have walked you through exactly why that statement is wrong and misleading.
 
LSC Program office stood up in 2019?

[many expletives deleted], we're still in the "what the hell do we want this ship to do" stage of development?!?

Nevermind that "having AAW flag facilities" is the one thing these need on top of the SPY6. [more expletives deleted]
 
johnpjones1775 said:
Keyword IF the first order comes in ‘32.
I’ll be surprised if it comes before ‘35 just based on how much of a fuck up everything other recent program of the last 20 years has been.

All I’ve said is we’ve been working on future large ships for well over a decade now.
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That’s exactly what I’d opine if, and only if, I lacked basic reading comprehension skills. Try again
 
As for program time length.

The Burke program was start in 1978 with the first metal being cut in December of 1988 with her being commissioned in 1991.

So bout 13 years between we want X to Burke.


Ditto for the Spruances as well. And every other new destroyer cruiser built after 1960.

The only mainline combat of the last 60 years that didn't take over a decade to build was those like the Ticos cause they were a modified an existing design like they did with the Spruance to Tico.
 
johnpjones1775 said:
Keyword IF the first order comes in ‘32.
I’ll be surprised if it comes before ‘35 just based on how much of a fuck up everything other recent program of the last 20 years has been.

All I’ve said is we’ve been working on future large ships for well over a decade now.
Click to expand...
There is 16 Arleigh Burke destroyers on the books that are yet to be laid down. 4 ships are laid down yet to be launched. 4 more ships launched and yet to enter service.

That is a solid backlog of destroyers to reach 2035. If the first DDG(X) enters service in 2035 that is fine. There is no need to start ringing the alarm bells.

Subs and destroyers is not where the Navy wants to have a big production pause between classes.
 
Firefinder said:
As for program time length.

The Burke program was start in 1978 with the first metal being cut in December of 1988 with her being commissioned in 1991.

So bout 13 years between we want X to Burke.


Ditto for the Spruances as well. And every other new destroyer cruiser built after 1960.

The only mainline combat of the last 60 years that didn't take over a decade to build was those like the Ticos cause they were a modified an existing design like they did with the Spruance to Tico.
Click to expand...

The Kidds took about 8-9 years.
 
Felocie said:
N

Much like the Ticos, the Kidds were Spruance derived so not really as applicable
Click to expand...

It's a mainline surface combatant.

DDG(X) should have some definition but it seems the Connies are eating the entirety of USN's ship design resources.
 
Scott Kenny said:
What USN ship design resources?
Click to expand...

Ding, dong, ding. The USN has basically outsourced its design knowhow since the 1980s. I think the Perrys are the last design largely done in house. This has been biting them in the posterior since the Zumwalt design. The Navy simply had inadequate in house design capacity to even ballpark what a ship with the capabilities demanded of DD-21 would actually look like. That's why the ultimate displacement of the Zs came as such a shock, and the Navy was incapable of calling bullshit on the contractor cost estimates.
 
Kat Tsun said:
it seems the Connies are eating the entirety of USN's ship design resources.
Click to expand...
Doubtful. The only two LSC yards are BIW and HII, so they’d be leading industry teams for the DDG(X) competition. They were also the only two competitors for the DD-21 competition, with HII leading Gold Team and BIW leading Blue Team. Gold Team won but all three ships were constructed at BIW, although it seems all refits will be done at HII.

There are of course support contractors on each team, but they likely handle systems integration and don’t have much role until the contract design is awarded. And Gibbs & Cox is assisting with both programs as of 7/27/2025.
 
Scott Kenny said:
What USN ship design resources?
Click to expand...

Yeah basically, but somehow Marinette's issues are the DON's. Whatever they're doing, and whoever at DON does ships, has their hands full.

that_person said:
Doubtful. The only two LSC yards are BIW and HII, so they’d be leading industry teams for the DDG(X) competition. They were also the only two competitors for the DD-21 competition, with HII leading Gold Team and BIW leading Blue Team. Gold Team won but all three ships were constructed at BIW, although it seems all refits will be done at HII.

There are of course support contractors on each team, but they likely handle systems integration and don’t have much role until the contract design is awarded. And Gibbs & Cox is assisting with both programs as of 7/27/2025.
Click to expand...

The USN should non-consensually acquire the entire design team and campus of G&C to rapidly rebuild its in-house naval engineering.
 
TomS said:
That's why the ultimate displacement of the Zs came as such a shock
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I’m not sure how true that is. Tumblehomes have their extreme dimensions are at or below the waterline, and are thus more volume restricted compared to traditional monohulls. For something with two giant AGS magazines which require lots of volume, the only way to achieve that is making the hull bigger, which in turn increases displacement.
 
Kat Tsun said:
The Kidds took about 8-9 years.
Click to expand...
Try 6 years.

The Design Started in 1971, as did most Spruance base designs as a We can do this napkin work. Then around 1972-73 the Shan of Iran said He like it and ask for a real deal. After a year of politics it got the green light and Ingalls went to work translating Chicken statch notes to proper design plans in 1974. Before this the design was basically as done as the Montana's, basically not.

Kidd got lay down 1978 and launch 1979, got a delayed to transfer over the Iranian stuff to USN and Commission into serve in 81. The last one, USS CHANDLER enter service in 82.


From Day one to cutting steel it less than 6 years in design, 8 to see the commissioning ceremony 9 to see all four in operation.

Far less then the protected from 1960 to laying down in 72 then commissioning in 75 that it's mother design had.
 
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Kat Tsun said:
Yeah basically, but somehow Marinette's issues are the DON's. Whatever they're doing, and whoever at DON does ships, has their hands full.



The USN should non-consensually acquire the entire design team and campus of G&C to rapidly rebuild its in-house naval engineering
Click to expand...

Felocie said:
Period
Click to expand...
Hi,
It should probably be noted here for reference that G&C was the designer of the LM Monohull LCS and the FMM FFG(X)
 
Felocie said:
Much like the Ticos, the Kidds were Spruance derived so not really as applicable
Click to expand...
Again the problem being we’re 5 or 6 years into this program, and 2 or 3 years from initial date of construction, and yet no one has provided any idea of what this ship will look like outside of a few pieces of concept art, and some cake art(that some read way too much into).

This ship could be just a larger iteration of the Burkes, a FIIII+ if you will, what need is there to recreate the wheel when we’ve had a very bad record of that?

I am not an engineer or a naval architect, so can some one explain why the burke hull can’t just be scaled up 8-15% from the FIIIs and given whatever new iterative technology we want on this ship?
 
that_person said:
I’m not sure how true that is. Tumblehomes have their extreme dimensions are at or below the waterline, and are thus more volume restricted compared to traditional monohulls. For something with two giant AGS magazines which require lots of volume, the only way to achieve that is making the hull bigger, which in turn increases displacement.
Click to expand...

Yes, it was likely inevitable, but the USN leadership did not see this number coming, largely because they didn't have a good preliminary design process.

As a result, they didn't really understand the consequences of the various capabilities specified. When the original DD-21 industry proposals both clocked in around 18,000 tons, both the Navy and Congress were shocked. That triggered a round of cuts, such as the removal of 32 VLS cells, shortening the flight deck, shrinking the AGS magazines, etc.
 
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johnpjones1775 said:
Again the problem being we’re 5 or 6 years into this program, and 2 or 3 years from initial date of construction, and yet no one has provided any idea of what this ship will look like outside of a few pieces of concept art, and some cake art(that some read way too much into).

This ship could be just a larger iteration of the Burkes, a FIIII+ if you will, what need is there to recreate the wheel when we’ve had a very bad record of that?

I am not an engineer or a naval architect, so can some one explain why the burke hull can’t just be scaled up 8-15% from the FIIIs and given whatever new iterative technology we want on this ship?
Click to expand...

A private firm can easily do this. A private firm also wants to make money. So they're going to undercut themselves(?) to do that by promising the moon, no matter how ridiculous DON's demands are, and then show up at Congress with a 2 lbs bag for 5 lbs of dirt and blame the Navy.

When you have a contractor that acts for all areas, and no strong government skill in prelim, you get a very simple logic where the best way to make money is to lie to the government and take advantage of their ignorance. It'll be admirals and captains explaining to Congress why their 2 lbs bag can't hold all the dirt they want, despite promising Congress it would, and not you. You'll simply get at least one stage of production out of the way and a few contracts to boot.

Nobody cares if the ship actually floats or not except the Navy.

The solution is recognizing that if you don't have a strong government ability in something that government needs (like warship architecture and construction), you probably shouldn't allow private industry to be strong in that area either, and as the government you can simply expropriate these things to rebuild a missing capability. America simply forgot it could do this I guess? What would a private company do? Run off to France, Spain, or China and beg to be allowed to work there?
 
johnpjones1775 said:
I am not an engineer or a naval architect, so can some one explain why the burke hull can’t just be scaled up 8-15% from the FIIIs and given whatever new iterative technology we want on this ship?
Click to expand...

I'm no naval engineer either, but for one IIRC the AB hull is essentially fundamentally outdated these days. And on top of that, the modifications you propose would more or less lead to a clean sheet design in practice. At which point you might as well develop a more modern hull designed for this day and age and with plenty of growth potential.

Now, one might say they did that with the Zumwalts and failed. But the Zumwalts were largely driven by the delusional schizophrenia induced idea of parking a literal stealth battleship in the litoral zone and bombard land targets with the ship mounted Advanced-Gun-Systems. So the entire hull was designed around providing stability for accurate fire and signature reduction. It is compromised for a very specific use case, although not outright ruined. A ship that's meant to replace the Arleigh-Burke and to a degree Ticonderoga would require a different hull, even if not fundamentally changed for whatever reason some adjustments would have to be made.
 
EmoBirb said:
I'm no naval engineer either, but for one IIRC the AB hull is essentially fundamentally outdated these days. And on top of that, the modifications you propose would more or less lead to a clean sheet design in practice. At which point you might as well develop a more modern hull designed for this day and age and with plenty of growth potential.

Now, one might say they did that with the Zumwalts and failed. But the Zumwalts were largely driven by the delusional schizophrenia induced idea of parking a literal stealth battleship in the litoral zone and bombard land targets with the ship mounted Advanced-Gun-Systems. So the entire hull was designed around providing stability for accurate fire and signature reduction. It is compromised for a very specific use case, although not outright ruined. A ship that's meant to replace the Arleigh-Burke and to a degree Ticonderoga would require a different hull, even if not fundamentally changed for whatever reason some adjustments would have to be made.
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I still think that the stealth shaping is worthwhile for DDGX. Make it harder for AShMs to lock on.

If you want a stealth battleship to come in and blast the crap out of things, you use a submarine. Build a Vertical gun unit that fits into a Trident tube. Broach the ship and volley off a bunch of rounds in that tube, submerge again. ~5 minutes total exposure time for 30 rounds per tube.
 
Scott Kenny said:
I still think that the stealth shaping is worthwhile for DDGX. Make it harder for AShMs to lock on.

If you want a stealth battleship to come in and blast the crap out of things, you use a submarine. Build a Vertical gun unit that fits into a Trident tube. Broach the ship and volley off a bunch of rounds in that tube, submerge again. ~5 minutes total exposure time for 30 rounds per tube.
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Of course stealth features will be incorporated, have been for several decades now across the world. I just doubt they'll go to the same lengths as they did with Zumwalt, law of diminishing returns and stuff. Especially as DDG(X) won't be meant to sit around in litoral waters and shoot with it's gun.

I dunno what the second paragraph was about but the modern equivalent to a battleship is probably an SSGN. I just mentioned the term "Battleship" while describing the Zumwalts because their intended mission of sitting ashore and shooting at targets with guns was very reminiscent of the naval artillery role the Iowa's had in the Navy. Whoever thought that was a good idea in the 21st century and messed up the DDG-1000 series as a consequence should have faced some sort of trial imo. The vessels should have been designed around missiles from the very beginning. Now it's an expensive refit and still leaves the ships with limited self defense capabilities.

Hopefully they approach the DDG(X) in a manner that will make it more future proof.
 
EmoBirb said:
Hopefully they approach the DDG(X) in a manner that will make it more future proof.
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Future proofing is a mugs game unless you have the equivalent talent of a Warren Buffet otherwise you will be just wasting of your money as the Admirals have proved by pouring $billions down black holes as with LCS, Zumwalt etc. If things change that much just build a new class of ship.
 
Cordy said:
Future proofing is a mugs game unless you have the equivalent talent of a Warren Buffet otherwise you will be just wasting of your money as the Admirals have proved by pouring $billions down black holes as with LCS, Zumwalt etc. If things change that much just build a new class of ship.
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LCS and Zumwalt were the opposite of future proof though. They were GWOT/ME Theater vessels, designed at a time when that era was already evidently coming to an end. Everyone and their dachshund could have predicted the rise of the PLAN and the recovery of post-soviet Russia. That Russia wasn't to simply vanish was clear as day and China bought up late Soviet equipment and unfinished projects (among them entire freaking aircraft carriers) like they were collectibles.

This whole "end of history" bullshit the Americans were snorting after 1991 was utterly delusional. Imagine designing a freaking *inhales* artillery based, land attack, stealth destroyer to blow up middle eastern farmers and fourth to third rate regional military forces. Like come on, "hindsight after the fact so on and on" doesn't apply. That was just pure naivity and misguided development goals pushed by battleship worshipping boomers.

Now compare that to other ships/hulls which were developed with future growth potential. Like how the Ticonderogas were able to switch from rail launchers to VLS monsters. Or how the Arleigh-Burkes went through three (and a half), fundamentally different flights.
 
EmoBirb said:
LCS and Zumwalt were the opposite of future proof though.
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Zumwalt has the greatest potential for further growth of any surface combatant currently in the US fleet. 10% margins for additions on a 16,000 ton hull, IEP with 78 MW of generation, wider diameter VLS than Mk 41 (although not as great as GJB 5860-2006 or KVLS-II) for missiles with greater performance, the (unfortunately not fitted in) SPY-4 arrays were deliberately under-populated with TRMs to enable room for growth and improved performance (an extra 15dB when combined with an increased duty cycle), and large amounts of displacement and volume used by the Advanced Gun Systems which could be repurposed for other purposes.

DDG-1000 derivatives were investigated as part of the Radar/Hull Study which led to the design of the Flight III, albeit limited to 14-foot radars, although the earlier MAMDJF study showed that DDG-10000 was capable of accommodating a SPY-1 +25dB radar (expected at the time to be an 18-foot diameter SPY-6 radar) and Bath Iron Works offered a derivative with a 21-foot diameter radar.
 
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EmoBirb said:
LCS and Zumwalt were the opposite of future proof though. They were GWOT/ME Theater vessels, designed at a time when that era was already evidently coming to an end. Everyone and their dachshund could have predicted the rise of the PLAN and the recovery of post-soviet Russia. That Russia wasn't to simply vanish was clear as day and China bought up late Soviet equipment and unfinished projects (among them entire freaking aircraft carriers) like they were collectibles.
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You obviously weren't alive then (1990s-2000s).

China really growing is only a last 15 years thing. Since 2010 at the earliest indications.
 
A Tentative Fleet Plan said:
Zumwalt has the greatest potential for further growth of any surface combatant currently in the US fleet.
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I didn't say it doesn't have growth potential, the hull itself certainly has. The ship as a whole wasn't future proof though. It wasn't meant to address threats decades into the future but genuinely threats of the past.

In fact they were/are to misdeveloped that each ship has to go through an extensive, multi year refit to make them somewhat usable in the modern naval domain. Let that sink in, these three multi billion dollar stealth destroyers have to receive extensive, expensive, multi year refits right out the gate in order to be somewhat viable today.

That's what I meant when I said they weren't futureproof, if they were there wouldn't be the need to rip out the guns and throw more missiles into their place for several hundred millions.
 
Scott Kenny said:
You obviously weren't alive then (1990s-2000s).

China really growing is only a last 15 years thing. Since 2010 at the earliest indications.
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Of course not.

But again, China was in the 90s running around shopping in the former soviet block. I repeat myself, they literally bought an aircraft carrier in the 90s, IN ONE PIECE. If anyone didn't see naval ambitions back then, I dunno anymore. And that Russia wouldn't remain in shambles should also have been clear, at that time a sizeable portion of people should have had the quick rebuilding of Europe after a much more devastating event in somewhat recent memory.

DD-21 was an all out, and I excuse my language here, piece of shit from the very start. The people who waved it through until it became DDG-1000 were, to quote out british friends, utter muppets.

Naval fire support in the 21st century my ass...
 
Zumwalt would be fine if it didn't have crew issues. Something like Type 45 would be better than the "we don't have engineering watch" TSCE.

EmoBirb said:
LCS and Zumwalt were the opposite of future proof though.
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Likely in reference to Zumwalt's electrical capacities, helicopter hangar size, general survivability, and space for future weapons with Mk 57.

EmoBirb said:
They were GWOT/ME Theater vessels, designed at a time when that era was already evidently coming to an end.
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GWOT didn't happen until 2001 and Zumwalt PEO was in place in 1998. Prelims were done by then and DD-21/DDX design reqs were drawn up by 1994. So they were designed to fight the Soviet Union and support a MEF landing in Vladivostok and Murmansk, actually. References changed from a Soviet threat to a Bosnian/South American/Iraqi/North Korea threat through the 1990's reflecting the majority threats at the time.

Their reference threat for NGFS was a Soviet MRR with D-30s and BM-21s pulled from 1984 (1986?) requirements for OTH amphibious assault.

The stealth was a result of needing to get close to support a landing operation in the USSR and the later targets a result of stealth aircraft performance in Desert Storm. The big debate at NAVSEA at the time was whether Arleigh Burke was sufficient (this is what the former BuShips felt) or whether the ships needed a far greater level of radar reduction (this is what BuWeps felt) after seeing La Fayette and Visby.

In the end, BuWeps won, and the ship was made extremely stealthy, like a Visby. The ideal BuWeps surface fleet would be something like a battle force of Visbys, La Fayettes, Zumwalts, San Antonios, and the medium stealth CVNX designed by James David White. Amphibious landing force would be MV-22s and AAAVs with CH-53Ks and Vipers/Venoms with SSCs supporting the landing of heavy armor.

Most of this happened too. They just happened to appear in GWOT.

As far as I know the only thing explicitly GWOT derived programs were the MRAPs (the biggest program of all), the C-RAM programs, possibly PELE, most of the UHF/VHF jammers, and some various unusual natures of ammunition (120mm canister), which collectively is basically nothing honestly.

EmoBirb said:
Of course not.

But again, China was in the 90s running around shopping in the former soviet block.
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China in the 90s was broadly agricultural, similar to Japan in the 50s, though. Nobody really expected a country with $23 bn of defense budget in 1993 to become a country with a $235 bn defense budget in 2023 and eclipse Japan economically as the second largest economy. That's about as silly as China collapsing into a steady state non-growth economy by 2033 and the United States having a space dock for construction of Mars colonial transports in the 2050s.

China in the 1990's was seen as a threat for the 2020s (if that), not the 2000s, really. I think the expectation was that putting them in the WTO would make them explode economically, like the Japanese and European Union had happen to them, and then the opposite happened. Intelligence estimates in Robert Gates' time was that the Chinese would produce a super Flanker instead of J-20 even then. Oops!

If you invert expectations of Russia (300 F-22s and 1,000 T-14s by 2020), versus the reality of Russia (20 Super Flankers/Rafales [Su-57] and 50 T-14s), you get pretty close to actual DOD intelligence expectations for China in the late 1990s through the early 2010s. Precedent exists here: both the US and British Empire had trouble believing the Japanese could produce advanced weapons in 1941.

Ironically the Zumwalt would be better for operating in the SCS than most warships the USN has today. The primary sea search sensors for surface detection and Chinese weapons guidance are still radar today. Shame GWOT ate the shipbuilding budget.
 
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