DARPA Experimental Spaceplane (XS-1)

[Flyaway]

I obviously don’t know how true this is but I seen some blame the influx of senior people from McDonnell Douglas for the current issues, from when they merged.

 

[starviking]

I obviously don’t know how true this is but I seen some blame the influx of senior people from McDonnell Douglas for the current issues, from when they merged.

See https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/how-boeing-lost-its-bearings/602188/

 

[dark sidius]

Let Darpa continue with SPACE X, Boeing is going very bad way in all domains.

 

[Archibald]

It blows my mind that the program dies because the contractor goes away. It is the mirror story of DynaSoar, SST, or Saturn S-IC - for Boeing, of course. For once a major aerospace program dies, it is the contractor that screw the government and not the other way around (to you, my beloved CF-105 arrow).

 

[trose213]

It blows my mind that the program dies because the contractor goes away. It is the mirror story of DynaSoar, SST, or Saturn S-IC - for Boeing, of course. For once a major aerospace program dies, it is the contractor that screw the government and not the other way around (to you, my beloved CF-105 arrow).

Most of those programs had significant technical hurdles, greater than this one. It could also be that Boeing did a reassessment of the market, especially because of how many players there are in small satellite launcher space.

 

[blackstar]

It blows my mind that the program dies because the contractor goes away. It is the mirror story of DynaSoar, SST, or Saturn S-IC - for Boeing, of course. For once a major aerospace program dies, it is the contractor that screw the government and not the other way around (to you, my beloved CF-105 arrow).

Contractors take every opportunity they can to screw the government. That's what change fees are for.

 

[In_A_Dream]

Contractors take every opportunity they can to screw the government. That's what change fees are for.

Come on, lol. If the government knew what it wanted, it wouldn't be as bad. Or if it was fully committed to sustainment in relation to that.

Everyone has commitment issues

 

[Grey Havoc]

DARPA scraps XS-1 military space plane project after Boeing drops out

The Phantom Express space plane is a ghost.

www.space.com

 

[Dynoman]

"The reasoning went like this: the winning bidder, Boeing, really wasn’t interested in the technology. The company was actually interested in government funding and keeping other companies from developing the system." (According to Parabolic Arc.com)

 

[dark sidius]

The company is in bad standing, slam the door of DARPA I think they can say good bye to have another chance with them, 737 max grounded may be forever, starliner unable to match with the ISS there is serious problems in the company.

 

[Grey Havoc]

 

[sferrin]

3,254th cancelled DARPA space launcher. I. Am. Shocked.

 

[antigravite]

3,254th cancelled DARPA space launcher. I. Am. Shocked.

Business as usual?

A.

 

[archipeppe]

3,254th cancelled DARPA space launcher. I. Am. Shocked.

I'm not American and so I'm not an American paytaxer.
But if I would be one, probably I would not shocked rather disappointed or better upset (especially if you add to the list all of NASA cancelled spaceplanes of the last 30 years).

 

[sferrin]

3,254th cancelled DARPA space launcher. I. Am. Shocked.

I'm not American and so I'm not an American paytaxer.
But if I would be one, probably I would not shocked rather disappointed or better upset (especially if you add to the list all of NASA cancelled spaceplanes of the last 30 years).

Sarcasm. Sometimes I wonder why they even bother starting these programs if they have no intention of following through.

 

[RanulfC]

3,254th cancelled DARPA space launcher. I. Am. Shocked.

I'm not American and so I'm not an American paytaxer.
But if I would be one, probably I would not shocked rather disappointed or better upset (especially if you add to the list all of NASA cancelled spaceplanes of the last 30 years).

Sarcasm. Sometimes I wonder why they even bother starting these programs if they have no intention of following through.

As Scott Manley notes when the program was inititated return and re-use were still things that were talked about but not done yet. When Boeing won the contract SpaceX had yet to land a booster. By the time they were finalizing the design SpaceX was recoverying boosters on a regular basis and it's not likely that Boeing saw any future market for anything that was developed from the XS-1 program hence they dropped it. (I was always more a fan of the Mastesen design but the big question was always could they actually build it)

We did get some interesting tech development from the program in that we now know that the RS-25/AR-22 is a tested and working high re-use, high relability hydrolox engine which no one was sure wasn't going to work out when this all started.

One of the main issues with most DARPA programs like this is the tendency to either go to 'cutting-edge' and risk failing or going to 'near-term' and being passed by advancing technology. The XS-1 was always classified, (except for the engine) as at least RL5 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_readiness_level) or higher so it was pretty much assumed that development would be straightforward and pretty quick. The 'selection' process took from 2013 to 2017 and the amount of work between 2017 and 2019 was mostly on the engine with little development on the airframe by Boeing as (noted above) it looked like the program was already far behind what was operational and in use.

IMO, I'm having to agree it looks like Boeing wasn't really interested in actually building anything and simply wanted to ensure that IF DARPA was spending money on this idea they would be the ones being paid. (Of course I'd pointed out way back-when that most of the Phase 1 'goals' had already been accomplished by others even before the progra was announced. LM was rather too-proud of duplicating what StarBooster and some collage kids had done several years earlier for twice the price, among others) Even DARPA didn't seem all that interested as time wore on due to advances in operational technology versus what the program offered. Personally I'm still of the mind that this approach has something to offer but given current mind-set I doubt it will come about. Oh well.


Randy

 

[edwest4]

Perhaps establishing a commitment first is the answer. This concept is part of a much bigger picture. If the final answer and question are about making money, then this sort of thing will continue.

 

[sferrin]

Seriously though, what did they think they were going to learn that they didn't learn from RASCAL? (THAT would have been truly useful. The engine mods could have found use in many applications.)

 

[trose213]

I thought it was because DARPA wanted a serious investment from the company because of the probable commercial opportunities.

 

[Grey Havoc]

I thought it was because DARPA wanted a serious investment from the company because of the probable commercial opportunities.

Indeed. Unfortunately, DARPA then went for what they thought would be the 'safe' option, Boeing. Or rather the company it used to be and what DARPA's higher ups still thought it was.

 

[RanulfC]

Perhaps establishing a commitment first is the answer. This concept is part of a much bigger picture. If the final answer and question are about making money, then this sort of thing will continue.

"It's complicated" while likely not a very satisfying answer is likely the best one we'd get My take on this is that DARPA, (as per has been happening a lot of late) was aiming for a 'quick' program leading to an operational or at least operationally available booster. Boeing was likely looking for a 'profit' and possible commercial follow ons. In the 'big picture' sense, (and at the time it was initiated at any rate) a reusable booster was a distinct possiblity and had applications both as a "light" and "quick" launch system. What seems to have been lacking was a sense of how fast the operational technology was in fact changing. (And don't get me wrong, what DARPA had in mind as rerquirements are STILL not available today and there's no one who can actually meet the requirements but that's less technology than operations and market driven)

Seriously though, what did they think they were going to learn that they didn't learn from RASCAL? (THAT would have been truly useful. The engine mods could have found use in many applications.)

Well for one thing RASCAL didn't show that you could in fact turn a very high performance RS-25 into a high-use-rate AR-22 till they went and built it (And note I AGREE with the need to get more work on the RASCAL engine mods done, that stuff would have and would be worth its weight in gold since it has so many applications beyond 'just' space launch)

Unfortunatly I get the feeling DARPA was to focused on the engines, (even though that was actually a lagging part of the program, go figure) and getting to rapid operational, (rather than research) use that they overlooked way to many basic questions in the design. Followed up with the whole thing pretty much being a 'one-off' design and program despite the push towards an operational rather than research program and it was going to run into problems prettly quickly anyway. In this case they were again aiming more for an operational rather than research vehicle but planned to 'partner' with a bigger aerospace firm with more capability and a higher chance of being able to meet the 'needs' should they in fact get to an operational rather than research program state.

The downside of course to such a 'partnership' is that if Boeing got bored or needed to change focus then they can and will, (and did) step away which would leave the program dead in the water. On the Gripping-Hand of course going with a leaner, more 'hungry' partner such as Mastesen while less likely they'd drop out also means there's much less chance they could move from a one-off research vehicle to series production without bringing in a bigger partner eventually so why not do so from the start? It's a seductive logic really.

I thought it was because DARPA wanted a serious investment from the company because of the probable commercial opportunities.

Comparativly how much 'skin' did Boeing put into the game compared to DARPA? And DARPA by it's nature isn't likely to lead to either large scale operational or commercual oppotunities so that's up to the 'commercial' partner to both asses and work towards. Boeing (and really NG/LM) from the begining didn't seem all that interested in a commercial application and despite the stated goal of moving towards a military usable operational system the payload and other capabilities the program would have demonstrated were pretty small and the overall justification weak. But there's a truism here in that the bigger the vehicle the vastly more expensive it becomes even, or especially if it's a limited number build program. Going small is usually cheaper but then scaling it up isn't going to be 'cheap' in any sense of the word and likely Boeing could see no end product where they didn't lose money in the deal despite DARPA footing the initial bill.

I thought it was because DARPA wanted a serious investment from the company because of the probable commercial opportunities.

Indeed. Unfortunately, DARPA then went for what they thought would be the 'safe' option, Boeing. Or rather the company it used to be and what DARPA's higher ups still thought it was.

Again I have to point out that there's a consistant 'logic' behind this path if you assuem that the end product is going to be an military operational or commercial launch vehicle booster. Boeing's a logical choice in that they have the needed infrastructure and industrial base to pull that off where as the other closest competitors (NG/LM) were far less capable and Mastesen, while they could likely pull off a research vehicle were in no position to move towards an operational or sellable vehicle without partnering with one of the bigger companies. I don't think it's a CORRECT logic mind you but it would be a compelling one and in context makes sense as to 'why' Boeing was chosen, but that comes right back to the basic premise of the program and what it was (in theory) trying to prove.

Given that the one thing the program HAS accomplished, (10 runs on the AR-22 in less than 10 days with a minimum of maintenance) while rather amazing in and of itself it NOT in fact as amazing as showing you could do it with a Mach-10/suborbital airframe attached with the same ability which was in fact the whole point of the program. And that's pretty much for me where the whole 'logic' chain of going with Boeing tends to break down because that's going to cost 'someone' a pretty penny, especially when you factor in all the requirements and that in and of itself should have been obvious to Boeing from the start. Which is why I have to wonder if they were even serious from the start given how little work they seem to have actually done towards an operational vehicle, even a 'research' one.

It's not that Boeing has fundementally 'changed' its nature because that 'change' is over a decade in the past when they decided to NOT stay a standard government contractor and went back to making commercial aircraft as a main focus. The 'optics' here is that Boeing dabbled in the XS-1 program as long as they could in the realm of the 'cheaper' work, (CFD, simulations, sub-scale wind tunnel testing, etc) and kept it's Rocketdyne folks busy with the AR-22 but the moment it looked like they were going to have to start sinking 'real' money into the development program they quite instead. I'm seeing it less as Boeing not willing to 'risk' things but more they are less willing to become involved in a government program that does not hold a significant end-goal contract for them that does not take away resources and capability they can instead put towards commercial applications.

Does that make any sense?

Randy

 

[edwest4]

A complex way of saying 'there's no money in it.' So why bother? Leave it all alone until someone forces someone's hand using money and some sort of cost-plus scheme. I heard from one Boeing sub-contractor that Boeing gets what it wants and the sub-contractor is in no position - time or money-wise - to complain over this or that detail.

 

[TomcatViP]

Don't forget that in order to launch ten times in ten days, you need to be weather and time (hence location) independant what Rockets like SpaceX's Falcons are fairly not.
They are inherently severely limited by planing and infrastructures being rocket maximized for payload Vs fuel ratio.
So, no, SpaceX didn't outrun Boeing there. We would have to look elsewhere for a culprit...

 

[RanulfC]

A complex way of saying 'there's no money in it.' So why bother? Leave it all alone until someone forces someone's hand using money and some sort of cost-plus scheme. I heard from one Boeing sub-contractor that Boeing gets what it wants and the sub-contractor is in no position - time or money-wise - to complain over this or that detail.

Well technically there's always "money-in-it" to a point But to get to that point, especialy for something as big as Boeing the program and/or vehicle contract has to be big as well. XS-1 wasn't every going to be that big even if the Air Force had bought in.

Don't forget that in order to launch ten times in ten days, you need to be weather and time (hence location) independant what Rockets like SpaceX's Falcons are fairly not.
They are inherently severely limited by planing and infrastructures being rocket maximized for payload Vs fuel ratio.
So, no, SpaceX didn't outrun Boeing there. We would have to look elsewhere for a culprit...

Eh, not for this situation. Unless it was storming like a hurricane or something they 'could' launch as you weren't actually required to do anything BUT launch under the requirements. They only opted for a single orbital demonstration and significantly they didn't tie that to the "proving" of the launch-turn-launch cycle..

And it's not that SpaceX has 'outrun' Boeing or what DARPA was arguably trying to do. It's more that this concept as a process seems less of a requirement than originally. But if we're getting specific, (and we should really ) in fact SpaceX HAS already met most of the requirements of the program so even if Boeing hadn't dropped out, keep in mind that DARPA probably would have had to at some near-term point.

Let's review, the program goals as stated were:

• hypersonic flight to Mach 10 (12,250 km/h) or higher (Done)
• fast one-day turnaround time, including flying 10 times in 10 days (Open)
• a 1,800 kg (4,000 lb) payload on a trajectory to orbit (Done)
• launch cost less than 1/10 that of current launch systems, approximately US$5 million per flight (Open)
• uncrewed vehicle (Done)
• utilize a reusable first stage booster to fly at hypersonic speeds to a suborbital altitude, coupled with one or more expendable upper stages that would separate and deploy a satellite (Done)

The main question would have been the price point which wasn't likely to open in real terms to Boeing so it would end up being the fast turn around which was/is something both SpaceX and Blue Origin are aiming for anyway so ...

Randy

 

[edwest4]

I guess the answer is we'll see. If there is a real need then DARPA will find a way. Meanwhile, who knows what the X-37B does. If payload cost to orbit is the primary issue, again, with no compelling reason to do the work, this concept will fall by the wayside as have others. So-called fast turnaround will depend on launching from a place with relatively stable weather, which can be done. How fast? Unknown at this point. It appears that the 'whatever is available now' rule will apply. No risk, no reward. The space program was doing better decades ago, and I can't clearly see what the priorities are today.

 

[In_A_Dream]

Perhaps establishing a commitment first is the answer. This concept is part of a much bigger picture. If the final answer and question are about making money, then this sort of thing will continue.

This answer suffices, there's always a bigger puzzle.

 

[RanulfC]

I guess the answer is we'll see.

That's always the 'answer' unfortunatly

If there is a real need then DARPA will find a way. Meanwhile, who knows what the X-37B does. If payload cost to orbit is the primary issue, again, with no compelling reason to do the work, this concept will fall by the wayside as have others.

There is an actual 'need' and both the Air Force and DARPA have been taking pot-shots at it but since they never have turned the concern into an actual "put-out-for-bid" type program contract the response has been less than stellar. Couple that with the fact there's likely no money in the budgets to actually undertake such a program and no political (Congressional) authorization to do so and it's likely to stay a background subject. Pile on top of that the fact that there isn't really a coherent 'plan' for how this type of vehicle and opreation should be pursued and you have pretty much a series of 'one-offs' of various types as interest, (and funding) waxes and wanes.

So-called fast turnaround will depend on launching from a place with relatively stable weather, which can be done. How fast? Unknown at this point. It appears that the 'whatever is available now' rule will apply. No risk, no reward. The space program was doing better decades ago, and I can't clearly see what the priorities are today.

Military operational "requirements" for "fast-turn-around" are pretty clear; Any weather, any time. See? Simple

Now taking into account the current technology level and operational practices then the scope narrows to such things as a place where the weather is "pretty good" most of the time or have an operational system that can launch despite the weather, and/or have multiple launch sites and multiple vehicles in ready uise status. As you might see these requirements can be achieved in various ways at varying costs but being the military they'd rather have just one. What they DO have and will continue to use is whatever the commercial space launch companies come up with simply because that fits the budget and general, (if not specific) requirements. They can afford that. Now if some decent money can be freed up to pursue multiple programs like the XS-1 to some conclusion then we'd have a clearer idea of what is needed. It's not that the ideas and concepts aren't out there.

Randy

 

[trose213]

Perhaps establishing a commitment first is the answer. This concept is part of a much bigger picture. If the final answer and question are about making money, then this sort of thing will continue.

"It's complicated" while likely not a very satisfying answer is likely the best one we'd get My take on this is that DARPA, (as per has been happening a lot of late) was aiming for a 'quick' program leading to an operational or at least operationally available booster. Boeing was likely looking for a 'profit' and possible commercial follow ons. In the 'big picture' sense, (and at the time it was initiated at any rate) a reusable booster was a distinct possiblity and had applications both as a "light" and "quick" launch system. What seems to have been lacking was a sense of how fast the operational technology was in fact changing. (And don't get me wrong, what DARPA had in mind as rerquirements are STILL not available today and there's no one who can actually meet the requirements but that's less technology than operations and market driven)

Seriously though, what did they think they were going to learn that they didn't learn from RASCAL? (THAT would have been truly useful. The engine mods could have found use in many applications.)

Well for one thing RASCAL didn't show that you could in fact turn a very high performance RS-25 into a high-use-rate AR-22 till they went and built it (And note I AGREE with the need to get more work on the RASCAL engine mods done, that stuff would have and would be worth its weight in gold since it has so many applications beyond 'just' space launch)

Unfortunatly I get the feeling DARPA was to focused on the engines, (even though that was actually a lagging part of the program, go figure) and getting to rapid operational, (rather than research) use that they overlooked way to many basic questions in the design. Followed up with the whole thing pretty much being a 'one-off' design and program despite the push towards an operational rather than research program and it was going to run into problems prettly quickly anyway. In this case they were again aiming more for an operational rather than research vehicle but planned to 'partner' with a bigger aerospace firm with more capability and a higher chance of being able to meet the 'needs' should they in fact get to an operational rather than research program state.

The downside of course to such a 'partnership' is that if Boeing got bored or needed to change focus then they can and will, (and did) step away which would leave the program dead in the water. On the Gripping-Hand of course going with a leaner, more 'hungry' partner such as Mastesen while less likely they'd drop out also means there's much less chance they could move from a one-off research vehicle to series production without bringing in a bigger partner eventually so why not do so from the start? It's a seductive logic really.

I thought it was because DARPA wanted a serious investment from the company because of the probable commercial opportunities.

Comparativly how much 'skin' did Boeing put into the game compared to DARPA? And DARPA by it's nature isn't likely to lead to either large scale operational or commercual oppotunities so that's up to the 'commercial' partner to both asses and work towards. Boeing (and really NG/LM) from the begining didn't seem all that interested in a commercial application and despite the stated goal of moving towards a military usable operational system the payload and other capabilities the program would have demonstrated were pretty small and the overall justification weak. But there's a truism here in that the bigger the vehicle the vastly more expensive it becomes even, or especially if it's a limited number build program. Going small is usually cheaper but then scaling it up isn't going to be 'cheap' in any sense of the word and likely Boeing could see no end product where they didn't lose money in the deal despite DARPA footing the initial bill.

I thought it was because DARPA wanted a serious investment from the company because of the probable commercial opportunities.

Indeed. Unfortunately, DARPA then went for what they thought would be the 'safe' option, Boeing. Or rather the company it used to be and what DARPA's higher ups still thought it was.

Again I have to point out that there's a consistant 'logic' behind this path if you assuem that the end product is going to be an military operational or commercial launch vehicle booster. Boeing's a logical choice in that they have the needed infrastructure and industrial base to pull that off where as the other closest competitors (NG/LM) were far less capable and Mastesen, while they could likely pull off a research vehicle were in no position to move towards an operational or sellable vehicle without partnering with one of the bigger companies. I don't think it's a CORRECT logic mind you but it would be a compelling one and in context makes sense as to 'why' Boeing was chosen, but that comes right back to the basic premise of the program and what it was (in theory) trying to prove.

Given that the one thing the program HAS accomplished, (10 runs on the AR-22 in less than 10 days with a minimum of maintenance) while rather amazing in and of itself it NOT in fact as amazing as showing you could do it with a Mach-10/suborbital airframe attached with the same ability which was in fact the whole point of the program. And that's pretty much for me where the whole 'logic' chain of going with Boeing tends to break down because that's going to cost 'someone' a pretty penny, especially when you factor in all the requirements and that in and of itself should have been obvious to Boeing from the start. Which is why I have to wonder if they were even serious from the start given how little work they seem to have actually done towards an operational vehicle, even a 'research' one.

It's not that Boeing has fundementally 'changed' its nature because that 'change' is over a decade in the past when they decided to NOT stay a standard government contractor and went back to making commercial aircraft as a main focus. The 'optics' here is that Boeing dabbled in the XS-1 program as long as they could in the realm of the 'cheaper' work, (CFD, simulations, sub-scale wind tunnel testing, etc) and kept it's Rocketdyne folks busy with the AR-22 but the moment it looked like they were going to have to start sinking 'real' money into the development program they quite instead. I'm seeing it less as Boeing not willing to 'risk' things but more they are less willing to become involved in a government program that does not hold a significant end-goal contract for them that does not take away resources and capability they can instead put towards commercial applications.

Does that make any sense?

Randy

Think it's a lot more that small sat launch space has become drastically more competitive. That and a Mach 10 rocket plane for this purpose might not be most efficient allocation of engineering resources.

 

[flateric]

...