carvalho2008
Naval alternative projects
- Joined
- 20 November 2015
- Messages
- 452
- Reaction score
- 500
Doesn't support your point. Those are "part' of the trench and not the individual soldiers equipment. Too heavy to be carried.
Doesn't support your point. Those are "part' of the trench and not the individual soldiers equipment. Too heavy to be carried.
Again, for trench warfare and not mobile infantry. None of those designs would work in an APC or on a march
Pay attention to the opening text of the topic...Again, for trench warfare and not mobile infantry. None of those designs would work in an APC or on a march
I don't believe it is incompetence on the part of Ukraine or Russia, but rather a new reality when there is relative parity of forces.Given the relative lack of competence shown on both sides, I'd argue that this is one of the most abnormal fights we will ever see.
Had the Russian Airborne been halfway competent, Ukraine would be a province of Russia less than 12 hours after operation start.
Exactly, this is highly atypical combat happening right now. Just like how Afghanistan was highly atypical (due to engagement ranges).
DO NOT make equipment decisions based on atypical scenarios!
It also GREATLY shifts point of impact when you hand a 10+lb weight off the barrel. Crud, POI shifts a good 6" or more just from hanging a bayonet on the front...
One problem is how heavy the extra armor is.
That's the thing, there should not have been relative parity of forces in Ukraine.I don't believe it is incompetence on the part of Ukraine or Russia, but rather a new reality when there is relative parity of forces.
Thing is, the Infantry have dug in ever since 1914. Always. As soon as the grunts stop walking, they start digging.The old manuals talked about concentrating forces, but today, any small concentration is quickly identified.
I think the attached text is a very well considered analysis... I don't believe that the Ukrainian trench war will not happen again.
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The Return of the Tactical Crisis - Modern War Institute
“Despite the requirement to achieve mass and concentration for decisive results, the greater lethality of weapons dictated a contradictory need for dispersion. Much of the history of modern warfare can be written as a function of attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory elements.” —...mwi.westpoint.edu