Up until a couple of months ago I and many former colleagues were being regularly contacted about specialty systems engineering roles in shipbuilding, teams were being built with whoever they could find, with many of those people being upskilled asap due to a lack of relevant experience. Some of the roles I was personally contacted about were a little intimidating, i.e. I would need to have had terminal Dunning Kruger to believe I had the required skills and experience, however there were also assurances of fast tracked training and mentoring etc.

Then it all stopped. Roles that are required going forward are not being recruited, teams that had several people are now down to two or three with existing roles not being back filled, the money has been turned off. Those working on the government side as either government employees or consultants, have seen their workloads go through the roof and their resources cut. I've given up getting back into shipbuilding and am switching to another field within defence, its all just too chaotic and unpredictable.

Government can blame the contractors, navy and the Capability, Acquisition and Sustainment Group, but they are the ones who are deciding who is worked with, what they are contracted to do, how much money is spent on what and when. They are the ones ignoring advice, (disbanding advisory boards even) signing contracts then demanding after that certain favored contractors are given work even though they have proven unreliable and inefficient.

It is probably also no coincidence that we have a new defence minister, a man who desperately wants to be prime Minister and has a reputation for shaking things up to make himself look vigorous and effective etc.

The sad thing is we learned lessons on submarines and destroyers the people who over came the structural contractual issues to deliver high quality platforms to Navy are still out there but have been completely ignored because politicians decided they didn't know how to do what they had just successfully done and decided to start from scratch. I love ships and shipbuilding, I aspired to a senior test or technical role on new subs or frigates, but to be honest, its probably better for my sanity to see out my career in my new field instead. Shipbuilding is just too political to ever allow the experts to just do their jobs.
 
Government can blame the contractors, navy and the Capability, Acquisition and Sustainment Group

You forgot: the Swedes (for the Collins) and the French (for the short fin Barracuda)
 
Industry gets blamed all too often but there is one common element in every Australian Defence Program that goes astray: Defence (be that DMO or CASG or...)
As I have discovered they are hamstrung by policy and procedures. They can dot every i and cross every t, then the minister or someone with political weight buys in and everything is turned on its head. Someone gets inserted above the subject matter expert and think, because they are a higher level or rank, or are a current or ex defence operator, that they know more than their subordinate SME in all things. Even when they realise their subordinates know more than them they feel obligated to ignore this and do their own thing.

A co occurring problem is many of the decision makers with "defence" backgrounds, are maintainers, not designers or builders, even worse, they are maintainers from a period where defence out sourced as much maintenance as they could, meaning their maintainers are mostly only experienced in operational maintenance. Extrapolate this and with the exception of a small minority of engineers who work closely with industry in Systems project offices and acquisition projects, most of them leave service without ever doing any real work in design, T&E, engineering change etc.

This means your ex defence engineering managers include a disproportionate number of ex NCOs and junior officers who were basically maintenance supervisors, taking pivotal roles in major projects. Some, not all, have undertaken significant additional study and certification, upskilling themselves for their new role, others, sadly, havent.
 
When projects go over-time, it is quite an often strategy to bring more people online to try and solve it's problems. That means more money gets spent on personnel and so the project costs start to creep up. Of course the correct procedure would be to plan ahead but that is often beyond most project managers who seem to have a hard time making their sub-managers to achieve their goals on time, which would of course bring the project in on schedule.

Australia's problem has been primarily it's feast or famine attitude to building ships. The result is that each project has to start with basically a new batch of workers, all the experienced ones have moved on. This means that they are often running behind schedule on the first ships of a class they are building. Invariably the latter ones are on schedule or running better as the workforce becomes familiar with the job before them. Of course all that experience gets shot when those staff members move on again. Being a political football doesn't help, with projects going from city to city as the occasion and the political needs, demand it.

Rather than grin and bear it, we have shenanigans in federal and state parliaments where the short-lived as it proved, minister declare they wouldn't trust a particular shipyard to, "build a canoe". Hardly confidence building amongst the workforce and then you have the MSM up to it's antics because it favours one shipbuilder over another because the media has interests in it.
 
<rant>
It's the exact same issue as we discussed over on the new Australian subs thread. The govt remains completely divorced from reality in regards to major engineering projects and refuse to accept the need to approach these programs properly with the necessary govt investment and support. They keep planning these projects as if a skilled workforce will just magically appear, the need to build that work force continues to completely escape them.

Apropos, the current govt is stripping funds and support from our Universities and trade schools.

The Australian govt keeps believing that private business will just step in and start building boats to support an industry between govt jobs. That they'll build schools and training facilities despite the fact that we don't have the population or the demand to support those business models.

It's just crazy. I don't know who they've got advising them on these issues but they badly need some new advisors.

</rant>
 
The govt remains completely divorced from reality in regards to major engineering projects and refuse to accept the need to approach these programs properly with the necessary govt investment and support. They keep planning these projects as if a skilled workforce will just magically appear, the need to build that work force continues to completely escape them...
I think you have partially hit the nail on the head here. There is a distinct shortage of skilled professionals across Australia and it has been getting worse for years. When one looks beyond the ship-building and across other major Defence programs (Air and Land) and beyond into the Civilian sector you see the same hurt points everywhere. Everyone is competing for the same resource pool ... which is shallow already.

I also don't think the Govt is completely divorced from reality but they certainly don't know how to address it within the constraints of their political/economic models. Standard economic theory would say that supply & demand action would step in to correct things with higher wages/salaries resulting as industry compete for the people there already and more people are attracted to the industry/career paths but things such as decades of pressure to constrain wage/salary growth plus cultural aspects such as people not wanting to enter certain career paths etc etc (there is too much to unpack for this thread...) have caused this. Add in pursuit of quick 'easy money' in sectors such as the resource sector (and resultant lack of investment elsewhere) and you have the problem we have now. It is only going to get worse to as existing people retire...

Industry doesn't have the answers either since typically they are looking at just their own needs and don't have the incentives to do anything for the bigger picture.

I could go on and also offer my thoughts on potential solutions but I don't think this forum in interested in that...
 
Dear Australians,
Don't feel bad because the Royal Canadian Nay suffers similar procurement problems.
Ship-building programs are always delayed and too often stop-and-start. The demand for Canadian-built civilian ships is not big enough to keep shipyards busy during times of no navy contracts, so they are frequently called upon to rapidly developed skilled labour forces from almost nothing. Even more annoying is the RCN insisting on 'Canadian mission specific' ships despite that gap since th last generation being so long that the last group of designers have all retired.
For example, about 20 years ago, the Provincial of British Columbia ordered a new class of fast ferries to serve our mountainous and island-studded West Coast. They picked the latest of welded aluminum, fast-cats from Australia (or was it NZ?). Despite having hardly any welders certified to work on aluminum. Then gov't changed the engines from gas turbines to diesel. The new ferries proved far more expensive than originally forecast. Their diesel engines also burned too much fuel at idle because they needed to idle at a constant-speed to keep the ships' electrical systems happy. The end result was that they were rapidly removed from service and sold at a loss.
The New Democratic Party that ordered them was accused of 'buying votes from unions.' The NDP lost the next provincial election.

Royal Canadian Navy procurement is even slower and more confusing, with poor bloody sailors reduced to 'priority last.'
 
You know, if several nations were to put their eggs into a single backet and come up with a unified requirement (Canada and Australia perhaps) they could keep their shipbuilding without the cost and hassle perhaps. Problem is, every time I come up with this 'plan', I have to go and soak my head for a few hours or lie down in a darkened room.
 
There is a distinct shortage of skilled professionals across Australia and it has been getting worse for years. When one looks beyond the ship-building and across other major Defence programs (Air and Land) and beyond into the Civilian sector you see the same hurt points everywhere. Everyone is competing for the same resource pool ... which is shallow already.

I also don't think the Govt is completely divorced from reality but they certainly don't know how to address it within the constraints of their political/economic models...

Agree mostly, our govts unwillingness to accept that their political/economic models just aren't cutting it is where I think they're departing from reality.

Other nations around the world spend billions sustaining national engineering and manufacturing capacity, we really don't, at least not at a useful level.

Please excuse the rant above, we now return you to your regular service. :D
 
It has been proposed in the past that Australia should join with other countries to build more and better ships. The only country we have done that with is New Zealand with the ANZAC class of frigates. Canada would be good candidate and it has been proposed that we should do more than just build ships. Professor John Blaxland from the ANU when a serving officer proposed a joint Brigade with Canada but it never came to nought. We share, apart from a language and a Commonwealth heritage, similar sized populations and outlook. The problem is geography. Canada is long, long, way away and it's centred primarily on the Atlantic coast rather than the Pacific. Canada is also perhaps a little too beholden to the nation on their southern border. We should perhaps think of joining forces with Singapore, Malaysia and perhaps Indonesia.

As far as the attitude of Government towards shipbuilding, it is not interested in putting adequate money into it to make it a going enterprise. They see it as a political football to buy votes in which ever city they favour at the moment or which one has upset them the most.
 
It seems that investment is no longer seen as retaining that money within the country concerned and as with car building, "Let someone else do it". How many more people could be paying taxes and supporting local business/outlets? Whenever a manafacturing plant closes, local shops and suppliers shut down too. Or am I talking out of my seat again?
 
Industry gets blamed all too often but there is one common element in every Australian Defence Program that goes astray: Defence (be that DMO or CASG or...)
If you don't mind me saying GTX, we've touched on such matters in another forum.
Please don't interpret this as an attack on yourself, but I think industry has to take responsibility itself on how it actually offers its said product/weapons system/platform in its sale pitch to win the contract and what it can realistically deliver. So much of Australia's problem IMO, is it's over willingness to afford multi million/billion dollar contracts for weapons systems that aren't mature or worst not even off the drawing board.
Australia's perceived need and want for quantum leap in capability is and continuous to be it's own undoing IMO. On top of this, the existing consecutive government in its three guises (Abbott/Turnbull/Scomo) have not been shy in promoting defence aquisition and export as their new economic obsession. There's hardly any point in having such stupendously experience and "supposed" capable weapons systems/platforms if they can't operate, fly or sail, let alone deliver weapons/troops on target.
Sadly this isn't new to Australia, consecutive government's, the ADF and Defence Industry as a whole.

In fact, only today I heard in the media that the newly acquired Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) are in trouble:

Regards
Pioneer
 
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It seems that investment is no longer seen as retaining that money within the country concerned and as with car building, "Let someone else do it". How many more people could be paying taxes and supporting local business/outlets? Whenever a manafacturing plant closes, local shops and suppliers shut down too. Or am I talking out of my seat again?

Go back in time, to the early 1990s, the Coalition parties had a policy of COTS - commercial of the shelf - and advocated that principle in defence spending, rather than the Labor party's attempt to build up the domestic manufacture of such items. When they gained power in 1994, that all changed. They realised that it was better for the economy and society to build things domestically. The result was that they also realised they could manipulate the process to gain voters. This meant that they started to treat procurement as a political football and were willing to shoot it around the nation, depending on which state or city was more important to them politcally. Since then we have had several changes of Government between the Coalition and the Labor Party. They have all decided its useful to use defence spending as a political effort to gain votes. We have had the AAW Destroyer contract be moved from Newcastle to Melbourne to Adelaide. We have had threats of the new submarine contract being moved from Adelaide to Perth. It is a right shemozzle, to say the least.
 
We also have to question whether building small batches in-country is really saving any money.
For example, back during the 1980s (?) Bath Iron Works, Maine bid on a Canadian Navy contract to build 4 or 6 ships. BIW had a long reputation of building USN ships on time, on budget, with good workmanship. BIW bid was less expensive than bids from Canadian shipyards.
Whenever Canadian shipyards bid successfully on navy contracts, they always brag about how navy money will give them the leg-up that they need to become competitive on the global market.
I remain cynical.














biw
 
The current Govt has at least put the following in place:


That said, there is a lot more needed than just a plan. Moreover, the basic underlying structural weaknesses still exist IMHO. Our population, and more so, our workforce/skills make up etc is just not sufficient to support the demands placed upon it whilst shackled by poor economic models and industrial/procurement practices that don't allow for efficient use of said resources. For instance having multiple ship-building locations and companies compete for orders, while great in economic theory ("competition drives the best solution and lowest price...blah, blah...") is not supportable if there is a winner take all approach applied to procurement. Its all very well to say people in one company will move to the other if they lose the contract too but in reality that doesn't happen, especially when we're talking about different states of the country.
 

Please don't interrupt this as an attack on yourself, but I think industry has to take responsibility itself on how it actually offers its said product/weapons system/platform in its sale pitch to win the contract and what it can realistically deliver. So much of Australia's problem IMO, is it's over willingness to afford multi million/billion dollar contracts for weapons systems that aren't mature or worst not even off the drawing board.

Industry is only responding to what the Govt/ADF/CASG...ask for. As they say "the customer is always right (even when they are wrong)" and one doesn't win contracts by ignoring them. Simple reality!

In fact, only today I heard in the media that the newly acquired Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) are in trouble:

slightly off topic but don't get fooled by an obvious 'hit piece' against a company in a open competition (L-400-3). Yes RDA's Boxer CRV program has problems (many tied to the same issues mentioned above re underlying structural problems) but some of the aspects called out in that story are rubbish:

  1. You order a vehicle with a German gun? Of course it is going to fire German ammunition! Moreover, it was CASG that ordered it and also CASG/ADF's responsibility to ensure ammunition manufacture is in place in australia (if that's what they want), not the vehicle manufacturer.
  2. Similar goes for the wheels. The ADF order a vehicle with bespoke wheels and then wonder why there isn't already a manufacturing source in Australia. Come on, don't be so foolish.


 
We also have to question whether building small batches in-country is really saving any money.
Agree - essentially we form a 'big' (in terms of physical products and costs) cottage industry.
 
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It seems that investment is no longer seen as retaining that money within the country concerned and as with car building, "Let someone else do it". How many more people could be paying taxes and supporting local business/outlets? Whenever a manafacturing plant closes, local shops and suppliers shut down too. Or am I talking out of my seat again?
You are correct and one has to take the holistic approach in mind here but unfortunately not many people can do that. In addition though, we have to look at the cultural aspects: how many people see some of these industries as a career path? And at the risk of sounding like an old codger, do some of the younger ones even want to do the hard years these days? I ask this in the light of many older workers having already retired or starting to retire without obvious backfills...
 
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Other nations around the world spend billions sustaining national engineering and manufacturing capacity, we really don't, at least not at a useful level.

One of the problems for Australia IMHO is that we are actually too well off. I mean in terms of being resource rich, politically stable, part of the Western, English speaking dominant grouping in the world. We haven't had to 'fight' for our place in the world - to be somewhat flippant, in Australia if you dig a hole and send that 'dirt' overseas you make big money. Why do the hard stuff such as manufacturing etc etc...?

Contrast this with some places such as Singapore, Israel, Japan even where they are resource poor but have had to invest in their industry, ingenuity, people etc and you see something arguably on the opposite end of the spectrum. Now this is not to say that Australia doesn't have a lot of that but from the big picture/Govt point of view, if you are looking at GDP etc at the national level it might all look good because it is made that way by a few big contributors.
 

In fact, only today I heard in the media that the newly acquired Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) are in trouble:


Oh and one last comment re this story - see here:

 
Why do I get the sinking feeling though that they are trying to run a huge bluff there?
 
But which perceived bluff are you referring to?
 
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For one thing that they would be able to achieve IOC in 2022. I fear that they may be trying to sell a pig in a poke there alone.
 
Cheers for your views and feedback GTX

I like your analogy:

"One of the problems for Australia IMHO is that we are actually too well off. I mean in terms of being resource rich, politically stable, part of the Western, English speaking dominant grouping in the world. We haven't had to 'fight' for our place in the world - to be somewhat flippant, in Australia if you dig a hole and send that 'dirt' overseas you make big money. Why do the hard stuff such as manufacturing etc etc...?

Contrast this with some places such as Singapore, Israel, Japan even where they are resource poor but have had to invest in their industry, ingenuity, people etc and you see something arguably on the opposite end of the spectrum. Now this is not to say that Australia doesn't have a lot of that but from the big picture/Govt point of view, if you are looking at GDP etc at the national level it might all look good because it is made that way by a few big contributors.
"

We are good at digging shit up.

Regards
Pioneer
 
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Please don't interrupt this as an attack on yourself, but I think industry has to take responsibility itself on how it actually offers its said product/weapons system/platform in its sale pitch to win the contract and what it can realistically deliver. So much of Australia's problem IMO, is it's over willingness to afford multi million/billion dollar contracts for weapons systems that aren't mature or worst not even off the drawing board.

Industry is only responding to what the Govt/ADF/CASG...ask for. As they say "the customer is always right (even when they are wrong)" and one doesn't win contracts by ignoring them. Simple reality!

In fact, only today I heard in the media that the newly acquired Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) are in trouble:

slightly off topic but don't get fooled by an obvious 'hit piece' against a company in a open competition (L-400-3). Yes RDA's Boxer CRV program has problems (many tied to the same issues mentioned above re underlying structural problems) but some of the aspects called out in that story are rubbish:

  1. You order a vehicle with a German gun? Of course it is going to fire German ammunition! Moreover, it was CASG that ordered it and also CASG/ADF's responsibility to ensure ammunition manufacture is in place in australia (if that's what they want), not the vehicle manufacturer.
  2. Similar goes for the wheels. The ADF order a vehicle with bespoke wheels and then wonder why there isn't already a manufacturing source in Australia. Come on, don't be so foolish.


The Boxer story is definitely a hit piece, likely, at least part, in response to the ASPI discussion that the IFV should be cancelled in favor of additional Boxers with the Light Forces Mafia cheering from the sidelines as they see it as an opportunity to kill LAND 400 all together.
 
We also have to question whether building small batches in-country is really saving any money.
Agree - essentially we form a 'big' (in terms of physical products and costs) cottage industry.
The sad thing is we have demonstrated over and over again, so long and the skills and infrastructure are maintained, we can economically build small batches, even one offs, as economically as anyone else.

Where we can't compete is in mass production because we will always lose out on economies of scale.

We can however specialise in efficiently transitioning between small batches and one off builds. Identify the common elements of each build and make them as efficient and repeatable as possible, then identify the difference and conduct extensive planning and prototyping, including digital builds, to de-risk and streamline the production process. Develop build strategies that permit the most work possibly to be completed before block consolidation, i.e. build ship blocks upside down to facilitate build submarine blocks vertically to facilitate installation of pipe work etc. and the use of overhead cranes.

While the designs and their sizes may be very different there is no reason why systems, prefabricated accommodation, panel and plate sizes cant be standardised. Common sized hatches, compartment sizes, framing even.

To achieve this we need consistency and vision, combined with a constant workflow. Stop gifting work to buy votes and do what best for the country. By all means let certain contractors in various locations specialize in certain things, even to the extent of having one yard doing the keel blocks for everything, one doing the main hull blocks etc, and one specializing in superstructures and their outfit. Even allow for final consolidation to be competitively tendered but up till then optimize.

Do this and the benefits of doing the work and spending the money locally should be able to compensate for to extra costs associated with local production of small batches. Order one class of ships from overseas, move work from one yard to another in a pork barreling exercise and it all falls over.

It is doable but I fear our political class lacks the intellect, and foresight to do it.
 
It seems that investment is no longer seen as retaining that money within the country concerned and as with car building, "Let someone else do it". How many more people could be paying taxes and supporting local business/outlets? Whenever a manafacturing plant closes, local shops and suppliers shut down too. Or am I talking out of my seat again?
You are correct and one has to take the holistic approach in mind here but unfortunately not many people can do that. In addition though, we have to look at the cultural aspects: how many people see some of these industries as a career path? And at the risk of sounding like an old codger, do some of the younger ones even want to do the hard years these days? I ask this in the light of many older workers having already retired or starting to retire without obvious backfills...
The thing that is giving me the irrits at the moment is being given a list of things I have done and been doing for up to thirty years that I now need to redo so I can do what I have been doing for thirty years because some review determined that there is a shortage of people in my field.

If I have to go back to school I may as well learn something new in a new field than sit in the class with the instructor asking why I'm doing the course instead of teaching it.
 
We also have to question whether building small batches in-country is really saving any money.
For example, back during the 1980s (?) Bath Iron Works, Maine bid on a Canadian Navy contract to build 4 or 6 ships. BIW had a long reputation of building USN ships on time, on budget, with good workmanship. BIW bid was less expensive than bids from Canadian shipyards.
Whenever Canadian shipyards bid successfully on navy contracts, they always brag about how navy money will give them the leg-up that they need to become competitive on the global market.
I remain cynical.

biw
There is an assumption that what America builds is good enough for America and therefore good enough for everybody else around the world. However, as occurs often what America builds doesn't take into account the environmental needs of Australia or as in your case, Canada. Sometimes those needs are overblown and over-sold but generally what we end up with, if we buy from America is not what the ADF wants or needs. As we have seen in the case of the submarines, the US does not make non-nuclear submarines, which is what Australia wants and needs. Some American shipyards would love to build such submarines but the USN doesn't want to let them do it. So, we end up searching the world for non-nuclear submarines, which means we are either going to have to have one designed to our needs or accept one that doesn't suit them.
 
You need critical mass to keep any shipbuilding industry alive. I can't see how any nation can realistically maintain any kind of warship-building capability by building less than a dozen warships three times a century. But that's the reality of the situation, modern navies can't afford to replace ships every decade and build larger fleets.
Government's lack technical knowledge, and beyond feeding make-work contracts there is not much they can do between the lean times. Only a certain number of designing companies are able to sustain an export portfolio.

Sometimes those needs are overblown and over-sold but generally what we end up with, if we buy from America is not what the ADF wants or needs.

But Australia - and many many other maritime nations - don't design their own high-end vessels. They either buy off the shelf or get a bespoke variant made.
The RAN has Swedish submarines, Spanish LHD and destroyers and German frigates.
Its future ships include German OPVs, a Spanish oiler, British frigates and French submarines.

Shuffle the mix anyway you like but Navantia, Lurssen, BAE Systems, Naval Group (DCNS), Fincantieri or Blohm+Voss are likely to head up any list of tenders for surface combatants and the sub field is even narrower - as the RAN has found. The only question is how much you are willing to spend to alter their catalogue design to suit your needs and how much you are willing to spend to have it built at home.
Maybe its Buggin's Turn all round? Aviation of course is just the same, we get excited about competitions but the same few big names turn up again and again.

As an aside, is there any evidence that military contracts have ever swung votes anywhere? Is it just an urban myth?
 
You need critical mass to keep any shipbuilding industry alive. I can't see how any nation can realistically maintain any kind of warship-building capability by building less than a dozen warships three times a century. But that's the reality of the situation, modern navies can't afford to replace ships every decade and build larger fleets.
Government's lack technical knowledge, and beyond feeding make-work contracts there is not much they can do between the lean times. Only a certain number of designing companies are able to sustain an export portfolio.

Sometimes those needs are overblown and over-sold but generally what we end up with, if we buy from America is not what the ADF wants or needs.

But Australia - and many many other maritime nations - don't design their own high-end vessels. They either buy off the shelf or get a bespoke variant made.
The RAN has Swedish submarines, Spanish LHD and destroyers and German frigates.
Its future ships include German OPVs, a Spanish oiler, British frigates and French submarines.

They tend to be bespoke designs that suit the ADF's requirements. The Swedish submarines are longer ranged, bigger versions of the Swedish version. The Spanish LHDs are Australian versions of the Spanish ship and so on and so on. They tend to have better air-conditioning and better ablutions.
 
" ... As an aside, is there any evidence that military contracts have ever swung votes anywhere? Is it just an urban myth?"
I don't have hard statistics, but Canadian federal politicians have long believed that they can buy votes in Quebec.
The root of the problem is that French-speaking Quebec represents roughly 1/3 of the Canadian electorate and they often vote in a "bloc."
IOW it is difficult to win federal elections without a substantial proportion of Quebec voters.
The issue is further complicated by Quebec's recurring threats to separate if they don't get enough federal contracts.

Back when I was born - 1957 - Montreal was the busiest port, manufacturer and city in Canada, but that advantage has been diluted by falling birth rates, immigrants, and big money moving westwards.
In efforts to 'buy votes' Ottawa has contracted for a wide variety of military equipment to factories in Quebec: Bell helicopters, Bombardier snowmobiles, Bombardier trucks (?), Canadair airplanes, CAE simulators, Levis ships, Sorel boots, Vickers ships, etc.
 
You need critical mass to keep any shipbuilding industry alive. I can't see how any nation can realistically maintain any kind of warship-building capability by building less than a dozen warships three times a century. But that's the reality of the situation, modern navies can't afford to replace ships every decade and build larger fleets.
Government's lack technical knowledge, and beyond feeding make-work contracts there is not much they can do between the lean times. Only a certain number of designing companies are able to sustain an export portfolio.

Sometimes those needs are overblown and over-sold but generally what we end up with, if we buy from America is not what the ADF wants or needs.

But Australia - and many many other maritime nations - don't design their own high-end vessels. They either buy off the shelf or get a bespoke variant made.
The RAN has Swedish submarines, Spanish LHD and destroyers and German frigates.
Its future ships include German OPVs, a Spanish oiler, British frigates and French submarines.

They tend to be bespoke designs that suit the ADF's requirements. The Swedish submarines are longer ranged, bigger versions of the Swedish version. The Spanish LHDs are Australian versions of the Spanish ship and so on and so on. They tend to have better air-conditioning and better ablutions.
And different grades of steel.

The RAN operates in much more diverse operating environments than most navies meaning that structural cracking and corrosion, micro-biological attack (marine variety) it encounters in extremes few other navies have to deal with. Even Austal, the much lorded Australian designer and builder have encountered issues their designs can't handle in Australian operation that they have never seen anywhere else.

There are material and design solutions that are just fine for most operating environments that just don't cut it for ships operating in Australian waters (extending from almost equatorial to Antarctic). Failing to take this into account causes serious maintenance headaches and sustainment cost blow outs.

The other factor is the RAN only has about a dozen large combatants, a dozen minor combatants and half a dozen each of MCMV and survey vessels, three large amphibs and two AORs. Our ships need to be more multi roled in nature than those of other navies, there's just not enough of them for them not to be. Every time we buy a cheap(er) MOTs or modified MOTS option that is single roled, specialised or deliberately despec'd to prevent it being used for any other role and minimise the options for scope creep to keep costs down, even before they are in service attempts are being made to increase their capability and versatility because there are operational need that are not being met by current capability.

It can be argued going MOTS and COTS, in particular when it has derailed national shipbuilding capability, has actually adversely affected capability and increased costs. The Charles F Adams class destroyers, the most capable and transformational acquisitions by the RAN since the carriers, virtually killed local shipbuilding and then required extensive upgrades over and above what the USN intended for their own ships of the class. This was because, while the USN also had DLGs and CGs with their extensive command and control, NTDS, large crews, continually evolving and improving combat systems, that operated in large battle groups with other types providing mutual support, the RAN only had the DDGs and Melbourne with everything else being obsolete or obsolescent and of dubious operational value. No ship fully met RAN requirements, let alone their needs and the government opted for the cheapest option that came close to meeting most of the requirements.

What did Australia need? Basically a minimum of a DLG with Terrier and preferably a helicopter, and more than three of them, or at least the Darings, possibly also the Battles, upgraded with Tartar (Mk-22 with 16 rounds would have done). Considering what happened with the carrier replacement program it likely would have made better sense strategically and economically to have converted Melbourne into a helicopter carrier, built three or more DLGs or even better Terrier armed helicopter cruisers, converted the existing destroyers to Tartar DDGs and proceeded with the DDL program to replace the conversions in the 80s. No Skyhawk and Tracker buy, no shipbuilding blackholes, no final pair of Rivers, three + modern DLGs or CGH, and DDL to replace the Darings and Battles, maybe Amazons to replace the Rivers, or more DDLs if there is the money, no US built FFG-07s.

See what I did there, I turned a the acquisition of three DDG, four FFG, a small number of Skyhawks and Trackers from the US, into a much more sustainable build of three or more DLGs, the conversion of three to five DDs to DDGs, the build of five or more multi role FFG/DDL over the same period. Forget the Fremantle Class patrol boats, their role could be taken over by a class of patrol frigates or sloops based on the Type 21 Amazon Class that also replaces the by then pretty useless River Class DEs / frigates.

Melbourne retires in the mid to late 80s and is replaced by a class of through deck cruiser that continues to be built into the 90s to also replace the DLG/CGH to a total of say five. These ships have Mk-41 VLS and adapted NTU systems in addition to their half dozen Seakings and half dozen assorted other types of helicopters. As the last DLG / CGH retire in the late 90s the DDLs begin to be replaced by an Australian designed equivalent to the F100, De Zeven Provincien, Type 124, through the 2000s and the Amazons are replaced by an Australian equivalent of either something like the K130 or maybe even the Type 31 / Iver Huitfeldt in the 2010s. Through deck cruisers are then replaced either with modern equivalent or something more capable in the 2020s.

End result, Australia is building one big ship every two years or one frigate / destroyer sized ship ever year, from the early 60s onwards. Each ship has a service life of 25 to 30 years, total fleet size is about what is now but no patrol boats, more multirole big ships, more effective and capable task forces. Throw in fat ships, LHDs, LPDs, AORs etc. and continuous shipbuilding is a very real and affordable possibility. 5 Through Deck Cruisers, 10 FFG/DDG, 10 FFH, 2-3 Amphibs, 2-3 AOR, vs 3 DDG, 8-9 FFG/FFH (extensively and expensively upgraded well beyond any reasonable expectation), 12 OPV (moves afoot to upgrade with anything and everything they can and space and weight to fit, even before the first one hits the water), several more OPVs for other roles, 3 Amphibs and 2 AORs.

Best of all in my imaginary world, no skills shortage as we have been building, then designing and building ships non stop for 60 years, 80 years if you go back to WWII. In fact if you go back to the late 30s when it was realized that Australia had to build ships for the upcoming war, and it had been realized that failing to maintain the required skills in the 20s and 30s had placed the country at risk, it is actually surprising that the dodgy decisions of the 50s and 60s, cutting back and cancelling shipbuilding projects, were allowed to happen at all.
 
The rationale' for the ANZAC class was that they were more multi-role than the proposed patrol corvettes. They were also considered cheaper because the cheapest thing in ship design is steel. Teaming with the New Zealanders made them cheaper again. Compared to the OHP class of patrol frigates there have been few complaints with the design, as purchased. They were admittedly based on the MEKO design from Europe but their modular design suited the RAN/RNZN's purposes.
 
The rationale' for the ANZAC class was that they were more multi-role than the proposed patrol corvettes. They were also considered cheaper because the cheapest thing in ship design is steel. Teaming with the New Zealanders made them cheaper again. Compared to the OHP class of patrol frigates there have been few complaints with the design, as purchased. They were admittedly based on the MEKO design from Europe but their modular design suited the RAN/RNZN's purposes.
Actually the FFGs proved easier to maintain and have many design features that made them much more habitable, even safer to operate.

Dibb and White thought the ANZACs were too large and capable for the patrol frigate requirement but the patrol corvettes or OPCs were a completely different project. One of the reasons they thought the ANZACs too big was they feared that the perceived greater capability associated with their greater size and 5" gun etc. would end up justifying cancelling or going cheap on far more critical patrol boat, DDG and FFG replacements. Their fears were well founded.

The geography north of Australia dictates a minimum number of platforms of a minimum level of capability to control, or more to the point, keep open strategically critical choke points. It wasn't just Dibb and White, there were multiple papers about the modernising and growing economic power of India and China, and how economic strength tends to lead to increased military strength and greater influence. I first read about the strategic importance of the south China Sea in the late 80s in an article about territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands between China and other nations with perhaps more legitimate claims. It was well recognised, particularly as the Cold War wound up, that Australia would likely have to look to their own security, including the security of strategic trade routes as new players started flexing their muscles.

Current thinking on defending / controlling choke points is more along the lines of mobile land based anti ship missiles but in the late 80s early 90s combatants with missiles and helicopters were seen as the answer. The number of ships on station determined the total number required and the traditional dozen or so frigates and destroyers was no where near sufficient.

Thus we ended up with a plan in the late 80s that evolved in the early 90s, to dramatically increase the numbers and capabilities of our surface combatant force. Initially it was split into three tiers to cater for the existing types available.

Tier 1 the three Standard SM-1 armed Perth Class DDG and four (to be six) Adelaide Class FFGs

Tier 2 the six River class DEs (modified Type 12 Frigates)

Tier 3 the 15 Fremantle Class patrol boats (that had been designed for but never fitted with Oto Melara 76mm Compato and antiship missiles)

The existing Tier 2 and 3 types were totally incapable of making a useful contribution to the desired strategic objective.

First in need of replacement were the hopelessly obsolete Rivers that had lost their Seacats and Ikara leaving them only with the twin Mk6 4.5" forward and their triple light weight torpedo tubes on each beam. A patrol frigate with a medium caliber gun 57mm or 3" preferred, a point defense missile, a medium sized helicopter with antiship missiles and able to drop torpedoes plus space and weight for ASW torpedoes and antiship missiles was desired. A ship that could defend its self while patrolling and securing choke points to our north. The requirement was for 8 to replace the 6 DEs.

Next was to have been the replacement of the DDGs, followed by the first four FFGs. This was to be either three high end DDGs, think Flight IIA Burkes, and a high end ASW frigate replacement for the FFGs, i.e. the German Type 123 was mentioned at the time I believe, or a single type to replace the seven ships, possibly a stretched ANZAC / MEKO with SM-2 and a combat system maybe along the lines of the NTU upgraded USN DDGs and CGs. The 2 Australian built FFGs being much newer would be upgraded with similar systems to serve out their lives.

The patrol boats were unsuitable for the desired role and were to be replaced by missile corvettes, initially 15 ships with point defence missiles, ASMs etc. but no permanent helicopter facilities but later when the effectiveness of the helicopters were modelled (and witnessed, i.e. RN Lynx / Skua in the 91 Gulf war) the planned number of hulls was reduced to 9 but they were to have an organic ships helicopter with antiship missiles and the ability to drop torpedoes.

So there we have it, at one point a planned combatant strength of 9 tier 1 DDG/FFG, 8 Tier 2 PF/ FFH, and 9 Tier 3 corvettes. All with organic helicopters armed with Penguin ASMs, all with at a minimum point defence missiles.

Because the the ANZACS were as large as they were, had 5" guns etc. there was the perception that they were proper high end frigates, or at least should be upgraded to be such. Hence the brain dead ANZAC Warfighting Improvement Program (WIP) to fit them with AEGIS, SPY-1F and SM-2. It was rapidly demonstrated to be impossible but the politicians were now convinced they were real frigates, which they weren't. This is were concerns over the size of the ANZACs proved justified, had they been physically smaller there is no way the delusional decisions that were made would have gotten as far as they did.

Before this the proposed upgrades for the last pair of FFGs to keep them useful made them look modern and powerful, leading to the decision to delay the replacement of the DDG and upgrade all six FFGs. Again politicians thought as the upgrade replaced SM-1 with SM-2 that these ships could replace the capability provided by the DDGs, failing to understand the importance of the DDGs superior sensors, command and control systems. Surely six upgraded FFGs would be as good as or better than three new Destroyers, besides with 8 new frigates and 9 new corvettes building or planned, the RAN could wait a little longer for their new tier 1 ships.

Flash forward one change of government and a couple of years, with 6 FFGUP and 8 ANZAC WIP the RAN would obviously be more powerful than it had ever been before so why waste money on corvettes and new DDGs (or even ex USN Kidd Class DDGs with NTU, or possibly even three or four early Ticonderogas). "Why give more work to those pesky Victorians building corvettes we don't need when those excellent Western Australian people at Austal could build a really sexy looking pleasure craft, whoops I mean patrol boat, for much less money that does everything we need?" Well actually Austal came in later, the original plan was to life extend the Fremantles and not replace them until much later. Here are the seeds for the first ship building black hole since the industry was rebuilt.

Reality intrudes, Timor's independence vote shows that the ADF as a whole is woefully hollow when Australia is forced to intervene by public opinion and international pressure. The FFGs most definitely are not DDGs and the operation is only able to proceed because the US provides support including an AEGIC CG and an LHD/LHA. The physical impossibility of retrofitting the required systems to the ANZACs for WIP are finally realised and new DDGs are back on the agenda.

FFGUP starts having issues, I used to assume it was down to ADI but now realise that Thales, who bought ADI are not really a first tier defence contractor. The project falls behind due to major technical issues and poor project management (Transfield / Tenix would definitely have done a much better job) and cost blow out, eventually years late and at much higher cost four of the six ships are eventually upgraded and returned to service though they only achieved FOC just before they started retiring.

Now the patrol boats, oh the Armidales, no I wont go into them, the sooner we forget that embarrassment the better, lets just say im surprised they didn't have gun ports on the waterline and sunk on their way out of the harbor their design was so inappropriate for even the dumbed down patrol boat role they were designed for.

The eventual DDG replacements became FFG replacements, the PFs / FFHs were turned into sort of capable warships and the PBs are being replaced by OPVs. So 3 DDG, 6 FFG, 8 PF/FFH and 9 high end corvettes becomes 3 FFGs pretending to be destroyers, 8 PF pretending to be high end frigates and 12 OPVs (the government now want to arm to the teeth apparently, just like ANZAC WIP), just as China starts flexing their muscles and taking what they want.

It really is too bad no one could have predicted this turn of events and put something in place to mitigate it.....
 
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