Alternative history powerplants

Maybe Rolls-Royce didn't want to sell licences to potential US competitors (having been burned by Comrade Klimov)?
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but RR didn't really begin to sell jet licenses until the Spey series?
Svenska Flygmotor licence produced the Avon for the Draken, before the Spey was produced. Indeed, the Swedes were licence producing the Avon even earlier, in the 1950's, for the Saab Lansen.
Australia also licence produced over 200 RR Avons in the 50's for their CAC Sabre.
Fabrique National in Belgium also produced 100's of Avon's, as well as the Derwent earlier.
The Nene was also licence produced by other countries, including France.

The Orpheus and Viper were also licence produced, but I'm not sure if that was a continuation of existing licence production before RR swallowed up various British manufacturers in 1966.
The Spey was first run in 1964, fwiw.

Edit: it appears India signed the licence agreement for the Orpheus with Bristol Siddeley. RR continued this.
Not sure about the Italians and the Orpheus and Viper, or Yugoslavia and the Viper.
 
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Jumping back a bit ...

steelpillow: Orenda Engines was a division of Avro Canada, not of DHC. Development of the PS.13 Iroquois was not prompted by the cancellation of the RB.106 or J67 (as Wikipedia claims). PS.13 development had already begun back in 1953.

zen: "Had the bigger Thames versions been built, would this be chosen by Avro Canada for the Arrow?
Without the costs of getting Orenda to develop the Irequois?"

Doubtful. The CF-105 airframe was scaled for the RB.106. Installing larger RB.122s or RB.128s would have meant a complete redesign. As for Iroquois development costs, the PS.13 programme was already underway.

zen: Why didn't the US look at licensed Avons?

They did. Westinghouse Corporation and Rolls Royce Ltd had a technical collaboration agreement in place by 1953. One result was the Westinghouse XJ54 (J54-WE-2), a scaled-down Avon (105 lb/sec airflow to produce 6,200 lb thrust). Westinghouse also wanted to produce a licensed version of the RB.106.
 
If the Arrow was designed around the RB.106, then it could have flown with Avons until the engine was ready.
But the Iroquois at 42 inches diameter was closer to the scaled up RB.122 of 41.3 inches....which also is closer in thrust output.
 
If the Arrow was designed around the RB.106, then it could have flown with Avons until the engine was ready.
But the Iroquois at 42 inches diameter was closer to the scaled up RB.122 of 41.3 inches....which also is closer in thrust output.

Sure. Although the Avon 210R seem to have been thirsty beasts. For production CF-105s, timing would have been about right for the Svenska Flygmotor AB RM6B with Ebk 66 reheat. But the RM6B's rating of ~14,000 lbf in reheat is a far cry from the Iroquois 2's 19,350 lbf.

As you suggest, if the CF-105 design has to be revised to fit the Iroquois, tailoring for the RB.122 would be no big deal by comparison. But, if taking a risk on a new airframe and a total unknown of an engine type, why not take the further risk of building your own domestic design?
 
If the Arrow was designed around the RB.106, then it could have flown with Avons until the engine was ready.
But the Iroquois at 42 inches diameter was closer to the scaled up RB.122 of 41.3 inches....which also is closer in thrust output.

Sure. Although the Avon 210R seem to have been thirsty beasts. For production CF-105s, timing would have been about right for the Svenska Flygmotor AB RM6B with Ebk 66 reheat. But the RM6B's rating of ~14,000 lbf in reheat is a far cry from the Iroquois 2's 19,350 lbf.

As you suggest, if the CF-105 design has to be revised to fit the Iroquois, tailoring for the RB.122 would be no big deal by comparison. But, if taking a risk on a new airframe and a total unknown of an engine type, why not take the further risk of building your own domestic design?
The only way RB.106 or RB.122 is going forward us with RAF order for a fighter fitted with such engines.
In which case the bugs will be worked out at UK expense.
If Westinghouse gets a license, then US production is likely gor a variety of US aircraft designs.
RB.106 would challenge the J79, and RB.122 or RB.128 the J75.
 
Agreed. And there was no sign of large-scale UK investment in the RB.106 or its growth variants.

A.V. Roe Canada Ltd. was a subsidiary of Hawker Siddeley Group while Orenda Engines was an Avro Canada subsidiary. Obviously, that keeps a new Orenda powerplant 'in-house'.

The 1953 decision to develop the PS.13 Iroquois sprang from senior management at A.V. Roe Canada Ltd. That makes sense but it also suggests that the Avro Canada bosses were already aware that all was not well with Rolls-Royce's RB.106 programme.
 
Thread necromancy because I missed a key alternative.

The Armstrong Siddeley engines.
Later developments of the Sapphire such as Sa.10 or Sa.15 for 17,000lb dry. Still inside the 44" diameter.
Supposedly this led to P.172 for OR.330 Recce Bomber.

Arguably had this gone ahead, connections to Canada and the US could result in substantial success.
In OTL they lost out to BS Olympus and DH Gyron.
But arguably engines of Sapphire 15 power and size are both achievable and better suited to multiple applications.

Also a potentially optimal solution for scaling P.1103 to P.1121 around.

I read somewhere the P.176 got as far as some hardware and vaguely reccal seeing a drawing of it.....

Edited Addional thoughts

A Lightning with a Sa.15 of 17,000lb dry and 24,000lb reheated thrust is superior thrust-to-weight ratio compared to two Avons.
 
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Okay then.
The Wright R-2170 short-stroke Cyclone 14 gets produced. Stroke was shortened from 6.312 in (6 and 5/16th of an inch) to 5.25 in. Result was a very compact engine, 47 in diameter (vs. 55 in for the Cyclones), even more compact than the BMW 801 at 51in diameter. Power was supposed to be, on early 100 oct fuel, 1500 HP due to the high RPM (2900) enabled by the short stroke, weight was to be 1700 lbs for an 1-stage 2-speed supercharged version, and 1805 lbs for the 2-stage S/Ced version. None was built historically.
Possible users: Curtiss fighters (improved P-36, or a radial-powered P-40, P-46, P-53, or P-60), (X)P-44, big Wildcat, A-20 (1-stage S/C version; the the 2-stage supercharged version for the night fighter version), P-51.
 
In Fighters Over the Fleet: Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War, Norman Friedman has the Wright R-2170-A listed as "with two-speed or two-stage supercharger (1500hp)" as of September 1940. That engine was an option for the requirement ultimately leading to the Grumman F7F. But, by the following month, the R-2170 had been struck off the list of options.

Mention of the R-2170 immediately brings to mind the similarly displaced P&W R-2180A - but the two engines' arrangements were reversed. The R-2180A Twin Hornet was almost 'square' (5.75 in x 6.0 in) while the R-2170 had roughly R-2600-sized pistons in stumpy cylinders (6.13 in x 5.25 in). That makes me wonder what, exactly, the R-2170's short-stroke arrangement actually nets you.

Still, I'm curious. Are there other WW2-era radials with bore sizes substantially larger than their strokes? IIRC, the generalization is that bigger bores usually equate to higher power, long strokes translate into increased mechanical efficiency and improved combustion. It sounds like such an arrangement will likely produce a very highly-strung, fast-revving engine.

A less radical approach would have been for Wright to develop a slightly shorter stroke R-2600 derivative specifically for use in fighters. Reduce the stroke to 6.105 and you get an 'R-2518'. Going by Arkadiy Shvetsov's M-82, such an engine would have a diameter of ~49.5 in and be capable of producing 1,900 hp on 100 octane fuel.

Anyway, I suspect that Wright was better off attempting to build quality into their R-2600 (instead of pretending to do so!) and getting some amount of reliability into their new R-3350.
 
In Fighters Over the Fleet: Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War, Norman Friedman has the Wright R-2170-A listed as "with two-speed or two-stage supercharger (1500hp)" as of September 1940. That engine was an option for the requirement ultimately leading to the Grumman F7F. But, by the following month, the R-2170 had been struck off the list of options.

Than you for that tidbit.

Mention of the R-2170 immediately brings to mind the similarly displaced P&W R-2180A - but the two engines' arrangements were reversed. The R-2180A Twin Hornet was almost 'square' (5.75 in x 6.0 in) while the R-2170 had roughly R-2600-sized pistons in stumpy cylinders (6.13 in x 5.25 in). That makes me wonder what, exactly, the R-2170's short-stroke arrangement actually nets you.

It nets the big reduction of frontal area = less drag = better speed and mileage. R-2600's frontal area was ~2375 sq in, that of the R-2170 was supposed to be ~1735 sq in.

A less radical approach would have been for Wright to develop a slightly shorter stroke R-2600 derivative specifically for use in fighters. Reduce the stroke to 6.105 and you get an 'R-2518'. Going by Arkadiy Shvetsov's M-82, such an engine would have a diameter of ~49.5 in and be capable of producing 1,900 hp on 100 octane fuel.

That obviously works, too.
I'd say that US and UK have had the access of better hi-oct fuel in greater quantities earlier than the Soviets, so the great power levels down low were to be had even earlier that was the case with ASh-82 engines.

Anyway, I suspect that Wright was better off attempting to build quality into their R-2600 (instead of pretending to do so!) and getting some amount of reliability into their new R-3350.

The bad quality R-2600s were the ones made at Lockland plant, Cincinnati (1st R-2600's were made from mid-1941 there; the factory seems to be a brand-new one). The ones made at 'old' Wright factory at Patterson were okay. The corruption at the Lockland factory was rampant, at least when looking here, something that needs to be addressed without a delay, whatever engine type it is to be produced there.
Yes, the R-3350 will need to be debugged. From the mixture distribution faults (solved by incorporating the fuel injection) to the flammable magnesium alloys in the engine.
 
Soviets: make the 18 cylinder engine using the Shvetsov's M-82 bore and stroke, phasing out the Tumanskiy's M-88 engine from production.

Tanking greater advantage of Mikulin's big V12 would've also be very useful. Somewhat different engine types:
- a 'mid-altitude' type, in-between the AM-35A and AM-38, talk 1300 HP at 4 km, both for fighters and bombers
- version with 2-speed supercharger (don't wait for 1943/44 and AM-39)
- version with direct fuel injection instead of handful of carbs per engine for a bit ore power and mileage

The VK-105 with a proper 2-stage supercharger, instead of the so-so VK-105PD that was produced in small quantities.
 
Germany:
- actually produce the BMW 801E from early 1943 on, being a much improved engine vs. 801D
- DB 601 with the big supercharger from the DB 603A
- Jumo 211 with a 2-stage S/C
 
Much improved V-1710s:
- introduction of the reliable higher step-up gear for the S/C so the impeller turns faster by late 1941 instead of late 1942 (see here for the 400+ mph P-39C with engine with the faster impeller and some nip & tuck; the P-40 and P-51 also gain a lot in a timely manner)
- hydraulic coupling for the S/C instead of the 1-speed gearing, for increase of both high-alt performance (greater step-up ratio) and low-alt performance (lower step-up ratio)
- supercharger with a big impeller, talk 11-12 inches diamerer vs. 9.5 in, for much improved high altitude performance; far easier to install on P-40, P-51, and especially on P-39 than the 2-stage supercharged V-1710
- early introduction of the 2-stage S/Ced version - don't wait until late 1943
- fuel injection, in order to cure the issues with intake and to add a bit of power and fuel mileage
- introduction of water/alcohol injection by mid-1943 for all V-1710s, not just for the 2-stage version by winter of 1943/44
 
One interesting thing that never happened was the development of something like the supercharged Rolls-Royce Merlin or Hispano-Suiza 12, to give the engine fuel injection and a swirl throttle.
The swirl throttle is essentially a set of variable stator vanes at the engine air compressor intake. It creates significantly less turbulence and efficiency loss than the common butterfly valve. Fuel injection can take place either here, or directly into the cylinders, or preferably both. It is more precise and controllable than a carburettor; injection into the compressor intake is simpler and helps pre-cool the air, while direct injection offers better control over combustion.
The Mikulin AM-28, standard in the Ilyushin IL-2 Shturmovik, had a swirl throttle, and Germany was introducing it on some of its last piston developments in WWII. Had Germany had better strategic management and fewer shortages of key raw materials, we would surely have seen Daimler-Benz come back with a vengeance.The West had tinkered with it pre-war but apathy ruled.
When Hispano-Suiza abandoned further development, Swiss conglomerate Saurer took up the challenge for a while. Klimov had also long license-built it as the M-105, but as far as I know never nicked Mikulin's tech.
Nowadays, the swirl throttle and fuel injection are pretty much standard on F1 racing cars: the world missed a trick, back then.
 
One interesting thing that never happened was the development of something like the supercharged Rolls-Royce Merlin or Hispano-Suiza 12, to give the engine fuel injection and a swirl throttle.

Boon with the swirl throttle is that reduces the throttling losses under the rated height (ie. when the throttle needs to be partially closed), thus the engine makes better power on same boost and RPM. It would've indeed be handy on the Merlins (all of them were supercharged), especially the 1-speed supercharged types like the omni-present Mk.III and Mk.45.
HS 12Y was plagued with a bad S/C (among other things), that was solved by a good deal with the S/C designed and produced by the the Syzdlovski-Planiol duo (founders of the 'Turbomeca' company) that also featured variable stator blades in order to reduce the losses at low altitudes. 1st used on the -45 version, powered the D.520 fighter.
Fuel injection might give a 10% increase of power per Calum Douglas, while also offering better consumption figures. For the HS 12Y, it also represents the way to get rid of handful of carbs per engine.

The Mikulin AM-28, standard in the Ilyushin IL-2 Shturmovik, had a swirl throttle, and Germany was introducing it on some of its last piston developments in WWII. Had Germany had better strategic management and fewer shortages of key raw materials, we would surely have seen Daimler-Benz come back with a vengeance.The West had tinkered with it pre-war but apathy ruled.

DB was introducing the swirl throttle with the DB 603L (for Ta 152C) and 605L (for Bf 109K6 or K8), both engines also had the variable-speed 2-stage supercharger; yes, to late to matter. Indeed, DB thinkered with the swirl throttle pre-war, they used the Soviet-pattern throttle eventually.
Nice thing with the swirl throttle from German perspective is that it represents a way to somewhat circumvent the low boost dictated by low octane fuel their V12 engines used since the power is gained with it even with no increase of boost under the rated altitude.

When Hispano-Suiza abandoned further development, Swiss conglomerate Saurer took up the challenge for a while. Klimov had also long license-built it as the M-105, but as far as I know never nicked Mikulin's tech.

Soviets knew the swirl throttle as the 'Polikovsky's device'. Klimov introduced it on the VK-107 and -108 engines.
FWIW, my take on the subject: link
 
Further on the British engines:
- water-alcohol injection, especially for the Merlins and Griffons
- fuel injection, especially for anything more complicated than 9 cyl radials
- a really good S/C for the Bristol engines, especially the Hercules, from day one (not to wait until mid/late 1944 for the Hercules 100)
- Mercury and Pegasus with a better S/C, to help out early in the war (ditch the Taurus for all I care)
- perhaps a 2-speed S/C drive for the Dagger, so it is actually an useful engine for 1939-40?
- RR going with a big V12 (pre-Griffon) instead of Merlin by mid-1930s?
 
Further on the British engines:
- water-alcohol injection, especially for the Merlins and Griffons
- fuel injection, especially for anything more complicated than 9 cyl radials
- a really good S/C for the Bristol engines, especially the Hercules, from day one (not to wait until mid/late 1944 for the Hercules 100)
- Mercury and Pegasus with a better S/C, to help out early in the war (ditch the Taurus for all I care)
- perhaps a 2-speed S/C drive for the Dagger, so it is actually an useful engine for 1939-40?
- RR going with a big V12 (pre-Griffon) instead of Merlin by mid-1930s?

There are many who think that Bristol would have done better to throw itself at superchargers rather than sleeve valves. But Roy Fedden was in charge and he forced the sleeve valve through, while brushing superchargers aside. With hindsight, Bristol could certainly not have resourced both. One can only speculate how supercharged Bristol poppet-valve radials would have compared.
The Napier Dagger was one of Frank Halford's brainchilds. It suffered cooling problems and a second supercharger stage would not have helped matters. Moreover it soon became obsolescent and left behind by military requirements for higher-powered types, requirements which a second stage would not have met. Halford consulted with his old friend and mentor Harry Ricardo on where to take its replacement, and the result was the water-cooled Sabre, another sleeve-valve type but one which owed nothing to Fedden. Had a more direct uprated Dagger derivative been pursued, it would still have needed to adopt water-cooling but would have used conventional poppet valves. And probably still only one s/c stage, as the state of the art in the UK still had some way to go before that would be worthwhile.
I seem to recall that R-R mooted various high-power engines before initiating the clean-sheet Private Venture 12 (PV-12), which became the Merlin. Any of those early thoughts might have led somewhere, who knows; for a long time the PV12-Merlin 1 lineage showed more theoretical potential than actual achievement, and only dogged persistence on the part of the Ministry eventually turned it into a winner. The outstanding competitor to the Griffon was the two-stroke, fuel-injected, supercharged, sleeve valve (them again!) V-12 Crecy. This arose from another of Ricardo's ideas and was originally conceived as a Diesel (Junkers Jumo had just made the two-stroke aero Diesel work, and work well, and Napier had begun licensed manufacture, but all that is another story), however the Ministry asked R-R to develop it for petrol because that was more suited to the interceptor role they envisaged for the Merlin replacement. The Griffon and the Crecy vied with each other for some years until, in the latter half of the war, R-R decided that it could no longer support work on both; and the Griffon, with fewer development issues remaining, won the final showdown. The Crecy otherwise lacked only a swirl throttle to become perhaps the ultimate piston aero engine of all time.
 
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What if someone developed a radial engine with a motor-kanon?

My alternate history starts at Canadian Car and Foundry during the late 1930s. They are testing airplanes that include Wright R-1820m single-row, 9 cylinder radial engines. The synchronizer gear fails on a Grumman FF (CCF G-23) biplane fighter and its .5o caliber machine gun shoots off the propeller. Management is annoyed.
A light plane powered by a Pobjoy radial visits CCF at the critical moment.
A senior engineer muses "What if we install the machinegun to fire through the center of the prop shaft?"
CCF cooperates with Wright to develop an offset propeller speed reduction unit that displaces the prop shaft to the top of the engine. The entire engine has to be rotated 20 degrees to keep the prop shaft centered on the airframe. This also requires minor modifications to oil scavenging pipes in the lower cylinders. The prop hub now extends from the top edge of the engine cowling.
CCF builds and tests a G-23 with the modified engine/gun configuration and deems it a success. But it does not enter production because biplanes are obsolete by then.
When Gregor designs his FDB-1 biplane, his second prototype incorporates an R-1820 and the new PSRU. It still fails to sell to the RCAF.

A couple of years later, CCF gets a contract to build Grumman F4F Wildcats under license. Since they are destined for the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm, they get Wright R-1820 engines. CCF modifies a single example with the new PSRU. This leads to a second Wildcat prototype with the new PSRU and sells a few to the RCAF.
CCF soon adapts a Hispano-Suiza 20 x 99 mm cannon (standard on later marks of Hurricane and Spitfire) to fire through the R-1820. They even experiment with a Browning M4, 37 X 145 cannon "borrowed" from a Bell P-39 Airacobra.
Since this concept is limited to single-row radial engines, development continues through WW2. Fortunately, the R-1820 had plenty of room for improvement. While pre-war R-1820-78 Cyclones only produced 700 horsepower, Cold War R-1820-82WA (Grumman S2F Tracker) variants produced 1,525 hp.

Meanwhile Bristol did similar experiments with Pegasus and Perseus engines.
Alfa-Romeo did similar experiments with Model 128 radial engine.
Nakajima did similar experiments with a Hikari radial engine.

For further development ... What was the most powerful, single-row radial engine?
 
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There are many who think that Bristol would have done better to throw itself at superchargers rather than sleeve valves. But Roy Fedden was in charge and he forced the sleeve valve through, while brushing superchargers aside. With hindsight, Bristol could certainly not have resourced both. One can only speculate how supercharged Bristol poppet-valve radials would have compared.

Ironically enough, Bristol flew the 2-stage supercharged Pegasus aboard their Type 138 aircraft, capturing altitude records in 1936/37. Yes, supercharger >> layout of the valve gear.
Bristol poppet-valve 2-row engine would've been easier and cheaper to design and produce than the sleeve-valve types. Even with the same power vs. the sleeve valve types, these advantages matter a lot in a major war.

The Napier Dagger was one of Frank Halford's brainchilds. It suffered cooling problems and a second supercharger stage would not have helped matters. Moreover it soon became obsolescent and left behind by military requirements for higher-powered types, requirements which a second stage would not have met.

Note that I've suggested 2-speed drive for the S/C (1-stage type), not going for a 2-stage supercharger. Dagger's S/C drive was set for low altitude ('MS' gear in the RAF/AM lingo), the power above 1000 ft was on par with Kestrel. Having the high-altitude ('FS' per RAF) gearing, too, improves the power at greater altitudes.
Having the half-decent Dagger in production should've come in handy in the days of the time of RAF's build-up in the late 1930s.
Halford consulted with his old friend and mentor Harry Ricardo on where to take its replacement, and the result was the water-cooled Sabre, another sleeve-valve type but one which owed nothing to Fedden. Had a more direct uprated Dagger derivative been pursued, it would still have needed to adopt water-cooling but would have used conventional poppet valves. And probably still only one s/c stage, as the state of the art in the UK still had some way to go before that would be worthwhile.

Perhaps it was too bad the Sabre was not designed with poppe valves from day one?

For further development ... What was the most powerful, single-row radial engine?

Probably the post-war Cyclones.
 
Note that I've suggested 2-speed drive for the S/C (1-stage type), not going for a 2-stage supercharger.
Oh, sorry. Yes, that would have helped.

Perhaps it was too bad the Sabre was not designed with poppet valves from day one?
It would probably have gone into production sooner and been a bit more practical. But ease of manufacture and maintenance are not the foremost requirements for frontline military hardware. Since there is only one almost-flyable one in existence (at least, as far as I know its restoration is not yet complete), we cannot hope to modify a spare unit and find out which would really have been the better war machine.
 
Japanese ww2:
They are really in the hot water. But anyway:
- forget the licence production of the DB 601 engine
- two-stage superchargers for their 'better' engines (Ha-109, Kinsei, Kasei); out-source the small 2-row radial engines - Zuisei, Sakae - ASAP to Kawasaki and Aichi, so Nakajima and Mitsubishi can concentrate on the bigger types
- water-alcohol injection mandatory, since it helps if the only fuel is available is of low octane
 
It [Napier Sabre] would probably have gone into production sooner and been a bit more practical. But ease of manufacture and maintenance are not the foremost requirements for frontline military hardware. Since there is only one almost-flyable one in existence (at least, as far as I know its restoration is not yet complete), we cannot hope to modify a spare unit and find out which would really have been the better war machine.

Being available sooner, in bigger numbers and with better reliability is a thing for the military hardware. A working 'poppet-Sabre' available in good numbers might mean a de-bugged Typhoon already for early 1942 instead of 1943.
Sabre as-is was not that easy to manufacture, leaving it to power just two types of aircraft in ww2. If it was available sooner, in better numbers and with better reliability, it would've been a good engine that is actually available for the FAA.
 
Licences: zen/hood,#18/19. "Klimov stung". It was not for RR to judge where the National Interest lies in licences. Little risk-investment has ever been made by UK Aero Industry, less than little in military jet engines (obviously: how can risk be assessed when markets are at the whim of Export Licensing bureaucrats?) If anyone has been "stung" by royalty-free reverse engineering, it was not RR but their Paymaster. But we were not stung. Ministers 10/46 sold Derwent/Nene to USSR, bartered for grain, timber et al when we had no $ for materials to feed and house the blitzed. We knew the engines would be reversed, but hoped the Bear would be grateful to a still-Ally. It seemed a good idea at the time. (So did Xian/Spey 202, 13/12/75). None of this was within RR's competence to comment.

Between 2/46, Nene/Hispano-Suiza, and 1967, Allison RB168-62, I know of 15 jet licences, IN and OUT, by RR, plus the wide-ranging Collaboration Agreements with Westinghouse and M.A.N (largely VTOL). Such deals may cause leakage of Intellectual Property, setting up a competitor. Or: they may stimulate interchange, to everybody's benefit. The point is: that was not for RR to bother their minds with.

(As ap.#43 says) 14/7/53 RR/Westinghouse Agt led to Avon/XJ54: initiative was with each Nation's Ministers, not the firms. DoD wanted Wright (7/50: Olympus licence as J67) and Westinghouse to be credible in turbines alongside GE, PW; UK welcomed a chance for a two-way street under Korea-stress.
It was not RR's fault that Westinghouse/Avon failed.
 
Licences: zen/hood,#18/19. "Klimov stung"
Klimov is not mentioned in posts #18 and #19.
Nor is the term "stung".

Ministers 10/46 sold Derwent/Nene to USSR, bartered for grain, timber et al when we had no $ for materials to feed and house the blitzed.
Grain?
USSR was still recieving US and Canadian grain shipments into the early 70's.
Even 10/46 axial was the obvious way forward, centrifugal wasn't going much further. Known since much earlier.

Ref post #18 is to Armstrong Siddeley, not RR.

Sapphire and Avon 'failures' are made in the US.
 
Licences: zen/hood,#18/19. "Klimov stung". It was not for RR to judge where the National Interest lies in licences.
True as far as it goes; such deals are brokered - or at least vetted - by national governments. But the deal must respect the originator's licensing terms under the vendor country's laws, a government cannot break its own laws. As I understand the history (and I may be mistaken), Klimov & Co. were obliged to pay royalities like any other licensee. They did so for a while and then presently stopped bothering, thus ripping off R-R from that point on.

Little risk-investment has ever been made by UK Aero Industry, less than little in military jet engines (obviously: how can risk be assessed when markets are at the whim of Export Licensing bureaucrats?)
What do you mean by that? UK aerospace and engine companies have made a strong habit of high-risk investments since the dawn of aviation, both at home and overseas; their history is littered with the consequences. Can you give an example of the kind of risk investment you have in mind?
 
PV R&D. Rare.
V-A for Vanguard (RR had Tyne Launch Aid), but the State Corpn's order, 20/7/56, long preceded first flight, 20/1/59. Percival Prince, HS Argosy and 748 flew PV, but with grounds for their Boards to anticipate early RAF orders. Little military PV R&D has been done beyond modest study (naturally, due to Arms Export restrictions, though HAL on P.1121 rang up £1.2Mn. - a lot, 1956/7).
PV R&D is partly recoverable in overheads on those single-source contracts where prices are based on cost. So is Plant/Capital equipment, unless the contract is cancelled for Customer Convenience (Capital Clause Cover). Then it is paid in cash. Much was gifted by US taxpayers, if installed under MDAP/MSP, 1951-55.

Miltary is fully-funded cradle-to-grave (subject, we hope, to good procurement management dumping under-performance on Supplier, not Buyer); civil had 100% Govt funding through the post-War Brabazon suite, then Treasury Launch Aid (commonly 50% of an agreed Estimate; Concorde 100% of actuals), until the very recent settlement of the WTO Cases.

Where is investment risk? Yet the narrative is of meddling and worse by functionaries impeding genius. See GR.Edwards, V1000 cancellation "worst blunder of all". Go pitch to your Board.

When Sandys declined to buy (it was never cancelled) P.1121, 4/57, Camm decried the "lost opportunity" (British Phantom). But RAF had shedloads of US-part-funded Hunter 6s available to re-role (to be FGA.9/FR.10) free, because Ministers had reduced Fighter strength. No home lost opportunity, so widen horizons - see Northrop, to be F-5s, never ordered (for front line combat) by USAF. Camm should have gone to his Board and to those of ASM (Oh! same) and the other enginemen, to extract prototype funding for Customers to Fly before Buy.

What UK Aero has never faced is auto industry's £Billions/several years sunk into a new model before sales revenue. Bet the Company.
 
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Japanese ww2:
They are really in the hot water. But anyway:
- forget the licence production of the DB 601 engine
- two-stage superchargers for their 'better' engines (Ha-109, Kinsei, Kasei); out-source the small 2-row radial engines - Zuisei, Sakae - ASAP to Kawasaki and Aichi, so Nakajima and Mitsubishi can concentrate on the bigger types
- water-alcohol injection mandatory, since it helps if the only fuel is available is of low octane
Maybe all the piston engine stuff should be moved to a separate topic so it doesn't get lost between all the jet stuff . Anyway i mostly agree with what you say except i would have Aichi and Kawasaki build Kinsei/Ha-112s as these are the engines that replaced the unreliable inlines late in the war. Being simpler to build and more reliable perhaps instead of about 1800 Atsutas and 3500 Ha-40/140, they could built 3000 Kinsei and 5000 Ha-112, which is close to the actual planned production figures for the inline, not achieved because of production difficulties (especially crankshafts etc.) and continuing unreliability.

In addition i would cancel Ha-20 (waste of time, messed up the already problematic Ki-45 even more), Mamoru (total waste of design and production capacity) and possibly Zuisei because it already duplicated Ha-25/Sakae, though as i understand it was available a little bit earlier than Sakae. Can Sakae development be sped up a little bit to be available same time as the Zuisei was?

Reason i want Zuisei cancelled is because then Mitsubishi cand add the two speed supercharger to the Kinsei in the same timeframe as the OTL Ha-102, so the Kinsei-50 is in production in 1941, one year at least ahead of OTL. One year is a long time in WW2.

So then there would be two 14 cylinder Mitsubishi radials, Kinsei and Kasei, and two Nakajima, Sakae and Ha-41 series, to concentrate on developing them and their 18 cylinder developments (Mistubishi Ha-211 and Ha-104 and Nakajima Homare and Ha-219 respectively). That ought to be significantly better for IJAAF/IJNAAF than OTL.
 
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As to jets, i always wondered why Lyulka didn't work to uprate the AL-21F from the 11250 kgf of OTL, the R-27/29/35 was continuously uprated as you know among others by increasing turbine temperature. Iirc the AL-21F ran a bit cooler than R-29/35, so perhaps increased turbine temperature even by say 50-75 Kelvin would have resulted in say 12,000kgf for an uprated AL-21F. Can't have too much power!
 
PV R&D. Rare.

What UK Aero has never faced is auto industry's £Billions/several years sunk into a new model before sales revenue. Bet the Company.

Sorry, that is absolutely the opposite of how it has been.

As far back as 1911, the industry sent a deputation to Parliament to personally lobby the Secretary of State for War for financial support. He refused, insisting that the industry must finance its own growth and the government would do no more than order any aeroplanes that would suit its needs. It was only the arrival of war which changed that.

In British aero engines, the innovative companies like Rolls-Royce, Bristol, Napier and de Havilland poured all they could find into aero engine development, while independent research consultancies set up by the likes of Harry Ricardo and Frank Halford drew more from the private sector than from government. The sleeve valve developed by Bristol must be the most famous example of the protracted-development private-money pit; it took a decade and nearly broke the company before final success.

As for the protracted-costs myth, in the 1930s Airspeed underwent just such a lengthy period before finally turning a profit on their advanced monoplane transports. Rolls-Royce later poured so much money for so long into the RB-211 three-shaft turbofan that they became insolvent and saw refinancing and changes of ownership before eventually returning to profitability.

Throughout the 1920s and 30s the British aero industry led the world. Postwar we have been right up there in our niches, from the Rolls-Royce Pegasus and Hawker Harrier to Concorde to the B.Ae EAP which defined the Eurofighter Typhoon, and all arose from privately-funded R&D.

Of course we have had our government-funded monstrosities, but I cannot think of a stronger underlying theme to British aviation than the eternal struggle of independent investors betting their shirts and their companies to bring innovative products to market.

When Sandys declined to buy (it was never cancelled)
TSR-2 flew before it was, explicitly, cancelled and the agreed development funding withdrawn.
 
Maybe all the piston engine stuff should be moved to a separate topic so it doesn't get lost between all the jet stuff . Anyway i mostly agree with what you say except i would have Aichi and Kawasaki build Kinsei/Ha-112s as these are the engines that replaced the unreliable inlines late in the war. Being simpler to build and more reliable perhaps instead of about 1800 Atsutas and 3500 Ha-40/140, they could built 3000 Kinsei and 5000 Ha-112, which is close to the actual planned production figures for the inline, not achieved because of production difficulties (especially crankshafts etc.) and continuing unreliability.

Kawasaki was already making the engines from the Sakae family even before the Ha 40 entered production, almost 600 in 1941 (and 1300+ in 1942), continuing to do it as the war progressed. They've produced ~6500 of those from early 1941 until the war's end. So perhaps let them double that figure by not venturing in the DB 601A story?
Leaves Nakajima free to do the Ha 109 type, a far better engine than the Sakae, and somewhat better than Kinsei before the Kinsei gets the water-alcohol injection for the Dinah III (winter of 1944/45?)?

Aichi's DB 601 experience was a bad one. They've been making the Kotobuki (eg. 340 in 1940), and when flopped in 1941 with only 112 of Kotobukis produced, and just 22 of the V12s. In 1942 they were still awful, under 200 engine produced. Have Aichi switch to either Zuisei in 1940 (leaves Mitsubishi free to do Kinsei and Kasei by some time in 1942), or have them to switch to Kinsei indeed? Anything is better than the loopsided Astuta production.

At any rate, the earlier Japanese figure out that 1000+- HP engines are a bad thing, the more dangerous they become.

In addition i would cancel Ha-20 (waste of time, messed up the already problematic Ki-45 even more), Mamoru (total waste of design and production capacity) and possibly Zuisei because it already duplicated Ha-25/Sakae, though as i understand it was available a little bit earlier than Sakae. Can Sakae development be sped up a little bit to be available same time as the Zuisei was?

I'm not sure for the early Sakae. Nakajima was still in full production of the Ha-5 in 1941.
Yes, ditch the Ha-20 and Mamoru.
 
As i understand it the first methanol boosted 1500HP Ha-112 was flying in the Ki-46-III prototype as early as March 1943, and it was in production iirc in the first half of 1944. Perhaps KAWASAKI building more Ha-112 engines insted of the inlines will result in more radial engined Ki-61s (they have the Ha-112 from the start in this ATL) being built if the airframe capacity is there, so perhaps they can build say 4000 of them instead of about 3000 or so in OTL.
Ki-100 was a good machine and having say about 2000 of them instead of less than 400 would be good for IJAAF.

Similarly, if Aichi builds suficient Kinseis to cover the D4Y production (about 2000), then Mitsubishi can use it's own produced Kinsei-60s to build the A6M8 as soon as the engine is ready, maybe they can build about 1000 of them 1944-45.

As to Nakajima, i was puzzled why they haven't managed to get the 1300HP methanol boosted Sakae-31 to work, when Mitsubishi did with their 1500HP Kinsei-60. The A6M needed every HP it could get in 1944. Strangely, the army equivalent Ha-115-II worked well on Ki-43-III, so this must be a IJNAF blunder of some kind.

Regarding the Ha-109, i've seen people say it had a lot of potential, almost as much power as Kasei, but quite a bit smaller. Perhaps it could be further developed into a Ha-109-II with methanol boost and good for say 1750HP, but this is justified only in a scenario in which Ki-44 gets more priority (have Tachikawa build more Ki-44s instead of the weak although exceptionally nimble Ki-43). Perhaps the IJNAF can also use this engine on J2M instead of the bulkier Kasei, maybe the smaller engine would make them give up on extended shafts and cooling fans which were a source of constant trouble in the J2M.
 
Shove the Ha 109 (1500 HP for take off, 1300 HP at 5200m) on the "not-Ki-61" already in 1942. The water-alcohol version can go both there and, until the Homare is as ready as possible, on the Ki-84.
The earlier Ki-43 is phased out from production and service, the better.
 
sp #72: Throughout the 1920s and 30s the British aero industry led the world.

We are not, I hope, arguing on quality, but on funding-sources, so recognition of credit for that quality. I am saying that, however inventive the design team, funding from (us) either helped (50% Launch Aid for civil engines) or caused (100% State funding of Concorde) glorious products. And that Aid is obscured by industry's/journos' moans about the folly of cancellations. History should be presented as State/ Industry Partnership, not of valiant inventors battling to success despite myopic blockers.

So, for example, Hawker's design team bounced back to do on P.1127 exactly what I suggested could have been done when P.1121 failed to land the domestic Customer: persuade the Board to fund through to prototype metal-cutting. The project 20/6/58 secured 75% US-funding for the engine, and 22/6/60 MoS funds towards 2, 12/60+4 prototypes. So, firms could put their money where their mouth was: they very seldom did.

So: RB211: won exclusivity on L-1011 29/3/68; RR 1969 won £47.1Mn Launch Aid, 78% of then Estimate £60.25Mn. By 10/70 £60Mn had been spent with Certification distant...so (we) stumped up 66% to a ceiling of £89Mn. That led to over-trading so Bankruptcy, 4/2/71.
(We) then funded 100% of everything they did until privatisation, 20/5/87. Partnership...or what?

(my comment on not cancelled was maybe confusing - P.1121. TSR.2 was of course cancelled, costing us £195Mn. Let us not go there).
 
[UK aero] firms could put their money where their mouth was: they very seldom did.
No, in the context of postwar history that is utterly wrong. Few could do so after 1914, and as technologies and costs advanced it became ever more difficult. This was precisely the reason why, from the 1930s on, the industry progressively consolidated its meagre private resources into ever fewer and larger companies, to try and keep the flame alive (Nationalisation slightly accelerated the process during the postwar period, but further consolidations have continued since de-nationalisation).
The idea that say R-R could have followed its private RB 211 initiative through, without government backing, is absurd; it tried to do exactly that and went bust. That the government had to step in was not, as you claim, for want of trying.

You have to remember too that much US R&D financing came via the state-run NACA/NASA and via government subsidies disguised as hugely profitable technology-development contracts. If anybody needed state funding to innovate, it was the USA and USSR.

Seriously, I cannot imagine where your ideas about UK industry are coming from, certainly not from the historical facts. I think this conversation has gone far enough for others to make up their minds about it (I have now made use of the Ignore button so I won't be tempted to prolong it).
 
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Two examples of going it alone would be the BAC 1-11 and Rolls-Royce high-bypass family.

It was RR who went all guns blazing to nab the TriStar contract which blew up in their faces. But beyond getting a shoe-horn onto Airbus with government support its Trent development has only really been of benefit to non-UK manufacturers and the UK stake in Airbus. Even when it began looking at high-bypass engines there was little scope beyond a couple of projects like 2-11 and 3-11 or Trident/1-11 developments which all needed government funds as neither had been able to amass bank account busting numbers of sales. Without getting the engine on the A300 it may well have been the end of RR's dreams.

Beagle also was a PV on a massively ambitious scale but quickly went sour and the government having to pick up the tab until they could see it was a no hoper and binned it. LTV may have saved the day then again they may not have. Ironically it relied on Rolls-Royce taking out licences from Continental to provide suitable engines, the entire light aircraft market having died in the UK besides from a few Austers which were lugging around 1930s engines...

Hawker's board would have had to been munching magic mushrooms to imagine they could flog 500+ P.1121s without the RAF seal of approval (EE/BAC found it couldn't shift more than a couple of dozen Lightnings and that had the "By Royal Appointment" seal on it) and refurbing Hunters was easy money. Hawker might have gone for Hawk on its own but it knew the RAF needed something in that segment to help pick up the tab. It got to a point by 1961 where the banks were refusing HSA more credit and so much had been spent on diversification into steel and Canadian lumber; which shows you where the real investment opportunities were - timber over trying to get BOAC to buy something non-Boeing, switching gear over trying to get the RAF to calm down its latest Supermarination boondoggle....

V.1000 was a non-starter, Edwards might have believed that but BOAC wasn't even slightly interested. It just put Conways on its 707s, making V-bomber swords into ploughshares.

And yes, with so much MIC cash sloshing around no US company could claim state funds were not bankrolling their efforts.
 
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Oh the military side in recent decades PV isn't even really PV. Its an explicit overhead on government contracts. So its basically government money but directed by the company. Its not as if they're raising money from shareholders and investing that; its a one way train of dividends.
 
The Nene was also licence produced by other countries, including France.
Not until the SMB-2 did Dassault got a viable french turbojet to put inside its aircraft.
Before that, we put a Nene into the Vampire and turned it into the Mistral.
The Mystere II and IV had a tay engine.

As for alternate French engines... SNECMA sucked. I mean: really. They did an honest job with the Atar, but it took until the M88 they were on par with the British and Americans.

So who could have lit a fire under SNECMA rear end to make them a bit more competitive ?
Post WWII and after the 1938 horrors that led to SNECMA being created in the first place; only Turboméca and Hispano Suiza (Nene, Tay: Verdon) ever tried to compete in turbojets.

Of the two, Turboméca would be by far the most robust - considering the empire they built in helicopter turbines and turboprop derivatives.

Alas, their one and only atempt, the Gabizo, was a dismal failure.

In the FFO / FTL universe I had Turboméca in exile in Algiers going to America and getting in touch with Lockheed for P-38 compressors - as Turboméca and Planiol had done splendid compressors for the D-520 HS12Y-49 engine.
So while working on P-38 compressors, Planiol stumble on the L-1000 / J37 ultra-advanced engine that OTL never got a chance. Turboméca then use it as basis to play havoc with SNECMA Atar turbojet fiefdom... with a much more advanced design.
 
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