Alternative fighter for Argentine AF & Navy during Falklands war.

[Wotan]

One squadron of jet fighters based on the Falkland airfield would have also posed massive problems to the landings and the subsequent logistic support required.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Gnat has little range no ? Could never fly from Argentina to Falklands and back. Not sure it could fly out of Port Stanley runway.

When tested by the RAF against the Hunter in the 1958 VRET it had a combat radius of 188nm against the required 240nm. Dunno about using Port Stanley runway, the VRET was done in the Middle East on at least 1 compacted sand runway, so the runway requirements were pretty tough.

 

[Scott Kenny]

And the following [Gnat F.1] performance numbers:

• 0.64 thrust/weight at take-off (clean). Similar to an F-8E Crusader and better than all A-4 Skyhawks except for the souped-up A-4M
• ~0.283 fuel fraction at take-off (clean). Similar to a clean Etendard IV with full fuel, or an F-8E Crusader or A-4 Skyhawk with 85% fuel
• ~700m take-off run lightly loaded with 2x AIM-9s (3,550kg), ~900m at 4,100kg max take-off weight
• ~650m landing run at 2,800kg landing weight (200kg fuel + 2x AIM-9s)
• ~200nm max range at sea level with allowances for take-off, landing and 2.5 minutes combat (this aligns with the Ajeet's combat radius of ~93nm with 2x 500lb bombs)

All in all the the runway take-off and landing performance is definitely compatible with Port Stanley's 1,200m runway. Thrust/weight is on par with high-performance aircraft like the F-8 and A-4M. Fuel fraction with the wet wing is decent but the max combat radius is limited unless you add external fuel tanks.

That's marginal for a rejected takeoff. Add takeoff and landing lengths together and compare to runway length. 1350+m versus 1200m runway.

Your V1 decision point is going to be many seconds before your rotate speed.

 

[Rule of cool]

This thread time and time again has come back to those ribbons of tarmac being a key driver of air power.

Which is good, because it makes my obsession with them seem less unhealthy, or so I tell myself anyway.

 

[H_K]

That's marginal for a rejected takeoff. Add takeoff and landing lengths together and compare to runway length. 1350+m versus 1200m runway.

Your V1 decision point is going to be many seconds before your rotate speed.

Perfectly normal to have a gap between V1 and Vr during which you're putting your trust in your zero zero ejection seat. Especially in wartime.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Perfectly normal to have a gap between V1 and Vr during which you're putting your trust in your zero zero ejection seat. Especially in wartime.

Not wrong, but it does mean that pretty much any rejected takeoff is writing off the plane in this stiuation. Not ideal. We're honestly back to sending the engineers in Wave 2, to add turning loops on both ends of the runway plus maybe 50m of marston matting each side end.

 

[Yellow Palace]

This thread time and time again has come back to those ribbons of tarmac being a key driver of air power.

Having done a little digging, the 1976 Shackleton Report found that the full economic potential of the islands couldn't be realised with the 1,250-metre runway then under construction. The recommendation to do so was the only thing underlined in the entire report.

An extension to 2,200 metres and strengthening to an LCN of between 65 and 70 would allow operation of 737, as well as 707s at light weights. Doing so at that time would have been relatively cheap as the plant and workforce were already on site for the work.

It goes without saying that such a runway would have been very useful for military purposes to whomever occupied the island. It didn't make it into the report - which had as an unofficial goal a raprochemment between the Falklands and Argentina - but Lord Shackleton made much the same point privately.

 

[Rule of cool]

Having done a little digging, the 1976 Shackleton Report found that the full economic potential of the islands couldn't be realised with the 1,250-metre runway then under construction. The recommendation to do so was the only thing underlined in the entire report.

An extension to 2,200 metres and strengthening to an LCN of between 65 and 70 would allow operation of 737, as well as 707s at light weights. Doing so at that time would have been relatively cheap as the plant and workforce were already on site for the work.

It goes without saying that such a runway would have been very useful for military purposes to whomever occupied the island. It didn't make it into the report - which had as an unofficial goal a raprochemment between the Falklands and Argentina - but Lord Shackleton made much the same point privately.

Funnily enough Argentina flew 737s (and BAC111s) into Port Stanley during their impressive airlift during the war.

 

[carvalho2008]

Funnily enough Argentina flew 737s (and BAC111s) into Port Stanley during their impressive airlift during the war.

There is also an unpaved section, despite the runway being only 1,250 meters long. Barring fog and rain, weather conditions are excellent for takeoffs: low temperatures, sea-level elevation, and relative winds of up to 30 knots, with an overall average of 16 knots. This remains fairly constant regardless of the month.

 

[H_K]

There is also an unpaved section, despite the runway being only 1,250 meters long. Barring fog and rain, weather conditions are excellent for takeoffs: low temperatures, sea-level elevation, and relative winds of up to 30 knots, with an overall average of 16 knots. This remains fairly constant regardless of the month.

The issue with Port Stanley was always more landing: wet runway which increased landing distances and the risk of squalls reducing visibility below minimums with no suitable divert field available.

So losing fighters due to fuel starvation or runway excursions was a risk that had to be factored in.

 

[Rule of cool]

There is also an unpaved section, despite the runway being only 1,250 meters long. Barring fog and rain, weather conditions are excellent for takeoffs: low temperatures, sea-level elevation, and relative winds of up to 30 knots, with an overall average of 16 knots. This remains fairly constant regardless of the month.

Where was the unpaved section? IIRC only 1 end was suitable for extension as the ground at the other was too soft and boggy.

 

[EwenS]

Where was the unpaved section? IIRC only 1 end was suitable for extension as the ground at the other was too soft and boggy.

The whole area around the runway was soft & boggy. When it was extended after the War several thousand tons (IIRC) of stone had to be quarried, using machinery brought in from the UK, to stabilise the ground before the PSP surface could be laid.

 

[Rule of cool]

The whole area around the runway was soft & boggy. When it was extended after the War several thousand tons (IIRC) of stone had to be quarried, using machinery brought in from the UK, to stabilise the ground before the PSP surface could be laid.

Yes, it was such a massive job that I think there are strict limits to what a well planned an executed Argentine extension operation could achieve in a few weeks between the invasion and the response. Probably not much more than the rumoured 500m, an arrestor wire and maybe some PSP handstand and gravel access tracks.

 

[taralon]

I haven't read through the entire thread, but why not the F-5C? They were being heavily marketed around the time that the 1970 mirage purchases and at the time they could have purchased 2x as many fighters, and still had money left over for an expansion of their A4 fleet. Sure in 1978 they wouldn't have been able to purchase new F-5s from the US, but at that point they could have increased their Super Etendard purchase instead of getting IAI Neshers, and a larger order may have resulted in having more planes and missiles on hand for Exocet strikes.

The F-5C's were apparently pretty easy to modify for probe and drogue refueling, and shouldn't have an issue tanking from a C130, and with full drop tanks wouldn't even need to tank for combat air patrols over the Falklands.

 

[Rule of cool]

I haven't read through the entire thread, but why not the F-5C? They were being heavily marketed around the time that the 1970 mirage purchases and at the time they could have purchased 2x as many fighters, and still had money left over for an expansion of their A4 fleet. Sure in 1978 they wouldn't have been able to purchase new F-5s from the US, but at that point they could have increased their Super Etendard purchase instead of getting IAI Neshers, and a larger order may have resulted in having more planes and missiles on hand for Exocet strikes.

The F-5C's were apparently pretty easy to modify for probe and drogue refueling, and shouldn't have an issue tanking from a C130, and with full drop tanks wouldn't even need to tank for combat air patrols over the Falklands.

Argentina was under a US Arms embargo from 1977 but received 50 of 75 A4s (1st batch of 25 in 1966), 10 of 17 Mirage IIIs and 12 Canberra's in the 70s prior to the embargo and 7 Mirage IIIs, 39 Daggers and 5 Super Etendards after the 1977 embargo but before the 1982 war.

I'd say the Mirage III is a better fighter than the F5 and the A4 is a better attack aircraft, so choosing the F5 instead of those types is a retrograde step and would be a limiting factor once the embargo kicks in. In any case bringing about 100 jets into service in the decade before the war is a pretty good effort from a small-medium power.

 

[taralon]

Argentina was under a US Arms embargo from 1977 but received 50 of 75 A4s (1st batch of 25 in 1966), 10 of 17 Mirage IIIs and 12 Canberra's in the 70s prior to the embargo and 7 Mirage IIIs, 39 Daggers and 5 Super Etendards after the 1977 embargo but before the 1982 war.

I'd say the Mirage III is a better fighter than the F5 and the A4 is a better attack aircraft, so choosing the F5 instead of those types is a retrograde step and would be a limiting factor once the embargo kicks in. In any case bringing about 100 jets into service in the decade before the war is a pretty good effort from a small-medium power.

In pure speed, yes the Mirage III is probably a better fighter, but the F5c even without refueling could fly to the Falklands from the mainland, have fuel for 15-30 minutes of combat before it would have to leave for the mainland to refuel. Against the Harrier, I would expect that the F5 would do equally as well one to one. If you substitue the initial 12 Mirage IIIs with F5c/a you'd have 20-30 fighter airframes you could mount a rotating combat air patrol with over the island and/or escort the A4s/Super Etendards in their strikes against the British surface vessels. The post 1977 purchases would have to be Mirage IIIs or their Israeli equivalents and Super Etendards as US and UK had them under arms Embargo. It would also give Argentina a better numerical advantage against the initial airwing on the Hermes and Invincible. I wouldn't suggest replacing the A4 purchases at all, but maybe further increasing them. If Argentina purchased 20 F5c/as they'd still have roughly 6 million left over from the OTL purchase of Mirage IIIs to spend on additional A4s.

 

[Yodasgrandad]

The Argentine planes didn't have 10-15 minutes 'spare' time over the islands in which attack aircraft could pick a good attack approach, drop their bombs and then turn around to face the Sea Harriers if intercepted. Similarly the few times Mirage IIIs did fly over the islands they didn't have 10-15 minutes time on a CAP station plus a fuel allowance for combat, like the Sea Harriers did.

This is why the airfield gets so much attention, even if only for minimum viable capability, as it transforms the FAA/COAN fuel situation under combat conditions. The (majority of?) missions that never encountered a Sea Harrier would happen as they did historically, but in the event of an interception an A4 or Dagger could turn and defend itself with guns to at least frustrate the interception, knowing that they could land at Port Stanley and with a quick turn-around leave before the RN could lay on naval gunfire or a bombing mission.

The same applies to Mirage III 'escort' or 'decoy' missions, if the opportunity came they could engage at high speed to frustrate the Sea Harriers and then do a quick turn-around at Port Stanley. Indeed this is exactly how the Sea Harriers used 'Sids Strip' once it became available, as well as that one time where they landed on Fearless and Intrepid after an interception ran their fuel down.

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On that first day of air-air fighting we saw that the Argie fast-movers did have the time and the fuel to conduct attempted fighter cover ops, and they loitered long enough to dogfight and maneuver and get themselves splashed.

Why did the myth of “no time to hang around” get started?

Two reasons.

One involved the FAA removing Mirages from fighter cover in the theatre, for asset preservation, to let other aircraft do alternative missions. And so unlike the low-drag lightweight air-air weapons mix on the first day, the subsequent air-ship and air-ground ops conducted by the Argies involved heavy bomb loads with high drag, which consumed more fuel than when armed for air-air combat. Higher inbound fuel consumption, less loiter time.

 

[Rule of cool]

In pure speed, yes the Mirage III is probably a better fighter, but the F5c even without refueling could fly to the Falklands from the mainland, have fuel for 15-30 minutes of combat before it would have to leave for the mainland to refuel. Against the Harrier, I would expect that the F5 would do equally as well one to one. If you substitue the initial 12 Mirage IIIs with F5c/a you'd have 20-30 fighter airframes you could mount a rotating combat air patrol with over the island and/or escort the A4s/Super Etendards in their strikes against the British surface vessels. The post 1977 purchases would have to be Mirage IIIs or their Israeli equivalents and Super Etendards as US and UK had them under arms Embargo. It would also give Argentina a better numerical advantage against the initial airwing on the Hermes and Invincible. I wouldn't suggest replacing the A4 purchases at all, but maybe further increasing them. If Argentina purchased 20 F5c/as they'd still have roughly 6 million left over from the OTL purchase of Mirage IIIs to spend on additional A4s.

In air-to-air combat pure speed is not a 'nice to have', its a key ingredient and often a marker for 'energy'. It allows a fighter pilot to engage and disengage at will, to convert speed into position and a deficit of speed is very difficult to overcome.

You assume that budget is the prime driver of numbers, affording 10 Mirages means you can afford 20 F5Cs, but that isn't the case. There's no point in having 20 fighters if you can only crew and support 10 and only have room at your bases for 10. Buying 20 F5s might mean spending a fortune on expanding hardstand, hangar and HAS space, expanding training pipelines and building more accommodation, mess facilities, gyms and soccer pitches for these extra support staff. This is no small thing; in 1982 the southern airfields were considered 'packed' when the squadrons deployed to fight the war.

 

[Rule of cool]

On that first day of air-air fighting we saw that the Argie fast-movers did have the time and the fuel to conduct attempted fighter cover ops, and they loitered long enough to dogfight and maneuver and get themselves splashed.

Why did the myth of “no time to hang around” get started?

Two reasons.

One involved the FAA removing Mirages from fighter cover in the theatre, for asset preservation, to let other aircraft do alternative missions. And so unlike the low-drag lightweight air-air weapons mix on the first day, the subsequent air-ship and air-ground ops conducted by the Argies involved heavy bomb loads with high drag, which consumed more fuel than when armed for air-air combat. Higher inbound fuel consumption, less loiter time.

Mirage IIIs and Daggers when used in the air-to-air role had a 'loiter' time of 5-10 minutes over the Falklands, in contrast the Sea Harriers had a 15-minute CAP time over Port San Carlos. More than that, the Sea Harrier's 15-minutes CAP time was robust, properly factored into mission planning without restriction and was only exceeded once at which point the RN had a 'Plan B' of landing on the LPDs. It didn't rely on flying at high altitude and not coming down to fight, not using afterburner and using oversize and performance draining 'ferry' tanks like the Argentine Mirages and Daggers.

 

[Darthmalgus]

Mirage IIIs and Daggers when used in the air-to-air role had a 'loiter' time of 5-10 minutes over the Falklands, in contrast the Sea Harriers had a 15-minute CAP time over Port San Carlos. More than that, the Sea Harrier's 15-minutes CAP time was robust, properly factored into mission planning without restriction and was only exceeded once at which point the RN had a 'Plan B' of landing on the LPDs. It didn't rely on flying at high altitude and not coming down to fight, not using afterburner and using oversize and performance draining 'ferry' tanks like the Argentine Mirages and Daggers.

Exactly,

It was the Sea Harriers job to shoot them down. And they refused to be drawn up into the stratosphere to mess around.

And at that height, all the Mirage and Dagger advantages melted away.

Good tactics beats good paper stats.

 

[Darthmalgus]

On that first day of air-air fighting we saw that the Argie fast-movers did have the time and the fuel to conduct attempted fighter cover ops, and they loitered long enough to dogfight and maneuver and get themselves splashed.

Why did the myth of “no time to hang around” get started?

Two reasons.

One involved the FAA removing Mirages from fighter cover in the theatre, for asset preservation, to let other aircraft do alternative missions. And so unlike the low-drag lightweight air-air weapons mix on the first day, the subsequent air-ship and air-ground ops conducted by the Argies involved heavy bomb loads with high drag, which consumed more fuel than when armed for air-air combat. Higher inbound fuel consumption, less loiter time.

A year or two after the war the Royal Navy had the opportunity to put its Sea Harriers up against the Mirage IllOs of the Royal Australian Air Force - essentially the same as those flown by Argentina- in an exercise. It was a much more equal fight, the Australians using their jets in the way the Argentines should have.

Didn’t help in contrast, they had no practical experience of flying dissimiliar air combat training or operating under simulated wartime conditions. It’s pilots also did not enjoy the amount of monthly flying hours Royal Navy pilots did.

No matter what fighter Argentina could have mounted against the British Task Force the result would have been the same.

Had the British had HMS Eagle or a better condition Ark Royal with their F-4K Phantoms the Argentines would have had a much worse time of it.

With such a true aircraft carrier and the then-available mix of aircraft it could carry, and their associated AEW and ordnance capabilities, there would have been no “close run thing” but rather immediate air supremacy for the task force.

A more effective CAP to the point of being able to detect and intercept Argie aircraft long before they even approached the Falklands (the Fairey Gannet AEW role allowed bandit detection at 100 miles or so)