It was reported in September that the U. S. Defense Resources Board had approved development of a new Advanced Tactical Support Aircraft (ATSA), to replace the EA-6B electronic warfare, S-3 antisubmarine, and E-2C airborne early warning aircraft. In theory, then, the future carrier air wing might consist of only three types of fixed-wing aircraft: fighters (either F-14 or Advanced Tactical Fighter [ATF]), strike (Advanced Tactical Aircraft [ATA]), and ATSA. The ATSA likely would shift missions more by changing software than by changing internal configuration. It would employ “smart skin” antennas capable of operating over a very broad frequency range, and very-high-capacity, general- purpose computers. In its E-2C mode, an ATSA might use conformal antennas along the leading edges of its wings and around its nose. The same antennas might perform surface search and inverse synthetic aperture radar ship identification when the aircraft was in its S-3 mode. Some of them would be used to monitor sonobuoys. In the EA-6B mode, the same antennas would be used to transmit jamming signals.
The great appeal of the ATSA is that it would drastically reduce the range of spare parts and maintenance equipment required to be carried on board a carrier. Moreover, it would allow the carrier air wing to be tailored instantly to changing conditions. For example, of three carriers operating together, one might function as an antiair warfare (AAW) ship, one as an ASW ship, and one as a strike carrier. If the ATSA were fully flexible, then the ATSAs on board the AAW ship would function as E-2Cs and EA-6Bs; those on board the strike ship would be EA-6B escort jammers; and those on board the ASW ship would function as S-3s do now. Carriers currently accommodate about five E-2Cs, five EA-6Bs, and ten S-3s, an overhead that cuts into their strike complements. In theory, then, a truly flexible ATSA could drastically reduce this overhead and increase striking power.
There are, of course, some important caveats. The ideal ATSA would serve for all three missions, changing only its software (i.e., changing on board the carrier). This might be extended to adding some underwing pods, as in the case of a jammer. The next best thing would be a common airframe, which would cut acquisition costs without adding the sort of operational flexibility suggested here.
Some earlier projects suggest that these goals are not as farfetched as they may appear. In about 1960, Grumman proposed an electronic warfare conversion of the A-6 Intruder, in which jamming pods would be hung from the underwing hard points and new avionics essentially snapped in, replacing the standard cockpit panels. Some special antennas (particularly the tail crown) were still needed, but the proposal was a true dual-purpose aircraft. It failed because electronic warfare required two more operators and a big computer. But computer power is now more easily packaged than in 1960, and both of the alternative ATSA missions need extra crewmen. They presumably would be supplied with general- purpose displays that could function as electronic warfare terminals-
Similarly, during the 1970s the A-6E was proposed for ASW use, carrying sonobuoys in underwing pods and communicating its data back to the carrier, much as LAMPS Mk-I helicopters communicate back to their frigates. This was not as attractive as an S-3, but it had the advantage of using existing carrier aircraft and thus increasing the carrier s potential striking force of A-6s.
Several aircraft have been proposed as the bases for the ATSA: the Lockheed S-3 (with new wings and canard surfaces), the ATA, and even the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor. For example, the ATSA might be an ATA with a stretched fuselage (for more crew members) and a “smarter skin. Using a derivative of the ATA might be attractive politically because Congress has pressed the services to cut the total number of new aircraft programs by collaboration. The ATA is a mandated collaborative effort (to replace the A-6 and the Air Force’s F-l 11); the ATSA would be a Navy-only airplane, at least initially.
Two other carrier roles might be filled by ATSA variants: the electronic intelligence role—to be filled by ES-3s and currently filled by EA-3s—and the carrier-on-board delivery role.
Whatever design is chosen for the ATSA, it and the ATA are likely 10 consume much of the naval aviation budget in the next five to ten years- That probably explains recently reported decisions to cease production ot new A-6s and EA-6Bs after 1990. The prospective cost of these aircraft may also affect the Navy’s participation in the Air Force’s ATF program, which is envisaged as a stealthy follow-on to the F-l5; the program also is designed to produce a naval version to replace the F-14.
