US FF(X) Program - DISCUSSION

johnpjones1775 said:
lol it’s a concept, there is no actual design decided on, and definitely doesn’t touch on the FII design that hasn’t even begun to be discussed in any serious manner.

I literally know some one advising on the program as a liaison officer to Congress.
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It is really cool watching it get mired in the foot dragging.

At least when it finally crawls into the production stages it shouldn't get overly fat like FFG(X).
 
TomS said:
What really happened was that DD-21 was planned to directly replace the DD-963s, and the Navy simply abandoned the ocean escort/deep-water ASW role almost completely.
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I don’t think Friedman was talking about DD-21 in the ocean escort role. I understood it to refer to the AAW capabilities DD-21 would bring to a CSG. I believe it is on an earlier page where the requirements for a system below Aegis were discussed
Scott Kenny said:
The only major increase in capability of FFGX over the FFG7s was adding Aegis. Technically FFGX was even down some missiles compared to FFG7, 32 versus 40.
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This is so hugely inaccurate it beggars belief. For one the powerplant is significantly more advanced, allowing for the integration of DEWs. It also has greater C3 infrastructure to work as a UxV teaming node. I even believe the radar system is more sensitive than legacy PESA radar systems in a smaller package. The undersea warfare suite combining both a towed array and VDS is do more sensitive than legacy systems, before we account for the lower noise of FFG(X) itself. FFG-7s were also incredibly skint on space for growth, both in displacement and volume. Final nail in the coffin: they don’t even fill the same roles

Yeah, raw cell counts are indeed lower, but this is a poor argument when the US navy overall is trending towards lower cell counts anyway, utilising offboard systems (for example cells on LUSVs)
Kat Tsun said:
At least when it finally crawls into the production stages it shouldn't get overly fat like FFG(X).
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It has lower SLA margins than FFG(X) and more changes to make if you want to reach anything resembling FFG(X) combat capability. Again, apples to oranges comparison
 
Kat Tsun said:
It is really cool watching it get mired in the foot dragging.

At least when it finally crawls into the production stages it shouldn't get overly fat like FFG(X).
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Mired in foot dragging? The new program was announced like mid December.
How fast did you expect this to go?
 
Scott Kenny said:
The only major increase in capability of FFGX over the FFG7s was adding Aegis. Technically FFGX was even down some missiles compared to FFG7, 32 versus 40.
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AEGIS/SPY-6 is a huge step up from the grand total of two channels of fire on the FFG-7.

Missile counts on the FFG-62 are 32 cells of VLS plus 16 NSM, so minimum of 48 missiles (plus more if any of those 32 are ESSM quadpacks).
 
ESSM is never probably going into FF(X). It's a great solution in most ways except cost. There is this romantic myth that ESSM are cheap missiles, but that is far from the truth. ESSM is not a huge savings over Standard SM-2. When ESSM came about it was an era where the USN was trying to get rid of any remnants of Tartar program and its successor, Standard SM-1. In hindsight, it really should have probably been adapted to new roles rather than abandoned.

I was excited about the ESSM Block 1 until I read about their inability to mass ripple-fire missiles like I was expecting it to work. Apparently the command link has some major limitations. FFG-7 with its SARH and limitations of the illuminators isn't much less capable within its limitations. ESSM wasn't really pitted against SM-1, but rather at Sea Sparrow users. Granted the ESSM has advantages that the Sea Sparrow will never have, but it was not as big of operational advantage as it sounded until they hit Block 2. Sea Sparrow was relatively cheap, so it wasn't a gold-plated solution. A navalized NASAMS in my opinion would be a better fit for an FF(X) when it comes to both cost and installation.

The Hellfire is probably what will ultimately protect FF(X) against aircraft. And they will get Sea RAM for anti-missile. Maybe they could also figure out Miniature Hit-to-Kill (MHTK) using a Multi-Mission Launcher (MML) derivative for USN anti-drone use. MML is a 3x5 tube launcher that fits on medium trucks, so not a huge system. Unit cost per MHTK is pretty affordable, nearly 1/3 the price of a Stinger, and would have gotten cheaper with orders. MHTK was designed with focus primarily on knocking down incoming artillery shells and rockets. Its cost made far more sense to use MHTK against drones than most other SAMs and was light enough it could have been adapted for use on aerial drones to take down enemy drones. Instead of replacing any CIWS they could offer it as an addon or replacement to existing Typhon/Mark 38 or Mini Typhon/Mark 49 mounts.
 
johnpjones1775 said:
You keep saying what FF(X) is or isn’t when there hasn’t even been an actual initial design released beyond ‘based off of NSC’
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I've made three posts concerning the FF(X), and all I said was that "The OHPs were a good ship, with good sensors and armaments appropriate to their role. The FF(X) is no such beast." Since as currently described, they are really just vaporware everyone is projecting/hoping will be something wonderful. History has shown that's not going to be the case.
 
Felocie said:
Yeah, raw cell counts are indeed lower, but this is a poor argument when the US navy overall is trending towards lower cell counts anyway, utilising offboard systems (for example cells on LUSVs)
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Do you really have faith that the USN will actually deploy USVs in substantial numbers (with filled magazines) in any reasonable time? We heard the same talk about UCAS and that was essentially ignored after 2015.
 
greedo said:
Do you really have faith that the USN will actually deploy USVs in substantial numbers (with filled magazines) in any reasonable time?
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This is the basis of NAVSEA's future fleet architecture and this impacts the construction and design of current and future vessels. It is entirely possible that this fails due to political meddling (see the DDG-1000 debacle) but as it stands we need to contextualize decisions within the scope of today, not 1975
 
MadRat said:
The Hellfire is probably what will ultimately protect FF(X) against aircraft.
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Hellfire is not an anti-aircraft solution. It's CUAS and counter-small boats.

RAM Block 2 is the closest thing FF(X) will have to anti-aircraft capability. With IR all-the-way homing and HAS, it's no longer limited to just emitting missile threats, but it is really only suitable for slow aircraft or jets doing reckless things like trying to dumb bomb a ship at sea.
 
Felocie said:
First of all FFG-7 did not have ASROC, it's sonar was incapable of utilizing the system. Secondly what gives you the impression FF(X) is an OHP successor?
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One would have assumed that, because they're calling it a frigate, it would have similar roles and capabilities as previous US frigates like the OHP and Knox classes.
 
MadRat said:
I was excited about the ESSM Block 1 until I read about their inability to mass ripple-fire missiles like I was expecting it to work.
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Current production is the active radar homing Block 2, criticising Block 2 for a Block 1 limitation doesn't really work.

MadRat said:
A navalized NASAMS in my opinion would be a better fit for an FF(X) when it comes to both cost and installation.
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NASAMS 3 uses either AIM 120, AIM-9X, or AMRAAM ER, which is ESSM with the AIM-120 guidance section. So compared to ESSM Block 2, you either get shorter-ranged missiles, or a new ESSM variant with only an X band datalink, rather than the dual S and X band datalink of ESSM Block 2, plus the problem of finding somewhere to point the efflux from a non-VLS launcher. So you're adding a new missile to the logistics load for no gain and several new problems.

MadRat said:
The Hellfire is probably what will ultimately protect FF(X) against aircraft.
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ESSM: Mach 4 to 50km
CAMM: Mach 3 to 25km
RAM Blk 2: Mach 2.8 to 16km
Stinger: Mach 2.5 to 8km
Starstreak: Mach 3-4 to 7km
Martlet/LMM: Mach 1.5 to 8km
Hellfire: Mach 1.3 to 8km
AGR-20F Falco: Mach 2 to 11km (air-launched, it'll be less ship-launched)

Hellfire as a SAM is about the worst option possible. It's out-performed by MANPADS. If RAM is aboard, it's going to be chosen over Hellfire every time versus an aircraft threat. It's only versus low performance drones that Hellfire is worth considering as the cheaper option. (I do wonder if Hellfire is also ceiling limited in comparison to the various MANPADS and SAMs - yes, you can drop it off a drone at 50,000ft, but how high can it go going up, not down).

MadRat said:
Maybe they could also figure out Miniature Hit-to-Kill (MHTK) using a Multi-Mission Launcher (MML) derivative for USN anti-drone use.
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MML and MHTK are both several years dead, though MML sort of lives on as the re-engineered Enduring Shield launcher, which only uses AIM-9X in a 6x3 configuration.
 
They are all similar in performance due to more or less same range/performance requirements, hence, ~8 km for ground launch and ~11 km air launched. The difference is altitude while helicopter speed is rather neglegible. The size difference is in their kinematics, the Martlet/LMM for example is better than AGR-20F/APKWS in every respect on paper but practicaly negligible.

DWG said:
(I do wonder if Hellfire is also ceiling limited in comparison to the various MANPADS and SAMs - yes, you can drop it off a drone at 50,000ft, but how high can it go going up, not down).
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nominal 1700 ft (altitude difference) up to 2300 ft for extreme
The important thing is terminal speed that will determine and limit the intercept to targets with a certain max. speed (roughly 66% or so).
It won't be able to intercept missiles or rockets if altitude comes into play.
 
Sferrin said:
One would have assumed that, because they're calling it a frigate, it would have similar roles and capabilities as previous US frigates like the OHP and Knox classes.
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But the OHP and a Knox classes in and of themselves filled separate roles, particularly during the later years of their lives
DWG said:
but people are going to demand you use it to fill FFG-sized holes if you don't actually have any real FFGs.
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I'll let that pearl of wisdom speak for itself, not sure why USN operations should, or indeed would, be dictated by "people" who think a slightly modified USCG cutter should be engaging in the same missions as an FFG-7

This isn't to say I love FF(X) but the idea that fleet architecture shouldn't evolve is beyond me
 
Felocie said:
But the OHP and a Knox classes in and of themselves filled separate roles, particularly during the later years of their lives

I'll let that pearl of wisdom speak for itself, not sure why USN operations should, or indeed would, be dictated by "people" who think a slightly modified USCG cutter should be engaging in the same missions as an FFG-7

This isn't to say I love FF(X) but the idea that fleet architecture shouldn't evolve is beyond me
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Did the roles suddenly go away? Clearly most other navies think they still exist.
 
Sferrin said:
Did the roles suddenly go away? Clearly most other navies think they still exist.
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Yes and no, and in some ways they never existed. Recall the Ocean Escort fleet, and even the Spruances were built on the idea that the Soviet Navy would try to cut off Atlantic supply lines which we now realize was not a serious (or attainable) goal. Ultimately the USN has quite successfully filled the air warfare role in the post 1991 world via masses of Burkes but has failed to fill the ASW role due to the outcome of DDG-1000 and the currently abortive acquisition of FFG(X). Notably the composition of the PLAN forces different focuses on the USN than they had during the Cold War, and when we combine this with advances in technology I do not consider the OHP to be the best point of comparison for a modern USN frigate.
 
Felocie said:
Notably the composition of the PLAN forces different focuses on the USN than they had during the Cold War, and when we combine this with advances in technology I do not consider the OHP to be the best point of comparison for a modern USN frigate.
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What do you think the USN needs in a frigate?
 
Sferrin said:
What do you think the USN needs in a frigate?
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The identified FFG(X) CONOPS first and foremost, a solid contribution to SAGs and an ASW vessel to protect CSGs. This should be accomplished via integration of UxVs and, with the rapidly expanding list of future technologies the Navy is rapidly fielding, it needs stored power and good generative capacity. In this way they can slot into the networked fleet the Navy is working towards and not get constrained by a restrictive design. Third order missions would be maintaining SLOCs and in some cases perhaps convoy escort, although I hesitate to describe it as such because of the historical connotations.
 
Seragina said:
nominal 1700 ft (altitude difference) up to 2300 ft for extreme
The important thing is terminal speed that will determine and limit the intercept to targets with a certain max. speed (roughly 66% or so).
It won't be able to intercept missiles or rockets if altitude comes into play.
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Holy crap, I expected it to be bad, but not anywhere near that bad.
 
Felocie said:
not sure why USN operations should, or indeed would, be dictated by "people" who think a slightly modified USCG cutter should be engaging in the same missions as an FFG-7
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It's called the chain of command, and is what happens when you let ex-infantry majors, finance execs, or ex-Gurkha lieutenants* for that matter run a navy without the professionals calling them on their decisions.

(Which is not to say I disagree with having a civilian at the head of the chain of command, but when you appoint people to these positions they either have to be competent in their sphere of responsibility, or willing to be educated by those who are competent).

* see John Nott and the 1981 Defence White Paper, though to be fair to the Admiralty they did call him on it, they just didn't manage to stop him.
 
Felocie said:
Third order missions would be maintaining SLOCs and in some cases perhaps convoy escort, although I hesitate to describe it as such because of the historical connotations.
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Yeah, I think convoy escort per se is probably a dead letter, but SLOC control is a good way to talk about it. Ships that can operate inside a denied SLOC (like Bab al-Mandab) and provide close protection to ships transiting the area, under cover of high-end air/missile defense ships handling the AShBM threat.

LCS actually showed some ability to do that during the prior Houthi attacks there, but a ship with more robust multi-domain capabilities would seem like a better solution.
 
TomS said:
Yeah, I think convoy escort per se is probably a dead letter, but SLOC control is a good way to talk about it. Ships that can operate inside a denied SLOC (like Bab al-Mandab) and provide close protection to ships transiting the area, under cover of high-end air/missile defense ships handling the AShBM threat.

LCS actually showed some ability to do that during the prior Houthi attacks there, but a ship with more robust multi-domain capabilities would seem like a better solution.
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MMSC should have been the choice from the get go. Should have been the choice for FF(X) but shitty politics and ignorance got in the way.
 
johnpjones1775 said:
MMSC should have been the choice from the get go. Should have been the choice for FF(X) but shitty politics and ignorance got in the way.
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Does Lockmart's Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) even come in a steel version?
 
TomS said:
AEGIS/SPY-6 is a huge step up from the grand total of two channels of fire on the FFG-7.

Missile counts on the FFG-62 are 32 cells of VLS plus 16 NSM, so minimum of 48 missiles (plus more if any of those 32 are ESSM quadpacks).
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So lets just replace it with zero VLS? Phelan seems to think its not a bad compromise. But in a way you can argue that 2 fire channels was suitable for an old frigate, but a new one needs to deal with a swarm. Space reserved for a big laser and multiple AD guns would seem to be mandatory on a new design.
Sferrin said:
One would have assumed that, because they're calling it a frigate, it would have similar roles and capabilities as previous US frigates like the OHP and Knox classes.
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Yes, one would think so...
DWG said:
The Perry-sized hole in USN mission requirements. You may design your frigate as an OPV, but people are going to demand you use it to fill FFG-sized holes if you don't actually have any real FFGs.
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Even if those people dont want to risk the FF(X) in a more demanding role, the commanders dont always have optimal choices available.
Felocie said:
But the OHP and a Knox classes in and of themselves filled separate roles, particularly during the later years of their lives
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You would probably find many combat ships fill a different role in the last few years before retirement. The point was the roles they were built for, and what role is currently a capability gap in USN.
Felocie said:
This isn't to say I love FF(X) but the idea that fleet architecture shouldn't evolve is beyond me
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But FF(X) isnt an evolution, its a stopgap until something can be found that it can do without being a liability. Maybe it can function somehow in cooperation with LUSV and MUSV, but I doubt theres an existing requirement for that (or that FF(X) is the best fit).
Felocie said:
Ultimately the USN has quite successfully filled the air warfare role in the post 1991 world via masses of Burkes but has failed to fill the ASW role due to the outcome of DDG-1000 and the currently abortive acquisition of FFG(X).
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I realise DDG-1000 would be quite a good ASW hunter, but it had too much other stuff added for ASW to be more than a secondary role (even if the concept started out as ASW).
Felocie said:
Notably the composition of the PLAN forces different focuses on the USN than they had during the Cold War, and when we combine this with advances in technology I do not consider the OHP to be the best point of comparison for a modern USN frigate.
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Exactly. But since the closest alternative reference is LCS, which doesn't have useful ASW propulsion even if the modules were amazing, the best reference probably ends up being Royal Navy.
johnpjones1775 said:
I mean it can, but it doesn’t need to.
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Pretty sure its not designed for the extra top weight of a steel superstructure. Change the centre of gravity too much and you either lose growth margin or redesign everything from the keel up.
 
Felocie said:
The presence of AGS is overstated because it was so visible. The low observability features did not detract from the ASW role
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AGS probably would have hardly been used even if its ammunition had more reach and less dollars, it just was designed around the concept of putting an expensive "exquisite" hull within range of virtually every truck mounted ASCM to be able to fire off its AGS rounds. Made sense at the time I guess.
Firefinder said:
That is a Command deal not a design deal.

If you can not stop youself from Micromanaging you crews or cannot Prioritizes tasking well you deserve what coming to you.

A burke captain if given the orders to hunt subs...
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The commander needs assets available for competing tasks. You could say tactics are about what to do with available assets, while strategy is what assets can be built to enable winning tactics. Do you build 80 do-everything destroyers or have some optimised for tasks that would be the most demanding for a general purpose ship? The so called design decision is about providing the best options to the commander.
Firefinder said:
Bigger issue come from the old numbers game. And since the gear needed to do whatever is the expansive part of the ship, not the hull or engines which are the cheapest...

It pays to unified the designs to get economically of scale and all.
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that has been the USN strategy for the last few years, but appears to have led to a fleet that is very good at missile defence, but struggles to do as well at other tssks. USN gets beaten in ASW exercises every single time. Notto mention the "hull and engines" being less than ideal for modern ASW against quiet submarines, and in future even quieter UUVs.
Firefinder said:
60 Zumwalts be cheaper then 30 Constellations both in price tag and crews, which is honestly the bigger limiting factor then the gear. With those Zumwalts, even the cut down versions being as good as an ASW hunter as the Connies. The Full Bore ones be a submariner nightmare. And 60 Zumwalts give you far more ASW coverage then 30 Connies just from numbers.
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Do you really think you ever had a chance of getting 60 Zumwalts? And comparing first-of-class costs doesnt look like the 20th Zoomie was ever going to be half the price of the 20th Connie. And if you say cut down Zumwalt, the cut down bits would be (and turned out to be) the AAW fit and guns. So yeah kind of turning it into a Connie. Its all hypothetical now, only one of those options is in production.
Firefinder said:
Only when you limit the purposes to single use does that change.

However comma, if you go for single uses designs. You CANNOT bitch when said design has no Add abilitie worth the Name cause that the opportune cost for you.
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I think the whole debate about FFG(X) vs FF(X) is about multirole vs single role, and functional vs nasty. So I agree with you that FF(X) will suck at almost everything, except that we arent really sure its going to fill any role at all. Something about "drone mothership" but havent seen any info about having a CIC capable of that.
 
DJK said:
AGS probably would have hardly been used even if its ammunition had more reach and less dollars, it just was designed around the concept of putting an expensive "exquisite" hull within range of virtually every truck mounted ASCM to be able to fire off its AGS rounds. Made sense at the time I guess.
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A stealthy hull at the time when there were very few AShMs with the legs to reach it.

The "coastal artillery" role means you only have about 30km range to see the target. Anything beyond that requires the trucks to have MPA spotting for them, and the MPAs could engage anyway.
 
Scott Kenny said:
A stealthy hull at the time when there were very few AShMs with the legs to reach it.
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Only if you don't want to engage any deeper ashore than the surf line. Development time was not kind to the assumptions behind Zumwalt, or the entire From the Sea doctrine.

If you're kind and match the 150km AGS vs 2010 AShMs (first AGS delivery rather than 2016 for Zumwalt's commissioning date), then available AShMs would include:

Iran
Noor Phase 2, range = 130km
Noor Phase 3, range = 170km
Kader, Range = 200km

Russia
SSC-6 Sennight/Kh-35 Uran/Bal, range = 130km
SSC-7/P-270 Moskit/3M80E, range = 120km

Moving the timeline up to date brings in things like:
China
CX-1, range = 280km
YJ-12/CM-302, range = 460-500km
YJ-15, range = ?
HD-1, range 290km
CJ-1000, range =?

Iran:
Ghadir, range 300km
Khalij-e Fars, range 300km (ASBM)

Russia:
SSC-5 Stooge/K-300P Bastion N, range = 300km
SSC-12/P-270 Moskit/3M80MVE, range = 140/240km
Klub-K+3M54T Kalibr, range = 660km
3M22 Tsirkon, Range = 1000km

North Korea
KN-19/Kumsong-3, range = 240km

Ukraine
Neptune, range = 280km

Vietnam
VCM-01, range = ? (Uran derivative)

India
BrahMos, range = 8-900km
NASM-MR, range = 350km? (trials due this year)
 
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DJK said:
AGS probably would have hardly been used even if its ammunition had more reach and less dollars, it just was designed around the concept of putting an expensive "exquisite" hull within range of virtually every truck mounted ASCM to be able to fire off its AGS rounds. Made sense at the time I guess.
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Not all wars are the same, but it seems to me that 32 DDG-1000s with their AGS would be pretty useful in the current conflict with Iran.
 
DJK said:
AGS probably would have hardly been used even if its ammunition had more reach and less dollars, it just was designed around the concept of putting an expensive "exquisite" hull within range of virtually every truck mounted ASCM to be able to fire off its AGS rounds. Made sense at the time I guess.
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Blame the Marines. AGS/VGAS Objective range was defined by the need to counter-battery D-30 122mm guns firing at a Marine beach crossing point from 25 nautical miles offshore. That standoff was chosen because it was expected that ships could detect and engage ASCMs with that much lead time.

This wasn't a number totally picked out of a hat. LPD-17 was based around the same standoff range, launching AAAVs from 25nm offshore. That in turn drove the AAAV's 25 kts water speed, because about 1 hour (plus some staging time) was about the longest troops could ride in a floating amtrack and land in something like combat-ready condition. The AAAVs would be supported by tanks landed via LCAC.

And only "exquisite" ships could be expected to survive inside 25nm. You needed both signature reduction and competent self-defense capabilities to pull it off. Losing the VLS and thus the enhanced self-defense capability on the LPDs was the first sign of the whole 25nm offshore concept falling apart. But even without VLS on the amphibs, one might expect a couple of DD-21s to defend themselves and a small force of forward amphibs during a quick landing operation. The larger LHAs and less-protected LSDs would stand further offshore, using helos to launch their assault forces and then sustaining the landing using LCUs and LCACs, ideally from closer to shore, once the coast defense threat was worn down.
 
DWG said:
Only if you don't want to engage any deeper ashore than the surf line. Development time was not kind to the assumptions behind Zumwalt, or the entire From the Sea doctrine.

If you're kind and match the 150km AGS vs 2010 AShMs (first AGS delivery rather than 2016 for Zumwalt's commissioning date), then available AShMs would include:
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Zumwalt as it was designed, would've been an absolute game changer v Iran. 1 horizon stand off is sufficient to guarantee effectively normal engagement v low flying ASCMs (with very significant seeker problems due to low rcs hull).

At the same time, it also would've provided an effectively unlimited pool of ammo for MALEs(and, more persistently, small drones) to work with in coastal areas.

Either Zumwalt or an adequate state of the LCS program would've effectively allowed to lock Iran out of its own Gulf and Strait.
But there's no Zumwalt, and LCS surface combat capability is a joke when benchmarked against the evolution of the threat. FFGX is stillborn, too.
DWG said:
Russia:
SSC-5 Stooge/K-300P Bastion N, range = 300km
SSC-12/P-270 Moskit/3M80MVE, range = 140/240km
Klub-K+3M54T Kalibr, range = 660km
3M22 Tsirkon, Range = 1000km
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Some of those ranges are substantially wrong, but more importantly, most of these are mounted exclusively or primarily on mobile platforms, and this is the case since the 1950s(i.e., for over 70 years at this point). This makes any range comparisons between stand-off and stand-in systems fundamentally irrelevant, unless the plan is to silence MG nests with MRBMs.
 
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Ainen said:
most of these are mounted exclusively or primarily on mobile platforms, and this is the case since the 1950s(i.e., for over 70 years at this point). This makes any range comparisons between stand-off and stand-in systems fundamentally irrelevant, unless the plan is to silence MG nests with MRBMs.
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That depends alot on the set up of hte launchers, and their fire and move times.

There is alot to be said to be hidden in a hid say 5 miles inland, pop out, fart off 4 missiles at a ship and booking it before the ship has a change to respond with counterfire, be it gun missile or drone.

That is if you cant remote the launch. IE drop the trailer with the missiles here camo all up, ad fuck off wth the prime mover say 1km that way, easy to do with fiberoptic wire.

Use spotters or datalinks to get the target data, fire when ready, drive leasuriely away cause they are looking THAT way and not This way.

All this relies on being able to do that shot and scoot work with the launch, cause if you are still there five minutes after the first missile launches....
 
DWG said:
Only if you don't want to engage any deeper ashore than the surf line. Development time was not kind to the assumptions behind Zumwalt, or the entire From the Sea doctrine.

If you're kind and match the 150km AGS vs 2010 AShMs (first AGS delivery rather than 2016 for Zumwalt's commissioning date), then available AShMs would include:

Iran
Noor Phase 2, range = 130km
Noor Phase 3, range = 170km
Kader, Range = 200km

Russia
SSC-6 Sennight/Kh-35 Uran/Bal, range = 130km
SSC-7/P-270 Moskit/3M80E, range = 120km

Moving the timeline up to date brings in things like:
China
CX-1, range = 280km
YJ-12/CM-302, range = 460-500km
YJ-15, range = ?
HD-1, range 290km
CJ-1000, range =?

Iran:
Ghadir, range 300km
Khalij-e Fars, range 300km (ASBM)

Russia:
SSC-5 Stooge/K-300P Bastion N, range = 300km
SSC-12/P-270 Moskit/3M80MVE, range = 140/240km
Klub-K+3M54T Kalibr, range = 660km
3M22 Tsirkon, Range = 1000km

North Korea
KN-19/Kumsong-3, range = 240km

Ukraine
Neptune, range = 280km

Vietnam
VCM-01, range = ? (Uran derivative)

India
BrahMos, range = 8-900km
NASM-MR, range = 350km? (trials due this year)
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I mean I see 4 missiles that could be destroyed by AGS outside of their range.

TLAM the longer ranged missiles, at least some of them, but most importantly their radar systems, and then use AGS for the shorter ranged ASMs.

You could even go a few miles within their maximum range, to fire and simply sail out of Ranger after launch and keep firing the whole time.
 
Firefinder said:
That depends alot on the set up of hte launchers, and their fire and move times.

There is alot to be said to be hidden in a hid say 5 miles inland, pop out, fart off 4 missiles at a ship and booking it before the ship has a change to respond with counterfire, be it gun missile or drone.

That is if you cant remote the launch. IE drop the trailer with the missiles here camo all up, ad fuck off wth the prime mover say 1km that way, easy to do with fiberoptic wire.

Use spotters or datalinks to get the target data, fire when ready, drive leasuriely away cause they are looking THAT way and not This way.

All this relies on being able to do that shot and scoot work with the launch, cause if you are still there five minutes after the first missile launches....
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Just like with SAM batteries the real method of neutralizing them is to destroy the radars that would be detecting targets and possibly guiding them.

A radar that can see that far off shore isn’t packing up and moving in anything like a short time period.

A 500km range is useless if the launcher vehicle doesn’t have eyes to tell the missiles where to go.
 

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