Russian 'Status-6' nuclear attack system

Typical naval requirements is 3 ships of a type to have one of them at sea at any given moment. With a dual crew system you could get one hull at sea 75% of the time, but that's hard to pull off. You need ships designed to be easily repaired without cutting holes in the hull, a tracking system to pull and replace systems before they are expected to actually fail, enough shore-side support to do a standard 6month overhaul in 1 month, and enough supplies stockpiled to feed this monster.
Worth noting that the 3:1 ratio is really applicable to maintaining a forward deployment: you get one hull working up or in transit, one on station, and one in refit. If you're not interested in forward deployment, it's not necessarily relevant. In the case of the Soviet Union (and presumably Russia), the preferred operating model seems to be for ships and submarines to be held alongside at relatively high readiness to sail, with occasional programmed deployments.
 
Typical naval requirements is 3 ships of a type to have one of them at sea at any given moment. With a dual crew system you could get one hull at sea 75% of the time, but that's hard to pull off. You need ships designed to be easily repaired without cutting holes in the hull, a tracking system to pull and replace systems before they are expected to actually fail, enough shore-side support to do a standard 6month overhaul in 1 month, and enough supplies stockpiled to feed this monster.
Worth noting that the 3:1 ratio is really applicable to maintaining a forward deployment: you get one hull working up or in transit, one on station, and one in refit. If you're not interested in forward deployment, it's not necessarily relevant. In the case of the Soviet Union (and presumably Russia), the preferred operating model seems to be for ships and submarines to be held alongside at relatively high readiness to sail, with occasional programmed deployments.
As a sailor, I can tell you that unless you are actively sailing, you are not at anything resembling a "relatively high readiness to sail".

This has been demonstrated since at least the Napoleonic era.
 
As a sailor, I can tell you that unless you are actively sailing, you are not at anything resembling a "relatively high readiness to sail".
There is a difference between making local voyages to maintain crew readiness, and embarking on transoceanic deployments.

If you're doing the former, there's relatively little difference between the vessels which in a deploying navy would be considered 'working up', and those which would be considered 'deployed'. Both spend a lot of time at or close to their home base carrying out maintenance between exercises. And if you're deploying less, the need to spend a third of the time in deep refit is reduced, as some (but not all) work can be done in fleet time. You probably get two-thirds, maybe more, of the force available for operational tasking. It's essentially a coastal defence model applied to oceangoing warships.

'Relatively short notice' is doing some heavy lifting here, of course. What I'm meaning there is that vessels are at several days notice to sail, rather than several weeks or months as might be the case when in heavy maintenance.

Only having one hull, is of course, still a shortfall. It doesn't matter how you operate the boat when in fleet time, you'll still need refits occasionally.
 
As a sailor, I can tell you that unless you are actively sailing, you are not at anything resembling a "relatively high readiness to sail".
There is a difference between making local voyages to maintain crew readiness, and embarking on transoceanic deployments.

If you're doing the former, there's relatively little difference between the vessels which in a deploying navy would be considered 'working up', and those which would be considered 'deployed'. Both spend a lot of time at or close to their home base carrying out maintenance between exercises. And if you're deploying less, the need to spend a third of the time in deep refit is reduced, as some (but not all) work can be done in fleet time. You probably get two-thirds, maybe more, of the force available for operational tasking. It's essentially a coastal defence model applied to oceangoing warships.

'Relatively short notice' is doing some heavy lifting here, of course. What I'm meaning there is that vessels are at several days notice to sail, rather than several weeks or months as might be the case when in heavy maintenance.

Only having one hull, is of course, still a shortfall. It doesn't matter how you operate the boat when in fleet time, you'll still need refits occasionally.
I'm not convinced that even going out for a week or so at a stretch is enough to really be ready to sail for an extended period. There's a lot of stuff that gets put off because "we can fix that in port", and the shipdriving skills are rusty if the junior officers only stand one or two watches on the bridge and then have another two weeks off.
 
What prevents from launching these super-torpedoes directly from the base, bypassing intermediaries in the form of a carrier submarine?
 
Given Russia's precarious situation regarding mass production, and desire to attack American supercarriers from far away with as little manpower committed as possible, Poseidon makes perfect sense. If it's a truly autonomous, truly artificially intelligent torpedo it would be able to sprint-drift, listen for carriers, pickup their acoustic signal, sail towards the carrier rapidly, literally chase it down if it flees, with little to no capacity to stop it for the BATGRU.

The only way to avoid it would be to station large ASW screens along a potential threat axis of incoming nuclear torpedoes. This is challenging. Far more than aviation strike defense, due to as you said, the limited ASW capabilities of U.S. carriers. They're excellent at detecting Soviet-era submarines in open ocean with SURTASS-LFA and destroying them, but they would struggle with Poseidon.
That operation model would require being less than 200ft deep, to get above the major thermocline to track surface targets. It would also require slowing down to less than 20 knots for sonar to be effective, and you don't think it can go that slow because it would sink out.

Yes?

That is why I think it's a fairly normal torpedo guided by a submarine like Oscar II for destruction of CVs. If it could autonomously track stuff you'd put it on a truck and fire it from a pier or shore or a large surface ship and scatter them around. Oscar II has a built-in TMA and sensor system. This indicates Poseidon is probably quite dumb as far as torpedoes go.

I wouldn't be too shocked if it were wire guided, but I suspect it's mostly a straight runner that detonates at a pre-determined distance, is fired by volley, and TMA provides the target information. It is simply fired from far enough away and moves so deep that it isn't detected before it's too late. The sonar is probably a low power, high frequency active pinger that detects undersea rocks to avoid a dreaded "American submariner" moment with a nuclear torpedo.

That's my own speculation, I have no evidence for that, and no one else does either except the RuMOD, so it's all circumstantial.

There's a lot of possible use cases of Poseidon, but the general construction of the thing suggests its primary purpose is attacking surface units, or perhaps undersea units, rather than ports or cities.

Getting all those pieces together is a stretch for the US tech base. Or for a manned sub, honestly. Getting close to a carrier is a pain.

Finding a carrier will still require the use of the Maritime Aviation Forces, yes, they will need to locate it and VID it. This is somewhat trivial in the era of electric eye cubesats where even people on Twitter can actively track U.S. warships though. It's only going to get easier to find and track surface battlegroups in the future.

The good news is that Poseidon lets the submarine have a credible standoff that can't be defeated by simply driving 32 knots in the opposite direction, like Type 65 or DM4A2, or other long range, Otto Fuel powered torpedoes. The bad news is it's really big. The good news is that Oscar II is really big. The bad news is there aren't many of those. The good news is that Borei is big enough to carry Poseidon too. The bad news is they don't exist. Yet. And so it goes...

While it's entirely possible that the Belgorod and friends will have the capacity to attack cities, they are Special Mission Submarines, it just will not be with Poseidon. It will be another system, like a SDV with a nuclear mine, or a robotic AUR with a fusion bomb. That sort of thing. Poseidon might be able to do it as well, just really poorly, and only in the most permissive harbor environments, where the entrance is essentially direct to the ocean and requires little to no channel navigation.

So like...Pearl, Guam, and basically nowhere else?

The idea that Poseidon is a big bomb city/port killer torpedo is almost decades-old speculation on par with "Su-57 will be in service in 2020 meaning restart F-22 production NOW" and "130mm guns are necessary to deal with the Armata". It's a bit quaint to still be thinking that these days, given all the evidence that suggests otherwise.

None of the design suggests it's built for that job, but like the ASTOR or using ICBMs for anti-carrier duty, it could do it if it had to I suppose.

As a sailor, I can tell you that unless you are actively sailing, you are not at anything resembling a "relatively high readiness to sail".
There is a difference between making local voyages to maintain crew readiness, and embarking on transoceanic deployments.

If you're doing the former, there's relatively little difference between the vessels which in a deploying navy would be considered 'working up', and those which would be considered 'deployed'. Both spend a lot of time at or close to their home base carrying out maintenance between exercises. And if you're deploying less, the need to spend a third of the time in deep refit is reduced, as some (but not all) work can be done in fleet time. You probably get two-thirds, maybe more, of the force available for operational tasking. It's essentially a coastal defence model applied to oceangoing warships.

'Relatively short notice' is doing some heavy lifting here, of course. What I'm meaning there is that vessels are at several days notice to sail, rather than several weeks or months as might be the case when in heavy maintenance.

Only having one hull, is of course, still a shortfall. It doesn't matter how you operate the boat when in fleet time, you'll still need refits occasionally.
I'm not convinced that even going out for a week or so at a stretch is enough to really be ready to sail for an extended period. There's a lot of stuff that gets put off because "we can fix that in port", and the shipdriving skills are rusty if the junior officers only stand one or two watches on the bridge and then have another two weeks off.

There will be four Khabarovsk class Poseidon carriers and the Belgorod special missions submarine for the Pacific Fleet. Khabarovsk is a large torpedo carrying ship based on the Borei SSBNs, and there are four on order so far.

The Northern Fleet may or may not receive Poseidon, but Belgorod is/was constructing the Harmony SOSUS network of nuclear battery-powered ATGUs for detection of American/NATO hunter-killers and SSBNs. Without the Kuznetsov to provide aviation cover over the Arctic Ocean, the Northern Bastion is pretty small, anyway.
 
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Scott Kenny where is your source on noise emissions of the Borei?
 
Scott Kenny where is your source on noise emissions of the Borei?
Pulled from a Quora article. ( https://www.quora.com/What-major-flaw-do-Russias-Borei-class-nuclear-submarines-have ) Because idiots like to leak secrets to win quora/reddit arguments. :D

And it makes sense that their reduction gears are based on the Oscar II design. They may have been rafted, but reduction gears have a direct access to the ocean in terms of noise emission, out the prop shaft.

The hydraulic pump kinda surprised me, but seems to tie in with hit-or-miss Russian QA. If the pump really does wear to the point of being a noise source in a couple of months, I'd expect them to be changed every patrol or every other patrol at the longest.


There will be four Khabarovsk class Poseidon carriers and the Belgorod special missions submarine for the Pacific Fleet. Khabarovsk is a large torpedo carrying ship based on the Borei SSBNs, and there are four on order so far.

The Northern Fleet may or may not receive Poseidon, but Belgorod is/was constructing the Harmony SOSUS network of nuclear battery-powered ATGUs for detection of American/NATO hunter-killers and SSBNs. Without the Kuznetsov to provide aviation cover over the Arctic Ocean, the Northern Bastion is pretty small, anyway.
Eventually. Russia is having a hard time affording their current production plans, and it just flat takes time to build a submarine. 5-8 years from ordering stuff like reactors and reduction gears to ship commissioned even for the US.

So for the next decade or so, there won't be but the Belgorod and Khaborovsk.
 
I doubt it's a particularly long way, but obviously systems as critical as this get tested thoroughly before being declared operational. Just look at the rigorous test schedule Bulava had, which had to work out many things before being formally accepted after many tests.

But it clearly shows that the system is still considered a top priority and of according interest. I wonder if Belgorod conducted these tests or if the system has been tested by itself without a submarine launching it. Makes me wonder about the status of Khabarovsk.
 
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Regardless of US...let's call them "efforts" to remain neutral here...like Golden Dome, the Poseidon was going to come into existence regardless. It provides a rather unique capability compared to other systems on each end of the spectrum, like conventional UUVs or SLBMs. The ability to have a weapon with unlimited operating duration that can hunt down a target or lay in ambush silently is just too good to pass up. As is the concept of being able to wipe out an entire carrier battle group or coastal military infrastructure in one blow. It's an asymmetric approach to the issue the Russians are facing, being the USN which would be able to operate with relative little inconvenience in case of a direct confrontation. Surely a Yasen here and a Zircon there would inflict losses, but being outnumbered heavily is a reality the Russians are aware of. So creating this landscape of fear, in which offensive operation by large NATO formations would quite literally being blown out of the water by a single submarine armed with these, that creates a deterrence and heavily influences how US/NATO naval assets would operate, i.e. extremely cautiously. So this weapon has clear tactical benefits as an equalizer.

But even in true doomsday scenarios they find utility in being able to destroy shipyards, naval bases, large coastal cities in a second strike. These may even be able to go up some rivers and the ultimately the threat of repeated nuclear strikes following an initial exchange would render the already unlikely scenario of the US surviving such an exchange as a proper state basically impossible.

In that capacity it actually functions more successfully than an ICBM and even better than the next best thing, being Russian SSBNs. It's a way of saying that even if one could defend against ballistic missiles semi successfully, can you defend against ballistic missile, cruise missiles, Burevestnik and Poseidon simultaneously? Can you defend against the last two after you received prior nuclear strikes? That's the thinking behind Poseidon in a strategic setting rather than the tactical setting I laid out in the first paragraph. That no matter what happens, whoever Russia deemed worthy of being at the receiving end of their nuclear arsenal will be finished off one way or another eventually.

So far the biggest issue I see with Poseidon is host systems. As far as we are aware only Belgorod can equip them thus far. So unless all of these will be container launched from the sea floor, there needs to be an entire new submarine class dedicated to the launch of these weapons, essentially a pendant to SSBNs. And that's surely a costly thing, even if adapted from already existing designs like Borei-A.
 
It provides a rather unique capability compared to other systems on each end of the spectrum, like conventional UUVs or SLBMs. The ability to have a weapon with unlimited operating duration that can hunt down a target or lay in ambush silently is just too good to pass up.
You'd have to worry about marine growth at some point. At the same time, the strategic nuclear role makes it rather useless for missions other than strategic nuclear attack, because its deployment just signals a nuclear strike is ongoing. It's like an even dumber and more escalatory version of Low Yield Trident or like a conventional ICBM, because it is much slower and more expensive.

As is the concept of being able to wipe out an entire carrier battle group or coastal military infrastructure in one blow.
Even assuming a 100 megaton warhead, the state of disaggregated carrier group operations would make destroying the whole thing with one warhead at least questionable. With a more reasonable warhead (i.e. single digit megatons) and a subsurface detonation you're going to cause a stressful day, no doubt, but may have significantly worse weapons effects than an air burst against a task force at sea.

So creating this landscape of fear, in which offensive operation by large NATO formations would quite literally being blown out of the water by a single submarine armed with these, that creates a deterrence and heavily influences how US/NATO naval assets would operate, i.e. extremely cautiously. So this weapon has clear tactical benefits as an equalizer.
I'm not sure this would inspire deterrence, or if it would inspire a great emphasis on hunting the enemy launch platform or weapon itself. It also is a massive escalation risk, given that it is a strategic nuclear device. How would France react, for example, to the use of such a weapon outside of a strategic nuclear exchange? One may very well conclude that its deployment is the first stage of a Russian strategic nuclear attack and retaliate in kind. Trying to constrain NATO naval activity with Poseidon and the response being a French "pre-strategic" nuclear strike on St Petersburg or the United Kingdom launching its Tridents at Moscow is not what I would describe as inducing NATO to act with extreme caution.

Because, if it cannot be tracked, there is absolutely no way to know if Poseidon is loitering as a threat of escalation, or if it is on its way to deliver megatons to coastal cities, or if it is chasing down a carrier group until the thing goes bang. But if it can be tracked then killing it is a matter of making a weapon that fits on an aircraft, given the reported speed and depth (100kts and 1000m). It certainly would make the case for nuclear depth bombs much more compelling (and be a reasonable target for them!).

It's a way of saying that even if one could defend against ballistic missiles semi successfully, can you defend against ballistic missile, cruise missiles, Burevestnik and Poseidon simultaneously?
It would be expensive to do so, but given the profusion of sensors and processing power, as well as the endurance capabilities opened up by uncrewed systems it seems more a matter of desire than technical capability. The problem is one of scale and investment. Remember that the US managed to field 134 Nike Hercules batteries defending CONUS in the 1960s, as well as over a thousand interceptors (and hundreds of air national guard fighters with a secondary air defense role). It's absolutely conceivable that, given some time and increased defense spending, the US could do continental defense against this threat portfolio. Though, of course, the best deterrence is increased size, scope, and capability of offensive nuclear means at the strategic and theater level.

So far the biggest issue I see with Poseidon is host systems. As far as we are aware only Belgorod can equip them thus far. So unless all of these will be container launched from the sea floor, there needs to be an entire new submarine class dedicated to the launch of these weapons, essentially a pendant to SSBNs. And that's surely a costly thing, even if adapted from already existing designs like Borei-A.
Leaving it on a container on the sea floor seems like a great opportunity to place CAPTOR type mines nearby and/or examine (or even recover) one for exploitation. If the range is unlimited then they could just be launched off the pier.

Anyway, in sum Poseidon is a solution to a very niche problem with questionable utility outside of that realm, and with an incredible number of risks and downsides associated with its use and deployment. In my personal view the appropriate response is that we in the west should start cooking up some delivery systems to keep the Russians awake at night. To turn the Russian comments about EPAA around, when it comes to confidence and security the Russians have too much of both.
 
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1) You'd have to worry about marine growth at some point. At the same time, the strategic nuclear role makes it rather useless for missions other than strategic nuclear attack, because its deployment just signals a nuclear strike is ongoing.

2) Even assuming a 100 megaton warhead, the state of disaggregated carrier group operations would make destroying the whole thing with one warhead at least questionable. With a more reasonable warhead (i.e. single digit megatons) and a subsurface detonation you're going to cause a stressful day, no doubt, but may have significantly worse weapons effects than an air burst against a task force at sea.

3) How would France react, for example, to the use of such a weapon outside of a strategic nuclear exchange? One may very well conclude that its deployment is the first stage of a Russian strategic nuclear attack and retaliate in kind. Trying to constrain NATO naval activity with Poseidon and the response being a French "pre-strategic" nuclear strike on St Petersburg or the United Kingdom launching its Tridents at Moscow is not what I would describe as inducing NATO to act with extreme caution.

4) Because, if it cannot be tracked, there is absolutely no way to know if Poseidon is loitering as a threat of escalation, or if it is on its way to deliver megatons to coastal cities, or if it is chasing down a carrier group until the thing goes bang.

5) Remember that the US managed to field 134 Nike Hercules batteries defending CONUS in the 1960s, as well as over a thousand interceptors (and hundreds of air national guard fighters with a secondary air defense role). It's absolutely conceivable that, given some time and increased defense spending, the US could do continental defense against this threat portfolio.

6) Leaving it on a container on the sea floor seems like a great opportunity to place CAPTOR type mines nearby and/or examine (or even recover) one for exploitation. If the range is unlimited then they could just be launched off the pier.

1) Marine growth surely is a concern, but not significantly more than with submarines really. Certain coating and surface treatments lend themselves to combat that issue. As for nuclear strike, when the time comes where a CSG has to be sunk, that's of no concern anymore.

2) the main goal would be to destroy the carrier and the accompanying submarines, which is entirely feasible. The latter wouldn't take well to the large shock wave propagating through the water. Without the carrier and the submarines, the surface combatants are easy pickings for lesser UUVs, Submarines and AShMs. A couple derelict Arleigh-Burkes don't pose the same threat as a CVN, it's airwing and the submarines lurking beneath the surface. If these are dealt with, the carrier group is a much less threatening proposition, it has been operationally defanged.

3) This doesn't matter, because to refer back to point 1) when the tactical use of nuclear weapons is in order, the Strategic use is not far away. Although even than, neither France nor the UK are much of a factor with their...four (lol) SSBNs respectively, of which not all will be deployed at the same time and each of these as well as the French CVN and the two UK CVs are prime targets for Poseidon shadowing such assets or going after them in Port. A counter to a potential reaction to Poseidon is ultimately the use of the very same weapon. Imagine not having a nuclear triad in 2025, couldn't be any of the three super powers.

4) this ambiguity is what lends itself to making it a credible deterrence, knowing that if you get too hot headed in your foreign policy, that there could be potentially a couple dozens of such things now roaming around looking for your CVNs, SSBNs, SSGNs, Harbors and Naval bases and waiting to see what happens. This is not too dissimilar to the increased readiness of nuclear forces and putting the stockpile in launch condition in moments of extreme tension. This kind of pressure serves as a means to get people to calm down. Especially with France and the UK relying completely on SSBNs and the US heavily favoring SSBNs Poseidon serves as a mirror to US ABM concepts, which seek to counter Russian and Chinese land based arsenals most effectively. Ones in Orbit, the other beneath the surface of the ocean.

5) Remember that the US is a shadow of it's former self and would bankrupt itself quite quickly if they were to attempt to replicate this. The US couldn't print money quick enough to get something similar rolling these days. I bet Beijing would be delighted.

6) That would require knowledge of its position first, which is already making this highly unlikely. And then it would require plenty of set up and activity which would attract unwanted attention. Not to mention the possibility of countermeasures.
 
1) Marine growth surely is a concern, but not significantly more than with submarines really. Certain coating and surface treatments lend themselves to combat that issue. As for nuclear strike, when the time comes where a CSG has to be sunk, that's of no concern anymore.
My point is that using this weapon against a "tactical" target invites a strategic response. It is like firing an ICBM at a tank battalion, except that there is perhaps 30h to launch your response and it is much harder to tell if it isn't going anywhere important.

Secondly, if you are arguing that the use of strategic nuclear weapons against conventional assets in the opening stages of a strategic nuclear exchange is a plausible role for Poseidon, I would disagree but largely for technical reasons. In principle this is a reasonable use case.

However, I would point out that the VMF has a requirement to sink carriers in a great many more scenarios than "strategic nuclear war with America" and that those scenarios are among the more likely threats. In any rational examination Pr.949AM, with its 72 missile cells for Klub/Kalibr/Oniks/Zirkon is a much better cost proposition for non-strategic uses and still retains nuclear capabilities. Or a follow-on SSGN, or increased Pr.885M/follow-on procurement.
2) the main goal would be to destroy the carrier and the accompanying submarines, which is entirely feasible. The latter wouldn't take well to the large shock wave propagating through the water. Without the carrier and the submarines, the surface combatants are easy pickings for lesser UUVs, Submarines and AShMs. A couple derelict Arleigh-Burkes don't pose the same threat as a CVN, it's airwing and the submarines lurking beneath the surface. If these are dealt with, the carrier group is a much less threatening proposition, it has been operationally defanged.
My point is that a realistic warhead may struggle to destroy the carrier and submarine given the dispersal of the carrier group and its extensive anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Keep in mind that a 10kt depth bomb (such as on Vikhr) has a lethal radius of ~1.5km, while the 200kt warhead on Sea Lance was estimated lethal radius of ~10km. It does not seem likely that a 2 megaton device would have a 100km lethal radius against submarines, but it also does raise the question of fratricide. Targeting is also another significant issue.
3) This doesn't matter, because to refer back to point 1) when the tactical use of nuclear weapons is in order, the Strategic use is not far away. Although even than, neither France nor the UK are much of a factor with their...four (lol) SSBNs respectively, of which not all will be deployed at the same time and each of these as well as the French CVN and the two UK CVs are prime targets for Poseidon shadowing such assets or going after them in Port. A counter to a potential reaction to Poseidon is ultimately the use of the very same weapon. Imagine not having a nuclear triad in 2025, couldn't be any of the three super powers.
My point is that Poseidon shadowing an asset, or even being deployed operationally (i.e. launched from the submarine) invites a strategic nuclear response. Your point about escalation control is an argument against tactical use of this weapon, given that it would be better used on strategic targets given the long transit times.

I will also point out that the Anglo-French SSBNs are individually more than enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the Russian State, though they provide limited options for use below an all-out strike. Given UK and French vulnerability to Poseidon, this only encourages smaller nuclear powers to conduct a strike against Russia if Poseidon is launched. Though I will note that in the French case I think ASMP is a more likely response, at least initially.
4) this ambiguity is what lends itself to making it a credible deterrence, knowing that if you get too hot headed in your foreign policy, that there could be potentially a couple dozens of such things now roaming around looking for your CVNs, SSBNs, SSGNs, Harbors and Naval bases and waiting to see what happens. This is not too dissimilar to the increased readiness of nuclear forces and putting the stockpile in launch condition in moments of extreme tension. This kind of pressure serves as a means to get people to calm down. Especially with France and the UK relying completely on SSBNs and the US heavily favoring SSBNs Poseidon serves as a mirror to US ABM concepts, which seek to counter Russian and Chinese land based arsenals most effectively. Ones in Orbit, the other beneath the surface of the ocean.
I think if the Russians put one of these in the water with a nuclear warhead on it, it would at least invite the question as to whether this was the opening move of a nuclear strike. It would instantly be a nuclear crisis far more acute than even the carribean crisis.
I cannot understand how you both claim that the use of this weapon is not escalatory because tactical nuclear use inevitably precipitates strategic use (an untested claim, and one which is dubious at best), and that simultaneously the use of this weapon would serve to de-escalate a crisis.
Once the weapon is launched, when Poseidon swims from the tube with a live warhead, the die is cast. At that point the question becomes how to best hit the rest of Russia's nuclear weapons before they launch to limit damage, and how to find and sink Poseidon in the 30+ hours as it crosses the Atlantic. This is why it is an incredibly foolish weapon for anything other than a second strike in a strategic exchange!
5) Remember that the US is a shadow of it's former self and would bankrupt itself quite quickly if they were to attempt to replicate this. The US couldn't print money quick enough to get something similar rolling these days. I bet Beijing would be delighted.
The US economy is vastly larger and more productive than in the period in question.
6) That would require knowledge of its position first, which is already making this highly unlikely. And then it would require plenty of set up and activity which would attract unwanted attention. Not to mention the possibility of countermeasures.
If it is so threatening as you claim then it is the primary target set for ASW development in the US Navy, which (unless one was very foolish) would mean it quickly would no longer become especially invulnerable. Sonars and processing power are cheaper and better than during the cold war. The US has more than twice the population and an economy several times larger than Russia. Only a very skilled fool would argue that Russia could somehow make a weapon so advanced that it could not be destroyed, given the disparity in resources.

Fundamentally, Poseidon is a strategic weapons system for strategic purposes. Arguing it is tactically useful is like arguing that the 20 megaton R-36 would have been great for clearing out NATO fortifications in Germany in the event of war. Perhaps it might be technically feasible, but it's foolish and takes what may otherwise be a conventional conflict into a strategic nuclear exchange. Perhaps the Russians may lust for death to an extent that this seems wise to them, but I do not think this is the case.
 
1) Marine growth surely is a concern, but not significantly more than with submarines really. Certain coating and surface treatments lend themselves to combat that issue. As for nuclear strike, when the time comes where a CSG has to be sunk, that's of no concern anymore.
If you're sinking a CSG, nuclear attacks on your country just stepped up to the table. Whether that's via conventional strike or via nuclear strike. Sink a carrier and the President will be reaching for the Football to open nuclear codes.



2) the main goal would be to destroy the carrier and the accompanying submarines, which is entirely feasible. The latter wouldn't take well to the large shock wave propagating through the water. Without the carrier and the submarines, the surface combatants are easy pickings for lesser UUVs, Submarines and AShMs. A couple derelict Arleigh-Burkes don't pose the same threat as a CVN, it's airwing and the submarines lurking beneath the surface. If these are dealt with, the carrier group is a much less threatening proposition, it has been operationally defanged.
The submarine attached to the carrier group stays well away from the carrier proper, so that any sub detected close to the carrier is assumed to be hostile.


3) This doesn't matter, because to refer back to point 1) when the tactical use of nuclear weapons is in order, the Strategic use is not far away. Although even than, neither France nor the UK are much of a factor with their...four (lol) SSBNs respectively, of which not all will be deployed at the same time and each of these as well as the French CVN and the two UK CVs are prime targets for Poseidon shadowing such assets or going after them in Port. A counter to a potential reaction to Poseidon is ultimately the use of the very same weapon. Imagine not having a nuclear triad in 2025, couldn't be any of the three super powers.
At least the French subs are dual crewed, so of those 4 subs 3 are at sea 24/7. I thought that the UK started out dual-crew but I'm not sure they still do.
 
It would be expensive to do so, but given the profusion of sensors and processing power, as well as the endurance capabilities opened up by uncrewed systems it seems more a matter of desire than technical capability.
The key point is expensive. Yes, in theory the perfect defense could be achieved. On practice, the cost of such "all-aspect" defense would be extreme. And it would for sure cost much more than "Poseidon" and "Burevestnik" development and limited deployment.

The US economy is vastly larger and more productive than in the period in question.
But the US industry isn't. Deploying comprehensive defenses against ballistic, hypersonic, low-altitude nuclear cruise missiles and submercible nuclear drones would strain US industrial capabilities way over its limits. It would also took decades to implement - partially because US tendency to downplay the Russian capabilities would make such extreme spendings very hard to justify.

Basically even American politicians would suspect that something is not fitting together if US military would at the same time claim that "Burevestnik" and/or "Poseidon" are not a problem, AND ask for trillions of dollars in decades-long spending against them.
 
The US has more than twice the population and an economy several times larger than Russia. Only a very skilled fool would argue that Russia could somehow make a weapon so advanced that it could not be destroyed, given the disparity in resources.
The point is, thar deployment of such systems would require a smaller part of Russia limited resources, than deployment of defensive systems would require from USA larger - but still limited - resources. To put it simply, if US economy is ten times bigger than Russian, but one dollars spend by Russia on offense required twenty dollars spent by USA to defend against, the Russia sill havethe advantage.

Moreover. Any money spend by USA on defense means less money spend by USA on offense. Which - in context of deterrence - suits Russia perfectly.
 
You'd have to worry about marine growth at some point. At the same time, the strategic nuclear role makes it rather useless for missions other than strategic nuclear attack, because its deployment just signals a nuclear strike is ongoing. It's like an even dumber and more escalatory version of Low Yield Trident or like a conventional ICBM, because it is much slower and more expensive.

What it would signal at launch is dire. That is the point I think. It is one of 9000 signs that Russia feels existentially threatened. If your enemies are engineering powerful countermeasures to the classical nuke triad, you might try developing novel aSyMmEtRiC counters to these developments.

Even assuming a 100 megaton warhead, the state of disaggregated carrier group operations would make destroying the whole thing with one warhead at least questionable. With a more reasonable warhead (i.e. single digit megatons) and a subsurface detonation you're going to cause a stressful day, no doubt, but may have significantly worse weapons effects than an air burst against a task force at sea.

We don't know it's capabilities. We do not even know its purpose. So far the educated guesses are hit and miss. I think the argument for whether it is or is not useful is nearly impossible to answer at this point.

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=n6BdHSmXZiU


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=_F08jaM_RLI


I'm no expert but they seem pretty effective to me..
 
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Youtube slop video deleted and discussion about said Youtube slop presenter also deleted as offtopic.

Youtube videos are highly unlikely to include any interesting new information and commentator's "views" are two a penny these days. If you have real news sources or interesting info post it, if it's a clickbait video don't bother.
Anyone who is a big fan of ubiquitous beardy baldy guy can go you Youtube and subscribe there without the need to clutter up this forum.
 
Not sure how I missed this.
However, I would point out that the VMF has a requirement to sink carriers in a great many more scenarios than "strategic nuclear war with America" and that those scenarios are among the more likely threats. In any rational examination Pr.949AM, with its 72 missile cells for Klub/Kalibr/Oniks/Zirkon is a much better cost proposition for non-strategic uses and still retains nuclear capabilities. Or a follow-on SSGN, or increased Pr.885M/follow-on procurement.
Again, anyone sinking a carrier has just declared war on the US, and may well have stepped clear into "they touched our boats" territory in terms of the response.


I will also point out that the Anglo-French SSBNs are individually more than enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the Russian State, though they provide limited options for use below an all-out strike. Given UK and French vulnerability to Poseidon, this only encourages smaller nuclear powers to conduct a strike against Russia if Poseidon is launched. Though I will note that in the French case I think ASMP is a more likely response, at least initially.
Agreed that the detection of Poseidon being launched in what was thought to be peacetime would be an immediate DEFCON 2 moment, and would likely see W76-2s and ASMPs flying.



Fundamentally, Poseidon is a strategic weapons system for strategic purposes. Arguing it is tactically useful is like arguing that the 20 megaton R-36 would have been great for clearing out NATO fortifications in Germany in the event of war. Perhaps it might be technically feasible, but it's foolish and takes what may otherwise be a conventional conflict into a strategic nuclear exchange. Perhaps the Russians may lust for death to an extent that this seems wise to them, but I do not think this is the case.
I hope that the motivation for development is simply "well, if the Americans are going to deploy massive ABM suites we are going to develop a way to deliver a nuke that their ABMs cannot intercept." Which is at least sane.
 
Not sure how I missed this.

Again, anyone sinking a carrier has just declared war on the US, and may well have stepped clear into "they touched our boats" territory in terms of the response.
Nobody starts an all out war that would ensure the death of their own population and the complete obliteration of their command structure over a single aircraft carrier. A carrier that won't be attacked unless it's used for something foolish or already partaking in a foolish war (thus just another target on a larger battlefield).

the detection of Poseidon being launched in what was thought to be peacetime would be an immediate DEFCON 2 moment, and would likely see W76-2s and ASMPs flying.
The Poseidon, by design, can be deployed at a time of heightened tension and recalled when necessary. This makes it more akin to putting a missile in readiness than launching a missile. And something like an ASMP does not have the ability to return if deemed necessary, launching nuclear missiles with the intention of a preemptive strike ensures, in this example, that the Charles De Gaulle and France in general have to be referred to in the past tense from that point going forward. Which is why unlike ASMP, Poseidon is the better deterrent, it applies immense pressure on decision makers without actually being dangerous that that point it time. It just posesses the potential to dramatically increase it's potential danger at any given moment. In essence, you can boil the frog slowly and give people the opportunity to take a step back once these are in the water. A tactical nuclear cruise missile lacks this nuance, when it's not in the air, it's not a threat, when it is in the air whoever launched it will be at the receiving end of an all out nuclear exchange (a bargain small nuclear powers like the UK, France, North Korea, etc. are ultimately losing against the big nuclear powers of this world).

I hope that the motivation for development is simply "well, if the Americans are going to deploy massive ABM suites we are going to develop a way to deliver a nuke that their ABMs cannot intercept."
That's the purpose of every varied nuclear force. After all there used to be things like nuclear depth charges and howitzer shells. Conventional cruise missiles, ballistic missiles (with various ways of delivery), systems like Poseidon and Burevestnik are meant to ensure that nuclear retaliation can be delivered from any angle, at any time across the entire speed range and with various different approach envelopes. Only relying on a single way of delivery greatly decreases the potential effectiveness. That's why the US, China and in this case Russia seek out various delivery platforms. While less serious nuclear powers entirely rely on a handful of SSBNs (and in the case of France the ASMP on top).
 
The Poseidon, by design, can be deployed at a time of heightened tension and recalled when necessary. This makes it more akin to putting a missile in readiness than launching a missile.
Not passing the sniff test by any means. It can be "recalled" in the same sense that an ICBM is recalled when the carrying boomer completes it's deterrence patrol and return to port. Launching a nuclear armed loitering munition into the ocean and just letting it roam is a patently stupid way to lose a warhead and a highly advanced delivery system
 
Launching a nuclear armed loitering munition into the ocean and just letting it roam is a patently stupid way to lose a warhead and a highly advanced delivery system
I work exclusively with submarine sonar and admittedly have limited exposure to the unmanned world--but I've acted in an advisory role regarding sensors and CONOPS with external teams supporting unmanned systems.

The fact is, no matter what the techbros (and even the primes) tell you... you're 100% correct here. Frankly, we're still in relative infancy and UUVs in general are not at the maturity level they'd need to be to reliably send one halfway across the world with full faith that you'll maintain control of it or ever see it again.

There are a million things that can go wrong, and I can virtually guarantee you at least one of those things will happen. You lose a UUV, meh sucks for you, you lose a nuclear warhead--that's a pretty big deal.
 
I work exclusively with submarine sonar and admittedly have limited exposure to the unmanned world--but I've acted in an advisory role regarding sensors and CONOPS with external teams supporting unmanned systems.

The fact is, no matter what the techbros (and even the primes) tell you... you're 100% correct here. Frankly, we're still in relative infancy and UUVs in general are not at the maturity level they'd need to be to reliably send one halfway across the world with full faith that you'll maintain control of it or ever see it again.

There are a million things that can go wrong, and I can virtually guarantee you at least one of those things will happen. You lose a UUV, meh sucks for you, you lose a nuclear warhead--that's a pretty big deal.
The only "UUV" I would trust to work as intended is an ADCAP
 
I've had to clean this thread up twice in two days for political posts.
There is no need to try and start political arguments over Russia's political status. Consider this a last warning or I will lock this thread.
 
How can Status 6 be tested over intercontinental distances?
Perhaps it could be launched into the Sea of Okhotsk and made to circle a large number of times on a predefined path, or a route north of Russia, i.e., from Murmansk to Kamchatka.
But it's one thing to launch a missile (ICBM or cruise missile, regardless of the engine, even a nuclear one) over your own territory, and quite another to launch a nuclear-powered weapon thousands of kilometers away, leaving national waters after 12 nautical miles.
Isn't the risk of a failure in the guidance system (hopefully highly redundant) too high? The mega-torpedo under test could start cruising the oceans, with a nuclear reactor on board.
One of the reasons for not testing the SLAM was precisely the risk of the missile going off on its own. Perhaps this weapon is just another way of pursuing the Madman theory?
 
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