I rather like Legend-class FF(X} as a solution. They aren't gold-plated mini-Ticos. They are true fourth-rate, affordable, and built for endurance ships to exert a presence. Not every ship has to be a battleship. The USN can now focus on separate hulls for the first through third rate ships.
No doubt…presence matters in peace-time. Builds & strengthens alliances.
But I feel like we missed our chance at optimizing our presence ‘warship’ when we botched the speed requirement for the LCS, resulting in two classes that couldn’t deploy in the 2010s when we needed them, and now won’t help us much in a peer sea control fight.
To me, the US Navy lacks a first rate ship entirely - the PLAN has the type 055, and the US Navy has a conceptual BBG on pretty slides - that Congress hasn’t funded or negotiated down to a (big) CG yet. But at least we’re starting the conversation.
Fortunately, the USN has 75 proven excellent, if old, second rate designs in the water, with 20 more on the way. Given the environment, we should not stop building 2-3 (we’re running 1/year now, so work to do even here) Burkes/year until full production of both the BBG/CG and a not-yet-conceived Burke replacement are achieved.
The third rate warship program, the FFG, just died. The NSC cannot fill this gap. It is noisy and can’t carry the necessary gear to provide ASW to CVSGs & ARGs, and privateer Chinese merchants as WW3 begins. We have to start over here, and aside from a couple Internet forums, I see no discussion about it.
Unfortunately, the NSC is not even fourth rate - too noisy for ASW, and its Mk.110, SeaRAM, & MH-60 form an incomplete package to complete all but very niche missions. It is ok if the fourth rate warship performs but a single task well, but that task must fill a gap the first three rates leave in defeating a peer enemy. ASW - a volume-of-water business that demands lots more tails & dipping than the USN currently envisions, is the biggest fillable gap due to the unaffordable cost building only multi-mission warships (CG, DDG, & FFG) to carry out all ASW missions.
Some say a single mission ship can be an offboard missile magazine. This can fail when the Chinese jam signals between manned warship and arsenal USV.
Some say that fleet ASW will become autonomous. This can fail then unmanned and even undermanned ships break (read about LCS teething & the early ASW mission module to see how important crew is in peacetime, let alone wartime).
A fourth rate ship (an ASW Corvette) must be excellent at ASW to be additive to the fleet. And it must be designed from scratch, because while it may have the buoyancy to eventually mount the ASW & VLS gear, any redesign of the NSC to satisfy the ASW single-mission will end like the Constellation - cancelled due to the magnitude of change.
The US Navy’s #1 problem isn’t its industrial infrastructure (certainly a problem, but not #1). It’s #1 problem is understanding & credibly articulating ‘warship-packaged’ capabilities it needs to return to its place as a navy with an ability to fight a peer, and succinctly and definitively articulating it’s requirements to industry designers in ‘producible’ flights, to avoid design/build-creep.