Sorry, perhaps I used the wrong words, causing you to misunderstand. My idea is for all the designers to stay in the same office (of course, they could be divided into different design groups). This would facilitate communication among them; for example, submarine designers could share their experiences on how to reduce noise in the hull and propulsion system.
FFG(X) - NEWS Only
I think it is a double disaster of politics and reality. Back to 2019, when USN required FFG to be derived from a proven and mature design USN needed to face the reality that NAVSEA has no design ability and the design of domestic private contractors can not fully meet the RFI, Choosing a foreign design was the only solution. However, when the design team of FMM in the US is unable to complete the modification and cannot get the assistance of Italian designers, life entered the countdown.
It is a very arduous task to get the American defense shipbuilding industry back on track.
Domestic contractors can meet the RFI, they were just officially instructed they had to modify an already existing design which leads to problems. Burke Flt III hasn't faced these problems, neither have almost all of the other warship programs since 1991.
Italian designers are only a part of the team insofar as mating American systems to the Italian design. They do not know American systems so how would they effectively add to the program?
American shipbuilding is hardly as bad as you make out to be. This program is broadly the outlier, and even if you include LCS, American shipbuilding has broadly performed very well.
America-class LHAs
San Antonio-class LPDs
LPD Flight IIs
Flight III
Ford
T-AKEs
T-AO-205s
LMSRs
ESDs/ESBs
Even the Burke Flight II restart went ok all things considered, and Zumwalt, while it has faced issues, has given American designers an unparalleled edge in next generation warship design.
...The Zumwalt class was designed over two decades ago. How many of those designers and how much of that institutional knowledge do you think is s till around?
If we're looking at the latest actual warship procurement (not low-end combatants, reworking an existing design you have decades of experience with or support ships), the answer is "Clearly not enough".
The Constellation class was a failure because of a lack of knowledge and ability inside the USN, not because of an abundance of it!
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EmoBirb
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You can thank the moderators for that, which deleted my multi paragraph response to you which made you look as silly as you are.
Yes, Zumwalt is used as a testbed for new technology and has iteratively been modified and upgraded, the latest being hypersonic strike weapons. Naturally the teams who work on these programs work on DDG(X) given they are A) from the same areas of NAVSEA and B) most experienced with arguably the most advanced warship on the planet. Also institutional knowledge is transferred through studies which NAVSEA conducts periodically. Despite what some in this thread have tried to claim, these are crucial to allow an understanding of past, present, and future warship technology (not just a waste of funds)
You meant the design that was from an unexperienced design team based upon requirements (based on an existing ship) more political than technical?
Sure mate, you don't even understand the fundamentals of USN programs but I'm the one who looks silly because I think USN frigates shouldn't be Italian and should be American. My sources are people who work on USN projects and yours are vibes and feelings
If the USN still had an experienced warship design team they would not have needed to modify an Italian design.
Both me and that_person have stated previously why this process was chosen but sure, I can reiterate it again.
First, the political atmosphere was such that an all new FFG was not tenable. Government would not have accepted the costs and investments required.
Second, there was a view that this program would get a hull into the water quicker than an all new design (and even with the delays this is largely true)
Third, there was a concerted effort at the time to work on the next gen LSC, this being the program formally established 1 and a bit years later in 2021 as DDG(X). DDG(X) is led by Navy with G&C support. This was a serious concentration of talent that could not be reasonably split to work on other projects.
Therefore it is not so much a case of not knowing how and more a case of not being able to divert enough people to sustain multiple surface combatant programs from the perspective of Navy. Couple this with the political environment and you see a much more nuanced reason for the debacle Navy and FMM have embroiled themselves in
EmoBirb
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Given the state of US shipbuilding and the USN, yes, that's very silly.
You can ask the mods if they can retrieve it for you, but I can't be bothered to re-write several long paragraphs why survivability standards are important but only to an extent before becoming a liability with regards to cost and schedules, how it's better to have an off the shelf solution that's "less optimal" (which I questioned, given that China, Japan, South Korea, France, Italy and Germany would never construct something, be it ship or submarine, that's not up to a reasonable safety and damage management standard) than not having one at all, having to commit to deploy hyper expensive DDGs for missions that don't require them, having overall less hulls, the ones being built coming in very late. How proper crew training and awareness of damage mitigation and control is more important than standards written up last century, how the threats of today and tomorrow couldn't care less about what NAVSEA thinks and that if one were to follow your unreasonable crusade in the name of NAVSEA, we're soon seeing the US armor plate superstructures with composite and steel armor because of "muh damage control, muh safety". All of which btw ignores the fact than in the SCS, the scenario the USN is building up towards, any USN ship would be targeted by multiple ballistic and cruise missiles, there would be mines and submarines on the prowl. You're not surviving a salvo of Chinese AShMs and AShBMs, and you're not limping back home or get recovered. That's just not happening with the sheer missile volume the PLA can deliver from air, land and sea in the region. And, as someone who also think about the crews and that their survival is the utmost priority, that's the point where you simply abandon the ship. Losses will occur if that happens, and you better be able to replenish losses quickly and preferably cheaply, quick and cheap is anathema to everything American MIC related. So you're "American frigate" would ultimately result in the USN melting away in the pacific and taking multiple decades to replenish their numbers, a period in which US naval hegemony would effectively die.
Centering your navy around a single, cold war era hull, which can't even be delivered on schedule, is not a winning recipe. Having several failed shipbuilding programs which fall short of what they promised and were projected to offer is not a winning recipe. Planning and preparing for the next war you'll fight like you did for the last one you fought is not a winning recipe.
Your posts are largely based on "X told me Y about Z", quintessential hearsay and not a "source", and yet you act like you designed the last 3 generations of US surface combatants and cut the steel yourself. With 25...
If I were you I'd back off from having such a confrontational attitude, it doesn't help your point. Acting like only the US knows how to build ships properly, while China, Japan and South Korea show how to deliver cutting edge, powerful surface combatants in volume and short intervals doesn't help your point. Acting as if France and Italy in particular aren't building magnificent, modern and very capable surface combatants doesn't help your point. Going on a crusade for NAVSEA doesn't help your point.
Yes my focus is aerospace, which I study, but one doesn't need a degree in marine engineering to see and criticize the fallacy of the direction the US Navy has taken. It doesn't take any degree to know a train wreck when you see one. Which is a fitting analogy.
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And now...it looks like we will get a light frigate based on the Coast Guard's NSC.
An NSC is what you get when you've failed multiple times to produce a successful small surface combatant.
Look for Phelan to jam this down the Navy's throat like a mother giving medicine to a protesting child.
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/na...-were-war-chinas-ai-powered-fleet-races-ahead
An NSC is what you get when you've failed multiple times to produce a successful small surface combatant.
Look for Phelan to jam this down the Navy's throat like a mother giving medicine to a protesting child.
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/na...-were-war-chinas-ai-powered-fleet-races-ahead
If you include subs into the production of US vessels the #s are better. We need some innovation in how we produce ships - more of WWII Liberty ship assembly line, but automated like a car manufacturing. If that's what they want....now days ships are big, fat, and slow targets.
Reddington777
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https://defence-blog.com/future-frigate-set-for-2028-debut-u-s-navy-says/?amp
Any guesses on what said design is referring to
Rumor is, the frigate will be based on the Coast Guard's NSC.
Supposedly, Phelan said as much in a private gathering and word leaked out.
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LightningFan1959
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Here's hoping they can find a way to fit more than the 12 vls cells the previous 'patrol frigate' had (for the surface warfare focused version, mind you, iirc).
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If they're promising to that it will be delivered in 2028, it's going to be an NSC with grey paint.
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LightningFan1959
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Damn.
Though doesn't the NSC also have the issue of it being built to lower survivability standards than the Burke? Iirc the USCG doesn't really go up to that 'level', sitting at the one below it at best.
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As I said before, a navalized NSC is what happens when you've had a couple of swings at delivering a successful small surface combatant but missed.
That 15 knot Damen LST is what you get when you tried to build your own but failed.
To answer your question, the NSC is indeed designed and built to a lower survivability standard than the Burkes.
On the upside, HII has proven they can build them and perhaps the line is still warm.
The Coast Guard seems to like them as they work. They have very good endurance and high availability rates.
Maybe something usable can be made from them. Maybe.
The NSCs should work great in a peacetime show the flag role that we need to keep the Burkes away from. Are they perfect? Not at all, but they can be quite useful if used properly. Doesn't change that a proper FFG will still be needed.
Kat Tsun
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They don't have a choice, nor should they, because the alternative is nothing.
They can take a couple missile hits and stay afloat long enough to evacuate. They can operate a helicopter too.
They might even kill one or two subs or missiles.
All together beats losing a Burke or a merchant.
The RN won the last war using Flower class corvettes and the U.S. might need to win this one using NSCs. No big deal.
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Scott Kenny
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I suspect the mechanisms are similar enough. Different engines and speeds just mean different vibration frequencies and amplitudes.
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Oops, missed this one.
Yes, the designers should stay close enough that water cooler conversations can happen.
Ah, gotcha.
Yes, the designers should stay close enough that water cooler conversations can happen.
Anyone who thinks it'll be one and done in '27-29 is nuts.
I'm not happy with NSC, I think the money would be better spent on a functional clean sheet FFG, but God forbid a program deliver after Donnie leaves office.
Reddington777
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Even if they had a choice, this should have been the choice anyway. We need something fast with hulls in the water while others figure out a proprietary solution. We waste too much time dithering over standards and requirements when theres absolutely nothing even in the water yet.
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Well they want a boat in the water by 2028 and NSC can probably do that.
We don't need "hulls in the water." We need warships that can perform necessary missions as part of a larger naval force structure. The NSC frigate will be yet another ship that requires a Burke escort when going anywhere dangerous.
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This is not a strategic decision, it is a political one.
They may be up to reasonable standard but they aren't up to US standards. None of those navies have the reach, op tempo, or combat experience of the USN
That isn't what survivability is though.
The idea of tiered air defence+survivability means you are though. You can priorities your missile stocks to minimize damage, not avoid it entirely.
This has been studied and it isn't possible, I might go fish for the report again later. In wartime they cannot build a mobilization ship for logistics or combat. This is specifically why the USN does not want a cheap mass producible ship, they need to build in peacetime where cheap ships aren't a necessary fiscal move and therefore top tier surface combatants are preferred. This wasn't even the plan during the Cold War, it essentially died out as soon as the missile age began.
Ok, if you want to get into semantics then no, the Burke is not the center of the USN. The entire purpose of Burkes is to shield carriers so that carriers can use their airpower offensively. As for "several failed shipbuilding programs", only two of these directly pertain to the CSG and 1 of them wasn't even meant to be ready in time for fighting China. It's also silly to boil the Burke down to a
single, Cold War era hull". Fundamentally a Flight III or even IIA Burke is just as advanced as anything else afloat that China fields. Yeah, the basis may be old but they've been substantially reworked over the years.
Sorry, I didn't realize asking experts in the field was a bad thing. Will stop from now on.
None of those navies do what the USN do. China just sent their largest combined force into the Philippine Sea and it was 1 FFG, 1 DDG, 1 LHD, and a T-AOE. They haven't engaged in any form of combat at all. Yeah, they're without a doubt a capable fighting force and I would never detract from that but they build for a fundamentally different mission (crossing the Strait) than the USN (controlling global oceans). US op tempo is only matched by the French submarine force iirc, other than that no surface force meets the availability metrics the USN does.
Without a doubt there are problems in the construction process but the problem isn't the standards ships are designed too. These standards are necessary for the USN mission, and would probably be unnecessary for European missions. Do note that the standards mustn't be the issue given Spain builds to the same standards and have not had trouble getting their FFGs out.
You must be missing the portions in which I have criticized NAVSEA although a lot of the issues within NAVSEA are not the fault of Navy. American sacrificed on the altar of GWOT for 20+ years and the navy copped a lot of those cuts which often gets passed onto development as the op tempo and missions remained much the same. Certain decisions such as outsourcing design to shipyards are a result of government improperly funding NAVSEA. The FFG(X) program was conducted the way it was as a result of government requirements making an indigenous design untenable.
The USN is not a trainwreck, it's incredibly difficult to justify that position despite some struggles. Your argument also seems to entirely ignore the issues overseas programs have, especially China. Just because we hear no problems in Chinese shipbuilding does not mean no problems exist, to claim as much is a fallacious thinking. French, British, Korean, etc. shipbuilding is not impervious to flaws. The USN has a focus on everything they get wrong because they want to rectify those issues. This creates a media narrative that everything is bad and everything is not going well. If you dig a little below the surface the reality is much more nuanced
FMM is completing at least two ships which means the design is workable/will be workable. The Navy has work for FMM they could assign so as to keep the yard active so there is no point in building a dead end design. NSC does not meet navy requirements, it is functionally useless in a high intensity conflict. So why would they cancel it give the USN needs the design to meet operational requirements and nothing else can fill that gap? All the RnD money is still being paid out for the two hulls. Fiscally and practically it makes no sense
I expect FMM will get some LSM and other projects.
I do believe Navy and civilian leadership is trying preserve MM and it's employees as best they can.
Hopefully, those new Connies work out but I don't have confidence it's going to be anytime soon or that costs are under control.
Maybe the Navy and civilian leadership lost confidence as well.
The last rumor was that the design was significantly overweight and would nolonger be fast enough or stable enough for the missions intended.
If so, more redesign needed....
Requirements are a funny thing. LCS had many. DDG21 had many.
Sometimes it takes too long to hit them and they are nolonger relevant. Other times, it is just too expensive to hit them or the technology isn't quite there. You know this stuff.
This NSC thing, if true, will be interesting to watch.
It appears to be an blue water corvette more than a true frigate, at least from what we know.
Which will be paid for anyway so ultimately it’s wasted money if a serial production run doesn’t go ahead
It only matters if it works. If it works and costs are not stupid, build more. If it doesn't, move on.
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https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
"Then at last weekend’s Reagan National Defense Forum, Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him."
Seriously? I don't think he understands the amount of work involved in change control.
"Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter, two sources who heard the comments told Breaking Defense."
Now that's the kind of private disclosure that makes for insider trading, be a bit embarrassing to have the SEC going after SecNav.
"Then at last weekend’s Reagan National Defense Forum, Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him."
Seriously? I don't think he understands the amount of work involved in change control.
"Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter, two sources who heard the comments told Breaking Defense."
Now that's the kind of private disclosure that makes for insider trading, be a bit embarrassing to have the SEC going after SecNav.
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I believe the Claud Jones class of DEs was intended as a mobilization ship. It seems that they were not a success and the idea of a mobilization ship was dropped.
By the way, it's interesting that Phelan said the Constellation was shaping up to be "80% the cost of a destroyer, so we may as well just buy destroyers." In fact, a Burke Flt III costs $2.7B per, and the latest estimate for an FFG-62 was about $1.2B per, or less than half the cost of a Burke.
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AIUI purchase cost is about 20% of the cost of a warship, maintenance is 20%, crew is 20%, fuel is 20% and I can't remember the other, with might be modernization(s). When everything is accounted for, the 50% purchase price for FFG(X) might be more like 60-80% of the cost of a Burke for the lifecycle costs.
That is right where the decision making needs to rest. While he won't be approving every specific change order, and I doubt that was what he was actually suggesting, it is a consistent message than the Constellation lacked the high level oversight required. In the CAVASSHIPS podcast on 4th December a specific question was asked about the creation of a Naval Czar who would oversee all programs, including the final buck stop for change, and the guest, former Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly, made it very clear that is the SecNav's job. Modly rightly IMO suggested that tenure for positions like SecNav needs to be much longer. In the 5 years since the USN signed the contract for Constellation they have had 6 confirmed or acting SecNavs. That is hardly a way to build strong capability and direction and I would argue is as much the reason for the failure of the Constellation as anything else.
Just to clarify I'm also not suggesting Phelan is the guy that should be appointed for the next ten years...
Ainen
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It's hard to imagine.
Way less systems of lesser complexity, 1/3-1/2 crew, way more efficient machinery.
Where this will come from?
I don't get the politics part of it.
Someone has to be in charge. Someone has to be in a position to say "no".
Someone has to be accountable for decisions made and the success or failure of a program.
Someone has to be providing oversight.
Call that politics if you will.
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