How to fix USN shipbuilding

[joshjosh]

Some of you might enjoy this presentation by Dr. Bob Mortlock at the Naval Postgraduate School on shipbuilding acquisition using the Offshore Patrol Cutter as a case study:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6T__Le2RXzY

 

[EmoBirb]

There are two main issues in my eyes:

First: US shipbuilding can't be "fixed", as in there is no real possibility for the US to match or even exceed the output of Chinese yards. Meaning that instead of trying to catch up when that's a hopeless story, the Americans would be smart to look at how to challenge China despite an increasingly growing disparity in fleet size. Similar to how the Soviets had to figure out how they want to cripple and neuter the numerically superior USN (that's not even me touching on the fact that the entire PLAN is active in the WESTPAC region, while only a fraction of the USN is there).

Second: US shipbuilding is extremely unprofitable. Yards mostly make their money with commercial orders. US yards are not competitive at all on the global stage, especially with the US offering more money for less work elsewhere. Even trained welders, plumbers, engineers etc. find far more well paid work elsewhere than in US shipyards. How do you hold a terribly unprofitable but important sector over water? Nationalize it. Perhaps it is time to nationalize US shipbuilding. It makes further sense when you realize the by far biggest customer for US yards is the government anyway.

Everything else is a symptom of these two issues in my opinion. Just my two cents.

 

[Jacky]

Trump addressed the shipbuilding industry today. Wonder how much he would devote to fixing this problem.

He can do nothing.....

This is a systemic problem, and one can even write a paper about it.

Educational level: Education must be reformed, and compulsory education must provide the society with qualified graduates with basic science knowledge. At the same time, shipyards and technical schools should cooperate to ensure that shipyards can obtain qualified workers and shorten the training time for newly recruited workers.

Private shipyards: Private shipyards must be forced to participate in international civil ship construction bidding, and conditional financial subsidies can be appropriately provided. For example, when private shipyards obtain a certain tonnage of civil ship construction contracts, they can obtain government subsidies, and the subsidies can only be obtained after the ship is delivered. Encourage shipyards to innovate in construction technology.

Naval shipyards: Restore the shipbuilding capacity of naval shipyards. 40% of military ship orders are obtained unconditionally by naval shipyards (forcing private shipyards to survive on civilian ship orders rather than military ship orders). However, the supervision and management of naval shipyards must be strengthened to prevent them from having no innovation and responsibility in the construction field.

Naval procurement: Restore the original "Fleet Operator-BuShip-SCB" procurement process. All warship projects are subject to specific requirements from the fleet operator, designed by the navy itself, and finally reviewed and released by the SCB.

Propaganda level: Learn from China's educational slogans such as "Learn math, physics and chemistry well, and you will not be afraid to travel around the world", and promote "engineer culture". Make the whole society transform into an "engineer society". After all, engineers create history, while accountants and lawyers are just passers-by in history.

 

[EmoBirb]

Propaganda level: Learn from China's educational slogans such as "Learn math, physics and chemistry well, and you will not be afraid to travel around the world", and promote "engineer culture". Make the whole society transform into an "engineer society". After all, engineers create history, while accountants and lawyers are just passers-by in history.

An underestimated aspect, however if you look at the US for example I think the incentive to be an engineer or a tradesman has never been lower. Especially when social media bombards you with lazy dimwits who make six figures by blurting into a camera.

However all of that nukes the scope of the topic at hand. So while I agree that it's also a cultural issue, such cultural issues are beyond the scope of this forum.

 

[Jacky]

There are two main issues in my eyes:

First: US shipbuilding can't be "fixed", as in there is no real possibility for the US to match or even exceed the output of Chinese yards. Meaning that instead of trying to catch up when that's a hopeless story, the Americans would be smart to look at how to challenge China despite an increasingly growing disparity in fleet size. Similar to how the Soviets had to figure out how they want to cripple and neuter the numerically superior USN (that's not even me touching on the fact that the entire PLAN is active in the WESTPAC region, while only a fraction of the USN is there).

Second: US shipbuilding is extremely unprofitable. Yards mostly make their money with commercial orders. US yards are not competitive at all on the global stage, especially with the US offering more money for less work elsewhere. Even trained welders, plumbers, engineers etc. find far more well paid work elsewhere than in US shipyards. How do you hold a terribly unprofitable but important sector over water? Nationalize it. Perhaps it is time to nationalize US shipbuilding. It makes further sense when you realize the by far biggest customer for US yards is the government anyway.

Everything else is a symptom of these two issues in my opinion. Just my two cents.

Historically, the U.S. Navy's own shipyards can build submarines and warships. For example, the Brooklyn Navy Yard has built Essex-class aircraft carriers, Iowa-class battleships (Iowa and Missouri), CV-64 Constellation aircraft carriers, etc.; the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard has built North Carolina-class battleships (Washington), Iowa-class battleships (New Jersey and Wisconsin), Essex-class aircraft carriers, etc.; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has built conventional submarines and nuclear submarines; Mare Island Naval Shipyard has built conventional submarines and nuclear submarines. However, these naval shipyards were deprived of their construction capabilities after McNamara took office. This is a huge human error, but so far, no one has corrected it.

The United States cannot directly copy the Chinese method. Because the state-owned shipyards responsible for building Chinese naval warships are independent and closed, and only build naval ships. The design bureau responsible for designing Chinese naval warships is also responsible for designing civilian ships. But the key point is that the Chinese Navy will make clear requirements, and the Chinese Navy will not confirm the construction contract until the design plan is confirmed by the Chinese Navy. This procedure has been lost by the US Navy. I don’t understand why the successive Secretaries of Defense or Navy have abandoned the original procurement process of "fleet operators release requirements, BuShip is responsible for design, SCB reviews and finally confirms".

An underestimated aspect, however if you look at the US for example I think the incentive to be an engineer or a tradesman has never been lower. Especially when social media bombards you with lazy dimwits who make six figures by blurting into a camera.

However all of that nukes the scope of the topic at hand. So while I agree that it's also a cultural issue, such cultural issues are beyond the scope of this forum.

I just want to say that fixing the U.S. shipbuilding industry is a complex project that cannot be solved by just one or two simple measures.

 

[tychosis]

Historically, the U.S. Navy's own shipyards can build submarines and warships. For example, the Brooklyn Navy Yard has built Essex-class aircraft carriers, Iowa-class battleships (Iowa and Missouri), CV-64 Constellation aircraft carriers, etc.; the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard has built North Carolina-class battleships (Washington), Iowa-class battleships (New Jersey and Wisconsin), Essex-class aircraft carriers, etc.; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has built conventional submarines and nuclear submarines; Mare Island Naval Shipyard has built conventional submarines and nuclear submarines. However, these naval shipyards were deprived of their construction capabilities after McNamara took office. This is a huge human error, but so far, no one has corrected it.

That was 50 years ago, though.

Anyone who believes NAVSEA is capable of designing any modern ship or system has never worked with NAVSEA. (And anyone who has ever worked in both public and private shipyards knows that you don't want the public yards building anything.)

You're not building that back unless you poach all the people who are currently doing this work, and the Navy simply cannot afford that.

 

[Jacky]

That was 50 years ago, though.

Anyone who believes NAVSEA is capable of designing any modern ship or system has never worked with NAVSEA. (And anyone who has ever worked in both public and private shipyards knows that you don't want the public yards building anything.)

You're not building that back unless you poach all the people who are currently doing this work, and the Navy simply cannot afford that.

The current situation has thoroughly demonstrated the serious consequences of the Navy's loss of the ability to design and build warships. I don't know why you are so hostile to the Navy Yard.

The result of relying solely on private shipyards in the United States: huge waste in the Littoral Combat Ship project, delays in the Ford-class aircraft carrier, the Constellation-class frigate plan comes from abroad, and the DDGX project has made no progress. There are problems with the construction of all warships. Therefore, private shipyards that are independent of the international civilian shipbuilding market and rely heavily on defense orders can no longer provide warships for the Navy at a good price. From the actual performance, the original procurement process is much better and more efficient than the current one. At least under the original procurement process, the construction contract will not be confirmed without determining specific requirements and detailed designs.

As for the budget issue you mentioned, this level of budget cannot actually be classified as a defense budget, but should be allocated separately. And you mentioned the budget, which shows that you are thinking about the problem from an accounting perspective rather than from an engineer's perspective. This is the biggest difference between China and the United States at present. The priority of any project should be to meet the needs rather than to meet the budget, and the budget must be based on the needs.

 

[tychosis]

The current situation has thoroughly demonstrated the serious consequences of the Navy's loss of the ability to design and build warships. I don't know why you are so hostile to the Navy Yard.

The result of relying solely on private shipyards in the United States: huge waste in the Littoral Combat Ship project, delays in the Ford-class aircraft carrier, the Constellation-class frigate plan comes from abroad, and the DDGX project has made no progress. There are problems with the construction of all warships. Therefore, private shipyards that are independent of the international civilian shipbuilding market and rely heavily on defense orders can no longer provide warships for the Navy at a good price. From the actual performance, the original procurement process is much better and more efficient than the current one. At least under the original procurement process, the construction contract will not be confirmed without determining specific requirements and detailed designs.

As for the budget issue you mentioned, this level of budget cannot actually be classified as a defense budget, but should be allocated separately. And you mentioned the budget, which shows that you are thinking about the problem from an accounting perspective rather than from an engineer's perspective. This is the biggest difference between China and the United States at present. The priority of any project should be to meet the needs rather than to meet the budget, and the budget must be based on the needs.

Do you work in shipbuilding and maintenance? How many years have you spent helping both public and private yards solve problems?

I've worked on submarines for a quarter of a century. I can assure you--the Navy yards do not have the qualifications or capability to build ships or submarines. They simply don't.

I am an engineer. This is an engineer's perspective. Now, I don't know the root cause... but I'd imagine it's a lack of well-defined responsibilities and a lot of "not my job" and passing the buck. I have been to literally *every* yard helping them solve problems they should have been able to fix themselves but didn't feel like bothering. (And I'm gonna be fair, the private yards aren't *a whole lot* better.)

 

[lastdingo]

IMO the shipyard capacity PRC vs. USA comparison is so extremely lopsided it makes no sense for the U.S. to try to armsrace the PRC at sea.

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2023/07/shipbuilding-disparity-and-usn.html

It should instead
1) Use land-based assets (including airpower wiping out ships)
2) armed merchantment equipped with containerised naval systems (convoy self-defence, self-defending island supply ships, far blockade-enforcing auxiliary cruisers equipped with helo for boarding)

https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2019/07/how-to-fix-united-states-navy.html

Furthermore, it should look at land-based assets to secure maritime traffic lanes along the Pacific Coast and around Hawaiian ports and the "island chains".


It's nonsensical to buy F-35A. All F-35 should be capable of using arrestor gear routinely, using a jump ski routinely (both in combination reduces minimum runway length by about 50%) and using drogue-chute refuelling (many more tankers by converting airliners and by buddy-buddy refuelling).
The A-10 should be kept in air force reserve specifically for the purpose of buddy-buddy refuelling from island chain airfields.

 

[aonestudio]

HII Turns to AI to Revolutionize U.S. Naval Shipbuilding

America’s largest military shipbuilder HII and enterprise AI software company C3 AI have announced an expanded strategic partnership aimed at accelerating shipbuilding throughput through artificial intelligence implementation at HII’s Newport...

gcaptain.com

 

[dannydale]

No idea how this AI stuff is supposed to get more American hulls in the water, but I wish them the best.

 

[Kat Tsun]

You're not building that back unless you poach all the people who are currently doing this work, and the Navy simply cannot afford that.

You can just conscript them, or nationalize the shipyards, and make them work within DON lol. What are they gonna do? Go to the PRC?

Furthermore, it should look at land-based assets to secure maritime traffic lanes along the Pacific Coast and around Hawaiian ports and the "island chains".

So it should surrender? Why would it fortify things?

The problem isn't that the PRC wants to invade Hawaii (lmao). The problem is that they want to seize Taiwan, which is right off their coast, actually. The United States can literally only win that war by attacking, successfully degrading the defenses of the South China Sea, lifting the Taiwan blockade, and overall neutralizing the PLAN, PLARF, and PLAAF in its own backyard and likely within visual distance of its own mainland ports.

The alternative is that the United States isn't willing to do this. In which case it surrenders before a shot is fired. The arms race is moot.

 

[Reddington777]

IMO the shipyard capacity PRC vs. USA comparison is so extremely lopsided it makes no sense for the U.S. to try to armsrace the PRC at sea.

The alternative is that the United States isn't willing to do this. In which case it surrenders before a shot is fired. The arms race is moot.

If your arms race and competition lasts as far as Taiwan, sure not competing is an option. That clearly isnt the case. For China, challenging the US in every way shape and form guarantees the eventual annexation of Taiwan. For both sides, planning on Taiwan, while important, is becoming an afterthought. It is no longer the event horizon of US PRC competition, which means the longer you stay uncompetitive, the worse your situation becomes. In all areas that matter, not competing isnt an option.

It should instead
1) Use land-based assets (including airpower wiping out ships)
2) armed merchantment equipped with containerised naval systems (convoy self-defence, self-defending island supply ships, far blockade-enforcing auxiliary cruisers equipped with helo for boarding)

We are already doing those things but because of how sparse things are in the west pacific, you need to supply those locations. You can't supply them without maintaining presence in the air. You can let sufficiently maintain presence in the air without ships in the water from which your aerial assets have cover.

Furthermore, it should look at land-based assets to secure maritime traffic lanes along the Pacific Coast and around Hawaiian ports and the "island chains".

Thats a possibiity only if islands are close enough to your maratime routes. In the northern phillipines? Sure, but the further out you go, the less likely that is to happen. Yet like I mentioned above, you cant forgo the rest of the pacific either because in order to keep up those land based units, you need aircraft and warships.

It's nonsensical to buy F-35A. All F-35 should be capable of using arrestor gear routinely, using a jump ski routinely (both in combination reduces minimum runway length by about 50%) and using drogue-chute refuelling (many more tankers by converting airliners and by buddy-buddy refuelling).

Id argue it nonsensical to have made 3 variants of the F35 in the first place. Airforce should have gone with their own design as did the navy.

The A-10 should be kept in air force reserve specifically for the purpose of buddy-buddy refuelling from island chain airfields.

I pray to God every day the A-10 doesnt come back from the ashes.... I can maybe see that if those A10s can be unmanned, but still not a terribly useful investment when you can have a drone that does the same while being lower cost and less observable than flying football field.

 

[joshjosh]

Inside Shipbuilding: A Discussion with Senior Leaders by the US Naval Institute​

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCqVw9l-tHU

 

[EmoBirb]

The United States can literally only win that war by attacking, successfully degrading the defenses of the South China Sea, lifting the Taiwan blockade, and overall neutralizing the PLAN, PLARF, and PLAAF in its own backyard and likely within visual distance of its own mainland ports.

So the US can't win

 

[Foo Fighter]

It would very much depend on degrading the ability of the PRC to surge assets, probably at a time of low tension to mitigate any attack.

How many USN assests could successfully engage embarkation hubs and COULD they shut down those hubs for a few weeks to a month?

 

[Jacky]

Do you work in shipbuilding and maintenance? How many years have you spent helping both public and private yards solve problems?

I've worked on submarines for a quarter of a century. I can assure you--the Navy yards do not have the qualifications or capability to build ships or submarines. They simply don't.

I am an engineer. This is an engineer's perspective. Now, I don't know the root cause... but I'd imagine it's a lack of well-defined responsibilities and a lot of "not my job" and passing the buck. I have been to literally *every* yard helping them solve problems they should have been able to fix themselves but didn't feel like bothering. (And I'm gonna be fair, the private yards aren't *a whole lot* better.)

You are talking about the current situation, and I am talking about how to restore the shipbuilding industry's capabilities. In fact, the US has lost most of its industrial capacity because American society now relies more on the virtual economy (finance and consumption) than the real economy (industry).

I mentioned that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Mare Island Naval Shipyard were submarine builders. In the nuclear submarine era, the former built SSN-579, SSN-593, SSN-605, SSN-606, SSN-646, SSN-660. The latter built SSN-583, SSN-594, SSN-595, SSN-662, SSN-665, SSN-666, SSN672, SSN-677. But McNamara took away their ability to build. Obviously this happened before you entered the field.

I know that the public shipyards do not have the ability to build now because this is one of the results of McNamara's reforms. But if you understand my words, you should know that I am talking about restoring the ability of the public shipyards to build. Even if it requires additional funds. Because this is about restoring the ability of the shipbuilding industry rather than simply considering the cost of funds. Some things are easy to lose, but difficult to regain.

Before McNamara reformed the Navy's procurement system, the Navy's procurement system was concerned with how to maintain the shipbuilding industry's capabilities rather than how to control costs. It can be said that McNamara opened the prelude to destroying the US shipbuilding industry. Everything now is the result.

If you are a submarine industry practitioner, you can pay attention to the development and construction history of US nuclear submarines after 1965, and try to analyze whether the engineering and management problems encountered in these nuclear submarine projects are normal or the result of the gradual loss of shipbuilding industry capabilities.

 

[chimeric oncogene]

I think that a solution to Chinese industrial superiority that involves nuclear war is probably not a very good solution.

The Chinese can always retaliate, and have recently made significant investments in their nuclear weapons complex, precisely to deter vertical escalation.

The submarines on the other hand...

...well, there's no good answer to that yet, but OTOH they just need to hold a few relatively small bastions and littorals, and investments in fixed fortifications (mines, subsea sensors etc) probably help on that front. And given the fairly rapid improvements in human capital underway in the Middle Kingdom, it does not seem a stretch to retrain the submarine force - especially given expansion in the coming decade.

 

[Sferrin]

HII Turns to AI to Revolutionize U.S. Naval Shipbuilding

America’s largest military shipbuilder HII and enterprise AI software company C3 AI have announced an expanded strategic partnership aimed at accelerating shipbuilding throughput through artificial intelligence implementation at HII’s Newport...

gcaptain.com

 

[Kat Tsun]

I'm talking about underwater drones, and PLAN seems to be very active in that direction.

They're also constructing an entirely new class of manned submarine along the lines of the 774. They clearly don't think their ULUUVs can replace manned submarines, and they would know since they have the most experience using ULUUVs, so it's more likely they'll be used for missions that would otherwise need to risk an expensive SSN.

Minelaying and insertion of special operations forces comes to mind. Stalking enemy attack submarines is another one. A diesel-electric AIP ULUUV is almost certainly going to be much harder to hear than any Chinese nuke boat and would be an excellent way to keep tabs on SUBPAC. So add tattle-tale to that list.

Much more logical assumption is, that they aren't satisfied with existing designs, and simply reluctant to waste money on mass-producing something not completely satisfactory. Recall how they developed their destroyers; their first missile-armed designs were build in small numbers. Only after PLAN was fully satisfied with the capabilities of new designs, they started to crunch out Type 052's and Type 055's.

Well, considering how few SSNs they have, they should probably start settling soon if they want to take Taiwan. You don't normally build expeditionary piers and helicopter carriers for peaceful purposes after all. All of America's dumb gator navy stuff these days was built for invading the USSR after all.

Anyway pretty much everything you read about 095 and 096 suggests the PLAN is extremely pleased with their new submarines. They went from an Akula to a early model 774 in about a decade. That's impressive no matter how you slice it. It's not state of the art sure, considering 774 is now five blocks in, but it's very good. That's twenty years of development done in ten. They just need to build half a dozen and they'll have a somewhat formidable force of 10 okay to decent SSNs. Then we'll get to see how the crews go along.

 

[EmoBirb]

The US has a powerful submarine force which can likely press the PLAN quite hard, since they suffer with poor ASW and submarine warfare training (and equipment) in particular

I'm not sure I'd agree, given that China has multiple modern MPAs in service, plenty of frigates and destroyers with ASW helicopters as well as plenty of submarines (and probably other means to monitor their waters). So you have a lot of very modern ships (aided by okay submarines) with modern assets control a relatively small patch of sea. So there's a lot of saturation going on, on top of the SCS not being all that favorable for submarines to begin with.

So while the USNs submarines have probably a higher chance of survival, I would still argue these chances aren't great. However it's certainly more doable to try and slip past these defenses with a submarine and try to destroy a naval base with a hail mary mission and launch all the missiles before going down inevitably. As opposed to anything from the air or surface, which is just toast from it's conception onwards.

Neither nation will go nuclear over Taiwan, China knows they can just play the long game and the US is aware that in this day an age no American will die for Taiwan. After a couple big losses the US would probably back off anyway and focus containment of the PLAN by fortifying Japan and the Philippines as well as viewing the second island chain as the line to hold.

I also don't understand why you assume the PLA would want to avoid a war of attrition no matter what. While a quick sweep across Taiwan is preferable, a war of attrition would by all means favor China heavily over the US, which simply lacks the motivated population and has a joke of an industry compared to China. So in a Taiwan scenario China either wins quickly or wins slowly. Why do you think the US never truly committed to Taiwan? Because they're awfully aware of this. It's like the PLAN trying to fight a war over Hawaii, simply undoable by any serious measure.

Add to that the US overstretching their dwindling forces over the globe to maintain hegemony in other theaters and lacking allies that can take up the slack (let's just forget the joke that is the modern Royal Navy), and the picture becomes even uglier. While the entirety of the PLAN operates around China and secures important assets and is able to also lean on the PLAAF and PLARF to deal with any would be shenanigans from transpacific neighbors.

No matter how you slice it, no matter how good your subs are, they don't win wars. The German submarines of WW2 are such an example. Not even SSBNs win you wars, they just make you lose a little bit less by ensuring spite-launching some SLBMs no matter what. Furthermore, with the current output of US submarines, losses stack quickly and cannot be replenished. Same applies for their flatdecks which would melt away without replacement if they truly enter the actual theater.

 

[Kat Tsun]

I'm not sure I'd agree, given that China has multiple modern MPAs in service, plenty of frigates and destroyers with ASW helicopters as well as plenty of submarines (and probably other means to monitor their waters). So you have a lot of very modern ships (aided by okay submarines) with modern assets control a relatively small patch of sea. So there's a lot of saturation going on, on top of the SCS not being all that favorable for submarines to begin with.

It's fairly deep, but most PLAN forces would be concentrated around Taiwan, sure.

Neither nation will go nuclear over Taiwan,

DOD planners think otherwise but sure.

China knows they can just play the long game

If this were true, they wouldn't be constructing a naval force designed around blockading and landing on Taiwan. Helicopter carriers and CVNs aside, which are kind of whatever really, it's the oddball stuff that catches attention and makes it hard to think that the PRC is going to simply wait for Taiwan to rejoin the fold. Stuff like the big self-deploying expeditionary piers.

The long game is simply a continued standoff until Taiwan declares independence because it's fed up with waiting. Blue kind of lost big.

After a couple big losses the US would probably back off anyway and focus containment of the PLAN by fortifying Japan and the Philippines as well as viewing the second island chain as the line to hold.

This is the PLA's great hope as it was Japan's. Most Americans would be screaming for nukes to be used if a CVN were sunk though.

Why do you think the US never truly committed to Taiwan? Because they're awfully aware of this.

Not really. Besides needing to keep Taiwan from dragging us into a war whenever it wants to...

The only reason the U.S. war plan isn't literally "nuke PRC cities with B-2s" is because the PLA's ballistic missiles are still credible threats. There's not many, but they'll probably hit, and there's more than DPRK. Starshield, like GPALS before it, aims to correct that. If the PLA can wheel a couple squadrons of H-20s out in the next decade or so, and maybe a stealth cruise missile for the 095s, that would go a long way to keeping deterrence in check.

That's assuming Xi doesn't simply roll the dice and go all in before that.

Otherwise Starshield gets deployed, the Chinese nuclear deterrent is checked, and the U.S. recognizes an independent Taiwan.

There's a lot that could go wrong here: the PLA might simply make more ICBMs faster than America can deploy interceptors, Starshield might not get funding, there could be delays, the war could come sooner, etc. But that's the general plan. Right now the only thing keeping America from muscling around in East Asia like it does in the Middle East is the existence of a credible ballistic missile force in Xinjiang and, even with as loud as they are, the Jins.

The actual biggest obstacle to this is the continued U.S. reliance on Chinese trade and manufacturing and the Chinese reliance on U.S. capital and finance market access, FWIW. Neither side wants it, both sides need it, and most of the jingoism (and arms race) is for domestic media consumption. This is probably how we'll dodge the war, unless Xi is actually serious, and his big barges are meant for really invading places and not simply looking cool on CCTV defense news specials.

That would be the biggest surprise of the century, really.

 

[chimeric oncogene]

They're also constructing an entirely new class of manned submarine along the lines of the 774.

It's very interesting to hear this perspective on the PLAN submarine program, but following on from what you describe, I would come to different conclusions.

I knew 093B was being slightly proliferated, and it seems like a more refined design; 688i does not seem too bad when the submarine force was a complete joke not so long ago. The mission is littoral, you're operating under air cover, if the Virginia is hunting you, then it's not doing its job of hunting boomers or sinking invasion barges; there's more than one way to maintain sea control in the fairly crowded littorals of the Strait and South China Sea, you'll take losses and hope the USN runs out of torpedoes.

You're also saying that 095 is expected to be at parity with early Virginia, and that at present quietness is limited by crew constraints. That's honestly a lot more than you could hope for! Like you note, that's a lot of progress.

But think about the incentives for a moment. Part of the reason PLAN submarine force is filled with crap crews because the boats are crappy, and nobody wants to die in a crap boat. If the boats get better, the incentives to join improve; now of course, there will be other institutional factors at play, but people like to join winners. Once word gets out that 095 is competitive with early mod Virginia and not as much of a death trap, given the odds stacked against the USN in the likely theater, the test scores will improve and they can work from there.

This is also presumably why they did not build a zillion 093As or 093Bs when they were crap boats - you don't just end up with crap boats, you end up with crap crews. The Chinese are not necessarily rushing to meet a deadline, they want to grow a force and increase their options at every stage of the process. There are tradeoffs, yes, but otherwise you end up like Stalin cranking out a hundred noisy diesel-electrics in the 1950s like a moron.

There is room for improvement, and the situation is such that the incentive for the Americans to start a conflict are low and falling. The Chinese plan on invasion as a contingency/deterrence by denial, but obviously prefer peaceful reunification, and are unlikely to start a war out of the blue or on some nefarious timetable. On the other hand, the DPP might do all sorts of things to force the hand of Beijing, and there is a political crisis brewing in the Taiwanese legislature (A DPP-instigated recall election is poised to allow the DPP to take over the Legislature), so ask me again in twelve months (assuming I survive).

I would also question the incentives for the Chinese and Americans for a limited nuclear war - assuming that the irradiated ruins of Taiwan are under more or less PLA control (given that they're the only ones who can ship in food after this mess), the logical thing is to use the giant heaps of dual-use infrastructure - the fishing boats, the container ships, etc - to continue to supply Taiwan with logistics, while the homefront builds a spare navy (assuming the shipyards are not nuked) within two to three years (a lot of these would presumably be some flavor of jeep carrier or destroyer escort or attack cargo ship or some other "naval" vessel built to civilian standards).

US shipbuilding will be in no condition to build another Navy before 2030. No jeep carriers, no destroyer escorts, no liberty ships to get AUVs into the fight.

So America needs to hit the shipyards, but if they hit the shipyards, the Chinese let loose ICBMs against symmetrical targets in North America. A major counter-industrial exchange might be a fight the USA can win - US nuclear forces remain overall superior and the US has allies to rebuild etc - but it's kinda crazy.

To avoid this, US shipbuilding needs very large subsidies to restore to good health; the Chinese have spent 132 billion since 2000 to get their shipbuilding industry up to speed, and that's before the gazillions spent on the back end of the supply chain - steel, electricity, concrete etc. At the same time, you need to clear the deadwood away; this is a long and arduous process unlikely to take less than a decade.

Chinese industrialization went through a variety of township and village enterprises in the 1980s and 90s to turn farmers into industrial workers in a process of "factory education" - this was done despite the horrendous inefficiency of township and village enterprises because the benefits of factory education in a place close to the homes of the farmers outweighed the ridiculous unprofitability. These TVEs allowed farmers to learn the ropes of and acclimatize to factory work in a familiar setting, creating a labor force that could be tapped into by the coastal megapoli in the early 2000s for China's real manufacturing boom.

There needs to be an equivalent educational transitional stage to turn service workers back into industrial workers in a setting the service workers are comfortable with, and close to where they live. The school is a factory, and the factory is a school. Likewise the shipyard. So yes, the scope of the investment is likely very large and potentially extremely broad.

Perhaps the tech-bro-y drone and AUV/USV sectors (cough Anduril cough), despite their limited utility, are already serving a similar role, turning service economy workers in technology and adjacent industries into (inefficient) factory workers in a familiar and comfortable setting, close to the giant coastal cities full of service and knowledge economy workers. The efficient factory workers and efficient factories that will emerge out of the end of this process might be perhaps five to ten years away. Fancy that! Anduril, a modern-day take on a township and village enterprise funded for purposes of education and industrial transformation!

That's a long time to burn cash, but that I suppose is why Government is the ultimate venture capitalist.

 

[Kat Tsun]

It's very interesting to hear this perspective on the PLAN submarine program, but following on from what you describe, I would come to different conclusions.

I knew 093B was being slightly proliferated, and it seems like a more refined design; 688i does not seem too bad when the submarine force was a complete joke not so long ago. The mission is littoral, you're operating under air cover, if the Virginia is hunting you, then it's not doing its job of hunting boomers or sinking invasion barges; there's more than one way to maintain sea control in the fairly crowded littorals of the Strait and South China Sea, you'll take losses and hope the USN runs out of torpedoes.

This is diesel boat thinking tbh. Not surprising since the bulk of the PLANSF is a diesel force.

093Bs and 095s are better used to attack Fords transiting the Pacific within the Third Island Chain. Hard to do though.

You're also saying that 095 is expected to be at parity with early Virginia, and that at present quietness is limited by crew constraints. That's honestly a lot more than you could hope for! Like you note, that's a lot of progress.

It's quietness is limited by crew training and crew experience, yes, but that's true for the 093Bs as well.

But think about the incentives for a moment.

I have no doubt it can be turned around, given enough time, but at the very least the U.S. is expecting a major war within 18-72 months. It's something that will need to be fixed after the Taiwan War, should it happen, or through the next decade.

Part of the reason PLAN submarine force is filled with crap crews because the boats are crappy, and nobody wants to die in a crap boat. If the boats get better, the incentives to join improve; now of course, there will be other institutional factors at play, but people like to join winners. Once word gets out that 095 is competitive with early mod Virginia and not as much of a death trap, given the odds stacked against the USN in the likely theater, the test scores will improve and they can work from there.

I think the issue is the people they're picking are coming from low entrance score schools, not that they allow bad scores through. The high quality personnel, those coming from the Frunze or West Point of PLA, are going to carriers and their surface escorts. This is not a "wrong" choice on the PLAN's part. It's exactly what they should be focusing on.

This is also presumably why they did not build a zillion 093As or 093Bs when they were crap boats

093B isn't bad from what I understand. It's okay. 688is are still in large service in the US Navy, too, and Pr 945s in the Russian Navy.

The Chinese are not necessarily rushing to meet a deadline,

I'm not sure anyone can say this except the biggest men in the Party tbf. Deadlines can be fabricated as well.

they want to grow a force and increase their options at every stage of the process. There are tradeoffs, yes, but otherwise you end up like Stalin cranking out a hundred noisy diesel-electrics in the 1950s like a moron.

It's more it's interesting that the PLAN doesn't seem to have shipyards, besides Bohai, that can produce effective SSNs. Compared to surface escort numbers, the production of nuke boats looks positively American.

There is room for improvement, and the situation is such that the incentive for the Americans to start a conflict are low and falling. The Chinese plan on invasion as a contingency/deterrence by denial, but obviously prefer peaceful reunification, and are unlikely to start a war out of the blue or on some nefarious timetable.

Certainly a hopeful thought. The issue being...

On the other hand, the DPP

...yeah. This is also why the United States doesn't commit to defending Taiwan incidentally. The formal term is "dual deterrence". Some esteemed Congressmen fail to understand that Taiwan may be emboldened by American protection while others strongly understand it. Most don't care either way, though.

I would also question the incentives for the Chinese and Americans for a limited nuclear war -

The American incentive is simple: sink that battlegroup. The Chinese incentive is equally simple: neutralize Guam.

The hard part is threading the needle when nuclear weapons have been used to concluding a war without unduly impacting civilian populations of the combatants. Some people in DOD think it's possible and I suspect they're correct. Navies don't really survive nuclear wars and China needs its navy to invade Taiwan. The US doesn't need its navy to invade anyone.

assuming that the irradiated ruins of Taiwan are under more or less PLA control (given that they're the only ones who can ship in food after this mess), the logical thing is to use the giant heaps of dual-use infrastructure - the fishing boats, the container ships, etc - to continue to supply Taiwan with logistics, while the homefront builds a spare navy (assuming the shipyards are not nuked) within two to three years (a lot of these would presumably be some flavor of jeep carrier or destroyer escort or attack cargo ship or some other "naval" vessel built to civilian standards).

I think if the PLA can rapidly bring Taiwan under control, and credibly so, the US would not actually intervene. Like Ukraine there will be a "wait and see" period, where the US tries to determine if it's worth getting involved in the fighting or if Taiwan is just going to lie down and give up, and any decisions from there will depend on that initial period.

The limited nuclear war outcome is only the most dramatic wargame turnout but it's actually quite reassuring that neither side escalates to obliterating their Pacific coasts a month in.

US shipbuilding will be in no condition to build another Navy before 2030.

I think that's getting ahead a bit. The PLAN will a clapped out Ukrainian heap, a self similar reproduction of said heap, something between an Ulyanovsk and a Kitty Hawk, and a single Ford in 2030. It'll have to chew through the most experienced carrier aviators and largest nuclear submarine force in the world, at a ratio of 2:1 against, to actually "win".

The US would abandon most regional commitments for a Pacific fight because that is the reason why the US retains those regional committments in the first place.

So America needs to hit the shipyards, but if they hit the shipyards, the Chinese let loose ICBMs against symmetrical targets in North America. A major counter-industrial exchange might be a fight the USA can win - US nuclear forces remain overall superior and the US has allies to rebuild etc - but it's kinda crazy.

Starshield is the key element of avoiding catastrophic damage from PLA ballistic missiles AIUI.

To avoid this, US shipbuilding needs very large subsidies to restore to good health;

That ship passed 20 years ago, pardon the pun, and over 50 if you count the dissolution of BuShips, SCB, and the movement of production of US vessels to the private industry that got it in this mess in the first place.

the Chinese have spent 132 billion since 2000 to get their shipbuilding industry up to speed, and that's before the gazillions spent on the back end of the supply chain - steel, electricity, concrete etc. At the same time, you need to clear the deadwood away; this is a long and arduous process unlikely to take less than a decade.

It did so on the back of American finance markets, and it will have to continue on the back of those finance markets, until it can find an alternative source of liquidity. The Euro is not promising here. A basket of currencies for transforming XDRs into the Bancor might be.

there needs to be an equivalent educational transitional stage to turn service workers back into industrial workers.

Isn't China a world leader in automating factories these days though? BYD has dark factories and the solar panel scene is crazy competitive.

Perhaps the drone and AUV/USV sectors (cough Anduril cough), despite their limited utility, are already serving a similar role, turning service economy workers in technology and adjacent industries into (inefficient) factory workers; with the efficient factory workers and efficient factories that will emerge out of the end of this process perhaps five to ten years away. That's a long time to burn cash.

The U.S. doesn't have the macroeconomic environment to support major shipbuilding anymore, at least not at a rate of something like China, so it will mostly be emphasizing its leverage over regional allies like Japan and ROK and an incredibly large wealth of institutional knowledge in naval warfare that still hasn't fully evaporated since the end of the Cold War.

It just has a big navy because the US wanted to choke the USSR in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. China only has one coast though so it's getting two oceans worth of fleet to fight. Its current industrial advantages now lie in aviation, tactical anti-ballistic and ballistic missiles, and space launch capabilities. It's also great at the kind of engineering and R&D that the PRC desperately needs to develop to break through the trap of "late 20th/early 21st century" it's found itself in for a few industries. Integrated circuit design and internal combustion engines are what I'm mostly thinking of here.