M10 Booker Combat Vehicle / Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF)

The MGS turret was designed for an airborne application so it's hardly heavy. It would weigh less than the M10 did.

The only serious solution for IBCTs would be an M1 tank company since that's what the Army really wants anyway.
MGS has a rather elaborate system of reloading(feeding the ready rack). For that, you're changing AMPV hull as much as or more than was done for M10. At which point you may as well look at cutting unnecessary height...and here we are again.
With that, you're doing the same job, heavier, with lower ammo count of unsafely stored shells, and with still noticeable complication for battlefield observation.
It is anything but a simple good solution.

M1 is certainly nice, but state of the art combat-ready M1 takes full C-17 just by itself, and it will take all the proper armored div logistics tail to support. When we came here, you may as well deploy ABCT.
A lot of problems for more or less the same quality of fire support.
 
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Plenty of available options for the US to choose from, at a wide range of risks and costs.

As a lot of the news about program cancellations are really just about stopping to rethink them, I'm sure the MPF program isn't completely dead and could even result in a more optimal solution.

Take for example this article:

They say in the headline that RCV and howitzer programs are being cancelled. What does the article actually say? That they're reopening the competition for RCV after a single vendor was downselected, and that they're pushing back decision on a howitzer competition to FY26.
Intentional Delay =/= Cancellation.
 
Plenty of available options for the US to choose from, at a wide range of risks and costs.

As a lot of the news about program cancellations are really just about stopping to rethink them, I'm sure the MPF program isn't completely dead and could even result in a more optimal solution.

Take for example this article:

They say in the headline that RCV and howitzer programs are being cancelled. What does the article actually say? That they're reopening the competition for RCV after a single vendor was downselected, and that they're pushing back decision on a howitzer competition to FY26.
Intentional Delay =/= Cancellation.
Restructuring RCV is a blatant gift to Anduril & the other defense VC techbros. There’s nothing to suggest any fundamental flaws with Textron’s entry.

And delaying the howitzer competition (along with cutting AMPV to the bone, cancelling JLTV-A2, & divesting AH-64D without replacement) are pants on head retarded decisions.

Driscoll, Colby, Hegseth et al don’t deserve the benefit of the doubt. This unholy combo of defense VC grift & “cult of the operator” worship is gonna get a lot of people killed when the Indo-Pacific goes hot.
 
It is anything but a simple good solution.

M10 wasn't canceled because it was a simple vehicle. It was canceled because it's overweight. AMPV had a hot production line and the Mobile Gun Systems are already being scrapped, but if you cut a big hole in the AMPV you could easily fit the MGS turret and have a vehicle that's 30mm protected at around 35 tons.

That said it seems the entire NGCV family is at risk at the moment to hit that 8% year-over-year budget cut target. XM30 will probably last until next March-April or whenever the admin decides to release their FY27 budget. I suspect the NGH is actually dead but maybe DA can spin deciding to not follow through with that next year to save XM30.

M1 is certainly nice, but state of the art combat-ready M1 takes full C-17 just by itself

So does the M10. Which is why it was canceled.

The mobility and logistics requirements of a 40 ton medium tank are essentially no different than a 55-ton main battle tank. What's an extra M978 when you already have tank transporters and Hercules recovery vehicles? The IBCTs would lose nothing and gain everything by simply having M1A1SAs organized into a separate tank company instead.
 
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M10 wasn't canceled because it was a simple vehicle. It was canceled because it's overweight. AMPV had a hot production line and the Mobile Gun Systems are already being scrapped, but if you cut a big hole in the AMPV you could easily fit the MGS turret and have a vehicle that's 30mm protected at around 35 tons.

That said it seems the entire NGCV family is at risk at the moment to hit that 8% year-over-year budget cut target. XM30 will probably last until next March-April or whenever the admin decides to release their FY27 budget. I suspect the NGH is actually dead but maybe DA can spin deciding to not follow through with that next year to save XM30.



So does the M10. Which is why it was canceled.

The mobility and logistics requirements of a 40 ton medium tank are essentially no different than a 55-ton main battle tank. What's an extra M978 when you already have tank transporters and Hercules recovery vehicles? The IBCTs would lose nothing and gain everything by simply having M1A1SAs organized into a separate tank company instead.
Well if we are going back to ww2 then it would be a tank battalion actually, unfortunately I think we would need to build a lot more tanks for that kind of organization.
 
M10 wasn't canceled because it was a simple vehicle. It was canceled because it's overweight. AMPV had a hot production line and the Mobile Gun Systems are already being scrapped, but if you cut a big hole in the AMPV you could easily fit the MGS turret and have a vehicle that's 30mm protected at around 35 tons.
But how can wew ensure that a by default larger AMPV will be lighter? It's not Lego(m10 also was way lighter at that point, too). It would certainly take large changes(read: weight) and adaptation, however, which contradicts your point of it being a better way. The end result will still be APC with gun. And those things are not popular for a reason.
Also, both production lines are not that different in their hotness (timeline difference is small), and both got canned.
The mobility and logistics requirements of a 40 ton medium tank are essentially no different than a 55-ton main battle tank.
M1 last was a 55-ton tank 30 years ago.
Right now it's a 70t tank base.
For practical purposes(same that limit M10 to 1/plane; b/c you still can fly with two per se, as it is regulation, not physical overgrowth over 50% capacity), that means C17 doesn't carry anything else in this sortie, and that sortie is an overloaded one. Airfield restrictions, refuelling requirements, all are here.

While C17 can't now take more than one booker(which killed it), you're bringing a still much worse vehicle.
What's an extra M978 when you already have tank transporters and Hercules recovery vehicles?
Well, several more c17 sorties for minimum recovery detachment.
Add in refueling sorties, because you're again carrying most of payload with just 1 heavy vehicle. Add in airfield restrictions(c-17 with half payload can be quite austere-capable, but not when close to full payload capacity). M10 and XM1308 justified it by sending in 2/3 vehicles with lighter final footprint; here it is not justified, you're deploying the heaviest element of ABCT.

And "several c17 sorties" is something that brings entire IBCT to theater in the first place; it's a light formation, which skipped even it's transport for that reason. M10 was supposed to just about bring its fighting capability to peer fighting level, for reasonable increase in formation weight.
Now you're proposing using the number we began with for recovery detachment of tank detachment to the deployed detachment of infantry brigade.
Maybe consider entire infantry division at this point? :)
 
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IBCTs should have just got a AMPV with a MGS turret (it can take the weight) and Airborne gets the 1302.
Too bad the MGS turret does not work. Has not EVER worked. It's also got one of the most clusterfucked ways of reloading the thing, a 10rd revolver in the hull feeding an 8rd revolver in the turret, and then rounds being pulled backwards out of the 8rd to be loaded into the breech.

To reload the thing you have to feed rounds into the 8rd and have the 8rd then feed the 10rd. And all of that must be done outside what little armor an MGS has...



The mobility and logistics requirements of a 40 ton medium tank are essentially no different than a 55-ton main battle tank. What's an extra M978 when you already have tank transporters and Hercules recovery vehicles? The IBCTs would lose nothing and gain everything by simply having M1A1SAs organized into a separate tank company instead.
Except that Infantry Brigades/Divisions don't have HETs and M88 Hercules. Or AVLBs. Or all the other engineering support an Abrams requires.

Having a 40ton tank means that they don't need HETs or Hercs, the HEMTT Wreckers are capable of recovering the tank. And the Infantry Brigade already has bridges etc sized for 40 ton vehicles, because a loaded HEMTT is 40 tons.

The problem with the M10 is that someone forgot to allow ~15-20% weight growth from proposal to 20-40 years from now in the M10A2 variant. C17 cargo load is 170klbs, 2x MPFs per C17 means that the weight growth version needs to weigh no more than 85klbs, let's say 20% weight growth allowance which brings us down to a proposal max weight of 70,000lbs. That's how heavy the M10 should have been at introduction.
 
Restructuring RCV is a blatant gift to Anduril & the other defense VC techbros. There’s nothing to suggest any fundamental flaws with Textron’s entry.
They're supposed to still be in the running. RCV barely made any real progress up til now. If it's because of reluctance, I understand that. The NGCV is supposed to field a new MBT and general purpose medium platform. I think if the RCV is supposed to be optimally mated with them, it probably makes sense to wait.
Ideally they'd put out systems to start putting them through their paces but the logic is budget cuts so...
And delaying the howitzer competition (along with cutting AMPV to the bone, cancelling JLTV-A2, & divesting AH-64D without replacement) are pants on head retarded decisions.
So far I only heard about JLTV and AMPV not being bought in excess, not contract cancellations. Was any contract already cancelled or confirmed to be cancelled?

Delaying howitzers isn't a big thing IMO. It's just a competition to replace some towed ones, right? So it'll lead to net higher costs, as opposed to replacing tracked howitzers with wheels which would save a lot.

As of right now, howitzers isn't something the US is seriously behind in. A lot of missions are taken by M142/M270 and potentially other rocket and missile based systems.
Yes the L39 is suboptimal. Yes the large crews are problematic. But the M109A7 so far delivers within a multi-domain battlefield.
And for anything light and towed, I don't see a big capability gap that needs to be filled urgently.

Driscoll, Colby, Hegseth et al don’t deserve the benefit of the doubt. This unholy combo of defense VC grift & “cult of the operator” worship is gonna get a lot of people killed when the Indo-Pacific goes hot.
Perhaps. I don't consider them serious people. But cutting some platform procurement to boost production capacity and ammunition procurement is a good thing IMO.
 
Except that Infantry Brigades/Divisions don't have HETs and M88 Hercules. Or AVLBs. Or all the other engineering support an Abrams requires.

Having a 40ton tank means that they don't need HETs or Hercs, the HEMTT Wreckers are capable of recovering the tank. And the Infantry Brigade already has bridges etc sized for 40 ton vehicles, because a loaded HEMTT is 40 tons.

Except each MPF battalion maintenance company was going to be assigned M88A2s, which were the only available recovery vehicle able to handle the M10's weight. This has been known since the 2021 LCEA and had been discussed several times since that document was published:

Another item at issue is how to recover vehicles that go down. Right now, the only platform suited for the job is the M88A1 recovery vehicle, which comes in three variants.

Some of the repair parts for the older M88s are obsolete and there is not yet enough M88s to fill the light tank and heavier armor asset needs.


Or to quote the LCEA:

The exact design of MPF units has not yet been determined. There are currently two primary options. The first approved option is to equip one Cavalry Troop within a Cavalry Squadron with 14 MPF vehicles. Support equipment including one M1075 Palletized Load System, one M978 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) fueler, two M1152A1 maintenance contract trucks, and one M88A2 recovery vehicle to replace the HEMTT wrecker would be distributed to the Cavalry Delta Troop in each Cavalry Squadron. In this option, three or fewer squadrons at any given installation would receive MPFs. The second option is currently under review for approval and would combine three MPF Companies in a single MPF Battalion. In this case, the MPF Battalion would be assigned roughly three times the support equipment mentioned, above and no more than one battalion at a given installation would receive MPFs.

This was where the main concern with bridges comes from, the mere fact that the M10 required a M88A2 meant that suddenly the division had massively increased bridging requirements. The combined weight of a M10 being towed by a M88A2 was over one hundred tons, seventy tons for a M10 on a M870 trailer which was barely sufficient to carry it. Had the M10 suffered any weight growth over its service life, the M870 would not longer be suitable. Oh, and the presence of the M88A2 de facto requires HETs to be part of the formation, because nothing else can transport it in the field.

The problem with the M10 is that someone forgot to allow ~15-20% weight growth from proposal to 20-40 years from now in the M10A2 variant. C17 cargo load is 170klbs, 2x MPFs per C17 means that the weight growth version needs to weigh no more than 85klbs, let's say 20% weight growth allowance which brings us down to a proposal max weight of 70,000lbs. That's how heavy the M10 should have been at introduction.

Yeah, this is exactly where the Army whiffed on their weight requirements. Really the vehicle should have never weighed more than thirty five tons at any point during its service life, which translates to 26-28 tons in A-kit form once you account for the weight of the B-kit, necessary features such as an APS, and a 10-20% growth margin. Sub-35 tons would mean the system could be recovered by systems like M984 or MCRS, which the divisions either already have or could be attached to them with minimal issues, unlike the M88 and HET.

Basically the Army should have held to a three A-kit MPF per C-17 requirement, not because the air mobility was that valuable, but because such a requirement would be a useful proxy for the actual requirements of the infantry division.
 
I wonder do we know how much the m8 would weigh with trophy aps?
Trophy weighs a couple hundred kilos. Same for Iron Fist but on the lower side of that range. But residual penetration might dictate much more weight be added in the form of armor.
There are armor kits for the M8. I'm guessing the heaviest one will be necessary.
 
Except each MPF battalion maintenance company was going to be assigned M88A2s, which were the only available recovery vehicle able to handle the M10's weight. This has been known since the 2021 LCEA and had been discussed several times since that document was published:




Or to quote the LCEA:



This was where the main concern with bridges comes from, the mere fact that the M10 required a M88A2 meant that suddenly the division had massively increased bridging requirements. The combined weight of a M10 being towed by a M88A2 was over one hundred tons, seventy tons for a M10 on a M870 trailer which was barely sufficient to carry it. Had the M10 suffered any weight growth over its service life, the M870 would not longer be suitable. Oh, and the presence of the M88A2 de facto requires HETs to be part of the formation, because nothing else can transport it in the field.
Which is a complete fail on the part of the Army, then.




Yeah, this is exactly where the Army whiffed on their weight requirements. Really the vehicle should have never weighed more than thirty five tons at any point during its service life, which translates to 26-28 tons in A-kit form once you account for the weight of the B-kit, necessary features such as an APS, and a 10-20% growth margin. Sub-35 tons would mean the system could be recovered by systems like M984 or MCRS, which the divisions either already have or could be attached to them with minimal issues, unlike the M88 and HET.

Basically the Army should have held to a three A-kit MPF per C-17 requirement, not because the air mobility was that valuable, but because such a requirement would be a useful proxy for the actual requirements of the infantry division.
They could have added "can be recovered by HEMTT wrecker" as one of the requirements, but yes, "3x A-kit MPF per C-17" would be a useful proxy.
 
[MPF] should've been something in line with FCS but less on the networking side.
20 tons as A-kit? That's asking way too much for your APS, IMO.



Hell buy BMDs as surrogates.
I admit a strange fondness for the BMD-4 with the 100mm for HE-chucking and the occasional GL-ATGM, plus a 30mm for other work.
 
20 tons as A-kit? That's asking way too much for your APS, IMO.




I admit a strange fondness for the BMD-4 with the 100mm for HE-chucking and the occasional GL-ATGM, plus a 30mm for other work.
Despite many criticisms the Soviets/Russians know a thing or two about AFVs and how to keep them light and cheap to produce. Qualities which are to be appreciated in many instances in my humble opinion.
 
Despite many criticisms the Soviets/Russians know a thing or two about AFVs and how to keep them light and cheap to produce. Qualities which are to be appreciated in many instances in my humble opinion.
I wouldn't called any AFV whose soldiers rather sit outside on top of the vehicle anything but a failure. It fails its main purpose.
 
I caught a lot of shit mostly on Twitter for calling this a vehicle in search of a mission.

As useless as the entire concept of mass air deployed armor.
If it is not doctrine, obviously the idea is wrong! Who do you think you are, an general? Truth is from quoting Field Manuals~

That said, personally I think the existence of good simulations (aka games) is what gives the public a route of understanding enough to make counterarguments.

I really do wonder if what is being said here:

Is what is really going on with these things.
 
If it is not doctrine, obviously the idea is wrong! Who do you think you are, an general? Truth is from quoting Field Manuals~

That said, personally I think the existence of good simulations (aka games) is what gives the public a route of understanding enough to make counterarguments.

I really do wonder if what is being said here:

Is what is really going on with these things.
I read that paper several years ago. It was eye opening.

I’m not sure what you’re otherwise trying to say.
The air deployed armor crap was always bullshit. A vehicle searching for a mission.
 
Except that Infantry Brigades/Divisions don't have HETs and M88 Hercules. Or AVLBs. Or all the other engineering support an Abrams requires.

Well no, they don't, because they don't have M10 Bookers. What other tracked recovery vehicle or tank transporter does the U.S. Army use again? The support units for the Booker turned out to be just as heavy as the supporting ones for the M1 tank, Combined with a >40-ton combat weight and you're looking at the difference between a T-72 and a M1A1. You might as well just give them M1A1s.

Booker would have needed a new truck to carry it, a new 40 ton trailer, although I suppose it could use the M2A3's (hey, another ABCT thing!), and a new medium weight maintenance vehicle (maybe bring back the XM4 based fitter vehicle) and a recovery vehicle to go with it. Otherwise it's using whatever the hell the M1 uses because there's literally nothing else.

Since the Booker itself was on shaky ground to begin with, because programs requiring multiple procurement across decades gives the Congress the ick after FCS and Transformation, it was never going to get anything like that. Alternatively, it could be half as heavy, and use a HEMTT wrecker instead. Unfortunately, it was fat.

Giving the IBCTs an Abrams company isn't a bad idea though. It would do exactly what the Booker was supposed to do but better.

I wouldn't called any AFV whose soldiers rather sit outside on top of the vehicle anything but a failure. It fails its main purpose.

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As useless as the entire concept of mass air deployed armor.
Than you should have loved the M10 as it prioritized outright capability over the ability to be thrown out of a C-130 or C-17.

The mission of it was very clear: organic, direct fire support for infantry while not being an overweight white elephant like the M1
 
Well no, they don't, because they don't have M10 Bookers. What other tracked recovery vehicle or tank transporter does the U.S. Army use again? The support units for the Booker turned out to be just as heavy as the supporting ones for the M1 tank, Combined with a >40-ton combat weight and you're looking at the difference between a T-72 and a M1A1. You might as well just give them M1A1s.

Booker would have needed a new truck to carry it, a new 40 ton trailer, although I suppose it could use the M2A3's (hey, another ABCT thing!), and a new medium weight maintenance vehicle (maybe bring back the XM4 based fitter vehicle) and a recovery vehicle to go with it. Otherwise it's using whatever the hell the M1 uses because there's literally nothing else.

Since the Booker itself was on shaky ground to begin with, because programs requiring multiple procurement across decades gives the Congress the ick after FCS and Transformation, it was never going to get anything like that. Alternatively, it could be half as heavy, and use a HEMTT wrecker instead. Unfortunately, it was fat.
Exactly.

The MPF needed to fit within the existing IBCT logistics/engineering support. Needed to be recoverable from a HEMTT Wrecker, uses the same bridges as the HEMTT PLS, etc. It can probably be supported off a HEMTT workshop vehicle, or maybe the M113-based wrenchmobile (I guess it'd be an AMPV-based wrenchmobile now).
 
Than you should have loved the M10 as it prioritized outright capability over the ability to be thrown out of a C-130 or C-17.

The mission of it was very clear: organic, direct fire support for infantry while not being an overweight white elephant like the M1
The problem is, from what I've heard, climate change has caused atmospheric changes that actually reduce the capabilities of frames like the C-130 and C-17. The C-17 needs far more powerful engines if it wants to keep its current payload capability.
 
Than you should have loved the M10 as it prioritized outright capability over the ability to be thrown out of a C-130 or C-17.

The mission of it was very clear: organic, direct fire support for infantry while not being an overweight white elephant like the M1
No, it’s a vehicle searching for a mission and the search has been ordered to end.

Why would the transportation assets necessary for this be so much less than M1? If it’s going be sea (99% likely) then what’s the fucking difference!!?

As for “infantry support”, is the enemy going to cooperate and only hit it with different weapons than those aimed at an M1??

Grow up.
 
I read that paper several years ago. It was eye opening.

I’m not sure what you’re otherwise trying to say.
The air deployed armor crap was always bullshit. A vehicle searching for a mission.
I'm saying that twitter often just argue via appeal to authority and semantics, and "authority" is not to be trusted when branch interests is on the line. I just see so many arguments of the "its not an tank, its an assault gun" type I just don't.....

Than you should have loved the M10 as it prioritized outright capability over the ability to be thrown out of a C-130 or C-17.

For a vehicle that could be built 30 years ago, not having it for 30 years does not appear to have any significant impact on any particular campaign, and that wasn't the US not being involved in many wars. Simply put, any war that gives the US serious trouble can wait for Abrams to get shipped over via sea.

The idea that land wars can be dealt with in time frames where deployment methods matters is imo wishful thinking by the army. Every enemy of America knows that regardless of strength one can just wait out the Americans which have no plan to maintain presence for decade(s) nor seriously cleanse opponents.

It is only weak, minority governments that can be toppled and replaced (but that wouldn't take a difficult land war usually) while any government with significant support can simply wait out the Americans. In theory American supported puppet regime could win hearts and minds and thus flip the nation, in practice the American elites have ideas that is so unpopular that the American public is currently in open revolt, nevermind foreign countries.

If America wants to do this empire thing and influence foreign nations, they need a colonial office that can figure out how to build regimes (and design equipment for that mission) that can last forever.....

I guess the army can instead do assaults on ottawa instead~
 
Why would the transportation assets necessary for this be so much less than M1? If it’s going be sea (99% likely) then what’s the fucking difference!!?
Not just strategic transportation assets, although the Airborne Brigades do want a "tank" they can assault land at a captured airport.

Tactical/operational transportation. The truck and trailer used to haul the thing to the battlefield, so you're not ripping up roads with the thing's tracks (and risking it breaking down before it ever gets to the battlefield).

An Infantry Brigade currently only has bridges rated for ~40 tons, or whatever a loaded HEMTT PLS maxes out at. It does NOT have the kinds of bridges that an Abrams needs.

So the Booker and its recovery vehicle need to stick within the existing Infantry Brigade footprint. No adding M88s and AVLBs and whatever the hell else an Armored Brigade has to support Abrams. And yes, saying "Cannot exceed 32 tons as proposed" so that after 20% weight growth over time it's still under the 40ton bridge limits is an important point (that got missed).


As for “infantry support”, is the enemy going to cooperate and only hit it with different weapons than those aimed at an M1??
No, the enemy is going to point Abrams-busting weapons at it.

The point is that an Infantry Brigade has a metric shit-ton of Javelins in it (probably more javelins than a Roman Legion, TBH). An Infantry Brigade does not need help blowing up tanks. But Javelins are really damn expensive to use to blow up a bunker, while a 105mm HEP or HEAT shell is cheap. The M8/M10/whatever finally gets deployed to do the job exists to blow up bunkers and obstacles and lay prompt smoke, and it's got a few HEAT and APFSDS rounds if tanks show up and the infantry have their hands full.
 
For a vehicle that could be built 30 years ago, not having it for 30 years does not appear to have any significant impact on any particular campaign, and that wasn't the US not being involved in many wars. Simply put, any war that gives the US serious trouble can wait for Abrams to get shipped over via sea.
US were involved in counter insurgency wars.
The problem at hand is that deployable infantry brigades are weak against peers. Tank company gives them weight in defense, and at least some field offensive&ground maneuver capability.

Shipment of abrams over via sea to, i don't know, Philippines, should the need for land operations there arise, will already be accepted by a PLA liason officer.
 
US were involved in counter insurgency wars.
The problem at hand is that deployable infantry brigades are weak against peers. Tank company gives them weight in defense, and at least some field offensive&ground maneuver capability.

Shipment of abrams over via sea to, i don't know, Philippines, should the need for land operations there arise, will already be accepted by a PLA liason officer.
We’re still doing this

Yeah, we’re going to tie up the entire C-17 fleet to deliver MAYBE 200 of these mission-searchers.
 
The problem is, from what I've heard, climate change has caused atmospheric changes that actually reduce the capabilities of frames like the C-130 and C-17. The C-17 needs far more powerful engines if it wants to keep its current payload capability.
Can you elaborate?
 
What the MPF brings to the existing force is a tracked vehicle that can go mostly everywhere, tank limited bursts and hit foxholes/small fortifications with a heavy, high velocity gun. What it fails to do is to achieve all of the above whilst relying only on the current logistics of an IBCT.

There is a mission. The method examined and chosen was fantastically wrong. 2010 Army vibes, wrong shite all the time.
 
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It seems to me this mission could be met with UAVs/loitering munitions with far more operational/strategic mobility and less cost. 105mm is a lot cheaper that a switchblade 600, but the M10 itself is a pricey object. The new UAV/sniper/ATGW companies the Army is putting together seem like a better match for a light formation.

Also in an era of drop GPS guided kits for 155mm, I question how much added value a much more vulnerable direct fire platform brings to a light formation.
 
Not any more
Unless you're saying combined arms is out of the game, no the mission is still there. Booker was made to supplement Abrams attachments in leg infantry. The justification was that it would be able to do the same for far less money. Now that has been proven untrue.
 
The justification was that it would be able to do the same for far less money. Now that has been proven untrue.
Not for less money, for less weight.
Which was true, but broken development process ensured that it somehow became insufficiently less, and until last moment everyone pretended that it's something to be proud of.
 

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