Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

Really, GTX?
Even if there was faith in the French offer, the deal Australia got from the US/UK is FAR more extensive and valuable than anything they could have gotten from France.

That depends on what they end up paying for it.
 
Really, GTX?
Even if there was faith in the French offer, the deal Australia got from the US/UK is FAR more extensive and valuable than anything they could have gotten from France.

That depends on what they end up paying for it.
There's a lot more to the US/UK/AUS deal than the subs, is what I mean. The geopolitical/strategic side of that deal is something France simply can not offer.
 
I know that's what you meant.

The geopolitical/strategic side of that deal doesn't come for free.
 
Yeah, sorry about that. I was going to take you to task over deleting the very interesting and informative post relating to the possible performance improvements that could be realized by converting the Collins class lead-acid battery system (LAB) to a lithium-ion battery system (LIB).

HINT: They were substantial, substantial enough to raise more questions about the need to go to nuclear powered boats.

But unfortunately, the post referred to (likely actual) current capabilities and their potential improved values and while interesting and informative they were almost certainly a little too informative.

So on reflection I decided not to complain about the deletion and thought I'd removed that comment only to be caught out by the site's draft post mechanics. Again.

My bad.
 
Yeah, sorry about that. I was going to take you to task over deleting the very interesting and informative post relating to the possible performance improvements that could be realized by converting the Collins class lead-acid battery system (LAB) to a lithium-ion battery system (LIB).

HINT: They were substantial, substantial enough to raise more questions about the need to go to nuclear powered boats.

But unfortunately, the post referred to (likely actual) current capabilities and their potential improved values and while interesting and informative they were almost certainly a little too informative.

So on reflection I decided not to complain about the deletion and thought I'd removed that comment only to be caught out by the site's draft post mechanics. Again.

My bad.
A former boss had kittens when I told him of the post and one of the source docs has been passed onto PMB to discover how it slipped through their systems. Rule of thumb, people who work in secure environments should look at what's behind the grinning individual being photographed before releasing or approving the photo because there is always someone smart enough to extrapolate incomplete and inaccurate info and determine a close proximity to the actual.

Just look at we are able to surmise on here through collating various sources on projects from several decades ago.
 
More anti-Russia, anti-China rhetoric, is there an election coming up or something?

News story the other night on the Australia national broadcaster that Russian operatives were operating on popular Australian dating sites (Tinder, etc) looking to start relationships with Australian's with high security clearances.

In unrelated news Tinder Australia reported a surge in new memberships and profile updates overnight. :D
 
Rule of thumb, people who work in secure environments should look at what's behind the grinning individual being photographed before releasing or approving the photo because there is always someone smart enough to extrapolate incomplete and inaccurate info and determine a close proximity to the actual.

Man, this is so true. There's also an incredible temptation to point out such errors in ways that can do more harm than good.

I went to a public conference once where there was a presentation on a new minehunting technology, which included a slide with some info on the system's operating characteristics. Interesting, but not obviously concerning. During the Q&A some bright spark engineer asked about the system's target resolution, and the presenter responded that it was (obviously) classified. At which point, bright spark told the whole room that the resolution could be derived from the data on the slide. Suddenly a bunch of people in the audience start scribbling notes. Double security failure, because someone just had to show everyone else in the room how smart they are...

(Which, to be clear, is not what happened here. But it's always safer to call out such slip-ups in private, because security through obscurity does actually work sometimes.)
 
I think it is perfectly reasonable to potentially simultaneously hold the following views:

- Russia & China definitely being interested in targeting their miss-information resources at the AUKUS arrangement.

- Some politicians and media in favour of the AUKUS arrangement potentially looking to play up this Russian & Chinese interest to both strengthen wider support for the arrangement and to look to some extent insulate themselves and elements of the arrangement from some potentially legitimate inquiries and criticisms.

- Some politicians and media looking to relate current issues/ events re: the Ukraine to the AUKUS arrangement both to potentially strength support for the arrangement and to boast their own sense of relevance and importance re: current issues/ events re: the Ukraine.
 
Arguably, the only real threat to a nuclear submarine is another nuclear submarine and it's no secret that AUKUS is aimed at countering China, which has a lot of them, along with nuclear weapons. This suggests that conflict with Chinese forces could put Australia on the ladder of escalation to conflict involving nuclear weapons, even if it's 'cold' conflict with deliberate manoeuvring for political reasons rather than 'kinetic' engagement - that is, firing stuff and blowing things up.
I would guess therefore that the possession of SSNs would mean that Australia would be involving itself, strategically and doctrinally, in a level of war planning that would be very contentious politically.
To your point, this line was crossed years ago when plans for US bombers deploying to AU was hatched.
 

 
Ah, Peter Dutton, your partisan politics :rolleyes:



Regards
Pioneer


Sorry, I just had a vision of Pete riding a horse shirtless..... I get the feeling a lot of the rhetoric is aimed more at a leadership tilt than the election. I'm not sure if he's angling for the job before the poll date and turning the tide, or whether he's assuming a loss and being a Tony Abbott like opposition leader and PM in a term or two.

Sorry for going off topic but I am annoyed at the mixed messages coming from government on this, it really does stink of political posturing and egos, rather than sensible national security policy. Any subs at all are totally reliant on the assistance of our allies, if we are seen to be playing political games we may lose their good faith and support.
 
Now, apparently, Egypt wants its own Shortfin Barracudas - and some sort of an aircraft carrier as well. With Rafales. Go figure. Anyway, "any headline that ends in a question mark can be answered by the word no."

 
Guys, we're getting quite off topic from the Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines topic of this thread...
 
Not a surprise - in fact I believe I predicted this would be the case.
It would be surprising if that wasn't a step in the process. Or for the more cynically minded, if that wasn't the whole process and deploying RAN nuclear boats was secretly always considered not feasible by some or all of the parties involved.
 
US and UK subs based in Australia reminds me of this haunting if scientifically wrong film showing the USN and RAN working together with an RN A class submarine posing as USN nuclear boat. Still get emotional watching it


The theme music will always be the Australian Naional Anthem for me
 
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Not a surprise - in fact I believe I predicted this would be the case.
It would be surprising if that wasn't a step in the process. Or for the more cynically minded, if that wasn't the whole process and deploying RAN nuclear boats was secretly always considered not feasible by some or all of the parties involved.

Deploying 8 additional SSNs, largely irrelevant.

Shifting US assets and bases to and constructing maintenance infrastructure in an allied but "independent" country that sits close to your enemy's <cough> strategic competitor's proposed resource supply routes, hugely relevant.
 

Deploying 8 additional SSNs, largely irrelevant.

I don't understand how you arrived at this conclusion. We don't even know which boat will be selected.

And the quote is 'at least eight.'

Shifting US assets and bases to and constructing maintenance infrastructure in an allied but "independent" country that sits close to your enemy's <cough> strategic competitor's proposed resource supply routes, hugely relevant.

I totally agree. This is a boon for Australia. These maintenance facilities will be the gift that keeps on giving.
 
I don't understand how you arrived at this conclusion. We don't even know which boat will be selected.

And the quote is 'at least eight.'
We do know that they'll be SSNs though, based on current info. They might be considered SSGNs in some circles but I think their main intended role will be as SSNs.

The largely irrelevant conclusion stems from the fact that the Chinese, based on current output, will easily outstrip US/UK and AUS sub (and ship) building over the same period and that eight additional boats won't be strategically significant once they're all in the water.

The quote may be 'at least eight', but you still have to find crews for them and Australia is having trouble crewing the Collins boats as it is. Both current candidates have significantly larger crews than Collins.

I totally agree. This is a boon for Australia. These maintenance facilities will be the gift that keeps on giving

Economically, in the short term, I agree that the investment may well be a boon for Australia. In the long term though, supporting the US' "containment" of China may lead to some blow back.
 
We do know that they'll be SSNs though, based on current info. They might be considered SSGNs in some circles but I think their main intended role will be as SSNs.

Well..If you think so...but what's your point?

The largely irrelevant conclusion stems from the fact that the Chinese, based on current output, will easily outstrip US/UK and AUS sub (and ship) building over the same period and that eight additional boats won't be strategically significant once they're all in the water.

Again, how do you come to the conclusion they will not be strategically significant?

The quote may be 'at least eight', but you still have to find crews for them and Australia is having trouble crewing the Collins boats as it is. Both current candidates have significantly larger crews than Collins.

Nothing against Perth...but if you're 20 would you like the idea of being stationed there, and only there? It sounds like this problem is being solved.

Economically, in the short term, I agree that the investment may well be a boon for Australia.

In the short term, books are written. In the short term people raise their families and send children to school. In the short term grandparents pass wisdom to their grandchildren. Do you have any data to support how long this short term will be? And, really, what does it matter?

In the long term though, supporting the US' "containment" of China may lead to some blow back.

Of which options is this the worst?
 
This makes sense as an Australian capability can grown more easily if the basing deal includes crew slots and maintenance experience.
Ah, this makes much more sense now - it appears that this whole nuclear sub thing seems to have more to do with building an infrastructure to support US/British nuke sub operations than that of actual Australian/RAN operational needs and wants....

Regards
Pioneer
 
I don't understand how you arrived at this conclusion. We don't even know which boat will be selected.

And the quote is 'at least eight.'
We do know that they'll be SSNs though, based on current info. They might be considered SSGNs in some circles but I think their main intended role will be as SSNs.

The largely irrelevant conclusion stems from the fact that the Chinese, based on current output, will easily outstrip US/UK and AUS sub (and ship) building over the same period and that eight additional boats won't be strategically significant once they're all in the water.

The quote may be 'at least eight', but you still have to find crews for them and Australia is having trouble crewing the Collins boats as it is. Both current candidates have significantly larger crews than Collins.

I totally agree. This is a boon for Australia. These maintenance facilities will be the gift that keeps on giving

Economically, in the short term, I agree that the investment may well be a boon for Australia. In the long term though, supporting the US' "containment" of China may lead to some blow back.
One of the issues the RAN has had with crewing is they lacked critical mass, i.e. they ran the boats lean and run the FEG lean as well, meaning too few people being over worked.

A big improvement came when they increased berths and carried more people on each boat, increasing the overall number of trained submariners, resulting in less burnout, more training and advancement opportunities.
 
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