DD(X) DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers

Would not be surprised if by the time they rip out the two 155mm AGS guns and their very large associated automated magazines
They were installed as modules, so I think they'll be slightly easier to remove than "ripping out".
No expert but would have assumed the these large magazines after installation would be encased in thick amounts of welded in armor as well as the hoists? The magazines do not appear to be delivered as modules but as complete large units.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFLOs84q6dI&t=55s&ab_channel=BAESystems%2CInc
.
 
That is a module, which was lowered into the ship in one piece.

Absolutely no comment about what protection was in place around them. But in general, thick monoblock steel armor isn't a thing on warships anymore.
 
Last edited:
The closest thing to armor on modern warships that is NOT Kelver style fiber mats is the Zumwalts Mk57 PVLS since that was design to blow OUT like an ERA panel if it was hit. Which of course made it act like an ERA panel.

And is roughly about 5 feet away from either side the AGS mags at worse, probably more like 10, either way its enough space to literally cut and replace the thing easily enough.
 
How about a 1,180 mile rg 203mm ERCA II (formerly SLRC) as a new AGS?
 
How about a 1,180 mile rg 203mm ERCA II (formerly SLRC) as a new AGS?
Would the Zumwalt have stability to take the top weight of the heavy 1,000 nm cannon with it's tumblehome hull.

If the Navy had had any sense they would have fitted the existing Mk71 8" 55 caliber gun with new ballistic sub caliber round for range instead reaching for the sky and spending a $billion or so on the AGS 155mm with its LRLAP round only for it to turn out so expensive that it had to be canned.
 

Attachments

  • 1,000_nm_Army_stategic_cannoN_#2.jpg
    1,000_nm_Army_stategic_cannoN_#2.jpg
    63.8 KB · Views: 22


If the Navy had had any sense they would have fitted the existing Mk71 8" 55 caliber gun with new ballistic sub caliber round for range instead reaching for the sky and spending a $billion or so on the AGS 155mm with its LRLAP round only for it to turn out so expensive that it had to be canned.

The were kind of put in a bind by the USMC's "requirements" letters on NSFS, which demanded a range of 63nm (mid-term threshold) and 97 nm (long term objective). Thanks, General Hanlon.

No existing gun could even come close to the USMC's demands. The best an 8-inch naval gun had achieved to that point was 34 nm with saboted ammunition. That was during Vietnam, and possibly some additional improvement was possible with newer technology, but even doubling it only would get them to the threshold required by the Marines. So you needed really exotic ammunition -- super-heavy charges firing rocket assisted rounds -- to even get close. That was ERGM, and even that never quite achieved the required range, much less reliability. Presumably a similar development for 8-inch could have done a little better, at the expense of a large reduction in magazine size.

Getting to the ~100 nm objective range required some serious out-of-box thinking, because it just wasn't possible with anything like a conventional gun round. Hence VGAS (Vertical Gun for Advanced Ships), which was essentially a hybrid rocket launcher rather than a traditional gun. VGAS was clever, firing rounds to very high altitude where they could pitch over and glide long distances to the target. It was too non-traditional for Congress, which killed it and demanded the mechanical monstrosity that became AGS.

Now, VGAS ammo would still have been expensive and complicated (it was very much like LRLAP in concept), but without the cost of designing a complex trainable gun and loader first, the overall system might have become affordable in the end.

Imagine a DD(X) with one Mk 45 5-inch gun for "naval" duties plus an SSES B-module (the size of a 64-cell VLS) for two VGAS barrels and associated magazine. Then run standard Mk 41 modules around the perimeter instead of MK 57. You've just eliminated hundreds of tons of displacement, saved the wasted cost of Mk 57 development, and reduced the cost of AGS design as well. And even if VGAS fails, you still have the option to easily backfit a 64-cell Mk 41 module or a second Mk 45 gun. This is a ship we could have actually built around 2005-10.
 
Last edited:
Vertical and untrainable or not it would still run into the same issues which seem to plague every other gun-fired PGM the Navy has tried to introduce at this point. It all seems to boil down to the fact that firing what is almost a GPS/INS guided missile out of a a high performance naval gun is about as expensive as just a GPS/INS guided missile, and they don't like that jolt of being fired out of that gun very much. When you abandon that secondary utility of a more conventional gun mounting which AGS was *supposed* to offer why are you even bothering with the gun at the point? Theoretically you have smaller projectiles but some of that space is still being taken by the gun and propellant charges.

Maybe AGS could have worked "good enough" (but not to the objective specs) back when they were going to build 32 Zumwalts with them as the cost might come down just enough to make the ammo affordable. Yet what we ended up with in reality seems like a pure disaster.

Hindsight is 20/20 but presuming 32 ships I would still have gone with a 8"/60 caliber Mark 71 in the forward position with the other spot taken up by more missiles. The gun would cover "short range" shore bombardment for all of the conflicts that aren't against Russia or China plus other secondary uses a gun is good to have for. If you're stuck with a mere 3 ships might as well use the 5"/62.
 
Vertical and untrainable or not it would still run into the same issues which seem to plague every other gun-fired PGM the Navy has tried to introduce at this point. It all seems to boil down to the fact that firing what is almost a GPS/INS guided missile out of a a high performance naval gun is about as expensive as just a GPS/INS guided missile, and they don't like that jolt of being fired out of that gun very much.
Why are rds as expensive missiles? A combination rd/msle is the future of long range ie ramjet - scramjet rounds etc and they may be a bit more expensive but not all rounds. A vertical gun could place rds transatmospheric giving cdrs unparalleled options. Deep magazines could allow ships to become "porupine like" ie an adversary swarm would be afraid to engage..ie one could not overwhelm w/ numbers.

There are various means to deal w/ recoil in the 21st century. Even RAVEN could be installed. Silo missiles eject exhaust out of the top of their housing. The below EM recoil mitigation solution has been experimented on by the US Army.

When you abandon that secondary utility of a more conventional gun mounting which AGS was *supposed* to offer why are you even bothering with the gun at the point? Theoretically you have smaller projectiles but some of that space is still being taken by the gun and propellant charges.
You dont have theoretically smaller projectiles. You have smaller projectiles.
Maybe AGS could have worked "good enough" (but not to the objective specs) back when they were going to build 32 Zumwalts with them as the cost might come down just enough to make the ammo affordable. Yet what we ended up with in reality seems like a pure disaster.
Technology has advanced and genuine management on the gov' part to enforce a spec on an advanced gun would be a start. A joint Army Navy program might check each other's work.
Hindsight is 20/20 but presuming 32 ships I would still have gone with a 8"/60 caliber Mark 71 in the forward position with the other spot taken up by more missiles. The gun would cover "short range" shore bombardment for all of the conflicts that aren't against Russia or China plus other secondary uses a gun is good to have for. If you're stuck with a mere 3 ships might as well use the 5"/62.
One lightweight 8"/60 caliber Mark 71 for smaller ships but for the Large Surface Combatant a VLGAS.
 
Vertical and untrainable or not it would still run into the same issues which seem to plague every other gun-fired PGM the Navy has tried to introduce at this point. It all seems to boil down to the fact that firing what is almost a GPS/INS guided missile out of a a high performance naval gun is about as expensive as just a GPS/INS guided missile, and they don't like that jolt of being fired out of that gun very much. When you abandon that secondary utility of a more conventional gun mounting which AGS was *supposed* to offer why are you even bothering with the gun at the point? Theoretically you have smaller projectiles but some of that space is still being taken by the gun and propellant charges.

Maybe AGS could have worked "good enough" (but not to the objective specs) back when they were going to build 32 Zumwalts with them as the cost might come down just enough to make the ammo affordable. Yet what we ended up with in reality seems like a pure disaster.

Hindsight is 20/20 but presuming 32 ships I would still have gone with a 8"/60 caliber Mark 71 in the forward position with the other spot taken up by more missiles. The gun would cover "short range" shore bombardment for all of the conflicts that aren't against Russia or China plus other secondary uses a gun is good to have for. If you're stuck with a mere 3 ships might as well use the 5"/62.

There are good points here. I'm going to try to tackle it piece by piece, but it's all sort of interconnected, so bear with me..

1) The fact that the USN has had terrible success rates with gun-fired PGMs doesn't seem to be due to any inherent impossibility on the technology side. The Army has managed to make its own gun-fired PGMs for decades and they work just fine under most of the same demands (HERO safety and IM rules are extra, but the Army is getting to them as well.) I think the problems lie in the Navy's problems with requirements development and program management. They can't quite figure out how to balance the need to retire risk in some areas and accept it in others, so we get projects that try to advance the state of the art across the board and thus run into technical problems way more often than they should.

2) Even when they switched to AGS, the Navy managed to make it unsuitable for "naval" applications. There was never a funded antiship round for AGS, not even an unguided one. And the nature of the gun meant it couldn't actually use Army projectiles, despite this having been a selling point of the trainable gun.

3) The ammunition capacity of a VGAS module with two barrels was expected to be in the vicinity of 1200-1400 rounds. It's quite volumetrically efficient compared to conventional guns because the breeches are fixed in relation to the magazine and are down inside the hull. That eliminates the need for long hoists and complicated shell paths that can deliver heavy projectiles to the breech at a variety of elevations and azimuths. Even the switch to AGS basically halved the capacity while increasing volume. (It did push the magazines a bit deeper into the hull, which has some positives for stability and protection, so there's that, at least. OTOH, the turrets added weight high, so...)

By comparison, the best proposed option for a rocket-based alternative is probably POLAR, essentially a GMLRS with an extended motor. It would quadpack, so a 64-cell VLS full of POLAR would offer 256 "shots." And broadly, each shot would cost about 1.5 to 2 times much as an artillery PGM (based on the relative cost of Excalibur and GMLRS). So yes, POLAR is cheaper, and likely easier to develop (though we again have IM and HERO issues, which the Army is only now dealing with). Could a single POLAR achieve the same terminal effects as 5 or 6 VGAS shells? Maybe, maybe not. The elimination of submunition warheads would make it a lot harder. I see Diehl once proposed a GMLRS with four SMaRT submunitions, including a notional anti-material version of SMaRT, which looks pretty appealing here. But we're getting pretty pricy again, now that you have not one but five "smart" projectiles to buy.

4) Having just one gun on a ship that planned to use that gun primarily for NGFS would have been a terrible, likely unacceptable, decision, for a couple of reasons. First, guns fail, and usually at the worst possible time. You would need some redundancy, which means two guns, no matter what type they are, or have a very real risk of not being able to answer an urgent call for fire. Second, modern gun RoFs are marginal as it is. An 8-inch gun firing double-cycling PGMs (one cycle to ram the shell, a second to ram the propellant) could end up with a functional RoF in the single digit RPMs.
 


If the Navy had had any sense they would have fitted the existing Mk71 8" 55 caliber gun with new ballistic sub caliber round for range instead reaching for the sky and spending a $billion or so on the AGS 155mm with its LRLAP round only for it to turn out so expensive that it had to be canned.

The were kind of put in a bind by the USMC's "requirements" letters on NSFS, which demanded a range of 63nm (mid-term threshold) and 97 nm (long term objective). Thanks, General Hanlon.
Thanks for background and General Halon's insane requirements which resulted in the $26 billion black hole that is the cost of the three Zumwalts.

Reminds me of Steve Trimble of Aviation Week August 3, 2021 article in "Physics-Busting Requirements Challenge U.S. Army FARA Program" where Col. Greg Fortier, the FARA project manager admitted impossible.

"The Army’s conditions include a minimum cruise speed of 180 kt., maximum takeoff weight of 14,000 lb., rotor disc diameter of 40 ft. and engine that generates 3,000 shp. That combination of metrics is impossible to design in a single rotorcraft. “There’s no version of the world where you can go 180 [kt.] at 14,000 lb. on a 3,000-shp engine and a 40-ft. rotor disc”

PS You could make a very good argument for the Navy to have kept and upgraded the Iowa class battleships for NGFS, the 32 Zumwalts were supposed to be replacements for the battleships in their NGFS for supporting the Marines. Nothing mentioned today brings anything like the firepower to bear of their nine 16" guns with 2,700 lbs shells, even F-18s/f-35 would have problems delivering that amount of firepower. Navy could have developed a new long range sub-caliber rounds and the Iowa's heavy armor minimized any retaliatory counter fire if had got though defenses. Overall impression is Navy wanted out of NGFS mission supporting the Marines and that is the situation today. It would be madness for the Navy use the the thin skinned Burkes with their 5" peashooter firing a 70 lbs shell to max range of 13 nm for serious NGFS.
 
Last edited:
PS You could make a very good argument for the Navy to have kept and upgraded the Iowa class battleships for NGFS, the 32 Zumwalts were supposed to be replacements for the battleships in their NGFS for supporting the Marines.

No, you couldn't. They were manpower and maintenance black holes. Their guns didn't have the range to support Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective Maneuver or the precision to fire in direct support of friendly forces. They really were white elephants the Navy couldn't afford in the 1990s and they'd have just gotten worse and worse over time.
 
I wonder if a stealth warship (Zumwalt style) could be built with a pair of 16-inch guns ?
That would be completely awesome.

But I digress...
 
PS You could make a very good argument for the Navy to have kept and upgraded the Iowa class battleships for NGFS, the 32 Zumwalts were supposed to be replacements for the battleships in their NGFS for supporting the Marines.

No, you couldn't. They were manpower and maintenance black holes. Their guns didn't have the range to support Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective Maneuver or the precision to fire in direct support of friendly forces. They really were white elephants the Navy couldn't afford in the 1990s and they'd have just gotten worse and worse over time.
Our views differ :)
re range watch the video with 5" gun firing a modern sub-caliber Leonardo Vulcano projectile/shell, range claimed 90 km and that's with ~18 lbs of propellant charge. The Iwoa 16" guns reduced flashless propellant charge is 325 lbs (max 655 lbs) so I'll let you calculate range with say an equivalent 16" Vulcano sub-caliber round with a 1,500 lbs projectile/shell (the propellant figures reflects the massive difference the square cube law brings with larger diameters)

How many tens of Marine F-35Bs with 1,000 lbs bombs and Bonhomme Richards would you need to lay down equivalent firepower on beachhead (at substantial risk of being shot down) that a single Iwoa battleship could achieve from long range, would expect costs would be well in favor of the battleship, would note mentioned i would upgrade the battleships eg disposing of the manpower intensive steam propulsion plant and replacing with diesels.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pYrChnv9vg&t=97s&ab_channel=NavalNews
 
Last edited:
The USMC ‘requirements’ should always simply have been ignored as unnecessary, unachievable, or both. They similarly constrained the F-35 for largely irrelevant (for the US) STOVL capability. Then there was their budget busting over the horizon fantasy as well.

The USMC used to be a cost effective light to medium force. They could probably afford to keep their tanks and howitzers if they hadn’t made such exorbitant demands post Cold War.
 
They similarly constrained the F-35 for largely irrelevant (for the US) STOVL capability.
Tell that to Japan, South Korea, Italy, the UK, and others. Oh, and the USMC. Yep, those 400-500 stealth fighters? Completely irrelevant. Wow.


Here we have the USS Vinson with her F-35C and the USS Essex, with her completely irrelevant F-35Bs, currently in the South China Sea


7009050.jpg


 
Last edited:
I specifically stated that the STOVL requirements were irrelevant for the US. I acknowledge they were highly desired and irreplaceable for some US Allies.

The USMC puts all of 4-6 Harriers on an LPH and universally operates under friendly air superiority, generally within range of land based aircraft. All of two America class modifications have sailed with a full dozen F-35s. Yay. If the USMC needed more planes, there is ample room on any CVN for an extra squadron if not two. STOVL F-35s maybe absolutely necessary for other countries now, but the original requirement was an extravagance for the US.
 
I specifically stated that the STOVL requirements were irrelevant for the US. I acknowledge they were highly desired and irreplaceable for some US Allies.

The USMC puts all of 4-6 Harriers on an LPH and universally operates under friendly air superiority, generally within range of land based aircraft. All of two America class modifications have sailed with a full dozen F-35s. Yay. If the USMC needed more planes, there is ample room on any CVN for an extra squadron if not two. STOVL F-35s maybe absolutely necessary for other countries now, but the original requirement was an extravagance for the US.
I spot 10 just in the picture here:


"and universally operates under friendly air superiority"

I wasn't aware we had "universal air superiority" over the entirety of the South China Sea. This is news to me. Source?


(I reposted both links as you obviously didn't read them the first time through.)
 
It actually usage in combat they have always operated under the friendly air cover of one of the other US air based services. Let us start another thread if needed since this is off topic, or else agree to disagree on the cost effectiveness of USMC requirements that heavily impacted the final design.
 
It actually usage in combat they have always operated under the friendly air cover of one of the other US air based services. Let us start another thread if needed since this is off topic, or else agree to disagree on the cost effectiveness of USMC requirements that heavily impacted the final design.
Agree to disagree. A F-35A/C would have turned out better but if they didn't get the B in there the B would have never happened. Imagine the unit cost if it couldn't take advantage of commonality.
 
re range watch the video with 5" gun firing a modern sub-caliber Leonardo Vulcano projectile/shell, range claimed 90 km and that's with ~18 lbs of propellant charge. The Iwoa 16" guns reduced flashless propellant charge is 325 lbs (max 655 lbs) so I'll let you calculate range with say an equivalent 16" Vulcano sub-caliber round with a 1,500 lbs projectile/shell (the propellant figures reflects the massive difference the square cube law brings with larger diameters)

Sure, you could probably develop a guided, subcaliber 16-inch shell with range that might match the requirement. (Such a program was actually proposed, then cancelled in 1991) For a development cost probably similar to LRLAP. With the added constraint that you'd now have a round that only works in three ships with a fairly short remaining service life.*


* I say three instead of four, because if you want to keep the Iowas around much past the mid-1990s, you're going to have to pick one to cannibalize to keep the other three running. I nominate Iowa herself, which is already down a turret after 1989. Even with that, 2010 is probably the absolute limit. They're old ships, with quite long service lives, even discounting their time in mothballs. And they've been eating up a carrier worth of manpower the whole time.
 
It actually usage in combat they have always operated under the friendly air cover of one of the other US air based services. Let us start another thread if needed since this is off topic, or else agree to disagree on the cost effectiveness of USMC requirements that heavily impacted the final design.
You can argue the discussion is 100% on topic, the CONOPS/the sole reason for Zumwalts existence, was for the Navy to provide NGFS for the Marines and now due to Zumwalts total failure to fulfill its mission is there an alternative by using the F-35B etc

re range watch the video with 5" gun firing a modern sub-caliber Leonardo Vulcano projectile/shell, range claimed 90 km and that's with ~18 lbs of propellant charge. The Iwoa 16" guns reduced flashless propellant charge is 325 lbs (max 655 lbs) so I'll let you calculate range with say an equivalent 16" Vulcano sub-caliber round with a 1,500 lbs projectile/shell (the propellant figures reflects the massive difference the square cube law brings with larger diameters)

Sure, you could probably develop a guided, subcaliber 16-inch shell with range that might match the requirement. (Such a program was actually proposed, then cancelled in 1991) For a development cost probably similar to LRLAP. With the added constraint that you'd now have a round that only works in three ships with a fairly short remaining service life.*

Thanks for info on the proposed program for 16" sub-caliber round, would add don't think the sub-caliber round would cost anything like the cost of the LRLAP, sub-caliber tech is well known and proved, the NAVY fell for the LockMart con with their LRLAP rocket round, Navy should have known better, LockMart original 2004 estimate was $35,000, LOL actual ~ $1 million each.
 
You can argue the discussion is 100% on topic, the CONOPS/the sole reason for Zumwalts existence, was for the Navy to provide NGFS for the Marines and now due to Zumwalts total failure to fulfill its mission
Sigh, i hate how widespread this.

This is utterly wrong.

The NGFS role was the MOST PUBLICIZE ROLE.

The Zumwalt class was to be the MULTIROLE REPLACEMENT for the wore out Spruance class.

This included NGSR since at the time it seemed like an easy add on at the time compare to the next RADARs, Sonars, STEALTHING. And hey if it became an issue we can just from the gundfor more missiles as design and come back to it, a simple win win.

Thing is since Fire Support is a pretty neat thing Congress locked onto that and basically forced that thru at the expense of the other roles, like ASW.
 
You can argue the discussion is 100% on topic, the CONOPS/the sole reason for Zumwalts existence, was for the Navy to provide NGFS for the Marines and now due to Zumwalts total failure to fulfill its mission
Sigh, i hate how widespread this.

This is utterly wrong.

The NGFS role was the MOST PUBLICIZE ROLE.

The Zumwalt class was to be the MULTIROLE REPLACEMENT for the wore out Spruance class.

This included NGSR since at the time it seemed like an easy add on at the time compare to the next RADARs, Sonars, STEALTHING. And hey if it became an issue we can just from the gundfor more missiles as design and come back to it, a simple win win.

Thing is since Fire Support is a pretty neat thing Congress locked onto that and basically forced that thru at the expense of the other roles, like ASW.

Very true. The DD-21 was a direct roles and missions replacement for the DD-963, plus enhanced air defense for the modern near-shore threat environment and stealth to survive against advanced coastal defenses.

I'll disagree only on a couple of minor points.

1) It wasn't just Congress that latched onto the fire support role. The Navy jumped all over it, because the budget environment didn't look very friendly to "more of the same" procurements, and the Marines were making all sorts of noise about their new raid-based operating doctrine (OMFTS/STOM). The Navy seemed convinced that blue-water warfighting wasn't a marketable role for the 21st century and that the Marines had the winning ticket. Hence the branding of DD-21 as a "Land-Attack Destroyer" and the flailing around with various alternative strike missiles (LASM, ALAM, etc.) that I'm fairly sure was never intended to actually procure anything. This came back to bite them in a big way when the next two wars turned out to be essentially land-locked Army-led affairs.

2) The DDG-1000 didn't sacrifice ASW. Zumwalt is incredibly quiet, which is a big plus in ASW. Sensor-wise, it has the Multi-Function Towed Array active/passive sonar that is becoming the standard across the USN. The big difference from the DDGs is the switch to the SQS-60 MF sonar and SQS-61 HF combo, tailored more for near-shore waters than the giant SQS-53 LF sets across the rest of the fleet.
If anything, what got lost was air defense, with the shambles that was DDG-1000's radar development.
 

Sure, you could probably develop a guided, subcaliber 16-inch shell with range that might match the requirement. (Such a program was actually proposed, then cancelled in 1991) For a development cost probably similar to LRLAP. With the added constraint that you'd now have a round that only works in three ships with a fairly short remaining service life.*

Thanks for info on the proposed program for 16" sub-caliber round, would add don't think the sub-caliber round would cost anything like the cost of the LRLAP, sub-caliber tech is well known and proved, the NAVY fell for the LockMart con with their LRLAP rocket round, Navy should have known better, LockMart original 2004 estimate was $35,000, LOL actual ~ $1 million each.

Guided, subcaliber. At those ranges, without guidance, there's no point. And there's no reason to think a guided 12-inch subcaliber projectile would be significantly cheaper or easier to develop than a guided 6.1-inch round.

Absolutely agree that LRLAP management was stupendously bad, but I tend to blame the Navy. Recurring issue here; the Navy transferred so much of its actual technical knowhow to the contractors in the 1990s that it doesn't have the internal capacity to properly evaluate proposals for feasibility and cost-credibility. We see this time and again, from "small" programs like remote minehunting systems all the way up to major acquisitions like DD-21 itself.

For example, the Navy leadership was totally blindsided when the initial industry proposals for DD-21 came in at ~16,000 tons, because NAVSEA had no internal design activity capable of telling them how big a ship their stated requirements would produce or how expensive it was likely to be. There were some small teams doing "Spring Style" designs, ostensibly to validate design tools, but no one was reality-checking planned procurements as far as I can tell.
 
LRLAP never cost $1mm per round, this is just a myth that won't die. The actual cost according to the FY16 budget request was about $360k for the projectile for a buy of 241 rounds, about twice the quantity-adjusted price of Excalibur, which is A) half the size, and B) went through an aggressive cost reduction program that cut the unit price by double digit percentages.
 
You can argue the discussion is 100% on topic, the CONOPS/the sole reason for Zumwalts existence, was for the Navy to provide NGFS for the Marines and now due to Zumwalts total failure to fulfill its mission
Sigh, i hate how widespread this.

This is utterly wrong.

The NGFS role was the MOST PUBLICIZE ROLE.

The Zumwalt class was to be the MULTIROLE REPLACEMENT for the wore out Spruance class.

This included NGSR since at the time it seemed like an easy add on at the time compare to the next RADARs, Sonars, STEALTHING. And hey if it became an issue we can just from the gundfor more missiles as design and come back to it, a simple win win.

Thing is since Fire Support is a pretty neat thing Congress locked onto that and basically forced that thru at the expense of the other roles, like ASW.
CNO Adm Roughhead when testifying before Congress calling for the cancelation of the Zumwalt program, one reason given was the ASW AN/SQS 61 & 62 mid and high band frequency sonars as they were specifically designed to operate in the near shore littoral zone for its NGFS mission and unsuitable for blue water operations, where low frequency band sonars required, as the AN/SQS 53 sonar fitted on Burkes.
 
CNO Adm Roughhead when testifying before Congress calling for the cancelation of the Zumwalt program, one reason given was the ASW AN/SQS 61 & 62 mid and high band frequency sonars as they were specifically designed to operate in the near shore littoral zone for its NGFS mission and unsuitable for blue water operations, where low frequency band sonars required, as the AN/SQS 53 sonar fitted on Burkes.

Hmm, the main testimony I see on this is from DCNO McCullough, and it's frankly pretty disingenuous. It says, in summary, "we don't need the littoral ASW capability of DD-21/DDG-1000 because we have all these LCS with great littoral ASW capabilities." Which was a flat out lie at the time he said it and is still pretty much untrue today. And it ignores the fact that the Zumwalts got MFTA, a very capable deep-water towed array sonar, the very same system used by both LCS and the most recent/upgraded DDG-51s.


What we saw was a faction fight between the AEGIS supporters (once revolutionaries, now the old guard) and a generation of leadership who wanted to build ships along a very different paradigm (Z as built was pretty mild; the ships envisaged by Admiral Metcalf in "Revolution at Sea" were radical by comparison). Zumwalt was an easy target given how badly wrong pieces of it went and how expensive it became. But they rolled out a whole bunch of pretty shaky operational arguments to axe it. Apparently, the threat environment changed from littorals to deep water AIP submarines and ballistic missiles in about two months sometime in 2008.
 
Our views differ :)

Only one of your views is compatible with objective reality. I don't think you understand how ridiculously expensive they would be to run.

The fully burdened cost of a sailor doing useful work (on top of their current wages, including all the costs DoD paid to train them, and everything they will cost after they retire, distributed to their useful worklife), is ~$300,000 per year. The low-end crew requirement for Iowa that's capable of manning all 9 guns simultaneously is ~1800. Maintaining an Iowa for a year costs more than half a billion just for the personnel. Then you add up the problems caused by the fact that they were built 70 years ago, and have tons of equipment that has failed or is failing, and for which there are no spares readily available. Ships have limited useful service lives. It doesn't matter how awesome they are, at some point it will simply be literally cheaper to build a new one than to keep an old one running. And the Iowas were designed way back when the cost of manning them was a fraction of what it is today, so they don't try to be trifty with labor.
 
There was a simple solution to the Iowas' dilemma, take their turrets and plop them on a new simple single-purpose ship, like the monitors of old. One turret, some self defense weapons (RAM, CIWS, etc), diesels, done.
 
There was a simple solution to the Iowas' dilemma, take their turrets and plop them on a new simple single-purpose ship, like the monitors of old. One turret, some self defense weapons (RAM, CIWS, etc), diesels, done.
They would still need larger crews than modern DDGs, that's a lot for a single-mission ship which can't defend itself from much.
 
They disposed of all the remaining 16" shells minus a few demilitarized ones for display and such. Probably cut up most of the spare barrels they had too. Reactivating the Iowas or any of their 16" guns is simply a no-go now.
 
They disposed of all the remaining 16" shells minus a few demilitarized ones for display and such. Probably cut up most of the spare barrels they had too. Reactivating the Iowas or any of their 16" guns is simply a no-go now.
For these it needs to be point out that, and I can not stress this enough.

EXPLOSIVES HAVE A LIFE EXPECTANCY.

The newest 16inch shell was made in late 50s at the best since the gear to make them was scrap in the mid-60s, and while they did make a few new ones for that Enhanced Range project they did in the late 80s. They were cheap custem made jobs for testing clearances and Im not sure any were shottable. If you lucky the dud rate be your only worry, but more likely they will blow up in the barrel once the propellant* goes off.

And while you can repact the shells with new explosives.

After a certain age it just becames too dangerous and you better off paying for the new factory to build them.

Also it needs to be mention that these shells predate literally all the modern safety regs so they are a Forestall fire waiting to happen.

*And that is another SNAFU the propellant, cant use modern stuff in that, you bust the breeches. And See the above for the old shells for using the old stuff.

Honestly the navy will do well backing the Army SLRC and putting that on ships...
 
Our views differ :)

Only one of your views is compatible with objective reality. I don't think you understand how ridiculously expensive they would be to run.

The fully burdened cost of a sailor doing useful work (on top of their current wages, including all the costs DoD paid to train them, and everything they will cost after they retire, distributed to their useful worklife), is ~$300,000 per year. The low-end crew requirement for Iowa that's capable of manning all 9 guns simultaneously is ~1800. Maintaining an Iowa for a year costs more than half a billion just for the personnel. Then you add up the problems caused by the fact that they were built 70 years ago, and have tons of equipment that has failed or is failing, and for which there are no spares readily available. Ships have limited useful service lives. It doesn't matter how awesome they are, at some point it will simply be literally cheaper to build a new one than to keep an old one running. And the Iowas were designed way back when the cost of manning them was a fraction of what it is today, so they don't try to be trifty with labor.


Battleships "how ridiculously expensive they would be to run" large warships are very, very expensive to run but with battleships you are paying for the amount of high explosives the 16" guns can deliver on the beachhead which don't think any other weapon system can match for the cost. Need to keep things in perspective, Iowa crew ~1,800, 7,200 for four, the replacement plan was for 32 Zumwalts with crew of 200+ each ~6,400+ (last figure saw for Zumwalt crew was 180+ without its main weapon system, AGS 155mm operational) for reference a single Nimitz carrier is ~6,000 and finally would add Navy has a strength of 350,000 so Iowa's would account for nominal ~2% of its manpower.

Do agree with your point Iowa's would need serious upgrade, but don't think it would have cost anything like the $26 billion wasted on the 3 Zumwalts, but its all water under the bridge as Navy has abandoned its NGFS role in supporting the Marines making opposed landings against a peer enemy and don't see any current weapon system replacing the firepower of battleships.
 
Our views differ :)

Only one of your views is compatible with objective reality. I don't think you understand how ridiculously expensive they would be to run.

The fully burdened cost of a sailor doing useful work (on top of their current wages, including all the costs DoD paid to train them, and everything they will cost after they retire, distributed to their useful worklife), is ~$300,000 per year. The low-end crew requirement for Iowa that's capable of manning all 9 guns simultaneously is ~1800. Maintaining an Iowa for a year costs more than half a billion just for the personnel. Then you add up the problems caused by the fact that they were built 70 years ago, and have tons of equipment that has failed or is failing, and for which there are no spares readily available. Ships have limited useful service lives. It doesn't matter how awesome they are, at some point it will simply be literally cheaper to build a new one than to keep an old one running. And the Iowas were designed way back when the cost of manning them was a fraction of what it is today, so they don't try to be trifty with labor.


Battleships "how ridiculously expensive they would be to run" large warships are very, very expensive to run but with battleships you are paying for the amount of high explosives the 16" guns can deliver on the beachhead which don't think any other weapon system can match for the cost. Need to keep things in perspective, Iowa crew ~1,800, 7,200 for four, the replacement plan was for 32 Zumwalts with crew of 200+ each ~6,400+ (last figure saw for Zumwalt crew was 180+ without its main weapon system, AGS 155mm operational) for reference a single Nimitz carrier is ~6,000 and finally would add Navy has a strength of 350,000 so Iowa's would account for nominal ~2% of its manpower.

Do agree with your point Iowa's would need serious upgrade, but don't think it would have cost anything like the $26 billion wasted on the 3 Zumwalts, but its all water under the bridge as Navy has abandoned its NGFS role in supporting the Marines making opposed landings against a peer enemy and don't see any current weapon system replacing the firepower of battleships.
A better way to assess effectiveness would be to compare
1) Number of targets prosecuted/ number of projectiles carried per sailor.
2) Weight of explosives delivered per sailor.
 
Navy has abandoned its NGFS role in supporting the Marines making opposed landings against a peer enemy
The Marines have abandoned this idea. Because it's a terrible idea that leads to thousands of dead Marines with no return on that horrendous investment.

It's not 1944 anymore. No one will ever reproduce a Tarawa-style invasion against a top-tier adversary in the 21st Century because it's fundamentally suicidal.
 
Last edited:
Navy has abandoned its NGFS role in supporting the Marines making opposed landings against a peer enemy
The Marines have abandoned this idea. Because it's a terrible idea that leads to thousands of dead Marines with no return on that horrendous investment.

It's not 1944 anymore. No one will ever reproduce a Tarawa-style invasion against a top-tier adversary in the 21st Century because it's fundamentally suicidal.

Can't help thinking about John Basilone and Band of brothers: Pacific - and that final scene that has been described as "a tapestry of dead Marines" bodies seen from above...
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom