What if Germany did not go for the F-104

[Archibald]

I think the Swedes improved the Falcon to a level that satisfied their needs. That's why they tolerated it.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

Major JJ Burns apparently test fired an AIM-9 (borrowed from the Ticonderoga) on specially modified F-101C 56-0027 successfully on 25th November 1958 (source: Voodoo by Drendel & Stevens) albeit with no follow-up tests. Formal AIM-9 integration would hardly be beyond McDonnell's capability, as I previously alluded to.

The link provided in post 118 does seem to rather gloss over the F-101C model. The quote is actually particular to the A and paints a not wholly representative picture. While I don't doubt that "all models suffered from it" is true to an extent, I suspect some did more than others. The 81st TFW was routinely performing LABS attacks "on instruments at night and in weather". LABS of course involving an Immelman that was apparently "prohibited on all other models". There is sufficient evidence available that the F-101C at least could perform the nuclear strike role with that unit's exploits.

The 81st TFW wasn't loss-less during it's stint in Europe by any means but how much of it is inherently down to low-level tactics in frequently inclement weather? Could any aircraft, any unit conduct the low-level strike role in central Europe over any length of time, without loss? I suspect not.

I really can't see the Voodoo doing any worse than the Starfighter in the Luftwaffe. If nothing else, the dizzying number of engine failures in the list below would not have necessarily been terminal on the F-101. A Voodoo that loses an engine has a non-zero chance of making it back. The Starfighter......

916 Starfighter

www.916-starfighter.de

 

[bobtdwarf]

At the time, barring Lockheed laying out the bribes thick and heavy.. the Germans were in the process of inking a deal on the F-11 Super Tiger. They had already done extensive flight testing and with the exception of one General who failed to retract either the flaps or the air breaks (can't remember which and it would be a mild PITA to find the PDF to confirm at the moment), which kept his test flight from exceeding mach 1.1.. they were massively impressed with it. The fact that Grumman was open to full tech exchange/local production and fitting it with a reheated 200 series Avon did not hurt.

Super Tiger was capable of 2253 KM/H plus and could lug a 9000 pound payload, and like all Tigers before it capable of carrying a 1400 pound nuke.. ST was also wired for but the test birds were never fitted with, the APQ-50 allowing it to carry sparrows. It could do everything you needed from interceptor to air to ground. All in a package that was so docile and forgiving to fly that the USN used it to give greenhorns their first taste of supersonic flight, and still put nearly 190 of 200 airframes built into storage.

Germany buys ST and a lot of pilots get another birthday.

 

[bobtdwarf]

What is somewhat ironic with 100% hindsight is that Vought triumphed with the Crusader yet never put a J79 in that bird. By contrast Douglas and Grumman with the Skylancer and Super Tiger had plans to do so (the former) or very much did it; yet these aircraft ended orphans and went nowhere.

Another irony is related to vietnam. When the MiGs started making Phantom lives a misery, the USN was more than happy to have the Crusader guns and agility and smaller carrier abilities; to the point of remanufacturing hundreds of them;
- while USAF not so lucky not only struggled with the Phantoms
but also threw everything but the kitchen sink at air combat:
- F-111A and F-105 were for strike
- F-102 and F-104 were tried but found to be ill-suited
- F-101A /C /R were for reconnaissance, strike
- F-101B and F-106 were too few and for ADC in CONUS

It is pretty unnerving to think USAF couldn't find a decent fighter in its immense inventory to efficient tackle those freakkin' MIG-21 in A2A combat. In the end Phantoms did the job, TBH.

What else ?

Can't help thinking of Crusader III, Skylancer and Super Tiger fighting their way in Vietnam - some in place of Crusaders, some in place of Phantom.

USAF test flew the super tiger and it was considered highly and the pilots did recommend it for possible acquisition. It being a navy bird that was unlikely from the start though.. it is like the services are allergic to each other or something. The poor Marine corps kept pushing for better A2G capability on the F-8, which it got over time but it was never what I would consider stellar at it. They would have been much better served by SuperTiger but that would have run afoul of a whole lot of politics et al... the navy needed to keep Vought viable as a company and Crusader was good enough to get by

One problem these scenarios generally ignore is that many sales (including this one) were actually funded by a MAP grant.

So unless the French decided to give Dassault money for Mirage licenses to Germany, offer Germany the opportunity to participate in production and assembly (including the J79), help them pay for the tooling and construction for the lines, etc, then the shiny new, Mach 2 Starfighter is probably going to be a no-brainer for the pols, bribe or no.

For alternatives, the Crusader possibly. The Thud seems like too much plane. F-5 came too late. Super Tiger doesn't get a production contract from the Navy, so there's no logistics train to take advantage of.

barring the bribes, starfighter was coming in second to super tiger in a lot of the countries at the time... Germany acquires it and the logistic train builds itself as others hop on board since without the bribes Canada and Japan also buy ST. At the time, USAF was still looking at ST with varying degrees of seriousness and the USN came damn close to reconsidering her, so enough fuzz and buzz to not quash a deal and possibly help it given all that sweet, sweet MAP money.

 

[iverson]

At the time, barring Lockheed laying out the bribes thick and heavy.. the Germans were in the process of inking a deal on the F-11 Super Tiger. They had already done extensive flight testing and with the exception of one General who failed to retract either the flaps or the air breaks (can't remember which and it would be a mild PITA to find the PDF to confirm at the moment), which kept his test flight from exceeding mach 1.1.. they were massively impressed with it. The fact that Grumman was open to full tech exchange/local production and fitting it with a reheated 200 series Avon did not hurt.

Super Tiger was capable of 2253 KM/H plus and could lug a 9000 pound payload, and like all Tigers before it capable of carrying a 1400 pound nuke.. ST was also wired for but the test birds were never fitted with, the APQ-50 allowing it to carry sparrows. It could do everything you needed from interceptor to air to ground. All in a package that was so docile and forgiving to fly that the USN used it to give greenhorns their first taste of supersonic flight, and still put nearly 190 of 200 airframes built into storage.

Germany buys ST and a lot of pilots get another birthday.

I agree that Lockheed's successful bribery campaign was probably decisive. But the F-104 was nonetheless a contender on its own virtues. The F-11 was a much less llikely choice. It was unsuitable for the primary nuclear strike role (as defined in the requirements of the time). It was an old-fashioned design, drawing conceptually from the Panther/Cougar. Worse, nothing like it was in service with the US forces. The F-104G was not in service with the USAF, of course. But it was much closer to the F-104A/B/C/D than the Super Tiger was to the few F-11s produced for the Navy.

Accident rates can be just that--accidental. The learning curve when going from the F-86/CL-13 Sabre and F-84 to the F-104 had to have been a steep one at the best of times. The technology was new and the mission was new. That the simpler generation of aircraft that preceded it and the later aircraft that succeeded it had lower accident rates is hardly surprising.

 

[bobtdwarf]

At the time, barring Lockheed laying out the bribes thick and heavy.. the Germans were in the process of inking a deal on the F-11 Super Tiger. They had already done extensive flight testing and with the exception of one General who failed to retract either the flaps or the air breaks (can't remember which and it would be a mild PITA to find the PDF to confirm at the moment), which kept his test flight from exceeding mach 1.1.. they were massively impressed with it. The fact that Grumman was open to full tech exchange/local production and fitting it with a reheated 200 series Avon did not hurt.

Super Tiger was capable of 2253 KM/H plus and could lug a 9000 pound payload, and like all Tigers before it capable of carrying a 1400 pound nuke.. ST was also wired for but the test birds were never fitted with, the APQ-50 allowing it to carry sparrows. It could do everything you needed from interceptor to air to ground. All in a package that was so docile and forgiving to fly that the USN used it to give greenhorns their first taste of supersonic flight, and still put nearly 190 of 200 airframes built into storage.

Germany buys ST and a lot of pilots get another birthday.

I agree that Lockheed's successful bribery campaign was probably decisive. But the F-104 was nonetheless a contender on its own virtues. The F-11 was a much less llikely choice. It was unsuitable for the primary nuclear strike role (as defined in the requirements of the time). It was an old-fashioned design, drawing conceptually from the Panther/Cougar. Worse, nothing like it was in service with the US forces. The F-104G was not in service with the USAF, of course. But it was much closer to the F-104A/B/C/D than the Super Tiger was to the few F-11s produced for the Navy.

Accident rates can be just that--accidental. The learning curve when going from the F-86/CL-13 Sabre and F-84 to the F-104 had to have been a steep one at the best of times. The technology was new and the mission was new. That the simpler generation of aircraft that preceded it and the later aircraft that succeeded it had lower accident rates is hardly surprising.

Oh the F-11 was well beyond the cougar, it was essentially a clean sheet of paper design that just piggy backed on the name since there was funding to develop derivative's already approved and they would not have to go through congress again. That being said, SuperTiger was entirely derivative of the Tiger serving in the fleet.. the first prototype was quite literally just a bone stock F-11 with a J-79 and no other modifications.. the second one had the improved inlets and other mods. Barring the bribery, the Germans had already tested ST extensively and found her to be capable of the tasks asked of her and fulfilling the requirements.. I mean they along with Canada and Japan were on the verge of signing on the dotted line... the USN kept the Tiger in service for several years after in the training role, IIRC actually longer then they kept any Starfighter's in service.

Just going by the IRL history and deviating the least from it to answer the question of what if the Germans did not acquire F-104, the answer is clearly they would buy the aircraft they already indicated a strong desire to buy and that was the SuperTiger... the bribery was THAT decisive!

As I recall the base Tiger was withdrawn from fleet service in '60 or '61 and from training command in '66, or '65... from service with the Blue Angels in '69 and the navy did not fully kill any possibility of keeping or recalling Tiger to combat service until nearly '63/4, so at the time decisions were made there was still a significant US service presence of the type, at least enough not to kill a deal.. from what I have read the USN was actively cheerleading for it to be bought, and giving back channel support

 

[uk 75]

The Supertiger seems to have become the US equivalent of the Hawker P1121 as the go to design for Whatifs on this board.
Not knowing enough about this plane I will not join in the discussion for or against.
Looking at the history of the types that actually made it into Air Force service in the early 60s the Mirage still seems to me the family of aircraft that give the Luftwaffe both intercept and strike capabilities.
Beyond that is the close personal relationship between Adenauer and DeGaulle.

 

[Hood]

Had Germany gone for the Super Tiger, would the lack of any home interest have spurred Grumman to do a licencing deal similar to Lockheed and allow all and sundry to licence-build it and create the equivalents of Arbeitsgemeinschaft 104 (ARGE 104), ARGE Sud,
ARGE Nord, the Western Group (Belgium) and the Italian Group?

Because it feels like to amount of MAP money would justify a Grumman production line and without extensive licence-deals there is no way to get the ambitious companies of Europe on board, they would soon lobby hard for the chance to build a competitor that they could get their hands dirty with.

 

[alertken]

Licensing, readiness or not by the designer, should not be taken as a relevant factor in procurement of defence equipment. Designers do what they are told by the paymaster. Lockheed did not "own" F-104, Vought Crusader, Grumman S.T. DoD did. Ditto anything by Marcel. He "owned" nothing - not even Mercure, 56% Launch Aided by French Govt. plus 4 nice factories to build them.

It was because he did not understand this that the MD of Supermarine had to be fired 10/38 by his owner, Vickers. Sir R.McClean had been trying to hoard all of all the 310 Spitfires ordered 6/36 (remember he had been used to orders in shipyard quantities), so deliveries were...slow.

NASMA, NATO Starfighter Management Agency determined how Nations' industry would be assigned to F-104, after dissecting existing production/sub-contractor arrangements suitable for USAF: again, Lockheed was told what USAF wanted.

I watched UK MoA's AD/Engine R&D taking a big fat red crayon to a cutaway of RB172-T260 (to be Adour/Jaguar) and carving it to fit the political imposition of X% here, Y% there. RR and TM were then told to get on with it.

 

[bobtdwarf]

The Supertiger seems to have become the US equivalent of the Hawker P1121 as the go to design for Whatifs on this board.
Not knowing enough about this plane I will not join in the discussion for or against.
Looking at the history of the types that actually made it into Air Force service in the early 60s the Mirage still seems to me the family of aircraft that give the Luftwaffe both intercept and strike capabilities.
Beyond that is the close personal relationship between Adenauer and DeGaulle.

IF you can find a copy of "Naval fighters #44" it gives great detail on the SuperTiger... fun fact it was the first area rule aircraft in US inventory. EDIT for clarification.. the base Tiger was the first area rule...

There is a good sized section of the aforementioned about the various near sales. I don't think the site will allow me to attach a 29 meg PDF or I would just put a copy up.

 

[lostcosmonauts]

The dorsal sidewinders look “interesting”

 

[SSgtC]

The dorsal sidewinders look “interesting”

That was done for performance reasons. Having the sidewinders mounted dorsally was found to be drag neutral. Basically, it took advantage of a spot on the fuselage that was, in essence, a dead zone for air flow. If they were mounted below the fuselage or under the wings, it created a drag penalty which would reduce the range of the Super Tiger. Mounting them dorsally allowed the aircraft to be flown as if it was "clean."

 

[bobtdwarf]

The dorsal sidewinders look “interesting”

The arms extended quite a ways to launch as well...

 

[bobtdwarf]

Will include the following from the PDF on the German procurement section. In reference to my earlier post regarding a German generals test flight, it was GEN Kammhuber and he failed to retract the flaps and slats and that is in the partial section I am not including here.

Note that the German government had already declared their intent to purchase... the Japanese do so later and both withdraw

 

[bobtdwarf]

Now this part... this part is a heart breaker. Grumman had assured the navy that they would not accept a German contract!

 

[1635yankee]

Given that some portion of the F-104G losses were due to engine problems -- I posted information about its engine-related losses vs contemporary single-engine US jets, where the F-104 had nearly twice the engine-related losses as the second worse US fighter -- there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Regarding the Mirage III, I remember reading that Belgium, which operated both F-104Gs and Mirage IIIs, had a worse loss rate with the Mirages.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Given that some portion of the F-104G losses were due to engine problems -- I posted information about its engine-related losses vs contemporary single-engine US jets, where the F-104 had nearly twice the engine-related losses as the second worse US fighter -- there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Regarding the Mirage III, I remember reading that Belgium, which operated both F-104Gs and Mirage IIIs, had a worse loss rate with the Mirages.

I do not agree given that other J-79 equipped aircraft did not have the same issues, even those equipped with the same -3 version did not have the kind of horror show loss rate as the starfighter. The J-65 the base Tiger was equipped with was a dog with mange in terms of reliability...

Just between Germany and Japan we are talking 150 pilots... and the loss of over $150 million in '60s dollars in aircraft..

 

[_Del_]

there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Especially if they continued to fly them low and fast in terrain in bad weather as they did the Starfighter.

 

[SSgtC]

there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Especially if they continued to fly them low and fast in terrain in bad weather as they did the Starfighter.

Still, the Super Tiger would have had at least a decent radar installed, which would mitigate some of the bad weather problems. And without the -104's T tail, it wouldn't have had anywhere near the problems the Starfighter had with pitch up when it hit it's critical angle of attack. Those two features alone would save a lot of planes and lives.

 

[bobtdwarf]

there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Especially if they continued to fly them low and fast in terrain in bad weather as they did the Starfighter.

Still, the Super Tiger would have had at least a decent radar installed, which would mitigate some of the bad weather problems. And without the -104's T tail, it wouldn't have had anywhere near the problems the Starfighter had with pitch up when it hit it's critical angle of attack. Those two features alone would save a lot of planes and lives.

104 was originally a high altitude interceptor and built as lightly as possible to maintain structural strength in colder, thinner air: Operating her at low altitude in massively thicker and warmer air subjects her airframe to much larger structural and thermal stress. The Supertiger being a naval fighter is overbuilt to survive carrier landings... metal is strong over a given temperature range.. the 104 is going to start eroding much faster in those conditions.

 

[bobtdwarf]

The Supertiger seems to have become the US equivalent of the Hawker P1121 as the go to design for Whatifs on this board.
Not knowing enough about this plane I will not join in the discussion for or against.
Looking at the history of the types that actually made it into Air Force service in the early 60s the Mirage still seems to me the family of aircraft that give the Luftwaffe both intercept and strike capabilities.
Beyond that is the close personal relationship between Adenauer and DeGaulle.

I wanted to return to this.. the reason why SuperTiger is going to show up in so many "what ifs" of the era is that she actually physically existed, actually flew and there is so much hard data on which to draw an informed opinion about where it would work; and she works in a lot of places.

 

[zen]

It does seem, but for as much the random hand of fate as of any political dealing or bribery. That the Super Tiger would have succeeded.
Much more than most AH scenarios.

 

[1635yankee]

Given that some portion of the F-104G losses were due to engine problems -- I posted information about its engine-related losses vs contemporary single-engine US jets, where the F-104 had nearly twice the engine-related losses as the second worse US fighter -- there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Regarding the Mirage III, I remember reading that Belgium, which operated both F-104Gs and Mirage IIIs, had a worse loss rate with the Mirages.

I do not agree given that other J-79 equipped aircraft did not have the same issues, even those equipped with the same -3 version did not have the kind of horror show loss rate as the starfighter. The J-65 the base Tiger was equipped with was a dog with mange in terms of reliability...

Just between Germany and Japan we are talking 150 pilots... and the loss of over $150 million in '60s dollars in aircraft..

Given that some portion of the F-104G losses were due to engine problems -- I posted information about its engine-related losses vs contemporary single-engine US jets, where the F-104 had nearly twice the engine-related losses as the second worse US fighter -- there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Regarding the Mirage III, I remember reading that Belgium, which operated both F-104Gs and Mirage IIIs, had a worse loss rate with the Mirages.

I do not agree given that other J-79 equipped aircraft did not have the same issues, even those equipped with the same -3 version did not have the kind of horror show loss rate as the starfighter. The J-65 the base Tiger was equipped with was a dog with mange in terms of reliability...

Just between Germany and Japan we are talking 150 pilots... and the loss of over $150 million in '60s dollars in aircraft..

"as the F-104 in USAF service had 9.48 engine-related accidents per 100,000 flight hours vs 5.61 with the F-100," per https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1218&context=jate. Having a 70% higher loss rate due to engine problems would seem to be indicative of problems.

There weren't other single-engine fighters with J79s until the IAI Kfir, nearly 20 years after the F-104's introduction.

 

[starviking]

"as the F-104 in USAF service had 9.48 engine-related accidents per 100,000 flight hours vs 5.61 with the F-100," per https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1218&context=jate. Having a 70% higher loss rate due to engine problems would seem to be indicative of problems.

There weren't other single-engine fighters with J79s until the IAI Kfir, nearly 20 years after the F-104's introduction.

Engine problems don’t necessarily have to originate in the engine alone - interactions with the airframe (vibration and other environmental issues), airflow, even maintenance problems can have effects.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Given that some portion of the F-104G losses were due to engine problems -- I posted information about its engine-related losses vs contemporary single-engine US jets, where the F-104 had nearly twice the engine-related losses as the second worse US fighter -- there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Regarding the Mirage III, I remember reading that Belgium, which operated both F-104Gs and Mirage IIIs, had a worse loss rate with the Mirages.

I do not agree given that other J-79 equipped aircraft did not have the same issues, even those equipped with the same -3 version did not have the kind of horror show loss rate as the starfighter. The J-65 the base Tiger was equipped with was a dog with mange in terms of reliability...

Just between Germany and Japan we are talking 150 pilots... and the loss of over $150 million in '60s dollars in aircraft..

Given that some portion of the F-104G losses were due to engine problems -- I posted information about its engine-related losses vs contemporary single-engine US jets, where the F-104 had nearly twice the engine-related losses as the second worse US fighter -- there is a non-zero chance that we'd be having the same discussion about the appalling loss rate of the Super Tiger in Luftwaffe service.

Regarding the Mirage III, I remember reading that Belgium, which operated both F-104Gs and Mirage IIIs, had a worse loss rate with the Mirages.

I do not agree given that other J-79 equipped aircraft did not have the same issues, even those equipped with the same -3 version did not have the kind of horror show loss rate as the starfighter. The J-65 the base Tiger was equipped with was a dog with mange in terms of reliability...

Just between Germany and Japan we are talking 150 pilots... and the loss of over $150 million in '60s dollars in aircraft..

"as the F-104 in USAF service had 9.48 engine-related accidents per 100,000 flight hours vs 5.61 with the F-100," per https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1218&context=jate. Having a 70% higher loss rate due to engine problems would seem to be indicative of problems.

There weren't other single-engine fighters with J79s until the IAI Kfir, nearly 20 years after the F-104's introduction.

and the starfighter with under 200 sq.ft. of wing is going to turn into a lawn dart with engine problems

 

[Foo Fighter]

As I understand it, the F-104 relied on blown flaps for low altitude/low speed handling reasons. This blown flap/slat system would put extra demand on the engine, would it not? Was the blown flap/slat system prone to failure? It is interesting that those operators as mentioned, that operated the aircraft in its intended role, had few problems which would suggest that the super Tiger might not have experienced the loss rate the F-104 did. There was a senior commander (Erich Hartmann) in the Lufwaffe who resigned/retired early over the issue so problems were expected from someone who after all was an extremely experienced pilot who should have been listened to

 

[bobtdwarf]

As I understand it, the F-104 relied on blown flaps for low altitude/low speed hamndling reasons. This blown flap/slat system would put extra demand on the engine, would it not? Was the blown flap/slat system prone to failure? It is interesting that those operators as mentioned, that operated the aircraft in its intended role, had few problems which would suggest that the super Tiger might not have experienced the loss rate the F-104 did. There was a senior commander (Erich Hartmann) in the Lufwaffe who resigned/retired early over the issue so problems were expected from someone who after all was an extremely experienced pilot who should have been listened to

I remember reading about British blown flaps and the figure in it was BLC consumed about 1,000 pounds of thrust.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Thanks mate, I did not know that.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Thanks mate, I did not know that.

should have included this.. other useful figures regarding BLC: Good for about 7 knots of launch speed and reduces approach by about 17 knots. Figures will vary by type but those are reasonably decent for rule of thumb discussions/noodling in your brain applications. Can round them to 5/15 to make math easier..

 

[iverson]

None of the arguments for the F-11F address the fact that it was not actually suited to the primary low-level strike mission specified--rightly or wrongly--by contemporary German requirements. The F-104G was.

The F-104G variant was not the high-altitude F-104A or even the TAC F-104C. It was re-engineered for the mission of the TSR-2. The larger tail surfaces of the two-seaters were adopted to enhance stability. The wing itself was optimal for the low-level mission for the same reasons that it was optimal for supersonic dog-fighting at altitude: short span, high-stiffness, low thickness-to-chord ratio. At low level and high speed, this minimized gust response and vibration. State-of-the-art blown-flaps offset any need for more wing area (and were proving highly successful in carrier aircraft like the Buccaneer). The F-104G structure was reinforced for low-level, trans-sonic flight carrying a 2000-lb nuclear store plus significantly increased external fuel. The landing gear was strengthened and the downward-firing ejection seat was replaced by a conventional Martin-Baker low-level seat.

The avionics were optimized for the mission as well. The NASARR F-15 radar was an advanced version of the F-105D set with ground mapping, terrain-following, and terrain-avoidance capabilities. It may not have been the best all-weather air-intercept set. But it was state-of-the-art for tactical nuclear strike. Its Litton inertial navigation system was actual ahead of the stat of the art (which was Doppler radar, as used in the F-105D).

The type's troubles in later service are not really relevant given the times and the requirements. The requirements pushed the state-of-the-art to such an extent that a high number of accidents were inevitable. ANY aircraft that addressed the all-weather, low-level nuclear strike requirement with late-fifties-era technology was going to be complex, suffer reliability problems, impose a high workload on the pilot, and thus prove expensive and accident-prone. The Litton LN-3 INS in the F-104G was actually the first of its kind in any aircraft. The J-79 incorporated all sorts of new technology--notably variable compressor stators, variable afterburner nozzles, and automatic controls for both. All this sophistication meant lots of required maintenance and lots of failures. J-79 stators jammed or reset themselves to the wrong position, choking the engines. The afterburner often failed to light. The INS and radar were unreliable.

Worse, unlike the airplanes, the Luftwaffe was not state-of-the art in the late 1950s and eearly '60s. It had only recently been re-established and had limited experience, all with the F-84F and F-86/CL-13 generation of fighters. By comparison, everything about the F-104 was demanding, from maintenance to landing speeds to missions and operations. Given these challenges and the comparatively large number of airplanes it operated, Germany's losses seem, in retrospect, rather modest.

The F-11F was an attractive airplane that was unlikely to be selected and even less likely to be satisfactory in the role specified. Yes, it had a modern engine and systems (both of which would probably have been as problematic in service as those of the F-104G). But it was an old-fashioned notion of what a fighter should be--not a bad one, but an old-fashioned one that was unlikely to attract forward-thinking defense planners. Large wing area and a quartet of 20-mm cannon might have made the F-11F an excellent subsonic dog-fighter, conventional fighter-bomber, and/or medium-/high-altitude, supersonic interceptor. But these were not the specified missions for the new NATO aircraft. Tese roles were at most secondary to the strike role. Elegant, comparatively high-aspect ratio, swept wings would have been terrible in the specified low-level, high-speed flight regime. Poor ride, consequent poor equipment reliability, pilot fatigue, and early structural fatigue problems could have been expected.

The F-104G, by comparison, must have looked much better suited to the radically new role defined for it. It was nothing if not modern in conception, jam-packed with new technology, and closely aligned with the latest aerodynamic and tactical thinking, the very thinking that shaped the requirement. Even the otherwise admirable Mirage, with its large-area delta wing and decidedly more primitive jet engine, could not have looked as suitable.

So I think that, barring something designed from scratch specifically for the Luftwaffe/NATO requirement, the choice of the F-104G was inevitable. The specified mission and performance characteristics simply outweighed potential reliability and piloting problems that might be expected from any similar contemporary airplane. In retrospect, we might see a Mirage as a better choice, given subsequent history. But NATO planners did not have the luxury of hindsight.

 

[bobtdwarf]

None of the arguments for the F-11F address the fact that it was not actually suited to the primary low-level strike mission specified--rightly or wrongly--by contemporary German requirements. The F-104G was.

The F-104G variant was not the high-altitude F-104A or even the TAC F-104C. It was re-engineered for the mission of the TSR-2. The larger tail surfaces of the two-seaters were adopted to enhance stability. The wing itself was optimal for the low-level mission for the same reasons that it was optimal for supersonic dog-fighting at altitude: short span, high-stiffness, low thickness-to-chord ratio. At low level and high speed, this minimized gust response and vibration. State-of-the-art blown-flaps offset any need for more wing area (and were proving highly successful in carrier aircraft like the Buccaneer). The F-104G structure was reinforced for low-level, trans-sonic flight carrying a 2000-lb nuclear store plus significantly increased external fuel. The landing gear was strengthened and the downward-firing ejection seat was replaced by a conventional Martin-Baker low-level seat.

The avionics were optimized for the mission as well. The NASARR F-15 radar was an advanced version of the F-105D set with ground mapping, terrain-following, and terrain-avoidance capabilities. It may not have been the best all-weather air-intercept set. But it was state-of-the-art for tactical nuclear strike. Its Litton inertial navigation system was actual ahead of the stat of the art (which was Doppler radar, as used in the F-105D).

The type's troubles in later service are not really relevant given the times and the requirements. The requirements pushed the state-of-the-art to such an extent that a high number of accidents were inevitable. ANY aircraft that addressed the all-weather, low-level nuclear strike requirement with late-fifties-era technology was going to be complex, suffer reliability problems, impose a high workload on the pilot, and thus prove expensive and accident-prone. The Litton LN-3 INS in the F-104G was actually the first of its kind in any aircraft. The J-79 incorporated all sorts of new technology--notably variable compressor stators, variable afterburner nozzles, and automatic controls for both. All this sophistication meant lots of required maintenance and lots of failures. J-79 stators jammed or reset themselves to the wrong position, choking the engines. The afterburner often failed to light. The INS and radar were unreliable.

Worse, unlike the airplanes, the Luftwaffe was not state-of-the art in the late 1950s and eearly '60s. It had only recently been re-established and had limited experience, all with the F-84F and F-86/CL-13 generation of fighters. By comparison, everything about the F-104 was demanding, from maintenance to landing speeds to missions and operations. Given these challenges and the comparatively large number of airplanes it operated, Germany's losses seem, in retrospect, rather modest.

The F-11F was an attractive airplane that was unlikely to be selected and even less likely to be satisfactory in the role specified. Yes, it had a modern engine and systems (both of which would probably have been as problematic in service as those of the F-104G). But it was an old-fashioned notion of what a fighter should be--not a bad one, but an old-fashioned one that was unlikely to attract forward-thinking defense planners. Large wing area and a quartet of 20-mm cannon might have made the F-11F an excellent subsonic dog-fighter, conventional fighter-bomber, and/or medium-/high-altitude, supersonic interceptor. But these were not the specified missions for the new NATO aircraft. Tese roles were at most secondary to the strike role. Elegant, comparatively high-aspect ratio, swept wings would have been terrible in the specified low-level, high-speed flight regime. Poor ride, consequent poor equipment reliability, pilot fatigue, and early structural fatigue problems could have been expected.

The F-104G, by comparison, must have looked much better suited to the radically new role defined for it. It was nothing if not modern in conception, jam-packed with new technology, and closely aligned with the latest aerodynamic and tactical thinking, the very thinking that shaped the requirement. Even the otherwise admirable Mirage, with its large-area delta wing and decidedly more primitive jet engine, could not have looked as suitable.

So I think that, barring something designed from scratch specifically for the Luftwaffe/NATO requirement, the choice of the F-104G was inevitable. The specified mission and performance characteristics simply outweighed potential reliability and piloting problems that might be expected from any similar contemporary airplane. In retrospect, we might see a Mirage as a better choice, given subsequent history. But NATO planners did not have the luxury of hindsight.

The G was not the aircraft tested.. the G did not exist until 1963. The aircraft tested was the preproduction YF-104... the G was custom tailored to a requirement that was not there at the time of testing and decision making, for that I will refer you to the posted section and draw your attention to the the telegram from the West German government saying quite clearly that the F-11 was the superior machine for the requirements as they existed in 1957/8, not as they were in 1962.

As to "It was nothing if not modern in conception, jam-packed with new technology, and closely aligned with the latest aerodynamic and tactical thinking,"

Area rule, the most advanced aerodynamic thinking of that era originates with the Tiger which was a totally clean paper design having ZERO relationship with the older cougar except as a subterfuge initial naming to tap into already existing development funds.

So you are a bit off here, possibly due to unfamiliarity with the type.. Super Tiger was of the exact same generation of technical thinking as the Starfighter... are you aware that the Tigers wings were just about the same thickness as the Starfighter and were milled out of a single billet of aluminum or that the G was built up to be roughly the same weight and structural strength as the Tiger?

Everything you have said about advanced avionics is valid and they fit just as easily in a different skin if it is required, so it makes no difference if they are in a Starfighter or a Tiger.

Starfighter wing area is 194 sq. feet.. Tiger 250...A-4 259 and no-one wishing to maintaini credibility is going to argue that the A-4 was not an outstanding low-level strike platform.. the advantage of the somewhat larger wing on the Tiger is that it keeps providing lift even if the engine is out, something that BLC does not. BLC was used on the older Cougar so it is not something Grumman was not familiar with, they chose not to put it on the F-11 to keep it as simple to maintain and inexpensive as possible; and it could have been installed on a Tiger just as easily as the Starfighter...

Tiger was the better aircraft for the requirements in '57 and it would have still been the better choice for the '62 requirements of low level nuclear strike given that it spent most of its life in navy service being flown by trainees and still only lost 9 of 199 aircraft and everything from the avionics mentioned to the BLC could be as easily installed into it as the 104... the Tiger had a well earned reputation for being a forgiving aircraft to fly and that is with the notoriously flaky J-65 and nothing really changes on that with ST. The 104 did have a much better gun.

And I may as well include this data here since I refer to losses above: 184/199 were put in storage... 7 were assigned to the AN-1 submarine carrier project..something I thought was an internet joke or fantasy until I found a site where a gentleman tracked down every Tiger by their numbers and included those 7... I strongly suspect that there was some flight testing done on those aircraft after they were modified to fit in the regulus tubes on the Grayback class, but have not been able to confirm it. I base that suspicion on that being a lot of money in aircraft....modifying them so they fold up into a 10 diameter and NOT being able to fly afterwards kind of kills the program and wastes several million bucks. EDIT.. to clarify those 7 are not in storage, they are sent to the AN-1 program and vanish.

 

[Pioneer]

The problem with the Voodoo wasn't performance or US willingness to sell them. The problem was cost. The F-101 was damn near as expensive as the F-4 Phantom (1.8 million for the F-101 vs 1.9 million for early F-4 versions). Then you get in to issues of timing.

I'd have to agree, the F-104, like the F-16 that would later replace it as a psuodo standard NATO fighter-bomber was derived on cost - affordability per capability, maintainability and commonality.
As much as the F-101 and F-4 had in theory greater capabilities (and prestige), for most countries/air forces like Canada, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and West Germany to be able to afford their purchase, let alone their operational costs would have been prohibitive, not to mention their operational readiness...

The F-105 was far too specialised and expensive as a strike aircraft to be used as a multi-role fighter by such small air force (not to mention the length and high standards of runways required by the F-105 to operate = $$$

One probably must also appreciate that when the West Germany eventually purchased the F-4F for the Luftwaffe, it was a simplified and austere derivative of the F-4E ("The F-4F had one of the seven fuselage fuel tanks omitted along with the capability to carry Aim-7 Sparrow missiles and bombs.")

And of course, one can not forget or dismiss the Lockheed scandal...


Regards
Pioneer

 

[iverson]

I'd have to agree, the F-104, like the F-16 that would later replace it as a psuodo standard NATO fighter-bomber was derived on cost - affordability per capability, maintainability and commonality.
As much as the F-101 and F-4 had in theory greater capabilities (and prestige), for most countries/air forces like Canada, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and West Germany to be able to afford their purchase, let alone their operational costs would have been prohibitive, not to mention their operational readiness...

The F-105 was far too specialised and expensive as a strike aircraft to be used as a multi-role fighter by such small air force (not to mention the length and high standards of runways required by the F-105 to operate = $$$

One probably must also appreciate that when the West Germany eventually purchased the F-4F for the Luftwaffe, it was a simplified and austere derivative of the F-4E ("The F-4F had one of the seven fuselage fuel tanks omitted along with the capability to carry Aim-7 Sparrow missiles and bombs.")

And of course, one can not forget or dismiss the Lockheed scandal...


Regards
Pioneer

Trade-offs between cost and capability are, as you say, part of every engineering and procurement activity. But I suspect that the changing fashions in military aviation and defense simply created a different set of requirements from those that applied when the F-104G was adopted. If correctly remember my youthful readings in Aviation Week at the time, the F-4F was simply conceived from a different set of expectations. Nuclear war with the Warsaw Pact no longer seemed inevitable or necessary and would, in any case, be fought largely by NATO missiles and dedicated strike aircraft, like the USAF F-111s. A short, limited, conventional, fighter/fighter-bomber war like those in the Middle East seemed more likely. So while the Tornadoes, Jaguars, and Alphajets could handle interdiction and close-support, Germany needed a new airplane to perform the fashionable air-superiority role and protect the attack assets from Warsaw pact fighters.

The F-4F was sold specifically as an air superiority aircraft in keeping with the contemporary USAF mantra "not a pound for air-to-ground". The USAF's new F-15 was seen as a colossally expensive, unknown quantity, even by some in the US. McDonnell pitched the F-4F a simpler, known air-frame and engine combination that could meet generally similar requirements at lower cost and risk. Originally, the F-4F was even planned as a single-seater, but that the savings in cost and weight proved too small to justify the extra development cost. The German requirement did not demand long range, given the proximity of the German border. So fuel tankage could be sacrificed for lower weight, better acceleration, and better maneuverability (those were the days when thrust-to-weight ratios greater than unity were considered essential yet hard to attain). Strike, much less massive nuclear retaliation was no longer the focus.

 

[iverson]

The G was not the aircraft tested.. the G did not exist until 1963. The aircraft tested was the preproduction YF-104... the G was custom tailored to a requirement that was not there at the time of testing and decision making, for that I will refer you to the posted section and draw your attention to the the telegram from the West German government saying quite clearly that the F-11 was the superior machine for the requirements as they existed in 1957/8, not as they were in 1962.
<snip>

I'm fully aware of the F-11F and its specifications. But my remarks still stand. The YF-104 was the contemporary Lockheed offering, but not the contestant. NATO was not being sold YF-104s and would not have bought them. At that point, NATO was looking at two developments of existing prototypes. One was the F-11F, a development of a shipboard fighter that the US Navy passed over in favor of the F-8. The other was the F-104G, a specially developed strike version of a plane that was going into USAF service as an interceptor. The latter ticked all the right boxes as a low-level strike airplane. It was essentially a late-'50s Tornado. The former did not and was not.

The advanced technology that went into the F-11F did not make it look--note that I said "look"--any less old-fashioned compared to contemporaries or any less ill-suited to the mission that the F-104G was chosen to fill. It looked like what it still was conceptually, a rewarmed F-11, which was itself the descendant, however modernized, of a line of gun-armed, USN day fighters. The fact that the warming was very thorough--as your litany of technological sophistications shows--was simply not enough to overcome the perception. The F-104, on the other hand, was the "Missile with a Man in It," one of the Century Fighters. Where the design of the F-11F did not obviously address any of what the latest thinking considered essential for the low-level, high-speed, "under the radar" mission, the F-104G did, with its low aspect-ratio, minimal-area wings, blown flaps, advanced NASARR radar terrain-following radar, and inertial navigation. Grumman built a fighter. Lockheed built the weapons system that NATO wanted.

Finally, the fact that the USN had itself passed on the F-11F was, in any case, likely to have been fatal in its own right. Historically, non-use by the air arms of a parent nation generally makes a military airplane a non-contender internationally. The F-104 was in USAF service, and I doubt that the politicians and policy makers of the time saw the difference between the F-104A/C and the F-104G--both new airplanes--as decisive.

So, even if we assume that the F-11F would not have faced any of the troubles facing other Century-series airplanes, assume that the USN's failure to adopt it did not drive up the cost of development and support unduly, and believe that it would have served Germany better in the long run as the all-around air-superiority fighter the Luftwaffe ended up needing--the last of which I would be prepared to grant--I cannot see how it could have been adopted given the required mission and the climate of the times. I've actually thought that Lockheed's bribery efforts were as incomprehensible as they were reprehensible, given these factors.

 

[bobtdwarf]

The G was not the aircraft tested.. the G did not exist until 1963. The aircraft tested was the preproduction YF-104... the G was custom tailored to a requirement that was not there at the time of testing and decision making, for that I will refer you to the posted section and draw your attention to the the telegram from the West German government saying quite clearly that the F-11 was the superior machine for the requirements as they existed in 1957/8, not as they were in 1962.
<snip>

I'm fully aware of the F-11F and its specifications. But my remarks still stand. The YF-104 was the contemporary Lockheed offering, but not the contestant. NATO was not being sold YF-104s and would not have bought them. At that point, NATO was looking at two developments of existing prototypes. One was the F-11F, a development of a shipboard fighter that the US Navy passed over in favor of the F-8. The other was the F-104G, a specially developed strike version of a plane that was going into USAF service as an interceptor. The latter ticked all the right boxes as a low-level strike airplane. It was essentially a late-'50s Tornado. The former did not and was not.

The advanced technology that went into the F-11F did not make it look--note that I said "look"--any less old-fashioned compared to contemporaries or any less ill-suited to the mission that the F-104G was chosen to fill. It looked like what it still was conceptually, a rewarmed F-11, which was itself the descendant, however modernized, of a line of gun-armed, USN day fighters. The fact that the warming was very thorough--as your litany of technological sophistications shows--was simply not enough to overcome the perception. The F-104, on the other hand, was the "Missile with a Man in It," one of the Century Fighters. Where the design of the F-11F did not obviously address any of what the latest thinking considered essential for the low-level, high-speed, "under the radar" mission, the F-104G did, with its low aspect-ratio, minimal-area wings, blown flaps, advanced NASARR radar terrain-following radar, and inertial navigation. Grumman built a fighter. Lockheed built the weapons system that NATO wanted.

Finally, the fact that the USN had itself passed on the F-11F was, in any case, likely to have been fatal in its own right. Historically, non-use by the air arms of a parent nation generally makes a military airplane a non-contender internationally. The F-104 was in USAF service, and I doubt that the politicians and policy makers of the time saw the difference between the F-104A/C and the F-104G--both new airplanes--as decisive.

So, even if we assume that the F-11F would not have faced any of the troubles facing other Century-series airplanes, assume that the USN's failure to adopt it did not drive up the cost of development and support unduly, and believe that it would have served Germany better in the long run as the all-around air-superiority fighter the Luftwaffe ended up needing--the last of which I would be prepared to grant--I cannot see how it could have been adopted given the required mission and the climate of the times. I've actually thought that Lockheed's bribery efforts were as incomprehensible as they were reprehensible, given these factors.

At the time of the decision... see above telegram... F-11 was still in frontline service and would remain so until 1961, only being withdrawn from training command in '65/'66, so the argument about non adoption is an odd one, given that the USAF bought fewer F-104's and dumped those on the ANG as fast as possible and still restricted use of it to pilots with over 1500 hours. The USN had more Tigers than the USAF had Starfighters...at a time when the C was not even a glimmer in the eye of Lockheed engineers.

Not to be overly argumentative but calling SuperTiger a warmed over cougar indicates to me that you don't have an in-depth familiarity with the aircraft, a superficial one certainly, but not enough to know that making that statement would get you grief.

All the things you note about the F-104G were added well after, and after bribes had been laid out by the known timeline to consider the 104...all of the structural improvements made it more like the F-11: Reinforced airframe, landing gear and a weight now within 1000 pounds of the Supertiger evaporated what little safety margin it had at low altitude with a wing so loaded that it demanded BLC in level flight. All of those things could as easily be fitted to the Tiger to tailor it; and that would be an interesting aircraft...EDIT especially with the Avon option. Point being they were comparing prototypes and each type could be tailored to task.

Further EDIT to perhaps clarify the concept I am trying to convey: There was no "G" at the time of the evaluation, the "G" is what grew out of tailoring the base platform that was tested to do the task required. All of that same tailoring can be and would be done to the bare bones SuperTiger that was tested against the equally bare bones Starfighter leading to what would be in essence an "F-11G".

It was a sexy beast and man could Lockheed sell the sizzle! "Missile with a man in it" is cool marketing lingo but missiles are designed to hit the ground and explode... tragic fore shadowing given the record.

Once more I will refer to the above posted sections on the German contract inclusive of the statements of regret of not buying ST and noting in particular the protests made by Erich Hartmann and others on starfighter adoption. I will also refer myself to the statement that there was an agreement between Grumman and the navy to NOT accept the German contract.. which to be frank I had missed in my previous readings of the book and for the purposes of this discussion must be ignored or the navy would relent and not punish Grumman by pulling various contracts....

 

[bobtdwarf]

ok now I am curious as to what an "F-11G" would look like... Landing gear and airframe strength are already sufficient, as are internal fuel capacity given what they did to the 104 to bring it inline to the mission profile, even the ejection seat fires in the right direction; so in theory you could get away with just plugging in the avionics!

As I understand it the Germans had an existing production license for the Avon and an existing maintenance infrastructure for that engine, so lets use that to keep program costs low. A reheated 200 series would be roughly what was put in the Saab Lansen and Draken, so will use the figures for the Lansen: That takes static dry thrust to 11,000 pounds up from 9300(some list it at 10,750 either way a nice increase), and AB is essentially unchanged at about 14,500. A nice increase in acceleration and the possibility of a cruise speed of Mach one or a little above.

That would be fine, but we all know there are going to be some "tweaks", there are always "tweaks".

Though BLC is not likely to be needed lets install it just for giggles... that takes the F-11 POA speed from 139 knots down to about 124 and her touchdown speed from about 110 knots down to 95 or so. Short field and STOL performance should be outstanding for the era. This should be considered the baseline "low cost" version.

Now if you want to get a bit more ambitious you go with a version of the 98J-7 2 seater but replace the RIO with electronics, relocating the cannon(should have space for a pair of 30MM or a Vulcan), and some additional fuel to offset the Avon's slightly higher SFC in comparison to the J-79. If you go this route you can relocate the electronic "bullet" for the APQ-50 to here and make room for a larger dish in the nose or you can leave it as is and have room for more toys.

This would be the high cost option with the greatest versatility and capability, relocating the "dustbin/bullet" and larger dish would allow you to parallel the upgrade path of the F-4's avionics and capabilities over time to a large degree.

They might go with a compromise between the two with a smaller "plug" in the fuselage to accommodate relocation of the cannon and some additional electronics... IDK.

One thing is it would be a serious giggle if the German navy bought them and decided to carrier qualify their pilots to increase interoperability with their NATO partners...results should be good and would probably lead to some questions being asked in London and DC.

 

[CV12Hornet]

As I understand it the Germans had an existing production license for the Avon and an existing maintenance infrastructure for that engine, so lets use that to keep program costs low. A reheated 200 series would be roughly what was put in the Saab Lansen and Draken, so will use the figures for the Lansen: That takes static dry thrust to 11,000 pounds up from 9300(some list it at 10,750 either way a nice increase), and AB is essentially unchanged at about 14,500. A nice increase in acceleration and the possibility of a cruise speed of Mach one or a little above.

Would they go with the 200-series Avon, or would they use the 301 fitted to the late-model Drakens and the EE Lightning? That was in the same thrust class as the J79 (12,700 dry, 17,100 wet) despite being smaller, though like the 200-series it also had higher fuel consumption.

 

[bobtdwarf]

As I understand it the Germans had an existing production license for the Avon and an existing maintenance infrastructure for that engine, so lets use that to keep program costs low. A reheated 200 series would be roughly what was put in the Saab Lansen and Draken, so will use the figures for the Lansen: That takes static dry thrust to 11,000 pounds up from 9300(some list it at 10,750 either way a nice increase), and AB is essentially unchanged at about 14,500. A nice increase in acceleration and the possibility of a cruise speed of Mach one or a little above.

Would they go with the 200-series Avon, or would they use the 301 fitted to the late-model Drakens and the EE Lightning? That was in the same thrust class as the J79 (12,700 dry, 17,100 wet) despite being smaller, though like the 200-series it also had higher fuel consumption.

I am being conservative here, in that I know that Grumman offered a switch to the 200. I would MUCH rather go the 300 though....

EDIT: If going the 301 route it is worth noting that during early flight testing the SuperTiger was using a phase 0 early development version of the J-79 which had IIRC 650-700 pounds LESS thrust than is listed in most sources, which puts the max thrust at about 13.250 pounds on the Mach 1.61 run made by the A prototype with the less efficient intakes and no fillets. A static dry thrust of 12,700 pounds in an airframe with the aerodynamic tweaks and more efficient inlets of the B prototype, which was enough to take her to Mach 1.87(may have been the first Mach 2 run, I am fuzzy on that at the moment so being cautious).. with the same crap box engine... puts her into a really FUN zone regarding cruise speed ET AL.!

 

[zen]

Intriguing timing issues with selecting a UK engine for a German Super Tiger license.
Last version of F.177 for Heinkel was with RB.133 and in 1957....obviously.
At that time RR could revise RB.106, but a later request for a solution by 1961 is likely to see RR offer Spey derivatives.
UK government might fund either if they think it has legs with a foreign buyer....the latter fits MacMillan trying to ingratiate himself with Bonn.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Intriguing timing issues with selecting a UK engine for a German Super Tiger license.
Last version of F.177 for Heinkel was with RB.133 and in 1957....obviously.
At that time RR could revise RB.106, but a later request for a solution by 1961 is likely to see RR offer Spey derivatives.
UK government might fund either if they think it has legs with a foreign buyer....the latter fits MacMillan trying to ingratiate himself with Bonn.

RB.106 would be quite intriguing! We have discussed in other threads regarding RN carriers the potential of the Super Tiger with something like the TF-41 and the alterations to the airframe needed so any Spey would need to breath, all of which are doable. But if RB.106 would really be a true drop in Avon replacement that stands a shot in hell of being brought to market by say '66 at the outside, using an interim solution in the early days... might be viable: Would come about the time initial units would be looking at an initial engine overhaul (maybe) and they could instead just swap out...going from a MK.I to a MK. II unit so to say, and it would probably be cheaper than the probable cost of a reheated Spey option given the F-4K costs(who knew recontouring the tail of an aircraft was such a pain the butt?).