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[This was previously posted in the thread Diemert's Defender in the Postwar Aircraft Projects forum but really doesn't belong there, so starting a new thread here]
Which failed to defeat them. Amazingly, BTW their production actually increased during the height of the bombing of industry, rather than decreased.
So, killing them failed to break their will.
So, breaking their "stuff" failed to break their will.
What broke their will was military forces fighting their way to their political centre and destroying their government...
Yes. it was characterised by a lack of formal fighting, consisting of planned massacre of innocents. It also, BTW, singularly failed to break the will of the groups which were their victims.
That was a minor political objective of the German effort on the Eastern Front, not a military one and which diverted resources and time from the real battle facing the Germans and of course ensured that the "hearts and minds" of their victims were never going to support the German war effort but detract from it.
Civil war and a post ipso justification by the Indians for their objective of breaking up Pakistan so they were not continually fighting on two fronts. By installing a Muslim government sympathetic to India, they made sure they only faced one enemy, not two.
War and Genocide are I agree not always mutually exclusive but in modern, post-WWII history their joint employment has been without an exception a failure.
You appear to have forgotten ...
... nothing. I'm simply pointing out history: most of the time, for the last 6,000 years, people running wars tend to not care if they annoy the enemy populace.
"Tend" does not mean it is universal. Those military commanders who did care about it are the ones whom are usually most looked up to, compared to the others who were considered brutal and tyrannical.
The South was well supplied by April 1975. That decision did not cause it's downfall. It is merely another "stab in the back" excuse. The South's government was deeply unpopular and lacked support from the majority of the population. It was generally seen as a corrupt, tyrannical and neo-Colonial organisation. The Communists OTOH were perceived as the only legitimate Nationalist force which had seen off both the French and the Americans. 1975 was the delayed outcome of 1954. America had simply put off the inevitable and failed dismally to secure it's political objectives.
Mmm, see what I mean about "fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong war for the wrong objectives"?
The USA believed it was ultimately fighting against the Kremlin in Vietnam, not the local Vietnamese Communist nationalist forces. As the Kremlin did not control the fighting in Vietnam, the American effort was nearly pointless. The Kremlin utilised the Vietnamese Communist nationalist forces to hold American attention and waste American lives and lucre.
Americans had, still have this insane belief that Communism was a monolithic political ideology which was under the direction of the fUSSR from Moscow (and yet managed to identify China and even earlier, Yugoslavia as independent nations from that "Bloc'" monolith). It was not, it was always a loosely aligned group of independent (some considerably more so than others, such as in Eastern Europe) nations), each with their own national aspirations and interests. If the US had not backed the French, Vietnam could have been the Yugoslavia of Asia. Instead McCarthyism drove the US to adopt a hardline against Communism there, while at the same time accepting an independent, neutral Communist Yugoslavia. Such are the contradictions in American foreign policy.
So, to return to the original point, "breaking stuff" and "killing people" is not what military strategy is primarily about. Military Strategy is about defeating the enemy to achieve political objectives and preferably with the least casualties on both sides. From Sun Tzu through Clausewitz to Liddel-Hart, this is a common string.
“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“The greatest victory is that which requires no battle.”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it."
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
"Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard."
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
"War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."
- Clausewitze, On War
"War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."
- Clausewitze, On War
"No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."
- Clausewitze, On War
"The military weapon is but one of the means that serve the purposes of war: one out of the assortment which grand strategy can employ."
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"While there are many causes for which a state goes to war, its fundamental object can be epitomized as that of ensuring the continuance of its policy -- in face of the determination of the opposing state to pursue a contrary policy. In the human will lies the source and mainspring of conflict."
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"It is thus more potent, as well as more economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting ... A strategist should think in terms of paralysing, not of killing."
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow. "
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"Inflict the least possible permanent injury, for the enemy of to-day is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future "
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
Orionblamblam said:Kadija_Man said:As for breaking stuff, killing people to "break the enemy's will" I would point you to the failures of where maximum casualties were sought in the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII. They failed dismally to "break the enemy's will".
Yeah, but they broke the enemies *stuff.*
Which failed to defeat them. Amazingly, BTW their production actually increased during the height of the bombing of industry, rather than decreased.
So, killing them failed to break their will.
So, breaking their "stuff" failed to break their will.
What broke their will was military forces fighting their way to their political centre and destroying their government...
And stuff like ethnic wars (Hutus/Tutsis, frex) are all about maximising casualties.
That was not a war, that was a genocide. Perhaps you need to consult a dictionary as to the meaning of words?
Really?
Yes. it was characterised by a lack of formal fighting, consisting of planned massacre of innocents. It also, BTW, singularly failed to break the will of the groups which were their victims.
Given that one of the Nazis goal was the extermination of the Slavs, is it your contention that Germany was *not* waging war against the Soviet Union?
That was a minor political objective of the German effort on the Eastern Front, not a military one and which diverted resources and time from the real battle facing the Germans and of course ensured that the "hearts and minds" of their victims were never going to support the German war effort but detract from it.
How about the Bangladesh Liberation War of '71, where the Pakistani leadership planned to exterminate the Bengali Hindus?
Civil war and a post ipso justification by the Indians for their objective of breaking up Pakistan so they were not continually fighting on two fronts. By installing a Muslim government sympathetic to India, they made sure they only faced one enemy, not two.
"War" and "genocide" are not mutually exclusive concepts. Sometimes wholesale extermination is part and parcel of war planning.
War and Genocide are I agree not always mutually exclusive but in modern, post-WWII history their joint employment has been without an exception a failure.
Kill large numbers on either side and resentment sets in and grudges created.
To which the historically usual response has been "yeah, so?"
You appear to have forgotten ...
... nothing. I'm simply pointing out history: most of the time, for the last 6,000 years, people running wars tend to not care if they annoy the enemy populace.
"Tend" does not mean it is universal. Those military commanders who did care about it are the ones whom are usually most looked up to, compared to the others who were considered brutal and tyrannical.
As for Vietnam, it was the military men who ran that war and devised the strategy of attrition, not the politicians.
And yet it was Congress that chose to not aid South Viet Nam in April of 1975.
The South was well supplied by April 1975. That decision did not cause it's downfall. It is merely another "stab in the back" excuse. The South's government was deeply unpopular and lacked support from the majority of the population. It was generally seen as a corrupt, tyrannical and neo-Colonial organisation. The Communists OTOH were perceived as the only legitimate Nationalist force which had seen off both the French and the Americans. 1975 was the delayed outcome of 1954. America had simply put off the inevitable and failed dismally to secure it's political objectives.
The USA made the mistake of fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong war for the wrong objectives.
And yet while the US was slogging through VN, the Soviets did not spen as much effort on expansion as they had previously... no doubt in at least part due to their recognition that Americans were willign to spend blood and treasure to stop communism. And when the US demonstrated that it *wouldn't* step in to stop communist expansion, the Soviets up and invaded Afghanistan.
Mmm, see what I mean about "fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong war for the wrong objectives"?
The USA believed it was ultimately fighting against the Kremlin in Vietnam, not the local Vietnamese Communist nationalist forces. As the Kremlin did not control the fighting in Vietnam, the American effort was nearly pointless. The Kremlin utilised the Vietnamese Communist nationalist forces to hold American attention and waste American lives and lucre.
Americans had, still have this insane belief that Communism was a monolithic political ideology which was under the direction of the fUSSR from Moscow (and yet managed to identify China and even earlier, Yugoslavia as independent nations from that "Bloc'" monolith). It was not, it was always a loosely aligned group of independent (some considerably more so than others, such as in Eastern Europe) nations), each with their own national aspirations and interests. If the US had not backed the French, Vietnam could have been the Yugoslavia of Asia. Instead McCarthyism drove the US to adopt a hardline against Communism there, while at the same time accepting an independent, neutral Communist Yugoslavia. Such are the contradictions in American foreign policy.
So, to return to the original point, "breaking stuff" and "killing people" is not what military strategy is primarily about. Military Strategy is about defeating the enemy to achieve political objectives and preferably with the least casualties on both sides. From Sun Tzu through Clausewitz to Liddel-Hart, this is a common string.
“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“The greatest victory is that which requires no battle.”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it."
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
"Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard."
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
"War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."
- Clausewitze, On War
"War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."
- Clausewitze, On War
"No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."
- Clausewitze, On War
"The military weapon is but one of the means that serve the purposes of war: one out of the assortment which grand strategy can employ."
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"While there are many causes for which a state goes to war, its fundamental object can be epitomized as that of ensuring the continuance of its policy -- in face of the determination of the opposing state to pursue a contrary policy. In the human will lies the source and mainspring of conflict."
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"It is thus more potent, as well as more economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting ... A strategist should think in terms of paralysing, not of killing."
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"The higher level of grand strategy [is] that of conducting war with a far-sighted regard to the state of the peace that will follow. "
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy
"Inflict the least possible permanent injury, for the enemy of to-day is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future "
- Liddel-Hart, Strategy