LOL, the Washington Air Traffic controllers were sent the 8 month pay for voluntary resignation offer and their bosses in the FAA had to tell them not to accept as they hadnt worked out who who were essential employees yet while their union advised them not to accept until more details of the offer were released. Trump administration is backpedalling trying to claim the air traffic controllers were exempt from the offer and recruitment freeze. Biden had secured funding to expand the number of air traffic controllers by 2000 with an announcement last September that 1800 had been hired.

 
Last edited:

I'm not sure that this really adds anything unless there's specific elements of the exercise that would differ from normal night flying missions.

It makes me wonder why they decided not to do it later, after the airport closed. In a national emergency that required activating COG evacuation plans, there would almost certainly also be a ground stop on commercial traffic at least in the DC area.

I wonder if the VH-60 Blackhawk was equipped with TCAS?

Doesn't really matter because TCAS advisories are suppressed at the altitudes in question here. They are considered to be too much of a distraction to an aircrew during landing or takeoff.
 
How does Washington compare with other cities around the world where there are central airports and helicopters together?
 
It’s just a repeat of the Crowdstrike situation. Massive layoffs obliterated the morale of the survivors and led to major staff shortage. Mistakes are made and here we are.

As an aerospace engineer I would not compare the kinetic loss of 67 lives to some cybersecurity incident. Please keep things in the proper perspective.
 
New NTSB update, there is a discrepancy of 100ft between the altitude the planes instruments thought it was and the altitude air traffic control detected the plane to be. According to its black box the plane was at 325ft +/- 25ft. NTSB is unsure yet why the discrepancy and if this was a contributing factor.
 
Last edited:
New NTSB update, there is a discrepancy of 100ft between the altitude the planes instruments thought it was and the altitude air traffic control detected the plane to be. NTSB is unsure yet why the discrepancy and if this was a contributing factor.
But IAW 7110.65 Air Traffic Control, mode C altitude readout are considered valid if they do not vary by more than 300 feet between radar and pilot verification.

How does Washington compare with other cities around the world where there are central airports and helicopters together?

Where I work, Runway 28 has the exact same approach path scenario and is commonplace. SOP Dicates that all helicopters shall remain along the east bank of the river at or below 300 feet during transit through the airspace. Here's the thing. I feel passionate about this specific scenario because of how extremely avoidable it was. This situation has been done here with no qualms for atleast 5 years from myself since transferring here and decades by the others who have stayed here. 7110.65 dictates that priority handling also be given to arriving over departing/transit aircraft as well as IFR over VFR, the CRJ should have been given every bit of priority in ATC services and should have been given that traffic call first. The helo only needed to make one-left-360 per publication and this would have never happened. This is so disturbing.
 
Last edited:
But IAW 7110.65 Air Traffic Control, mode C altitude readout are considered valid if they do not vary by more than 300 feet between radar and pilot verification.

If under 300ft variance squawk Reset Transponder and read out altitude every 100ft. Squawk Stop Altitude if the pilot reported altitude varies by more than 300ft.
 
If under 300ft variance squawk Reset Transponder and read out altitude every 100ft. Squawk Stop Altitude if the pilot reported altitude varies by more than 300ft.
Did not appear that the radar feed shown any stop squawk. His Mode C had to have been valid, if there was any discrepancy to fix his readout, it looks as if it had been validated being it was still present.
 
The Wall Street Journal uploaded this video yesterday concerning the helicopter route which the VH-60 had been flying when it collided with the CRJ:


An Army Black Hawk helicopter collided with an American Airlines plane in Washington D.C. near the Reagan National Airport, killing 67 people on Tuesday night. The plane crash happened in one of the U.S.’s most restricted air spaces.
A WSJ visual investigation breaks down the helicopter corridors, airport runway paths and light pollution that may have played a role in the fatal D.C. crash.
Chapters:
0:00 The plane crash over the Potomac River
0:34 The flight rules around D.C.
1:18 What happened during the crash
2:42 Air traffic control staffing and altitude

Apparently this helicopter route has been of concern for years amongst helicopter pilots who fly in the area for years now. A factor that may've played a role in this collision is the ATC redirecting the CRJ to land at different runway at the last minute.
 
This provides a very useful, BS free, potential explanation:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdOU2BGHwHo


Not saying it is correct - that's for the formal investigation - but it does give a very convincing scenario.
Several key points he didn't cover here.

One is that airlines do not always have the person in the left seat being the Pilot Flying. It's pretty typical for the two seats to swap between who is Pilot Flying and who is Pilot Monitoring (reading checklists and stuff). CVR will have recorded who was PF and who was PM.

A second key point he missed is that the airliner was in a pretty hard left bank turn, so the copilot likely could not see the helo. At all.

Third point is that the copilot in a helo is in the left seat, not the right seat.
 
Apparently this helicopter route has been of concern for years amongst helicopter pilots who fly in the area for years now. A factor that may've played a role in this collision is the ATC redirecting the CRJ to land at different runway at the last minute.
I sure as hell do NOT like helicopters operating with less than 500ft separation between their hard ceiling and the glideslope of an active runway.
 
I am glad that they are paying attention to the height discrepancy, should there be any external factor like spoofing.

From Safran website:

Daily estimated Number of flights affected by GPS spoofing by Spoofed to region.jpg

It's an airport surrounded by a capital city and a pilot with a social profile that could make him/her a target, while the flightplan is recursive for this training mission.
 
An aerospace engineers view: Fixed wing aircraft, once they have committed to a landing at a regular airport, are on a steady glide slope as approved by ATC. Helicopters, on the other hand, can much more nimbly maneuver to accommodate any ATC commands they might receive.
Hence what I said earlier.
 
Do not forget that altering the glide path should have been done with a segment flown at a constant altitude (rwy 33 is angled away, shorter and with a farther threshold).
I don't know what was the profile of the Gulfstream trajectory but the recreation Simulation shown earlier do not include this. That would mean that the aircraft could have been lower that the 3deg glide slope if that is what is mandated here* with a nose possibly up restricting vision.

*just checked and it is 3deg

Screenshot_20250204_122859.jpg

Screenshot_20250204_124819.jpg
 
Last edited:
How easy is to climb 100 feet over your assigned altitude while flying a helicopter? Can the altitude readings be 100% accurate? Did the NVGs played a mayor factor. In my opinion they need to change that helicopter route or move the helicopter operations somewhere else.
 
For me the issue of altitude is a non-issue. If the helicopter pilot had the aircraft in sight, as they were cleared to pass behind the airliner, they would not have had to worry about the altitude of the airliner, because they would not have been on a collision course. It's simple, if the crew said they had the traffic in sight and collided with the airliner, then they were watching and passing behind the wrong traffic.

Also, it appears that the helicopter maneuvered off of the routing, placing them in the middle of Potomac and closer to the 3 degree glide slope for Runway 33. If they were at the designated altitude and remained on route then they would have been fine. Obviously, the helicopter was cutting across the Potomac River to expedite their flight to their destination and given clearance to do so with traffic in sight. If the controller would have held them to their route this may not have resulted in a collision. Also, allowing them to skirt across the Potomac would have placed them in front of traffic approaching Runway 1. Keeping the helicopters on their routes, on altitude, would have prevented the accident in my view.

Possible solution: I think the helicopter Route 4 is too close to the approach end of the runway. Of course if they move it further inland and out of the Potomac River then the altitude will have to be raised for obstacles (e.g. buildings, towers, etc.). This would be 1,000 feet over the highest obstacle over a congested city. This would require moving Route 1 further east of the Bolling Airfield. Also, controllers managing helicopter routing and other corridors through their airspace needs to keep traffic on the designated corridors unless they are positively controlled by ATC. Letting the pilot take responsibility of keeping themselves out of the way of traffic in a congested airspace at night against all of the ground lights is a workload intensive endeavor.
 
You have to think at the nuisance. There is a lot of helo flights each day in this area. Moving the route overland will face strong opposition from home owners.
When was the last time there was any incident?
 
WRT the height of both aircraft, I suspect there's enough video from different locations to calculate it geometrically as a sanity check for the onboard figures. OTOH it does point out the weakness of relying on secondary radar vs primary,

While WRT GPS spoofing, I think someone else would have noticed.
 
Do not forget that altering the glide path should have been done with a segment flown at a constant altitude (rwy 33 is angled away, shorter and with a farther threshold).
I don't know what was the profile of the Gulfstream trajectory but the recreation Simulation shown earlier do not include this. That would mean that the aircraft could have been lower that the 3deg glide slope if that is what is mandated here* with a nose possibly up restricting vision.

*just checked and it is 3deg

View attachment 758307

View attachment 758311
Also note that the approach plate shows that at ~1.5nmi from runway threshold, that airliner should have been at ~490ft agl and descending a 3deg slope.

Runway 01/19 is 7169ft long, ~1.18nmi or so.

The collision happened roughly 0.5nmi from the runway threshold. The plane was actually high above glideslope if they were still at 350ft, the plane should have been at roughly 170ft if they were on glideslope!

Helicopter was not where it was supposed to be. It was in a position where ANY traffic coming from the right-hand side of the aircraft would be invisible to the pilot (edit) of the airliner on approach. And it was square in the middle of the glideslope in terms of altitude!


How easy is to climb 100 feet over your assigned altitude while flying a helicopter? Can the altitude readings be 100% accurate? Did the NVGs played a mayor factor. In my opinion they need to change that helicopter route or move the helicopter operations somewhere else.
I don't think it should be particularly easy, you would have to add collective pitch to increase altitude and both pilot and copilot should have had hands on the collective. (Copilot/instructor to feel what the pilot is doing, pilot for actual control).

Edited for clarity.
 
Last edited:


Despite two deadly plane crashes rocking the Northeastern United States in the span of less than a week, President Donald Trump's administration is reportedly telling employees at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to not participate in discussions to advance aviation safety.

That is a really fucking stupid suggestion assuming it isn't criminal.
 
I don't think it should be particularly easy, you would have to add collective pitch to increase altitude and both pilot and copilot should have had hands on the collective. (Copilot/instructor to feel what the pilot is doing, pilot for actual control).

OTOH, coming down Route 4 you do have to clear the 14th Street bridge complex first. I haven't been able to find a definite number, but they have an air draft of at least 60 feet, and comfortable clearance over them is going to push you right up to near the 200-ft ceiling. Really easy to drift higher, especially on NVGs and with head out of the cockpit instead of fixed on instruments.
 
where did you get the 0.5nm from threshold for the location of the crash
The impact point on the water was reported about 3,000 feet or 0.49 nm from the threshold. Although, due to momentum of the airliner, the collision likely occurred further away from the threshold. However, if your trying to calculated the height of the airliner at impact, the 3 degrees starts at the touchdown aiming point markers 1,000 feet from the threshold on the runway. Making the distance 4,000 ft from the touchdown marker to the water impact. This is 209 feet AGL above the water impact point on a 3 degree glideslope.

The airliner's recorder had the impact occurring at 325ft AGL. If the airliner was established on the 3 degree glideslope this would have the collision location 6,450 feet from the touchdown marker or almost 1 nm exactly.

The tower recorded had the helicopter at 200 feet. Airport Surveillance Radar updates every 5-6 seconds. Its possible that when the helicopter turned right, towards the middle of the Potomac, that it climbed 100 feet in the 5 seconds before the next accurate radar contact. The Blackhawks recorder hopefully will shed light on the true altitude of the helicopter. Its possible that the pilot of the helicopter climbed for added comfort as they turned further over the water where there were fewer obstacles to judge their altitude above the water while flying VFR.
 
@Scott Kenny : where did you get the 0.5nm from threshold for the location of the crash? Could you kindly share.
I compared the published length of runway to where the ADSB tracks crossed.

However, @Dynoman corrected me on the altitude the airliner should have been at due to a difference in where the ILS beams put you on the runway. But that still puts the airliner at 210ft in the middle of the river. If the FDRs are correct and the impact occurred at 350ft, that would put the impact point at 1nmi away from the end of the runway. And means that there's only about 200ft of vertical separation between the published Route 4 at the water's edge and the center of the glideslope. Whoever approved that needs to be shot, and have every other decision they have made reviewed by at least a 9-strong team.

The videos where you can see the helo's lights (not easy, the airliner's landing lights tend to drown the much smaller lights out) make it look like the helo did not change altitude in the couple seconds before impact. I find it hard to believe that the helo would double its altitude without notice.
 
Helicopters can hover and alter course pretty easily. It's not uncommon to see military Helicopters doing their things at an airport while you strictly follow your landing pattern or approach.
200ft airway still require a clearance to cross the airspace (see chart)

Regarding the speed that reflects the confidence of 2 experienced pilots and a trainee (She had "only" 490 flight hours since qualifying in 2019 - I am not sure how you'd rate that in Army aviation) had in their flight path and the discrepancy with the effective altitude, that's where we can suspect something wrong with the hardware.
I have suggested QNH setting or Spoofing but the enquiry will certainly reveals more.
I hope that a police investigation will be opened. Spoofing would need broad time sensitive search beyond what the NTSB can certainly do.
 
Last edited:
Helicopters can hover and alter course pretty easily. It's not uncommon to see military Helicopters doing their things at an airport while you strictly follow your landing pattern or approach.
200ft airway still require a clearance to cross the airspace (see chart)
Yes, and the clearance was at least partially inadequate since even if everything worked perfectly the helo would pass directly under the airliner.

Is there a system that would show that the two would reach the same geographic position at the same time (ignoring altitude), and then allow the ATC to tell the helo to do a left 360 for separation?


Regarding the speed that reflects the confidence of 2 experienced pilots and a trainee (She had "only" 490 flight hours since qualifying in 2019 - I am not sure how you'd rate that in Army aviation) had in their flight path and the discrepancy with the effective altitude, that's where we can suspect something wrong with the hardware.
I have suggested QNH setting or Spoofing but the enquiry will certainly reveals more.
I hope that a police investigation will be opened. Spoofing would need broad time sensitive search beyond what the NTSB can certainly do.
Right. Two experienced pilots, suddenly doubling their altitude while at night seems odd. (If I had a 200ft hard ceiling, I'd be aiming for 150ft altitude by instruments)

That said, 490 flight hours in 6 years sounds really low. I'd expect ~200hrs a year or so, not ~82. That's less than 7 hours a month, and that is not enough to maintain proficiency on the civilian side for flight training. ~7 hours flight time would track with one weekend a month as a Guard/Reservist.
 
The controller did say pass after, meaning that he had a sound appraisal of the situation. Then rwy 33 approach is VFR (?) hence it belongs to landing crew to assert correctly the safety of their flight path. Obviously, the understaffed control tower was a factor here, but in a perfect world, if every one had behave fully professionally, the crash would have been averted by a go-around* (CRJ) or the Blackhawk hovering (I am not sure helo do 360's).

*The crew could also have requested the helo to be cleared out of the their approach path. The fact they weren't on the same frequency prevented it.
 
The controller did say pass after, meaning that he had a sound appraisal of the situation. Then rwy 33 approach is VFR (?) hence it belongs to landing crew to assert correctly the safety of their flight path. Obviously, the understaffed control tower was a factor here, but in a perfect world, if every one had behave fully professionally, the crash would have been averted by a go-around* (CRJ) or the Blackhawk hovering (I am not sure helo do 360's).

*The crew could also have requested the helo to be cleared out of the their approach path. The fact they weren't on the same frequency prevented it.
The Runway 33 approach leaves every aircraft UNABLE to see any traffic to their right, due to the sharp left turn. Big bank angle, puts the floor of the cockpit between the right seat and anything on those helo routes!
 
I know it is now a popular assertion but I personally don't see much bank angle in all the video available to the public. Approach trajectory, as seen in the landing chart (see above), is a straight (hence flat) approach above the Potomac.

This is why I have suggested the CRJ was below the glide slope, with a nose up, that would explain they didn't see the helo Nav and strobe lights.
 
An aircraft on a collision course with you will be a steady light in the sky that does not move. The lights on the helicopter, whether they be steady navigation lights, landing light (often on within 5 miles of an airport to help everyone see you) or a blinking anti-collision light, on a collision course would not have likely moved, only gotten bigger as it approached. In this regard the helicopter may have been 'camouflaged' in the cityscape of lights to the side of the airliner making it difficult for the airline crew to register the helicopter was there. (It did not help that the airline crew and the helicopter crew were not on the same frequency, reducing the aircrews situational awareness.)
 

Please donate to support the forum.

Back
Top Bottom