MANDATED COMMONALITY: NAVY AIR COMBAT FIGHTER
Competitive prototyping has since been embraced verbally by vira.
ttlly everyone concerned with the weapon systems procurement process,
and of course it has also been put into use 'though rarely extended
into the full-scale development phase). The first two post-1966 programs
to feature competitive prototypes, the Air Force's A-X and Lightweight
Fighter (LWF) programs, have been subjected to some preliminary
analysis at Rand and elsewhere. More interesting in the context of
this report is the Navy's search for a lightweight, low-mix tactical
aircraft.
The outstanding characteristic of Congress's role in what has become
the F-18/A-18 program is its insistence on a course of action that
has necessarily restricted competition for the contract award. The
insistence has taken the form of denial of Navy requests for funding
of new design competitions of its own and attempted consolidation of
the Air Force and Navy efforts to arrest their declining inventories
of fighter aircraft. Specifically, the report of the conference committee
on the FY 1975 DoD Appropriation Bill contained this directive:
The Managers are in agreement on the appropriation of $20,000,000
as proposed by the Senate instead of no funding as proposed by the
House for the VFAX aircraft. The conferees support the need for
a lower cost alternative fighter to complement the [Navy's] F-14A
and replace F-4 and A-7 aircraft; however the conferees direct
that the development of this aircraft make maximum use of the Air
Force Lightweight Fighter and Air Combat Fighter technology and
hardware. The $20,000,000 provided is to be placed in a new program
element titled "Navy Air Combat Fighter" rather than VFAX.
Adaptation of the [yet-to-be] selected Air Force Air Combat Fighter
to be capable of carrier operations is the prerequisite for use
of the funds provided. Funds may be released to a contractor for
the purpose of designing the modifications required for Navy use.
Future funding is to be contingent upon the capability of the
Navy to produce a derivative of the selected Air Force Air Combat
Fighter design.
This section examines this episode by pinpointing the times when competition
might have been considered and identifying the considerations
that militated against its use.
The Navy's air superiority, combat air patrol, and intercept roles
are performed by the F-14 Tomcat. The high cost of the F-14A and its
Phoenix weapon system contributed to (and then in turn was exacerbated
by) contractual difficulties with the prime contractor (Grumman Corp.)
and stimulated the Navy's search for a low-cost fighter to bolster its
declining force level. In 1973, Deputy Secretary of Defense William
P. Clements proposed that prototypes of a stripped-down F-14A (called
the F-14X), a Navy version of the F-15 Eagle (designated the F-15N),
and a stripped F-4 Phantom be developed as possible alternatives to
follow-on F-14s. This proposal, involving an initial request of $150
million and a total cost of either $250 million (the estimate of Secretary
Clements) or over $367 million (the estimate of George A. Spangenberg),
was denied by the Senate Armed Services Committee as "too
costly and of questionable value." A committee statement accompanying
the FY 1974 DoD Appropriation Authorization Bill when it was reported
to the Senate floor read:
The committee believes the Navy should examine the potential of a
completely new aircraft as a possible alternative to the F-14 in
the out-years. The Navy should obtain proposals to determine if
a smaller and presumably cheaper aircraft can be designed to serve
as an air superiority fighter to complement the F-14. Once this
determination has been made, the committee desires to receive the
Navy determination, including the costs of such alternatives as
well as a technical evaluation.
Competition in the Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems:
Legislative Perspectives
November 1976
Michael D. Rich
