USMC Doctrine Changes

 
Here Is Our First Look At The USMC’s NMESIS: NSM Being Launched From An Unmanned JLTV

Raytheon Missiles & Defense, a Raytheon Technologies business, and the U.S. Marine Corps successfully demonstrated the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, off the California coast.

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The latest word is that NMESIS, at least with the NSM, is now dead on arrival apparently due to a lack of spare production capacity for the latter.
 
IMO, leveraging the HIMARS launchers with a drop in round was the better route to an AShM anyway. Longer range, and not a one trick pony: it still is an artillery piece when you need it to be.
 
In 2005, the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission made major strategic arrangements to form a military service reserve force. In September of the same year, the first reservative minesweeping force of the Navy, a reserve minesweeper brigade of the East China Sea Fleet, was established. The formed brigade belonged to the East China Sea Fleet. It is mainly responsible for conducting reconnaissance by separate or coordinated active service units, especially anti-mine reconnaissance and anti-mine warfare operations. It provides personnel and equipment for the expansion of wartime troops, and explores the way for the construction of naval reserve forces in peacetime experience.
The brigade is responsible for maritime training and peacetime force management; the resident city committee organization, transportation, fishery and other departments and the military sub-districts, boat and brigade joint control, take the territorial allocation method to pre-contract the vessel; the financial security is included in the city and county (district) Budget, the reserve soldiers are all selected from the ship's boss and veterans.
In order to form the maritime combat capability as soon as possible, the brigade combines the training content of each ship's production tasks with reasonable training, and uses the fishing boat to go to sea and return to the time for ship driving, electromechanical maintenance and other training, and use the fishing boat to concentrate on the sea to carry out the gathering, formation, and formation.
Transform and other training. At the same time, the combination of theoretical teaching, practical exercises and assessment and evaluation, focus on the basic theoretical knowledge of war injury, damage, fire, reconnaissance, etc., and carry out practical training, further improving the military skills of the reserve officers and soldiers.


One could assume every swingin richard junk fishing boat will be hunting these mines...

 
That's a rather... optimistic article at best.
 
It is interesting to see how the US is facing similar issues with Marine Corps as the UK is with the Royal Marines.
As with so much else, things were simpler in the Cold War.
The US had 4 US Marine Division equivalents. They were designed to go to places where the US had no forward deployed Army units like Norway and the Persian Gulf. The UK had its Brigade sized Royal Marines designed to do the same.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and its "flanks" both the US and UK Marines have been bogged down since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their role and equipment has increasingly blurred with Army units.
In Western Europe there is no longer a requirement to storm ashore in Norway or Denmark. Conventional Army units and Special Forces are available in place.
The Middle East and Aghanistan are being left to regional powers. Bluntly the West has failed and had enough. Let Iranians, Turks and Saudis do it.
So that leaves our new Bogeyman: China.
 

The Japanese should have agreed to pay for the Mobile Operating Base (MOB). In a contemporary context the MOB cost could be shared by South Korea, Japan and the US. At this point Australia, Thailand, and Vietnam could be asked to contribute as well. Once again unsinkable material construction comes to mind.
 

The four major GBAD programs being developed or deployed by the Corps are:

MRIC – Medium-Range Interceptor Capability
MADIS – Marine Air Defense Integrated System
L-MADIS – Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System
Advanced MANPADS/Stinger

A guess for future AD architecture:

1. A new missile should be designed to reach the limit of (networked) EOIR targeting range with launcher and missile stored inside non-dedicated vehicles. Perhaps one can use a backpack hellfire mount type system, but ideally minimum setup time (open cover to truck, fire missile) and let missiles to the turning and datalinks to do the locking. This combo makes suppression via high attitude persistent stare difficult. Ground Radar can only be used in short bursts against serious SEAD, midcourse is IR's game so its range band is what matters.

These constrains may result in a very fat missile (booster pod field assembly needed?) that is too draggy for less length constrained purposes and will take dedicated development. Nonetheless, there is great need to increase the threat vectors to mid/high attitude aircraft outside of a few large TELs with radar dependency.

2. Networked small/micro-air vehicles that has sensors and software suitable for detecting opponent surface hugging micro-air and other vehicles, together with a concept of operation that maintains a persistent cloud at low cost (budget, manpower and resource wise). Early warning is necessary for reliable defenses, and MAV swarm more difficult to neutralize than singular large platforms. Interceptors can be allocated depending on realized threat, which can range from cheap AA vehicles, dual purpose AA/AS NLOS munitions (FOGM returns), light anti-air "kamikaze drones" normally held in reserve, energy weapons all the way to high end SAMs. Most of the interceptors of this category already exists though, only need to buy some.

3. A high performance missile for below horizon engagement that has to work with minimal external support, against well supported SEAD package (jammer, blinding, DEW, decoys, high target performance....). This is to deal with higher performance aircraft (fast attack helicopter, DEW armed fighter, ?) quickly defeating your early warning MAV screen, opening you up for low attitude saturation attack without response time.
 
Via the SNAFU blog:


Also:


 
Honestly, the need for landing a MEB in the Pacific theater is going to be nonexistent in most any scenario, so reducing the heavy lift associated with that is good cost savings to my mind. The USMC hasn’t done an opposed landing in seven decades and it’s a little silly to think they’ll start now. The USNs shipbuilding budget has to get squeezed from somewhere.
 

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