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USMC Doctrine Changes

drejr

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I'd like to know more about the flying taco.
 

jsport

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Berger also intends for the Marine Corps to return to its naval roots. The Marines will be naval not only in character but also in purpose, focusing on achieving and maintaining sea control in contested littorals in order to protect U.S. interests and those of our allies and partners. The Marine Corps of today and tomorrow is “a fleet marine force that could go ashore, instead of a land force that could go on a ship.” This is a return to the model that prevailed during the Pacific campaign of World War II as the Marines were tasked with the seizure of advanced naval bases.
Berger’s intent to reintegrate Marine and Navy forces is also part of a larger “counter-revolution in maritime affairs," returning naval forces to their historical role of defeating an adversary at sea and in contested spaces rather than simply maintaining freedom of navigation on the global commons. Berger sees the Marines as an extension of the fleet, asking, "what can Marines do to help the fleet commander fight his fleet?"
 

jsport

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Ships large enough to logistically support expeditionary bases should well be the means a future USN USMC integrate as other shipboard basing concepts do not have sufficient organic offensive defensive capability nor maneuver..


The Marine littoral regiment is “a structure that the Marine Corps is looking at to support” expeditionary advanced base operations, the command later confirmed to Marine Corps Times...... All other efforts are leaning into conducting sea control and sea denial operations from the sea and maritime terrain, he said.

To make that happen, the commandant said that he wants low cost, lethal air and ground unmanned platforms, unmanned long range surface and subsurface vehicles, mobile, rapidly deployable rocket systems, long range precision fires, loitering munitions across the echelons, mobile air defense and counter-precision guided munitions capabilities, signature management, electronic warfare and expeditionary airfields.
 
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TomS

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This is not a thread for discussing Marine Corps doctrine.
 

jsport

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Clarified post. Stovepiping ships and doctrine is how we sunk ourselves in the fiasco we have now.
 

TomS

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Clarified post. Stovepiping ships and doctrine is how we sunk ourselves in the fiasco we have now.
You just don't get it. This thread is supposed to be about a specific set of proposed warship designs. Those designs were not amphibious ships or carriers for Marine aircraft or troops at all. They were enhanced surface combatants.

Giving the benefit of the doubt, perhaps you are confused by the use of the term MEU? It is not a reference to the Marine Expeditionary Unit. Any discussion of Marine Corps or expeditionary warfare concepts is not relevant to this thread.

Look, if you want to discuss expeditionary doctrine, there are plenty of other threads I can ignore you in, but right now you are polluting a useful thread about a specific and interesting warship design with these off-topic posts.
 

jsport

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The answer — which the Air Force calls Agile Combat Employment — calls for the service to be able to launch, recover and maintain planes away from its main air bases and instead at unorthodox locations like partner nations’ military airfields or civilian airports.

A chance for true jointness betwwen the USN and USAF.

Specifically, the large, geographically dispersed terrain of the Asia-Pacific region generates unique challenges, said Maj. Gen. Brian Killough, deputy commander of Pacific Air Forces. “We’ve got to respond to that requirement to move everything by either air or ship across the theater” he said in a Jan. 29 interview. “
 

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The US Marine Corps (USMC) has formally begun its search for a ground-based air-defence system (GBADS) for integration aboard its Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs).

A request for information (RFI) issued by the Department of Defense (DoD) on 26 March called for the means to effectively defeat fixed- and rotary-winged (FW/RW), manned and unmanned aerial threats in support of the Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander's scheme-of-manoeuvre.

"The purpose of this RFI is to solicit potential solutions from industry on a FW/RW defeat capability that can be integrated onto the Marine Air Defense Integrated System [MADIS]," the RFO posted on the beta.sam.gov website said.

As noted in the solicitation, which was issued about 27 months after the corps first revealed its MADIS initiative to help field a near-term counter unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) capability, the FW/RW air-defence requirement is to be broken down into separate increments. MADIS Increment (Inc) 1, which is the subject of this current RFI, is to comprise a pair of JLTV vehicles (one Mk1 and one Mk2) to provide a short-range ability to detect, track, identify, and defeat aerial threats. MADIS Inc 1 focuses on the integration of command-and-control (C2) software onto the JLTV Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC) variant. The Mk1 vehicle will include a counter-FW/RW and a non-kinetic C-UAS capability, while the Mk2 vehicle will include a detection, kinetic, and non-kinetic C-UAS capability.

The effective range of the systems will be no less than the FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missile system (noted by Jane's Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence as being an envelope between 200 m and 4 km). It shall have a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 9 (most mature) and not require new development. It should also be able to support delivery of two engineering development models during Q3 of fiscal year (FY) 2021, and manufacture of 13 low-rate initial production (LRIP) units during Q3 2022.

 

jsport

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The US Marine Corps (USMC) has formally begun its search for a ground-based air-defence system (GBADS) for integration aboard its Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs).

A request for information (RFI) issued by the Department of Defense (DoD) on 26 March called for the means to effectively defeat fixed- and rotary-winged (FW/RW), manned and unmanned aerial threats in support of the Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander's scheme-of-manoeuvre.

"The purpose of this RFI is to solicit potential solutions from industry on a FW/RW defeat capability that can be integrated onto the Marine Air Defense Integrated System [MADIS]," the RFO posted on the beta.sam.gov website said.

As noted in the solicitation, which was issued about 27 months after the corps first revealed its MADIS initiative to help field a near-term counter unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) capability, the FW/RW air-defence requirement is to be broken down into separate increments. MADIS Increment (Inc) 1, which is the subject of this current RFI, is to comprise a pair of JLTV vehicles (one Mk1 and one Mk2) to provide a short-range ability to detect, track, identify, and defeat aerial threats. MADIS Inc 1 focuses on the integration of command-and-control (C2) software onto the JLTV Heavy Guns Carrier (HGC) variant. The Mk1 vehicle will include a counter-FW/RW and a non-kinetic C-UAS capability, while the Mk2 vehicle will include a detection, kinetic, and non-kinetic C-UAS capability.

The effective range of the systems will be no less than the FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missile system (noted by Jane's Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence as being an envelope between 200 m and 4 km). It shall have a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 9 (most mature) and not require new development. It should also be able to support delivery of two engineering development models during Q3 of fiscal year (FY) 2021, and manufacture of 13 low-rate initial production (LRIP) units during Q3 2022.

This is interesting, as believe that oshkosh has been told to provide JTLV specs to different vendors.
 

Grey Havoc

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This has all the hallmarks of a classic disaster in the making.
 

cluttonfred

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Anyone know any more about the "new class of small amphibious ships that could set sail as early as 2023" referenced in the article above?
 

TomS

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Anyone know any more about the "new class of small amphibious ships that could set sail as early as 2023" referenced in the article above?
The flavor of the month appears to be the Stern Landing Ship, basically a counterpart to the fast theater transports but slower and able to beach. I see it as something along to the WW2 LSMs; basically an enhanced LCU big enough to be seaworthy under its own power and (hopefully) at least fast enough to keep pace with the LSDs.

 
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Grey Havoc

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With little in the way of forces left to land, what would be the point of this design, to put it bluntly. Somehow I don't see the U.S. Army making use of this, with their own amphibious capability mostly scrapped thanks to insanities at least equal to those of the current USMC Commandant.
 

TomS

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With little in the way of forces left to land, what would be the point of this design, to put it bluntly. Somehow I don't see the U.S. Army making use of this, with their own amphibious capability mostly scrapped thanks to insanities at least equal to those of the current USMC Commandant.
The idea is to use this as a ship-to-shore connector to bring in equipment from the big amphibs. The LCACs are fast but can't carry a lot. I think of it basically as a successor to the many failed LCU replacement programs over the years.
 

Grey Havoc

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The problem is by the time it's laid down, there won't be any expeditionary or other substantial Line Marine forces left to support.
 

apparition13

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From the breakingdefense article above

If the weapons the Corps is fielding now likely won’t fit the bill, what will? Berger clearly has his eyes fixed firmly on the Pacific, and the challenges China’s military modernization and expansion present there. But while large bases in Japan, Okinawa and Guam are not likely to go away despite being within range of Chinese and North Korean medium- and long-range missiles, the Marines plan to disperse across the island-speckled region.

“Everywhere we’re going to operate in a maritime environment is going to be contested,” Berger said. “There’s no way that we’re going to travel around in complete control of all those domains. We need the force to remain inside the surveillance range, inside the weapons range, of an adversary.”

The idea is to get small units of Marines trained and equipped to establish a series of what’s being called “expeditionary advanced bases” where they can operate for several days at a time with minimal resupply. But these small bases have to be advanced enough to support the refueling of F-35Bs and other aircraft from the Navy and Air Force, while perhaps also providing precision fire support for ships at sea.

Berger said he’s looking for these bases to pack, “longer range anti-ship missiles. You could visualize them as an extension of the fleet’s magazine, augmenting air and ship-based fires. You want to add options for the fleet commander.”

Berger grew animated when talking about the small base plans he and his planners are putting together. He described them as consisting of “smaller units, distributed, mobile, that can rearm, refuel and sense forward, kill forward and move, all with a low signature.”

And in keeping with the effort underway inside both the Marine Corps and Navy to more closely align their operations after two decades of Marines fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan while the Navy patrolled hundreds of miles offshore, the general said those bases will be key waypoints for all four services.

“If you’re a captain and you’re running an expeditionary advanced base it can serve multiple functions for anybody, you don’t care. It’s not a service-centric ‘I’m sorry we only refuel Navy here.’ No. If you’re at an expeditionary advanced base you’ve serving the joint force.”
Look at what I bolded.

Read generously, he's talking about using islands as temporary carrier strike groups, with the ability to land and rearm aircraft, and strike targets with naval strike missiles and maybe defend airspace with something like a land based ESSM. Sounds neat, huh?

Read ungenerously, he's talking about turning the Marines into the Japanese Army on the Pacific Islands circa 1943-45; trapped on islands without resupply (no heavy or medium helicopter and tilt-rotor squadrons), heavy weapons (no tanks or artillery), or air cover (pie in the sky wishful thinking that by reducing squadron strength from 16 to 10 they will improve availability so the actual number of available aircraft will stay the same).

Read psychologically, Berger is either a genius, who will have one term* to put his decades long vision into action, which means his vision will last until the next guy comes in with his vision, so Berger will fail. Or he's just another Peter Principle middle manager promoted out of his comfort zone who thinks he has to make his mark by "disrupting" the organization, so all he will do is cripple the corps before being ushered out the retirement door for a job in industry.

Or maybe I'm just too cynical.

* This is a serious problem. There needs to be some way of identifying people with actual strategic vision, making them the leaders of their services, and then leaving them in place for 20 or 30 years so they can actually do something.
 

shin_getter

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Just how does an army contribute to a defensive naval fight? The end result paralleling the Japanese defenses is natural given similarity in the combat environment and mission.

If such marine bases are placed within areas where the opponent have air/naval superiority, it's tactical relevance is likely dependent on the missile batteries as it can otherwise be bombarded to submission or bypassed. Heavy anti-ground weapons is as relevant here as tanks helping bypassed IJA garrisons. Logistics would likely be reliant on assets with the best blockade penetrating capability (something dropped from penetrating bombers or submarines) as opposed to the convenient choice (helicopters with no range).

Perhaps it is not wrong to think in terms of constraints when it is the opponent that has the superior economy.
 

apparition13

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The problem with paralleling Japanese defenses is that it was a losing strategy. The problem with paralleling Japanese strategy against an opponent that has the stronger economy is that it was a losing strategy. "Fighting the last war" being a bad idea is a truism; how bad an idea would "fighting the last war using the losing strategy of the opponent you beat" be?

But the real question I have is what's the point? What are you trying to accomplish, what are you trying to prevent, what are your goals? I haven't seen any talk about strategic objectives, just force structure and “smaller units, distributed, mobile, that can rearm, refuel and sense forward, kill forward and move, all with a low signature.” How does that fit into strategy? Is there a strategy? Because if there is one, it isn't being communicated. I see a lot of nice sounding words, although he is missing "agile" and "synergistic", but no indication there is any substance behind them.

Maybe there is. Maybe he's a fan of South African mobile warfare during the border wars, and wants to translate that into a naval environment. Maybe it's well thought out and developed. But even if it is, the question of what are the strategic goals, and is this an appropriate approach to accomplishing those goals remains. And even if it's appropriate in one theater, do you want to turn the Marines into one trick ponies who can only "rearm, refuel and sense forward, kill forward and move, all with a low signature"?
 

chimeric oncogene

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If anyone hasn't seen this yet, take a gander. It gives a reasonable look into American operational/strategic thinking, and gives context to the Marines' latest scheme.


The IJA did not have long range antiship missiles, and the IJN was defeated at sea; the USMC will have adequate carrier support and long range antiship missiles, and the USN will likely win the naval war.
The IJA tried to cover a perimeter that was too large; the USMC is trying to cover a much smaller arc, substantially closer in to the Chinese littorals.
This is not a replay of World War II. This is a move towards a European Central Front on water. We should not be blinded by superficial similarities.

The confusion in the Navy is obviously political. The US is trying to balance/decide between containment and offshore balancing (which can also incorporate "temporary" containment until a new balance of power emerges). Different goals and different force structures result from these different geopolitical imperatives.
 

jsport

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If anyone hasn't seen this yet, take a gander. It gives a reasonable look into American operational/strategic thinking, and gives context to the Marines' latest scheme.


The IJA did not have long range antiship missiles, and the IJN was defeated at sea; the USMC will have adequate carrier support and long range antiship missiles, and the USN will likely win the naval war.
The IJA tried to cover a perimeter that was too large; the USMC is trying to cover a much smaller arc, substantially closer in to the Chinese littorals.
This is not a replay of World War II. This is a move towards a European Central Front on water. We should not be blinded by superficial similarities.

The confusion in the Navy is obviously political. The US is trying to balance/decide between containment and offshore balancing (which can also incorporate "temporary" containment until a new balance of power emerges). Different goals and different force structures result from these different geopolitical imperatives.
" This is a move towards a European Central Front on water. We should not be blinded by superficial similarities. " yes an invasion of Taiwan would be just that w/ boats and tanks.
 

apparition13

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If anyone hasn't seen this yet, take a gander. It gives a reasonable look into American operational/strategic thinking, and gives context to the Marines' latest scheme.

So far I've read the executive summary, and the ppt slides. Not impressed yet. It's full of cool sounding tech and pretty pictures of tactical operations, but seems devoid of strategic vision, assumes the US will have to do it all alone, and while it mentions allies it presents them as weak, fearful, and in need of Uncle Sam's protection. While it brings up allies, especially with regards to basing the deterrent force, it doesn't mention diplomacy, which is kind of important if you want allies. Whatever strategic vision it has is purely military, and devoid of politics, economics, demographics, and diplomacy.

The basic scheme is to spread much of the fleet out into every nook and cranny on the planet, which they call the deterrence force, but which is really the RNs presence mission during the colonial period, and a maneuver force for high end, sustained, conflict. This maneuver force? Two carriers, 6 destroyers, 8 frigates, 4 SSNs, 6 large unmanned vessels, and support ships. With a grand total between both carriers of 64 F-35s, 12 EF-18s, 12 unmanned strike aircraft, with 10 E-2Ds and 12 unmanned tankers. No mention of ASW. That's a task force of 20 (26 with the drones) warships, 16 of them surface, with no cruisers, and 88 tactical aircraft.

The IJA did not have long range antiship missiles, and the IJN was defeated at sea; the USMC will have adequate carrier support and long range antiship missiles, and the USN will likely win the naval war.
A 20 ship force with two carriers is not adequate carrier support. And the USN will be outnumbered 10 or more to 1, fighting a modern PLAN building at double to triple the rate the USN is, while the PLAN is fighting 2-3 days from port under air cover.

It's a plan to fight the PLAN that reminds me of why decent chess players reliably beat me, because I focus on what I intend to do to the - let's say unfortunate :oops: - exclusion of taking into account what the opposition can do. This is the similar. It's a force structure document that doesn't take into account the capabilities of the opponents at all. It calls for 12 CVNs, 71 DDG, 71 FF/FFGs, and 60 SSNs without taking into account present PLAN capabilities let alone attempting to forecast what the PRC might build in the intervening time, or how the US force, spread out over 10 operational areas, is supposed to deal with a navy with more hulls in the water right now (let alone in 10 years) that can concentrate it's entire force in one operational area.

The IJA tried to cover a perimeter that was too large; the USMC is trying to cover a much smaller arc, substantially closer in to the Chinese littorals.
It's an arc entirely under the umbrella of PRC missiles and aircraft, and within a couple days sail for their navy. Which means PLAN can sortie, attack, recover, rearm and sortie again in the time it takes a US naval force to get to the area once. It's an OODA loop that favors the PRC.

This is not a replay of World War II. This is a move towards a European Central Front on water. We should not be blinded by superficial similarities.
I'd hardly refer to the PRC side of the front as being on water.

The confusion in the Navy is obviously political. The US is trying to balance/decide between containment and offshore balancing (which can also incorporate "temporary" containment until a new balance of power emerges). Different goals and different force structures result from these different geopolitical imperatives.
Geopolitical imperatives which the document you link to doesn't articulate. Like I said, lots of talk of capabilities and platforms and numbers and force structure, but no strategic vision or accounting for opposition capabilities, let alone considerations of geostrategy, grand strategy, geopolitics, alliance systems, diplomacy, demography, or economics.
 

chimeric oncogene

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It's full of cool sounding tech and pretty pictures of tactical operations, but seems devoid of strategic vision, assumes the US will have to do it all alone, and while it mentions allies it presents them as weak, fearful, and in need of Uncle Sam's protection. While it brings up allies, especially with regards to basing the deterrent force, it doesn't mention diplomacy, which is kind of important if you want allies.
I'm not entirely sure, but I think the report addressed allies by saying "allies might not let us base the deterrent force (especially the land-based bits) out of them, so we need to have a mobile deterrent force and be ready to land on the Senkakus on D-minus 2, as the shit approaches the fan"
The PRC side is effectively on water because the PLAGF cannot march across the Fulda Gap. It needs boats if it wants to do so. Plus, the Chinese mainland is hardly inviolate.

The document doesn't go into geostrategy, because like I said, the US wants flexibility. Altering a balance between the deterrent and maneuver force might be an avenue for that flexibility.
 

apparition13

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I've now skimmed the document. I still don't see any reference to opposing force numbers or types. RN strategy pre-WWI was a two power strategy, US cold war strategy was based on nuclear warhead counts, this isn't based on any quantitative comparison to any potential opponent. I'm not sure a strategy that doesn't take the actual forces at the disposal of a potential enemy into account can actually be called a strategy.

And for a counterpoint, here is a link to a RAND study that suggests that Air, Naval, and light ground forces don't deter aggression, only the deployment of heavy ground forces including tanks deters.


Which implies that the Marines getting rid of tanks would be bad for deterrence, since the most quickly deployed heavy force we presently have would lose it's heavy elements and with it its deterrent effect.
 

chimeric oncogene

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Which implies that the Marines getting rid of tanks would be bad for deterrence,
Unless those tanks are in Taiwan, they're not doing much. Antiship missiles on the Senkakus, OTOH... very, very useful.

What, are you going to wait for the enemy to wade ashore before opening fire?
 

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Japanese should have built Tigers and put it on their islands garrisons. Just imagine how landings would have been destroyed when opposed by massed protected mobile firepower. Dependence on foot infantry was a failure, and more of the budget should have been moved from the surface fleet and air force into a competitive combined arms force with extensive training for high level of jointness :)
 

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apparition13

It's a force structure document that doesn't take into account the capabilities of the opponents at all. It calls for 12 CVNs, 71 DDG, 71 FF/FFGs, and 60 SSNs without taking into account present PLAN capabilities let alone attempting to forecast what the PRC might build in the intervening time, or how the US force, spread out over 10 operational areas, is supposed to deal with a navy with more hulls in the water right now (let alone in 10 years) that can concentrate it's entire force in one operational area.

Like throwing a cup of water on a forest fire
a couple of hypersonics (which are countered by numerous counter hypers from planes from boats from land) here and there from silly small ships w/ silly payloads who happen to survive first volley...surely one jests.....folks are livin in their own private Idaho...
 
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