USMC Doctrine Changes

Indeed, you would definitely need a decent supersonic anti-ship missile to have any hope of getting this concept to work even moderately.
 
Josh_TN said:
it seems these units would be impossible to supply or move without local air superiority. And if you have local air superiority, what goal are they serving?
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Persistence

Air superiority distant from air bases is transitory to begin with. It gets worst when flight time is long, and horrible when it involves daisy chaining in-flight refueling fleets.

A resupply package can be flown in with carefully planned "surges" where air superiority can be maintained for the duration of the op. This enables maintenance of forward firepower without insane fleet of tankers.

The other option would be submarines or high survivability/attritable surface resupply. The Japanese pacific island bases ended up relying on submarines after all.
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Though it can still be asked whether this idea is all that valuable as the conflict being looked at isn't a island hopping campaign to cross the pacific but invasion of a large close island far closer than suggested missile basing areas. Long range missile sites would be side show compared to counterattacking the CCP off the beaches or close range head on anti-ship combat.
 
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They have persistence while they survive and are combat effective. I question such a force having enough weapons of sufficient range and leathality to be effective. Let's say a battery of six four round NSM launchers is successfully landed on an islet. That is less firepower than a single B-1. What possible good will it do to risk landing ships to put this force in place when the landing ships will need to operate under air superiority from a distance, as you say? It seems to me if the US wants to sink ships from a persistent platform and the submarine fleet is not sufficient (and it likely will be over tasked), then a new long range missile capable of meeting strike needs from extended ranges needs to be based on ships outside the first island chain. Having amphibs run the gauntlet just so they can reach out to 200km is madness. And if the goal is to base Marines in allied nations with AShMs, then simply pay them for the right to do so ahead of time and build a base in permanent fashion.
 
Instead of anti-ship missile bases, I'd think the main tasks ought to be:

1. Maintain SAM umbrella, which will be needed for self protection, supporting the air war and maintain a corridor to resupply Taiwan. The need to closely integrate with navy CEC networks as well as skill in operating in air denied environments is not simple and can be argued do not fit with big army.
2. Operate facilities independent naval resupply assets: port facilities in forward areas is unlikely to survive. Field engineering and specialized assets would be needed for bulk resupply. If one envisions resupplying Taiwan in a multi-year campaign with attrition from A2AD, the force needs gets rather big.
3. Low supply land warfare. It should not be assumed that China would not attack lightly defended islands with land forces. The kind of land warfare that would occur would be very different from continental wars as supply would be limited on both sides and extreme weight efficiency is order of the day. This also ties back with the traditional marine mission.
 
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shin_getter said:
Instead of anti-ship missile bases, I'd think the main tasks ought to be:

1. Maintain SAM umbrella, which will be needed for self protection, supporting the air war and maintain a corridor to resupply Taiwan. The need to closely integrate with navy CEC networks as well as skill in operating in air denied environments is not simple and can be argued do not fit with big army.
2. Operate facilities independent naval resupply assets: port facilities in forward areas is unlikely to survive. Field engineering and specialized assets would be needed for bulk resupply. If one envisions resupplying Taiwan in a multi-year campaign with attrition from A2AD, the force needs gets rather big.
3. Low supply land warfare. It should not be assumed that China would not attack lightly defended islands with land forces. The kind of land warfare that would occur would be very different from continental wars as supply would be limited on both sides and extreme weight efficiency is order of the day. This also ties back with the traditional marine mission.
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Some good ideas, but I think the Line Marines should also retain at least some expeditionary capability, including the heavy assets needed for that such as tanks.
 
shin_getter said:
Instead of anti-ship missile bases, I'd think the main tasks ought to be:

1. Maintain SAM umbrella, which will be needed for self protection, supporting the air war and maintain a corridor to resupply Taiwan. The need to closely integrate with navy CEC networks as well as skill in operating in air denied environments is not simple and can be argued do not fit with big army.
2. Operate facilities independent naval resupply assets: port facilities in forward areas is unlikely to survive. Field engineering and specialized assets would be needed for bulk resupply. If one envisions resupplying Taiwan in a multi-year campaign with attrition from A2AD, the force needs gets rather big.
3. Low supply land warfare. It should not be assumed that China would not attack lightly defended islands with land forces. The kind of land warfare that would occur would be very different from continental wars as supply would be limited on both sides and extreme weight efficiency is order of the day. This also ties back with the traditional marine mission.
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it might not be a multi-year more like multi minute one way or the other..
 
Grey Havoc said:
jsport said:
foreignpolicy.com

The Tip of the American Military Spear Is Being Blunted

Reforms to the Marine Corps may be necessary to face China, but Congress needs to ask hard questions.
foreignpolicy.com foreignpolicy.com
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And that headline is arguably an understatement.
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I really don't get the point. The Army is already moving in the direction of gaining the capability envisaged for the Marines here. The Marine combined arms forces are lighter than US Army armored formations, but heavier that infantry and Stryker brigades. They are useful in a whole lot of roles. They are the DoDs Swiss army knife. I don't see the point of sacrificing the USA's intervention capability to duplicate a capability the Army is already acquiring.

jsport said:
shin_getter said:
Instead of anti-ship missile bases, I'd think the main tasks ought to be:

1. Maintain SAM umbrella, which will be needed for self protection, supporting the air war and maintain a corridor to resupply Taiwan. The need to closely integrate with navy CEC networks as well as skill in operating in air denied environments is not simple and can be argued do not fit with big army.
2. Operate facilities independent naval resupply assets: port facilities in forward areas is unlikely to survive. Field engineering and specialized assets would be needed for bulk resupply. If one envisions resupplying Taiwan in a multi-year campaign with attrition from A2AD, the force needs gets rather big.
3. Low supply land warfare. It should not be assumed that China would not attack lightly defended islands with land forces. The kind of land warfare that would occur would be very different from continental wars as supply would be limited on both sides and extreme weight efficiency is order of the day. This also ties back with the traditional marine mission.
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it might not be a multi-year more like multi minute one way or the other..
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The recent set of war games conducted by the US seemed to indicate that as soon as one side felt they were losing the military commanders started asking for tactical nukes right away. Long wars seem unlikely under those scenarios. Besides, given the tiny inventories and enormous loss rates a major war would involve everyone would be down to small arms in a matter of weeks. A long war might look like WW1 until industry could start cranking out new build kit, and even then it might have to be lower tech to produce the required numbers.

As for Taiwan, I can't see any way to now fight through to Taiwan after a PRC invasion, not after 20 years of the PRC building forces to prevent that. The only way to defend Taiwan is to place troops troops there. Barring that, and I don't see US or allied troops on Taiwan as diplomatically or militarily (it could easily trigger a PRC invasion to preempt deployment) feasible, I can't see any way Taiwan can defend itself without going nuclear.
 
Leaving nuclear weapons aside, it seems likely any US-China war is casualty intensive for one or both sides such that it would be over pretty quickly. If China were truly winning on the water, the US would probably attack the mainland long before it decided to brush off B-61s. Consider the effect of an SSGN strike on the yards and docks of Dalian. Even if 2/3s of the incoming were shot down, the result would be a Pearl Harbor-esque moment. China for its part would have no shortage of US targets in Japan and Korea to pummel with ballistic missiles (to say nothing of Guam, which houses a lot of satellite communications and control and the USAFs ammo dump for the Pacific theater on top of Anderson AFB). It seems likely one side or the other breaks fairly quickly, or else eventually everyone runs out of easily deliverable long range weapons and ships. It is hard to see a scenario where the conflict lasts more than a week or two before one side or the other caves, since any non-nuclear conflict wouldn't be existential for either side.
 
Josh_TN said:
Consider the effect of an SSGN strike on the yards and docks of Dalian.
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Should I remind you, that US didn't have much in homeland air defense also, and while distance provide SOME protection, cruise missile strikes against West Coast (launched by submarines, lomg-range bombers with refueling, or even converted civilian aircraft) are perfectly possible?
 
It is certainly possible but difficult to arrange without a lot of preparation and require a successful deception plan. A civilian ship or plane would have to be converted and successfully make the crossing without alerting anyone, and it would likely be a one way trip. A nuclear submarine would have better luck, but current Chinese nuke boats not only aren't super quiet, but also lack a significant number of launch tubes. The US on the other hand could pretty easily launch cruise missiles armed bombers against the mainland from the CONUS, with tanker support from Hawaii, even if every base it had in the WestPac was put out of action. I used an SSGN as my example primarily because you can expect one to be on station in the WestPac at any given moment, so it would allow for a prompt strike with little prep time. But again, China would have no shortage of targets for its ballistic missiles in theater, generally including a carrier in port in Japan, and there would be little the US could to do to stop them in the numbers they have deployed. It would be a costly, very fast paced war for both sides.

ETA: addressing bombers specifically, The PLA-AF at this time has no bomber/tanker combination that could make the flight to the CONUS even it if was one way and unopposed. USAF bombers have much longer ranges and their tankers have greater fuel offload capacities - but Hawaii would still be required assuming no WestPac resources were available.
 
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The PLA leaders do have to consider that Japan and Taiwan DO actually have WMDs and that if they the PLA were to pull something, something might be pulled in return. Best too 'be cool' everybody.
 
jsport said:
The PLA leaders do have to consider that Japan and Taiwan DO actually have WMDs and that if they the PLA were to pull something, something might be pulled in return. Best too 'be cool' everybody.
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The technology to produce such weapons given enough warning time perhaps, but not the weapons themselves.
 
Taiwan has the basic technology to get there given years of investment in such a program. Japan has set itself up to have a breakout ICBM capability and enough Plutonium for hundreds of warheads, but I think even then there would be a lot of lead time involved, even given that such an effort would be a top priority if exercised.
 
An open ocean det presents no moral hazard if your assets are clear and an invasion is "divine winded" thus giving the PLA permanant cause for pause.
 
"apparition13,-

I really don't get the point. The Army is already moving in the direction of gaining the capability envisaged for the Marines here. The Marine combined arms forces are lighter than US Army armored formations, but heavier that infantry and Stryker brigades. They are useful in a whole lot of roles. They are the DoDs Swiss army knife. I don't see the point of sacrificing the USA's intervention capability to duplicate a capability the Army is already acquiring.

jsport said:
www.armytimes.com

Paratroopers flew from Alaska to practice seizing a Pacific air base

An Army Alaska official said the jump was “the largest airborne operation in Guam that we are aware of in recent times.”
www.armytimes.com www.armytimes.com
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apparition13 said:
The recent set of war games conducted by the US seemed to indicate that as soon as one side felt they were losing the military commanders started asking for tactical nukes right away. Long wars seem unlikely under those scenarios. Besides, given the tiny inventories and enormous loss rates a major war would involve everyone would be down to small arms in a matter of weeks. A long war might look like WW1 until industry could start cranking out new build kit, and even then it might have to be lower tech to produce the required numbers.
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Josh_TN said:
It seems likely one side or the other breaks fairly quickly, or else eventually everyone runs out of easily deliverable long range weapons and ships. It is hard to see a scenario where the conflict lasts more than a week or two before one side or the other caves, since any non-nuclear conflict wouldn't be existential for either side.
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Massive firepower that enables the defense to inflict massive losses on attackers? That looks more like WW1 than anything.

I can see rapid losses to the surface fleet on one or both sides when the war breaks out, followed by "low intensity combat" as US-China stares each other across the Pacific hoarding resources and exchanging low volume standoff attacks. While this is happening Taiwan is put in siege (assuming Taiwan manages to prevent the most difficult military operation that exists: a opposed landing) which can last a while. Not sure how much would Japan escalate the war even on a conventional level.

The vulnerability of power projection assets is what will enable a long war. If the fleets are strong enough to challenge land forces than whoever wins the naval war would just sweep up the battlefield and win the war by projecting power onto ground. If the fleet is vulnerable to land forces and neither side is all that vulnerable to a blockade, the war can not end by force but by lack of motivation. One should never underestimate the capability of stubborn bastards in fighting pointless wars to the bitter end.

The potential high intensity of initial conflict means starting it means most of the cost of the war would be paid early. Sunk costs (remember Pearl Harbor!!!) and low marginal cost for continued conflict means continued fighting is more likely, if a decision is not reached early, not less likely.
 
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Massive firepower in this case favors the offense. The side that fires first and most likely causes a disproportionate amount of damage. But the key enablers are stand off PGMs, of which there are a limited amount (although for both sides thousands) and they cannot be replaced at anything like their rate of expenditure. Assuming they were all fired, all US regional bases and a fair proportion of Chinese bases and production facilities would be smoking ruins before either side had to resort to shorter ranged ordnance. It is hard to fathom both sides going down that road when neither side is existentially threatened by the other - they'd be flinging weapons hundreds or thousands of miles away from each other, not fighting in trenches. Landing troops for either side would be limited to reefs and small islands. Even Taiwan would likely be able to repel a landing with minimal US support, and it seems more likely the PRC would attempt to force the issue by blockade rather than a Normandy level endeavor.

It also is likely IMO that if there were a Sino-American war, it would be started largely by accident, not an intent by either side to initiate a large scale conflict. There isn't really anything for either side to win but bragging rights. The US isn't looking for that fight and the PRC is content to simply dominate economically in the long term rather than waste their shot in the short.
 
It would not be an economic war only. We have already clear signs of a rising hegemonic sentiment fuelled by the nation's elites in China.
 
The belief that "The other Side will obviously give up after 2 more weeks of war" is a great way to keep the war going. The belief that the opponent will soon run out of ammo and lose by default is also a good motivation to keep on fighting.

PGMs greatly threatens all ground taking forces, while being relatively weak in terms of inflicting pain or rooting out dispersed defenders in complex terrain. Remember how the last big war had cities erased weekly and the fighting still keep on going and going? Having some bases blown up is nothing compared to having entire army groups encircled and destroyed to the man. Bombardment has been a poor way to induce decision.

Look at the Vietnam war: that wasn't a conflict that was existential for either side (North Vietnam can simply stop trying for unification) and that side that was bombed for years with greater tonnage than WWII without giving up and won in the end.

Sino-American war is one that both sides can not hurt each other too much (without nuclear weapons). One could say such a war is dumb, but when there is will it can last years easily. As for will, the standard sufficiently crazy ideology is enough.
 
No US demographic will ever support a lengthy conflict in the Pacific. Either Taiwan defends itself/defies blockade or it doesnt. The US populous will never support anything beyond a couple weeks, a blockade, 2-3 months tops. The PLA and Pac nations know this, thus a likely secret drive for SK, Japan and Taiwan to have nuclear weapons. If the PLA nukes these dense urban countries in retaliation they are invading of a radioactive zombie wasteland? Thus the PLA is detered.

As others have stated, the idea that the USMC structure itself for some long struggle w/ the PLA is as smart as squad level quadrotor always giving away Marine squads position when it is launched.
 
shin_getter said:
The belief that "The other Side will obviously give up after 2 more weeks of war" is a great way to keep the war going. The belief that the opponent will soon run out of ammo and lose by default is also a good motivation to keep on fighting. PGMs greatly threatens all ground taking forces, while being relatively weak in terms of inflicting pain or rooting out dispersed defenders in complex terrain. Remember how the last big war had cities erased weekly and the fighting still keep on going and going? Having some bases blown up is nothing compared to having entire army groups encircled and destroyed to the man. Bombardment has been a poor way to induce decision. Look at the Vietnam war: that wasn't a conflict that was existential for either side (North Vietnam can simply stop trying for unification) and that side that was bombed for years with greater tonnage than WWII without giving up and won in the end. Sino-American war is one that both sides can not hurt each other too much (without nuclear weapons). One could say such a war is dumb, but when there is will it can last years easily. As for will, the standard sufficiently crazy ideology is enough.
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Spot on. Just like the Sino-Japanese war, and WWIII between USSR and USA, this is a lose-lose war that has the potential to screw the entire world. If not nuclear meltdown, then it will world commerce that will sink to rock bottom.

Then again, Trump is... Trump, and Xí Jìnpíng is, well, Xí Jìnpíng. (restrain from typing an endless list of very rude expletives about those two... bad persons).
 
TomcatViP said:
It would not be an economic war only. We have already clear signs of a rising hegemonic sentiment fuelled by the nation's elites in China.
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Hegemony can point west. Huawei, Belt and Road are ways to influence into Eurasia. Hardly anyone mentions Huawei infrastructure already in Russia only that it is on it way West Europe. Social Democrats in Europe will not stop Huawei in W Europe or a Russian takeover of W Europe's energy market. PRC's purchase of German precision engineering companies is well known. When you dominate Eurasia and Africa, the Pacific Rim will eventually follow in a dependance on you.

What do you get in a amphibious invasions, an expensive mess? The PLA can attempt to lower the number of years from a fifty year plan, but waiting, in general, is just fine.
 
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shin_getter said:
The belief that "The other Side will obviously give up after 2 more weeks of war" is a great way to keep the war going. The belief that the opponent will soon run out of ammo and lose by default is also a good motivation to keep on fighting.

PGMs greatly threatens all ground taking forces, while being relatively weak in terms of inflicting pain or rooting out dispersed defenders in complex terrain. Remember how the last big war had cities erased weekly and the fighting still keep on going and going? Having some bases blown up is nothing compared to having entire army groups encircled and destroyed to the man. Bombardment has been a poor way to induce decision.

Look at the Vietnam war: that wasn't a conflict that was existential for either side (North Vietnam can simply stop trying for unification) and that side that was bombed for years with greater tonnage than WWII without giving up and won in the end.

Sino-American war is one that both sides can not hurt each other too much (without nuclear weapons). One could say such a war is dumb, but when there is will it can last years easily. As for will, the standard sufficiently crazy ideology is enough.
Click to expand...

The difference with a US-PRC war is that there largely won't be any ground forces anywhere. There won't be any trenches or supporting artillery. And at some point, one country or the other will attack the other strategically if they are losing. Vietnam didn't have a hell of a lot of infrastructure to blow up, and arguably the US did a bad job of forcing the issue even during Rolling Thunder II. Two fully developed countries engaging in a protracted strategic engagement could easily bomb themselves into economic and military irrelevance vis-vis the rest of the world - which would primarily be the EU and Russia in this scenario. At certain point, one or both countries would not allow their infrastructure to be a continual target of PGMs, and I think it would come sooner rather than later. US presidents who don't have a good economy generally don't get re-elected and the CCP's legitimacy is very intimately tied to economic prosperity. Large scale destruction of infrastructure and trade is unlikely to persist past a couple of weeks IMO. If nothing else, at a certain point long range weapons will be expended and one or both sides will have to risk much higher value platforms (and personnel) delivering shorter ranged weapons to have the same effect. Your mileage may differ.
 
There will be no long US-PRC war. PRC nuclear capability is limited so they will not use them unless they are forced as they know what US retaliation would look like. Likewise, the US will not risk any PRC retaliation on the US homeland, so no nukes, and limited PGMs. No US "politic" is risking even limited strikes on CONUS. Taiwan knows this. As apparition 13 said Taiwan knows it can not defend itself w/o going nuclear as the US will not invade Taiwan to eject the PRC. Taiwan is likely to nuke and the PRC knows this and even a successful PLA invasion only leads to bloodly lengthy urban Pyrrhic victory weaking the PRC for any other challenge by the West. Their eyes would have been taken off the prize, so they, in the end, are not interested. The PLA is only interested in convincing you that they are interested.

Russia and China are partners in challenging Western Dominance. The CCP which Russia is still essentially run by (w/o the name), as well, do not need economic prosperity.. Westerns somehow beleive this.. They are police states who create false enemies and project a 'seige mentality' that the West out to get them. As if the West is interested in invading Asia.

PRC commerical cargo rail cars arrived in England after only a little more than week's travel having traversed almost all of Asia some years ago.
 
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Knight%27s_Armament_Company_logo.jpg


Marine Corps Systems Command announced its intent to award a single-source contract to Knight's Armament Company for 5.56 small arms suppressors for use on the Corps' arsenal of M27 Infantry Automatic Rifles, M4 carbines, and M4A1 Close Quarter Battle Weapons, as reported by Military.com..

In an email to Task & Purpose, MARCORSYSCOM confirmed that the Corps plans on fielding those suppressors to close combat units starting in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021. "Our intent is to posture our Marines with capability now in order to improve the lethality of our Marine Corps Close Combat Forces," MARCORSYSCOM spokesman Many Pacheco said.

While the Corps has fielded suppressors to reconnaissance units and employed them on the M27-based M38 Squad Designated Marksmanship Rifle in the past, the proliferation of suppressors among close combat units has been years in the making.

MARCORSYSCOM did not specify exactly how many suppressors the Corps plans on acquiring as part of its latest sole-source contract, but "The intent is to suppress every M4, M4A1 and M27 in the infantry community," MARCORSYSCOM program manager for infantry weapons Lt. Col. Tim Hough said in 2019.

U.S. Marine Corps infantry squads to receive sound suppressors | Defense News July 2020 Global Security army industry | Defense Security global news industry army 2020 | Archive News year

U.S. Marines operating in close combat formations will start receiving sound suppressors for their assault rifles and carbines starting in 2021, Task & Purpose has learned.
www.armyrecognition.com www.armyrecognition.com

At a minimum, suppressors should meet the following requirements:
1. The suppressor should be capable of detachment/attachment and disassembly/ reassembly by an operator in the field without the use of special tools for normal care and cleaning.
2. Suppressor should enable a noise level of 139 decibels or lower at either of the shooters ears.
3. Suppressor should be a design that minimizes the change in the host rifle internal operating system dynamics.
4. Suppressor may be of the over the barrel, or flush mount design and should not be longer than 20″ total barrel length (threshold), 18″ (objective).
5. Suppressor should be of the quick detachable design. A special muzzle device may be attached (by a unit Armorer) to the OEM weapon in order to facilitate installation and removal by an operator.
6. Must be able to withstand the sustained rate of the M27 IAR (capable of a rate of fire of 36 rounds per minute for 16 minutes, 40 seconds with firing starting at ambient temperature for a 600 round load).
7. The entire suppressor and muzzle device should weigh no more than 18 oz.
8. The use of the suppressor should not increase the dispersion of each respective weapon. It is acceptable for the weapon to experience a repeatable shift in the zero between unsuppressed and suppressed operating modes, but that shift should not exceed 3 MOA for each respective weapon.
9. The suppressed weapon should retain its dispersion through the life of the barrel (objective of 24,000 rounds)
10. The suppressor system is not required to have an internal projectile pathway which is the usual industry standard for a 5.56mm diameter round. The internal bullet channel may be larger than is typical of current suppressor designs. In other words, the suppressor may be able to be employed on multiple calibers (i.e. A059 Ball, AB49, AC12, AB57 etc.) without any modification to the suppressor. This attribute not only facilitates future caliber/weapon capabilities, but could also mitigate baffle strikes.
11. Suppressor should function with all Department of Defense Identification Code (DODIC) 5.56 mm ammunition, including A059 Ball, A063 Tracer, A080 Blank, AA33 Ball, AA53 Ball Special Match, AA69 Armor Piercing, AB49 Ball Carbine barrier, AC12 and AB57 Enhanced Performance Round.
12. Suppressor should not require permanent configuration changes to the weapon system.
13. Suppressor should not inhibit the mounting or operation of the M203 or M320 grenade launchers (objective).
14. Suppressor should not require the addition of a gas mitigating charging handle.
15. Should be able to accept a suppressor sleeve in order to reduce thermal signatures and mitigate operator burns.
16. All suppressor external surfaces should have a dull, low-reflective finish (to include pins, bolts, lanyards, sight posts, etc.). The external color of the system should be consistent with current camouflage colors and patterns.
18. The suppressor material should be able to accept approved USMC paint (e.g. rattle-can spray paint).
19. Suppressor should be resistant to corrosion, abrasion, impacts and chemicals, including standard Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) decontaminants.
20. The suppressor should resist maritime corrosion and/or effects of carbon/copper/lead fouling.
• MIL-L-46000C – Lubricant, Semi-fluid (Automatic Weapons)
• MIL-PRF-372D – Cleaning Compound, Solvent (Bore of Small Arms and Automatic Aircraft Weapons)
• MIL-PRF-14107D – Lubricating Oil, Weapons, Low Temperature
• MIL-PRF-63460D – Lubricant, Cleaner and Preservative for Weapons and Weapons Systems
22. The suppressor should not require a more frequent cleaning schedule than the weapon system.
23. The system, with suppressor attached should continue to operate and safely function after exposure to blowing dust, mud, salt fog, rain, and icing/freezing rain environments as specified in US Army Development Test Operations Procedure (TOP) 3-2-045 (Small Arms – Hand and Shoulder Weapons and Machineguns) dated Sep 2007.
24. The system, with suppressor attached should be able to withstand the shock from a user performing individual movement techniques in combat, and the vibrations of being transported in standard military aircraft and ground vehicles as loose cargo, without degradation of performance.
25. The system, with suppressor attached should continue to safely function after being dropped in any orientation from a 1.7 meter height onto a smooth concrete or steel surface at temperatures ranging from -25º Fahrenheit (F) to 140º F. The addition of the suppressor on the weapon system should not result in a discharge when dropped from this height.
26. The system, with suppressor attached should safely function through a temperature range of -25º F to +140º F without degradation of performance.
27. In addition to the suppressor, request information on the ability of industry to provide a BFA type suppressor (that looks like, operates like and weighs the same as the live fire suppressor). This BFA type suppressor should be capable of catching a live 5.56mm round. This BFA suppressor should also be easily distinguished as a training device only.
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www.thefirearmblog.com

New Suppressors for Devil Dogs? USMC Releases RFI for Commercial Suppressors for M4, M27 -

Suppressor manufacturers, start your engines. The United States Marine Corps Systems Command (MARSYSCOM) has issued a new request for information (RFI) to the industry regarding future suppressors for the M4 and M4A1 Carbine and M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR). The request is intended to tap...
www.thefirearmblog.com www.thefirearmblog.com
 
Suppressors wouldn't be something that most Line marines would need on anything like a regular basis, not to mention Fleet marines (including Embassy guard detachments). A 'would be nice' item in other words.
 
Is there much relationship between men power and missile capabilities? With decades of "missile in a box", or even "underwater missile pods" being talked about it appears that very little manpower is really needed. The bottleneck is the logistics system and ....TEL truck drivers (out of a job in a decade)?

Ultimately it appears that the number of "missile launcher batteries" should have very little to do with the ultimate combat capability and one should look at the actual missile count.
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Josh_TN said:
At certain point, one or both countries would not allow their infrastructure to be a continual target of PGMs, and I think it would come sooner rather than later.
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jsport said:
There will be no long US-PRC war... Likewise, the US will not risk any PRC retaliation on the US homeland, so no nukes, and limited PGMs. No US "politic" is risking even limited strikes on CONUS... even a successful PLA invasion only leads to bloodly lengthy urban Pyrrhic victory weaking the PRC for any other challenge by the West.
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Given that the default war scenario is sort of insane, for the war to actually happen one or both sides have be "insane" one have found a technique to make it workable.

There is some chance that a "contained" war happens due to both sides not wanting to escalate and inability to escalate conventionally without huge losses. In this scenario the war can last a while.
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If the USAF fails to reliably penetrate the Chinese region with air power, I do not think much "counter-value" strike on infrastructure would happen as it is both an escalation and without value tactically when PLAAF and PLAN remains active and both makes demand on stand-off munition stocks. One could see months of indecisive air campaign if the opening blow fails to win the war as rate of combat gets limited by rate of long range munition production. USAF may not want commit to high attrition "decisive" air campaign as it can wait until the Chinese makes a move that makes such a commitment relatively decisive, like the Chinese massing land forces onto vulnerable ships or Taiwan being close to giving up.

The bulk of the USN would probably stay well out of A2AD range until PLAN commits amphib or some other attack, as attriting against land forces is without merit, though it could be committed to defeat PLAN/PLA landing forces.

The Chinese can either launch a rapid land invasion of Taiwan at the start of the war, in one of the most difficult operation in the history of warfare, or just blockade it, which takes comparative trivial effort, and hope to force a surrender or at least greatly degrade defenses. As operational level surprise is difficult in the modern era, a siege is likely. China can still maintain a blockade if their landing attempt fails, so such a event won't necessarily end the war.

This war scenario can last a while, until either Taiwan or China takes enough damage to give up. CONUS is untouched.
 
Grey Havoc said:
Suppressors wouldn't be something that most Line marines would need on anything like a regular basis, not to mention Fleet marines (including Embassy guard detachments). A 'would be nice' item in other words.
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This seems to be changing. The Army is specifying a suppressor for all of it's next-Generation Squad Weapons as well. So going forward you can expect pretty much any US infantry small arm to be suppressed. Not silenced, since the rounds are still very supersonic, but definitely less loud. The target with the USMC gun is to keep sound pressure levels at the shooter's ears just below the pain threshold of 140 dB.

There are a number of reasons for this. One, it helps maintain situational awareness and communication, especially in CQB, if the shooters' own shots don't completely deafen them. Second, suppressors hide muzzle flash, so they are helpful in night fighting, which is increasingly common thanks to NVGs. Third, they are also recoil dampeners, which isn't a huge deal with 5.56 but will matter a lot for the 6.8mm magnum round in NGSW. And finally, the services are seeing a lot of service-related hearing loss disability claims, so knocking down muzzle noise to a level where hearing protectors actually help is a good thing.
 
A Hypersonic even in a low altitude skim across the open ocean would pummel blockade ships and especially amphibous formations.

Would Japan defend Taiwan? If they had an oppurtunity to cripple PLA amphibious force which would eventually be used on them. Hypersonics could well be used by any number of actors w/o attribution. Taiwan may have the their own soon enough.

No nukes required. The PLAN might seek a different plan.

AW&ST June 6 2020 Hypersonic Strike Weapons Accerate Worldwide pp.54-55
 

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Considering what the US pays to train troops/marines, and what it pays *after* they leave service in the form of the VA, just exposing troops' hearing to less bang sounds worth it to me given the long lifetime of a modern suppressor. Then there are the actual tactical benefits of greatly reduced muzzle flash and noise, with super sonic shot noise being far less directional. I honestly don't know why it took this long for this to become a standard issue item consider the obvious utility and ubiquity of combat optics. The US spends enough on an individual solider training-to-grave to absolutely warrant this kind of investment.
 
TomS said:
Grey Havoc said:
Suppressors wouldn't be something that most Line marines would need on anything like a regular basis, not to mention Fleet marines (including Embassy guard detachments). A 'would be nice' item in other words.
Click to expand...

This seems to be changing. The Army is specifying a suppressor for all of it's next-Generation Squad Weapons as well. So going forward you can expect pretty much any US infantry small arm to be suppressed. Not silenced, since the rounds are still very supersonic, but definitely less loud. The target with the USMC gun is to keep sound pressure levels at the shooter's ears just below the pain threshold of 140 dB.

There are a number of reasons for this. One, it helps maintain situational awareness and communication, especially in CQB, if the shooters' own shots don't completely deafen them. Second, suppressors hide muzzle flash, so they are helpful in night fighting, which is increasingly common thanks to NVGs. Third, they are also recoil dampeners, which isn't a huge deal with 5.56 but will matter a lot for the 6.8mm magnum round in NGSW. And finally, the services are seeing a lot of service-related hearing loss disability claims, so knocking down muzzle noise to a level where hearing protectors actually help is a good thing.
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IIRC last year there was a Marine detachment that was completely equipped with silencers for a major exercise, and one of the things that came out of that was the remark that not only situational awareness increased greatly, but also the ability to communicate across short distances was greatly enhanced.
Turns out if people are not half-deaf, they can hear shouted remarks and orders better from longer away.

Silencers are one of those "Why didn't we use them sooner in these numbers" items.
 

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