US FF(X) Program - DISCUSSION

[Hood]

Thread cleaned up and generic speculation and wishlist fantasy designs moved to a new thread here: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/future-usn-frigate-design-speculation.51745/

Please keep this thread for questions, commentary and discussions on actual FF(X) news.

 

[TeourdBeourglaer]

Well at least as I hoped for there is the plan to operate it as a drone mothership with accompanied assets for munition depth. Will be interesting to see how that plays out with the basic design. I suspect a Flt II will be very quick out after the first few Flt I designs with VLS and other add ons.

Everything built today can and will be designed to act as "Drone Motherships"..;

I expect we'll get six to eight Flt I before a Flt II comes along so enough runway to design things properly and ideally the Flt II Management Team starts the same day as the Flt I guys. I doubt there will be the same shenanigans as there was with Constellation given the higher level visibility and claimed accountability.

No,

Right?
Far from useless.

Edit
While 8 ASMs and 2mk70 launchers on the fantail is less than ideal for a frigate, it allows for engaging surface and subsurface contacts.
Or decent AAW self defense.

So yeah much less than ideal, but plenty of use.

It's not a Frigate, it's a Patrol Craft being labeled Frigate for $ funding purposes...
Legally, the "Patrol-Craft" role falls to the coast guard, but the Navy needs a ASW FFG and an Patrol Boat.
They should build both, unfortunately they decided to invest BILLIONS $ into Shipyard Upgrades for the constellation class in Marinette Wisconsin where there is no workforce to be had..!
Which is one of the main "lags" in the Constellation program, that and the necessary additions to FFG(X) design..!

 

[TomS]

It's not a Frigate, it's a Patrol Craft being labeled Frigate for $ funding purposes...
Legally, the "Patrol-Craft" role falls to the coast guard, but the Navy needs a ASW FFG and an Patrol Boat.

There's nothing legal that says patrol vessels are Coast Guard only. The Navy operated the Patrol Coastals (Cyclone-class), Patrol Gunboats (Asheville-class), Patrol Hydrofoils (Pegasus-class) and quite a few others. The first OH Perry was even ordered as a Patrol Frigate.

 

[Scott Kenny]

We could absolutely reclass the FFX-Flight 1s as PG or PGM (Patrol Gunboat, Missile), once either an ASW or an ASW-capable FFX Flight 2 shows up.

 

[Jimmo952]

This article states the Flight 2s will have 16 Mk41 VLS tubes. He mentions a potential loadout of 64 ESSMs which may imply the Mk41 version selected.

Sounds like a new hull section forward of the bridge will be added to accommodate the VLS.

I do not know this author and do not now how credible this is but he states it like it is a done deal.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar..._vls_gap_the_navys_frigate_pivot_1191837.html

 

[cccgong]

This article states the Flight 2s will have 16 Mk41 VLS tubes. He mentions a potential loadout of 64 ESSMs which may imply the Mk41 version selected.

Sounds like a new hull section forward of the bridge will be added to accommodate the VLS.

I do not know this author and do not now how credible this is but he states it like it is a done deal.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar..._vls_gap_the_navys_frigate_pivot_1191837.html

Decent chance he’s just confusing it for the mk56 VLS that the legend class cutter was designed to be able to use.

 

[Jimmo952]

Decent chance he’s just confusing it for the mk56 VLS that the legend class cutter was designed to be able to use.

I think he says the Mk41 is the chosen path forward and not the Mk56 the original cutter was designed for.

Edit. I was wrong. Here is his exact statement:

Historically, HII proposed a 12-cell Mk 41 layout that required no major structural modifications to the NSC hull. However, to maximize capability, Flight II accepts forward hull modifications to standardize a 16-cell Mk 41 VLS footprint.

He seems to be referring to HIIs FFGX submission and how that differs from what is being planned now.

 

[MadRat]

The advantage I could see to having strike length Mk 41 on FF(X) would be to sneak a frigate into an area where the regional actor has to believe there is a real possibility it does actually carry Tomahawk. Even if it has 8-16 Tomahawks that could be significant. It would never have to be within range of weapons that shoot back from most of the nations around the globe. FF(X) is a visible, diplomatic force whereas a stealthy sub could carry far more power but they cannot see it. And you certainly would not want to reveal the sub location.

But to me the difference between the FF(X) and FFG(X) programs was the absence of Mk 41. Let is not forget the Russians stick Kaliber on patrol craft, so Tomahawk on FF(X) is not any leap in capability over the rest of the world.

 

[JS23]

Even if it has 8-16 Tomahawks that could be significant.

Don’t forget that they’ve also been working on a VLS version of LRASM.

 

[TomS]

Don’t forget that they’ve also been working on a VLS version of LRASM.

The USN has not, at least in public. No expressed interest at all at the moment.

 

[JS23]

The USN has not, at least in public. No expressed interest at all at the moment.

The USN hasn't bought it, but LockMart has nonetheless made and tested it.

View: https://youtu.be/kl4ffgPu6qc?is=3SopCwrsjG_fNciJ

 

[TomS]

The USN hasn't bought it, but LockMart has nonetheless made and tested it.

Right, but the USN is not buying it.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Right, but the USN is not buying it.

Yet.

 

[TomS]

Yet.

There's no program where it fits. They could change their mind, but they have a ton of other weapons on their plate right now.

 

[Scott Kenny]

There's no program where it fits. They could change their mind, but they have a ton of other weapons on their plate right now.

Granted, but in event of "oh crap we need all the ship-launched cruise missiles we can get" being able to drop AGM-158s into Mk41 cells is a nice card up the sleeve.

 

[JS23]

I think that, theoretically, packing a couple of stealthy and deadly LRASM per hull on a bunch of relatively small and cheap frigates and doting them around the Pacific like a bunch of guerrilla snipers has some potential merit in terms of affecting the risk calculus of fleet movements (and maybe, in a pinch, punching above their weight against something way more valuable). Heck, even just the threat of it, not knowing whether any given boat has a silver bullet on board. Sort of like the old days of PT boats.

 

[MadRat]

VL-LRASM is essentially a more modern JASSM. Sounds like 2.5 times weight of an NSM for much bigger effect. But the Tomahawk has 5x the range for an extra 600 pounds.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think that, theoretically, packing a couple of stealthy and deadly LRASM per hull on a bunch of relatively small and cheap frigates and doting them around the Pacific like a bunch of guerrilla snipers has some potential merit in terms of affecting the risk calculus of fleet movements (and maybe, in a pinch, punching above their weight against something way more valuable). Heck, even just the threat of it, not knowing whether any given boat has a silver bullet on board. Sort of like the old days of PT boats.

It'd require open Mk41 cells on those Frigates.

 

[MadRat]

Meko A300 was an interesting layout. Strike length Mk41 up front. MRAD up between four quad SSM launchers. SeaRAM and DEW stations. 5" gun.

 

[Felocie]

it will be clear that it was USN incompetence that ruined the Constellation.

"USN incompetence"
FMM work didn't meet standards per the TWHs
FMM couldn't meet NAVSEA DC standards as stipulated in the contract

Both those come directly from FMM's CEO

But sure, "USN incompetence ruined the Constellation"

Not to say the US Navy ran a perfect program but when there are systemic flaws imposed on the program by Congress (parent hull design) and the builder explicitly can't meet what's required of them it is wildly disingenuous and indicative of nothing less than ignorance to pin it all on the Navy

 

[Stellerfella]

FMM work didn't meet standards per the TWHs
FMM couldn't meet NAVSEA DC standards as stipulated in the contract

Both those come directly from FMM's CEO

Do you have quotes for those? Not doubting you, just somethings need to be seen with ones own eyes.

 

[joshjosh]

Do you have quotes for those? Not doubting you, just somethings need to be seen with ones own eyes.

There is more than one way to interpret this situation, laying more blame either on the shipbuilder or on NAVSEA. I'll leave that as an exercise to the reader.

From the Cavasships December 5th podcast.

Retired Rear Admiral and former Fincantieri executive Chuck Goddard:

...

...

 

[Felocie]

The individual tech warrant holders were were allowed to run rampant and basically perfect each of their areas of the ship, whether it was an auxiliary system or propulsion system or electrical system. And they insisted that their specifications were the requirements, and the requirements were the requirements.

I order the TWHs to stop doing their jobs immediately and allow subpar work to continue!

 

[MigLui]

"USN incompetence"
FMM work didn't meet standards per the TWHs
FMM couldn't meet NAVSEA DC standards as stipulated in the contract

Sure FMM has its problems.
But it is a desperately needed American shipyard.
Could they have done things differently ... of course, but it is difficult to build to standards that aren't specified in approved design.

The USN has had three programs fail, up to now, because of 'capability creep'. If you try to make your lo-cost escort frigates into destroyers, they will cost just as much, and you may as well build Arleigh Burkes.
You do realize that, after all this time, the Constellation class design is still only 87% completed ?
How the he*l do you expect FMM to build without approved construction blueprints ?

I wonder who has learned a lesson from the Constellation fiasco, FMM or the USN ?
Keeping in mind that this is the third 'bite at the apple' for the USN; apparently they are hard learners.

 

[Felocie]

The USN has had three programs fail, up to now, because of 'capability creep'. If you try to make your lo-cost escort frigates into destroyers, they will cost just as much, and you may as well build Arleigh Burkes.

There was no capability creep, the requirements for FFG(X) did not change from start to finish. The only contract amendments made were to lessen the required specs where the Navy thought it was excessive such as target speed in high sea states (source: the testimony to congress previously posted here by myself).

Secondly the program was never meant to produce low cost escort frigates, that's an outright misrepresentation of the program goals. Read the RFI. It has been posted before in this thread, again, by me.

Third they never turned them into destroyers nor did the estimated unit cost ever approach the cost of a DDG-51. Indeed the radar suite of Constellation is arguably less capable than systems on comparable European frigates such as DB Kronos on FREMM EVO. The cell count (32) is also comparable to European frigates although the utility of the Mk 41 platform does mean a greater variety of munitions can be carried. The ASW sensors (an MFTA and VDS) are broadly comparable to European frigates.

Many of these traits are also broadly comparable to Asian frigates such as those made by the Japanese and Chinese.

I suppose the rest of the world are building destroyers too?

they will cost just as much, and you may as well build Arleigh Burkes.

No they won't lol, you're just making that up

How the he*l do you expect FMM to build without approved construction blueprints ?

I expect them to design to spec and then build to spec? They signed a contract agreeing to do so and if they aren't the job of the TWHs is to make sure they are

Brush up on the program then get back to me

 

[MigLui]

The only contract amendments made were to lessen the required specs where the Navy thought it was excessive such as target speed in high sea states (source: the testimony to congress previously posted here by myself)

HaHa !
So it had nothing to do with commonality going from 85%, down to 15% ?
Or the weight and instability gain that forced the reduction in speed ?
Did J Phelan not say that the reason for cancellation was 70% of the capability of an A-B, for 80% of the cost ( I may have my percents mixed up ) ?

Testimony before Congress means absolutely nothing when the Secretary of the Navy, J Phelan ( a retired business man and political donor ), is trying to save his job ( resign or be fired ) over this very program mismanagement.
It's not like any of the 'business men' appointed by this Administration are above lying.

All of this is available through a simple google search, as it was all over the news, and it all points in the same direction.

Who did the USN plan to scapegoat for the LCS and Zumwalt disasters ?

 

[Felocie]

So it had nothing to do with commonality going from 85%, down to 15% ?

Tue commonality between Aquitaine and Bergamini is between 8 and 10 percent per the head of DCNS' (now Naval Group) testionmy to the French National Assembly. Not sure why commonality would be such a massive issue

Testimony before Congress means absolutely nothing when the Secretary of the Navy, J Phelan ( a retired business man and political donor ), is trying to save his job ( resign or be fired ) over this very program mismanagement.

First of all the testimony was provided by a USN admiral who was in charge of the program, not Phelan. I frankly do not believe Phelan knows what he was talking about given he had absolutely no experience in the field and said the best alternative was an "all American frigate design" (despite NSC not meeting the criteria for FFG(X) whatsoever).

Phelan also thinks BBGNs are good ideas and bypassed basically everyone to propose it directly to Trump according to the WSJ, hardly the second coming of Mahan

His job was never at risk because of Constellation, the guy is a political appointee who rocked up after almost all of the problems were concreted. The entire admin's "naval strategy" is blowing hot air as has been made fairly clear by their industrial plans or rather the lack thereof. To give some credit they have finally made moves to properly fund SSN procurement.

Who did the USN plan to scapegoat for the LCS and Zumwalt disasters ?

The LCS program is a direct result of a very specific post Cold War mentality which is a mistake in hindsight although the failure is massively overstated in media who display a startling degree of illiteracy about the program.

The Zumwalt class had some programmatic flaws such as AGS imposed upon it by Congress but by and large the technology and the thinking behind the program worked. The cut back to three hulls was mostly down to the perceived future threat lying mainly in missiles, not submarines (DDG-1000 was an ASW/Strike focused Spruance replacement). This in turn stimulated CG(X) (of which the result is the Arleigh Burke Flight III).

 

[MigLui]

Obviously I'm not going to change your mind ...
You are right, and every news organization, as well as the whole internet, are mistaken, and the USN had no hand in the Constellation fiasco ( nor the two previous ).

Must be just our collective imagination that the USN can't get any ships built, while Europeans ( well, maybe Germany and the UK ) and South Asians ( especially China ! ) have no problems whatsoever.

 

[Felocie]

You are right, and every news organization, as well as the whole internet, are mistaken, and the USN had no hand in the Constellation fiasco ( nor the two previous ).

I have cited no less than 5 sources across America and France, you're "citing" "news organizations" and "the whole internet". When presented with these sources you say nothing in response. Okk bud

Must be just our collective imagination that the USN can't get any ships built, while Europeans ( well, maybe Germany and the UK ) and South Asians ( especially China ! ) have no problems whatsoever.

Dawg the US on average builds more tonnage per year than any European or Asian country. Only China seriously challenges this.

European builds most certainly do not "have no problems whatsoever". Should we begin with Damen's F126, Damen's ASWF, Navantia's S-80+ (which they ended up subcontracting American teams to fix btw), and the multitude of programs that have been substantially cut back over the past ~30 years?

Asian yards are far from perfect too, Korean yards in particular have produced shoddy work or have been extremely difficult to work with (see the Tide class fiasco for the Royal navy and the defects in the early Sejongs which may see them retired ahead of schedule). Japanese yards put vessels together impressively quickly but the JMSDF accepts vessels before they have finished fit out which artificially brings forward build times at a cursory glance and doesn't reflect the reality that Burkes are often commissioned at a comparable rate. Asian and European yards also build to less strenuous standards (largely because they don't operate at as high a level as the USN. The Royal Navy's standards are however quite close to the USN's).

This is not at all to say there aren't deep rooted problems in American yards. For instance Government regularly underfunds suppliers which has knock on effects both for cost of individual parts and readiness across the fleet. Another example is that the Navy has not had a consistent strategic vision since 1991 which means concepts become outdated before they have time to hit the fleet but too much has been investigated into the platform to abandon it entirely (Zumwalt is a great example of this).

But hey, that's a lot more complex than "NAVSEA bad" so I won't expect you to dive into it