United States Stability Police Force (SPF)

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Donald McKelvy
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I found a very interesting white paper prepared for the United States Army at the RAND Corporation web site discussing a United States Stability Police Force (SPF):

A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities

by Terrence K. Kelly, Seth G. Jones, James E. Barnett II,
Keith Crane, Robert C. Davis, Carl Jensen

Executive Summary:

Establishing security is the sine qua non of stability operations, since it is a prerequisite for reconstruction and development. Security requires a mix of military and police forces to deal with a range of threats from insurgents to criminal organizations. This research examines the creation of a high-end police force, which the authors call a Stability Police Force (SPF). The study considers what size force is necessary, how responsive it needs to be, where in the government it might be located, what capabilities it should have, how it could be staffed, and its cost. This monograph also considers several options for locating this force within the U.S. government, including the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the Department of State, and the U.S. Army's Military Police. The authors conclude that an SPF containing 6,000 people — created in the U.S. Marshals Service and staffed by a “hybrid option,” in which SPF members are federal police officers seconded to federal, state, and local police agencies when not deployed — would be the most effective of the options considered. The SPF would be able to deploy in 30 days. The cost for this option would be $637.3 million annually, in FY2007 dollars.


Excerpt:

An SPF is a high-end police force that engages in a range of tasks such as crowd and riot control, special weapons and tactics (SWAT), and investigations of organized criminal groups. In its ability to operate in stability operations, it is similar to such European forces as the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie. Its focus on high-end tasks makes it fundamentally different from UN or other civilian police, who deal with more routine law and order functions. It is also different from most military forces, which are generally not trained and experienced to conduct policing tasks in a civilian environment. Second, if an SPF is necessary, what should it look like? This includes considering such issues as: its objectives, tasks, and size; its speed of deployment; its institutional capabilities; where it should be headquartered in the U.S. government and how it should be staffed (standing force, reserve force, and hybrid force); and its cost.

Our conclusions are based on several facts and assumptions. First, it would be optimal to have SPF personnel with civilian police skills, orientation, and perspective do high-end policing. This is because civilian police have more experience working with the civilian population than do military personnel under normal circumstances. Additionally, police skills are created and maintained only by constant use, and only police forces that work daily with civilians can exercise the maximum number of SPF policing functions among the civilian population.

Second, we assume that a new agency would be difficult to establish. It would be politically challenging and face resistance from a range of organizations in the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State currently engaged in policing. It would need some additional overhead, and would take significant time to establish. All personnel and all additional administrative overhead personnel would have to be recruited. Training facilities and programs would have to be created and established, rather than modified or expanded, as they would have to be if an SPF becomes part of an existing agency.

Third, we assumed that stability operations are feasible only when the intervening authorities care a great deal about the outcome, and even then, only in relatively small countries or regions. We limited our SPF size estimates to countries under 20 million for reasons of cost and staffing. Specifically, we assumed that an SPF that cost more than $1 billion per year would be politically unpopular and would be difficult to get funded. If U.S. policymakers wanted to deploy an SPF to large countries with a hostile security environment, there are several options to deal with the shortfall: (a) an SPF size could be increased by augmenting it with additional federal, state, or local police from the United States; (b) an SPF could only be deployed to specific regions or cities in the country; (c) an SPF could be supplemented with highend police from other countries; (d) an SPF could be supplemented with military police (MPs); or (e) an SPF could be supplemented by local police forces from the host country. If a significantly larger force was feasible, this would make the military option more attractive, the management challenge for civilian agencies would be larger, which already call for significant expansion of management capabilities.


Conclusions (excerpt)

Given that it is unlikely that [Military Police] MPs would be permitted to perform civilian policing tasks in the United States, the USMS [United States Marshals Service], despite its capacity and management shortfalls, is the agency best suited to take on the SPF mission under the assumptions of this study. Placing the SPF in the USMS would place it where its members can develop the needed skills under the hybrid staffing option. Furthermore, the USMS has the broadest law enforcement mandate of any U.S. law enforcement agency and many of the required skills, though it would need to increase its capacity significantly. Furthermore,the Department of Justice stands at the center of the rule-of-law effort, with lead roles in policing, judiciary, and corrections efforts.

Sources:

Full White Paper
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf

Summary
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.sum.pdf

RAND website:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG819.html
 
Jesus Henry Christ. Thanks to the DHS, flying is a nightmare. Do we really need them on the streets making my drive in to work any worse than it has to be?
 
It might be a way to remove United States and NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014 and provide support for the Afghanistan government for another ten years until the year 2024. Or provide support for the Iraqi government without deploying United States troops.

I don't know the legalities of deploying United States Marshals over-seas or if it falls under the War Powers Act.
 
Actually the DoD recently gave itself the power to handle domestic disturbances...


http://www.longislandpress.com/2013/05/14/u-s-military-power-grab-goes-into-effect/
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/05/the-pentagon-has-engaged-in-a-power-grab-against-the-civilian-leadership.html
 
On a related note, an interesting reference to a 'UN/US Police Force' can be found here: http://up-ship.com/blog/?p=20282 (scroll down to the second image in the post)
In context:
More unconventionally, Nova was also proposed as a logistics transport. In this case, it could be used to chuck a capsule across the planet sub-orbitally… a capsule with 2.5 million pounds of payload. Additionally, Nova could put a 1 million pound capsule into orbit; the capsule would de-orbit itself and land to disgorge infantry. Orbital systems were in a way prefered, as orbital systems meant that the Nova itself would go into orbit. This meant that the Nova could de-orbit on command an return to Earth at convenient locations for recovery; ballistic lobs would essentially throw the Nova away. The orbital capsule was at least illustrated with a drawing.

This UN/US Police Force was probably one of McNamara's (or perhaps Kissinger) pet projects!
 

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