The Ukrainian guards were assumed/declared dead because there were no more communications with any of them after the small island was taken. I agree lack of communication is a bit flimsy to declare them all dead. Few days later Russia said they were alive and being held in captivity as prisoners of war. That still doens´t mean the sentence 'Go fuck yourself' wasn´t used in the conversation with the crew of the Russian warship.
Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko said on Friday that the Belarusian armed forces were not taking part and would not take part in Russia's military operation in Ukraine.
Scores of residents assembled in Lviv’s picturesque old town square devising imaginative ways to defend their city. Some made camouflage nets for the military while others manufactured hundreds of Molotov cocktails.
The U.S. is exploring a deal in which Poland would send Soviet-era aircraft to Ukraine in return for American F-16 jet fighters, U.S. officials said. Poland’s prime minister’s office dismissed reports of a potential arrangement.
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Russia Hybrid Seminar Series (RHSS) webinars held on March 3, 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. Context:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has placed a spotlight on President Putin, notions of Putinism and how power is actually exercised in Russia. Putin’s televised addresses to Russia on 22 February and 24 February highlighted the role of ideology and Putin’s own particular understanding of Russia’s history and its relevance to Russian foreign and security policy. The extraordinary hostility, anger and sheer venom on display in Putin’s speeches spoke to paranoia, isolation and unpredictability.
There are many imponderables, not least the impact of “economic warfare” on Russia as sanctions have never been used at this scale and on an economy that is as integrated into global supply chains and banking system. Over time, the state is likely to press further on civil society, and public opinion on elite behavior may change. In other conflicts (Afghanistan, Chechnya), for example the power of the ‘Committee of Soldiers and Mothers’ had a legitimacy that could not be ignored – it would be a definite signal if this time the Kremlin chose to crack down on it.
But, along with imponderables, there are also some certainties. First, Russian propaganda and soft power instruments are wholly delegitimized outside of Russia, particularly in the ‘political West’. Second, for Putin and his inner circle (“gerontocracy”) Ukraine represents and all-or-nothing proposition: only “victory” over Kyiv and Ukraine satisfies their self-image and prevents regime change in Moscow and system change in Russia.
What might alternative Russian futures and governing paradigms look like? How might the crucible of invasion of Ukraine generate alternative futures? This summary identified both Russia as “Brezhnev 2.0” and “Russian DPRK”. Both scenarios do not characterize the very present in Russia but aspects of them can be empirically evidenced today. If we extrapolate such evidence forward, what are the likely characteristics of such models, the assumptions that underpin them, and the indicators or drivers that suggest this is the trend line? “Brezhnev 2.0”
This scenario is predicated on the impossibility of a “forgive and forget” political settlement in Ukraine. Russia remains in political and cultural isolation with economic trade (mainly gas and oil) only occurring where absolutely necessary. A regime tilting even more to the “security bloc’’ is consolidated in Russia. The military and siloviki are funded and the regime is secure. Soft neo-Stalinist societal repression incubates a passive and apathetic public – there is no political relaxation or “thaw” this side of the horizon. Russia may have a rhetorically confrontational foreign policy but domestic public opinion and a weak economy limit aggressive action. The current pattern of foreign adventures is less easily enabled (physical access) and less affordable. The leadership, which may or may not include Putin, may be more stable, predictable, and pragmatic, but is likely to continue to regard the West as hostile and thus continue political operations it hopes will divide and distract it. In this context, Russia might be able to gradually reduce the costs of the occupation of Ukraine and address the worst aspects of crisis and confrontation with the West – or it may continue to justify the perception that it is now a “rogue state.”
If Putin is removed, then this would assume that the stakeholders, his inner circle, the chiefs-inside-the-system can meet, negotiate and bargain and find a consensus over successor team or ‘transition alliance’. This in turn assumes that factional interests can be evenly balanced and the current regime is self-sustaining and resilient without Putin, or with Putin as a symbolic head (President of the State Union).
However, these assumptions can be challenged. In an increasingly personalistic regime, Putin is the glue that binds the elite together. Consensus is not possible. For the siloviki, if Putin could agree to step aside or could be persuaded, what follows could raise the fear of perestroika II leading to system collapse. Furthermore, and unlike the Brezhnev period, there are no real formal mechanisms to appoint a successor, no Party to provide a cohering elite matrix. “Russian DPRK”
This scenario shares some similar characteristics with “Brezhnev 2.0” but differs in degree, scope, scale and most of all in tenor. As with the “Brezhnev 2.0” scenario, a securitocracy retains primacy. Russia’s national-security emergency regime becomes a pariah and Russia considered a rogue state. Russian-style DPRK nuclear blackmail is consecrated by mystical, apocalyptical “nuclear Orthodoxy”. The nationalization of oligarchs takes place under the rubric of ‘liquidation of property’. Autarky is declared as a national goal and necessary defiant response to sanctions. State-organized crime symbiotic relations are strengthened as organized crime groups break sanctions for the state, merging patriotic impulses and profit principles. State control of the media is absolute, and campaigns to “clean up” fifth and sixth columnists are justified through claims that these “internal Nazi agents” have ruined the Russian economy. In foreign policy we see the emergence of a Russian imperium consisting of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in the name of “restored Slavic unity”. “Territories” that fall outside “ancient Russian lands” and the “triune state” are not forcibly incorporated into the imperial core. “Forced neutrality” and buffer zone status is imposed on Georgia and Moldova.
This scenario is based on two assumptions: elite and societal challenges to Putin are not forthcoming and Putin’s “all-or-nothing” mindset means that he is determined to remain in power. What beliefs do these assumptions rest on? First,thatPutin’s control of the FSB and National Guard are absolute, and because of this he can discount elite or societal opposition. Second, predictive thinking within the elites (the defense industrial complex, the siloviki, and the military) calculate that having irrevocably burnt bridges with the West, Russia’s strategic choices are stark: subordination to China and stability or to maintain strategic autonomy at terrible domestic cost. If the choice falls between being “greater Kazakhstan with nuclear weapons” or a “DPRK’s nuclear attention-getting unpredictability but poverty”, then this current Russian elite will choose the latter. Better unstable and unpredictable but strategically relevant, the thinking goes, than a stable nuclear armed Chinese proxy. Third, it assumes that that those willing to remove Putin are unable and that those able are unwilling.
We can look to two powerful drivers and the immediate trigger of this “Russian DPRK” scenario, which moves Russia beyond the “Brezhnev 2.0” alternative. First, extreme rhetoric propagated by the Russian state-controlled media continues to radicalize itself. Narrative triggers that dehumanize Ukrainians as “Nazi”, fascists, reflecting official policy of “denazification” call now for “total war”. Russia’s media posits Putin’s unprovoked aggression as an existential struggle between “us” and “them”, demanding “cleansing” and “liquidation” as the only viable responses. Second, it appears likely that martial law will be declared in Russia, creating a permissive “total war” context. This will involve national mobilization, conscription, a war time economy and the closing of state borders. The trigger that marks this descent into darkness will be the ‘Battle of Kyiv’. This coming catastrophe brings into juxtaposition the dissonance at the heart of Putin’s narrative: in which universe is it necessary to storm “the mother of all Russian cities” to “restore Slavic unity”? Elites and society are forced to double-down along with Putin or revolt. Martial law is designed to preempt revolt, allowing the Russian military and security services to preventively occupy the streets of Moscow. Conclusions:
Open questions remain. How far does the ideological narrative constructed by Putin around “Slavic unity” and the necessary means of the Great Patriotic War place policy constraints on Putin and Russian foreign and security policy? For Ukraine, if ideology is driving Russian policy, might this mean that “Novorossiya” becomes the intermediate goal, leading to a demilitarized rump Ukraine and “denazification” in “Russian Ukraine”? Do “ancient Russian lands” include Transnistria, northern Kazakhstan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Or does pragmatism prevail? That the ideological factor clearly weighs more heavily in Russian risk/reward calculus than most analysts realized is now a given. But where is the recalibrated balance between Putin’s outbursts (passionarity) and military aggression to purge the past of historical grievances and the rational and pragmatic application of realpolitik principles in support of Russia’s legitimate state interests in the present? Does Russian policy become hostage to Putin’s own narrative? This narrative, baptized as it is in the blood of Ukrainians, is too militant, militarized, Slavic, Orthodox, imperial, revisionist, revanchist and chauvinistic to have any traction outside of Russia’s borders, or even within the non-ethnic Russian parts of the Russian Federation.
What of the Russia-China axis? China may expedite negotiations, having stated that it “understands Russia’s security concerns” but it will continue to hedge. It is too early for China to draw conclusive lessons about the effectiveness of the Russian military, the scale and scope of sanctions following military intervention or the likely evolution of the nature of its functional axis with Russia. Pragmatism in China’s relations with Russia will prevail.
The declaration of martial law in Russia and the fall of Kyiv could constitute inflection points, with the first the harbinger of and necessary precursor for the second. Both events force the Russian public and elites to confront the reality of their likely future. Neutrality is no longer an option. Recalibration of interests may still lead to dramatic breaks from the two “continuity-but-more-so” scenarios above. Might a military coup become the only mechanism of power transition, given Putin’s control over the FSB and National Guard? If so, what follows?
Putin’s war of conquest over Ukraine has created a “geopolitical Europe”, one that is determined “to ensure a free Ukraine, and then to re-establish peace and security across our continent”, in the words of Joseph Borrell. To that end, calibrated responses and coordinated policy approaches are needed to ensure sanctions are smart and targeted and humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine is timely, Western national interests are protected and its values are upheld and miscalculation leading to escalation is avoided. However, the desire to achieve all three goals poses a difficult and testing trilemma. Given the unfolding scale of the humanitarian disaster in Ukraine and the real and visible suffering of Ukrainians on a mass scale, might the West be able to achieve only two of its three objectives? If so, which two?
1) apply sanctions and provide humanitarian and military aid;
2) uphold national interests, democratic values and principles; and
3) avoid miscalculation and escalation.
In the context of mass civilian casualties, how does the West calibrate and balance moral principles that reflect its values with pragmatic approaches in line with interests? At what point does “responsibility to protect” trump other considerations? How the US, “geopolitical Europe”, friends and allies together manage this trilemma will shape the destiny of Ukraine and determine the contours of our New Cold War paradigm.
GCMC, March 3, 2022. Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Mark Galeotti and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.
News in that it's a very different opinion on how the invasion is going.
Time will tell I guess. Amusing to watch the hosts growing amazement that a former US Colonel would go so far off script.
"The Ukrainian military is using "game-changing" drones that can carry 3kg of explosives and hit
targets up to 30 miles behind enemy lines, The Times of London reported.
Eugene Bulatsev, an engineer with the Ukrainian designer UA-Dynamics, told the outlet that the
"game-changing" Punisher drones had completed up to 60 "successful" missions since the
Russian invasion began."
I've heard on other forums that the Russian's only really hold areas around the major roads and that beyond that their control is weak (hence these amusing vids of tractor Vs T-72). It reminds me of Operation Market Garden, and the results have been similar - stagnation, bitter fighting and loss of equipment. But that doesn't mean they will be defeated.
Russia will ultimately grind down the Ukrainian military by sheer mass eventually. Ukraine can call up reserves from its population but it can't replace trained manpower and heavy equipment. It simply hasn't got the strength and firepower to counterattack and break any of the current encirclements now and in a week's time will be in no better position. Hitler couldn't stop the Red Army with teenage boys with Panzerfausts and Ukraine can't do the same thing in 2022.
Ultimately once the Ukrainian Army shows signs of cracking the political leadership will have to decide whether to capitulate or fight their version of Gotterdammerung. If that happens the Russians are fools to think they can ignore Leningrad and Stalingrad as exemplars of what they will face and by talk of public executions etc. and increasing bombing will only make the inhabitants more desperate to fight. Ukrainian morale is good at the moment but will it last?
I think the talk of Afghanistan-like retribution is far too optimistic. Ukraine is not a mountainous or wild desert/jungle country, there are no inaccessible strongholds, no easy way for resistance forces to set up pockets of ground they can occupy with locals to get supplies from, no lawless grey areas where they can operate with some impunity. Any resistance is going to be more like the WW2 Resistance movements of Western Europe at best, certainly not something like the Kurds or Taliban or Viet Cong in size and power. And even if they were how would they be kept supplied? NATO certainly wouldn't risk it.
And even if they did get organised it took the Taliban 20 years to force out the West and ISIS never managed the same in Iraq, Syria and Libya remain battlegrounds, it took 25 years to push the West out of Indochina, the Maquis and SOE didn't push the Wehrmacht out of France, the Warsaw Uprising was crushed, Budapest likewise, Czech Spring didn't even get warmed up, though Tito gave the Germans and Italians a good run for their money in Yugoslavia.
I think the key different is that when the West attacked these middle east countries, they didn't receive economic sanction.
The impact of sanction on economy is pretty huge
For those who understand French: Senator Claude Malhuret in the debate about Ukraine. Wow!
Former president of Doctors Without Borders, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy & Human Rights in France, founder of the parliament group "Les Indépendants."
Just Wow, Mr Malhuret!
It has been reported by the bbc that Russian citizens are having accounts that have 'significantly more money than declared over the previous three years, seized. I would say that will significantly reduce the ability of the Kremlin to pro spin this. Politics by any means seems to be going back to the times of the crusades where a military campaign was funded directly by taxing and seizing money from the citizenry.
The West and Russia are already at war in just about every sphere except actual fighting. But is escalation into an era-defining armed conflict inevitable, asks Sky's Deborah Haynes.
In the latest blow to Russia's financial system after its invasion of Ukraine, Mastercard and Visa are suspending their operations in Russia, saying they feel compelled to act.
Russia is accused of deliberately attacking civilians after rockets "destroy" an airport in central Ukraine and an attempt to evacuate residents from city under siege fails due to ceasefire breaches.
I recently wrote a column on why I believe that the Russians are now committing flagrant war crimes. Ukraine is the victim of those crimes and the images from that country are truly sickening. Vla…
jonathanturley.org
Filming prisoners of war is a violation of the Geneva Convention. Basically, any video in which individual prisoners are identifiable is a war crime. It doesn’t even have to involve coercion or torture. This is something that every soldier knows.
Not in Ukraine but over Romania, dramatic series of events: Mig21 Lancer crashed (pilot MiA). CSAR team also crashed (7 confirmed dead) :
A Romanian helicopter sent on a search-and-rescue mission late on Wednesday after a Romanian military MiG 21 LanceR dropped off the radar has crashed, the defence ministry said, killing all seven soldiers on board.
The pilot of the IAR 330-Puma helicopter had reported unfavourable weather conditions and had been called back to base before the crash, the ministry said. The helicopter fell near the village of Gura Dobrogei in eastern Romania.
A Romanian helicopter sent on a search-and-rescue mission late on Wednesday after a Romanian military MiG 21 LanceR dropped off the radar has crashed, the defence ministry said, killing all seven soldiers on board.
www.reuters.com
Notice that 7 members in a Puma (even new built) appears to me as a lot of personnels for a CSAR mission (2 pilots, one gunner, one Para jumper, 2 Naval jumper and 1 medic) when
what you might need is dynamic performances.
From the Drive:
This comes a day after an Ukrainian Su-27 that landed in Romania flew back to Ukraine:
Except there is this BIG WARNING at the bottom of the page.
Last night, an alleged FSB whistle-blower letter was published that damned Russia's military performance in Ukraine and predicted a disaster for the RU in the next weeks and months. I wasn't sure if it was authentic - as Ukraine had previously leaked fake FSB letters as psy-ops.
A resident of Bucha, a city some 20 kilometers from Kyiv, filmed destroyed military vehicles near his house on February 27, after Ukrainian forces stopped the Russian advance through his town.
www.rferl.org
plenty o armored vehicles destroyed on a single street.
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