UK Industry Rationalisation 1950

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You are a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Supply just back from your summer holidays in 1950. You've just left the office of the Minister of Supply, George Strauss. He's handed you a big job this time. He wants you to come up with a plan for rationalising the aircraft industry on a sustainable basis.
Your brief is to:
- maintaining thirteen companies as viable production units
- maintain nine or ten design teams
- total workforce no greater than 150,000 workers
- ideally a restriction of only three or four operational requirements being issued each year

Who would you choose to be merged or closed? Who would you chose to loose their design team and become sub-contractors?

Industry players at this time were:
Armstrong Whitworth
Auster
Avro
Blackburn (General Aircraft)
Boulton Paul
Bristol
Chrislea
de Havilland
Elliott’s of Newbury
English Electric
Fairey
Folland
Gloster
Handley Page
Handley Page (Reading)
Hawker
Heston Aircraft
Miles Aircraft
Percival
Portsmouth Aviation
Saunders-Roe
Scottish Aviation
Short Brothers & Harland
Slingsby
Vickers Supermarine
Vickers
Westland

All aircraft programmes can be assumed to be as historical up to September 1950.


For those feeling even braver, you can take on the mantle of the Air Staff and try to come up with three or four operational requirements only per year for 1951-1960 covering all roles, to see how feasible it was.
 
Derek Woods, ‘Project Cancelled’ has a graphic of the steady real world amalgamation of aircraft and engine companies.
my personal preference would be for a Hawker-Siddeley group, a B.A.C. group and a third incorporating Handley-Page and other companies. I have thought of the latter as being a more ‘exotic/advanced projects group’…
either that or H.P. Goes into B.A.C., historically they did some work together, and, I would keep TWO helicopter firms…
 
With total hindsight it's probably best to work out the desired end state and then work backwards.

e.g. trying to maintain national competition appears to be a desirable objective so how do you still end up with two providers? Probably only until the 80s/90s realistically when lack of projects and rising costs force a final consolidation

On the combat air side, every company apart from EE appears to have been on the back foot since they were awarded the P.1 and got supersonic experience. I think that spreading out so another company gets design and operating experience is a key objective. Which is "best" choice to give a counterpart to Warton is unclear; maybe Hawker Kingston / Brooklands from an airframe side, but dH might be a better bet for a "weapon system" approach if people want a real Phantom equivalent
 
The simple list hides the already complex aviation groups that had existed since pre-WW2 in many cases. Internal rationalisations there might produce stronger more focussed design teams.

Hawker Siddeley:-
Armstrong Whitworth
Avro
Hawker
Gloster

De Havilland:-
Airspeed
De Havilland

Handley Page:-
Handley Page
Handley Page Reading (formerly Miles Aircraft)

F G MIles (new company producing light aircraft)

Blackburn & General Aircraft (companies merged 1949. the GA part wasn't dropped until later in the 1950s)

Percival (part of Hunting Group since 1944)

Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd (single company incorporating Vickers Aviation & Supermarine as separate design teams and product lines)

Heston (mainly a sub-contractor to other aircraft companies. Componenet supplier only after 1952)

Saunders Roe (acquired Cierva Autogyro Company in 1951 and with it the Skeeter helicopter project)

Then add in the problem that some of these companies also have non-aviation related businesses as part of their structures. Those are things that just add to the problems your unfortunate senior civil servant must tackle.
 
Drats - 27 - TWENTY SEVEN aircraft companies ? Sweet geez, and I thought 1935 France was bad, with "only" 18 companies to be amalgamated...

All I can say is "Good luck !"

France did it in 1936 the most atrocious way (eviscerating private companies, then creating franken-companies based on geography - WDF ?)
It didn't helped in 1940 - not at all.
It took until 1952 for some positive effects to be felt at last... and until 1970 for the last two - Nord Aviation & Sud Aviation - to merge at last.
So it took France 34 years... !

If I can offer some advice: if you want to trim and agglomerate companies, best way is to specialize some of them on peculiar aerospace innovations.
I mean, things like helicopters, missiles (of every kind: AAMs to ICBMs, anti-tank, and the kitchen sink), bizjets, airliners, commuters, jet trainers - whatever it takes to trim the number of combat aircraft companies. And kept them healthy with juicy R&D contracts.

This is what De Gaulle and his Defense Minister Messmer did in the 1960's. Dassault had combat aircraft, Breguet got Jaguar and Atlantic, Sud Aviation got airliners, rockets and helicopters (from memory) Nord specialized in all kind of missiles.
 
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Okay, what about the neoliberal option.
Don't force consolidation. Award the contracts to the companies which submit the cheapest compliant response to the ITT. Allow the successful companies to expand, or to take over the unsuccessful ones for their assets. Let the rest wither away.

It shouldn't take more than a year before you're applying for a job with one of these new 'thought aquariums' after the Civil Service fails to recognise your brilliance.
 
This is probably cheating, but I've arrived at thirteen companies by amalgamation into 'Aircraft Group'. No idea on workforce sizes or total design teams.

Closed firms would be:

Chrislea - Absorbed into Auster (design rights only; Heston plant closed)
Elliott’s of Newbury - Closed; designs absorbed by Slingsby (as OTL 1966)
English Electric - Closed; components merged into 2 other firms (below)
Heston Aircraft - Absorbed by de Havilland (Heston Aerodrome retained?)
Miles Aircraft - As per RW, absorbed into HP as Handley Page (Reading) Ltd
Scottish Aviation - Absorbed into HP as Handley Page (Prestwick) Ltd

Merged firms would be:

Airspeed Ltd. - Merged into DH (assuming DH needs Plymouth plant)
English Electric - Broken down into 2 x main plants
EE Preston, Lancs - Merged into Blackburn Aircraft
EE Samlesbury, Lancs - Merged into de Havilland
Percival Aircraft Ltd - Merged into Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd
-- Under Restrictive Practices law, Hunting Group was forced to divest
Portsmouth Aviation - Merged into DH (assuming DH needs Plymouth plant)
Short Brothers and Harland Ltd - Merged into shareholder Bristol Aeroplane

The revised aviation industry would consist of:

1 : Auster Aircraft Limited; Rearsby, Leics

2 : Blackburn-General Aircraft Group (BGAB)
- Blackburn-General Aircraft Limited = Blackburn Brough Division
- Blackburn-Warton Aircraft Limited = Blackburn Warton Division

3 : Bristol Aircraft Group (BrAG)
- Bristol Aeroplane Company; Filton, Glos
- Bristol Helicopters Division; Filton, Glos
- Boulton Paul Aircraft Ltd; Wolverhampton
- Short Brothers Aircraft Ltd; Belfast, NI

4 : De Havilland Aircraft Group (DHAG)
- de Havilland Aircraft Company; Hatfield, Herts
-- de Havilland Defence System (DDS); Lostock, Lancs
-- DDS = whif; formerly de Havilland Propellers (RW, OTL)
-- de Havilland Engine Company; Leavesden, Herts
- de Havilland Heston Division (merged Heston Aircraft Company)
- de Havilland Portsmouth Division; ex-Airspeed & Portsmouth Aviation
- de Havilland Samlesbury Division (EE Lancs factory; Vampires, etc.)

5 : Fairey Aviation Company Limited; Hayes, Stockport, Ringway
- Fairey Aviation Company Limited (as in OTL)
- Fairey Aviation Helicopter Division

6 : Folland Aircraft Limited; Hamble & Chilbolton, Hamps

7 : F. G. Miles Limited; Shoreham, West Sussex
- F. G. Miles encouraged for experiments only

8 : Handley Page Aircraft Group (HPAG)
- Handley Page Limited; Radlett, Herts
- Handley Page (Reading) Ltd; formerly Miles Aircraft
- Handley Page (Prestwick) Ltd; formerly Scottish Aviation

9 : Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Group (HSAG)
- Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft; Bitteswell, Leics
- A. V. Roe and Company; Woodford (Stockport)
- Gloster Aircraft Company; Hucclecote, Glos
- Hawker Aircraft; Kingston upon Thames (London)

10: Saunders-Roe Aircraft Group (SRAG)
- Saunders-Roe Limited (corporate); East Cowes, IoW
- Saro-Cierva Helicopters Division (Skeeter, Scout, etc.)
- Saunders-Roe (Anglesey) Ltd, Beaumaris, North Wales (hovercraft)

11 : Slingsby Sailplanes Ltd; Kirkbymoorside, Yorks
- Elliott’s of Newbury -- whif; Merged (fold into Slingsby; as OTL 1966)

12: Vickers-Armstrong Aviation Group (VAAG)
- Vickers-Armstrong Aviation Ltd; Westminster (London)
- Vickers-Supermarine Aviation Ltd; Woolston (Southampton)
- Vickers-Percival Aviation Ltd; Luton, Bedfordshire

13: Westland Aircraft Limited; Yeovil, Somerset
 
Airspeed Christchurch ought to go to Saro....could pool with Folland and F.G.Miles.....
 
It shouldn't take more than a year before you're applying for a job with one of these new 'thought aquariums' after the Civil Service fails to recognise your brilliance.
Generally the UK job market isn't this flexible and so people don't tend to move around the country (much) or change company. Far more likely to simply move to a different sector.

I'm not sure competition really works at this time; the main reason MoS/MoP/MoA ordered more than one typpe was the expedtation that one would be a duffer. e.g. Supermarine have a long history in poor and mediocre designs, then you get Spitfire, and then go back to poor and mediocre designs... there isn't much consistency*. So if you decide on the basis of one competition then its probably fluke.


* Apart from Hawkers fighter line which was much more evolutionary, but then this means lots of separate designs and the effort associated with this

** e.g. Glosters built the early jets because they didn't have much other design work (basically due to offering inferior designs). Picking them as one of the "winners" in 1950 would have been a disaster
 
Airspeed Christchurch ought to go to Saro....could pool with Folland and F.G.Miles.....
This is supposed to be 1950. Which means tearing it out of DH. (DH had acquired it in 1940.) A complete integration was achieved in 1951. What does that do to DH through the rest of the decade? Does it then have enough design capacity for Comet with its problems and starting various designs leading to the DH121 (later HS Trident) in the mid-1950s?
 
This is supposed to be 1950. Which means tearing it out of DH. (DH had acquired it in 1940.) A complete integration was achieved in 1951. What does that do to DH through the rest of the decade? Does it then have enough design capacity for Comet with its problems and starting various designs leading to the DH121 (later HS Trident) in the mid-1950s?
True, so either you carve it out or you roll Saro into DH. I just don't see the logic otherwise.
 
With total hindsight it's probably best to work out the desired end state and then work backwards.
Yes but hindsight can skew things, someone with the perspective of 1950 could not forsee what the industry would look like in 1977 when only three were left (BAe, Shorts, Westland).
There is no desired end state here other than to make a sustainable industry for the 1950s and into 1960s.

The simple list hides the already complex aviation groups that had existed since pre-WW2 in many cases. Internal rationalisations there might produce stronger more focussed design teams.
This is true. I didn't group them so as to retain some flexibility. Hawker Siddeley the only major grouping and yet still operated much as separate entities well into the late 1950s. Given the excess factory space it found itself with by the mid-50s, its not impossible that Hawker Siddeley might have entertained an offer for one of its sub-companies.

If I can offer some advice: if you want to trim and agglomerate companies, best way is to specialize some of them on peculiar aerospace innovations.
I mean, things like helicopters, missiles (of every kind: AAMs to ICBMs, anti-tank, and the kitchen sink), bizjets, airliners, commuters, jet trainers - whatever it takes to trim the number of combat aircraft companies. And kept them healthy with juicy R&D contracts.
British firms tended to fall within type cast roles, Handley Page for example never designed fighters (apart from one dalliance in the 1920s), Blackburn and Fairey had the naval market sewn up between them. Missiles is an interesting point and one that we've often discussed - whether this job should be entrusted to the aircraft manufacturers because they fly or to the electronics industry or a combination?

Okay, what about the neoliberal option.
Don't force consolidation. Award the contracts to the companies which submit the cheapest compliant response to the ITT. Allow the successful companies to expand, or to take over the unsuccessful ones for their assets. Let the rest wither away.
I'd say that this was the plan that came about (i.e. same as inaction), but it took too long and required a lot of capital. Sandys adopted the contract approach in the end, but not really based on cost. Cheapest doesn't necessarily mean the best - RAF Fighter Command getting Gnats instead of Lightnings?

This is probably cheating, but I've arrived at thirteen companies by amalgamation into 'Aircraft Group'. No idea on workforce sizes or total design teams.
Some interesting choices there.
Why did you decide to split English Electric? What happens to the Canberra and P.1A?

Generally the UK job market isn't this flexible and so people don't tend to move around the country (much) or change company. Far more likely to simply move to a different sector.
Very true, although the industry did tend to be concentrated in certain geographical regions. But you are correct, other industries were competing for the same labour.

True, so either you carve it out or you roll Saro into DH. I just don't see the logic otherwise.
I don't think that Airspeed really existed as such in 1950, Christchurch by this time was firmly under DH control and no real design work was taking place other than Ambassador development.
 
Generally the UK job market isn't this flexible and so people don't tend to move around the country (much) or change company. Far more likely to simply move to a different sector.
That paragraph is meant to indicate that the suggestion is mostly in jest. And it would be our erstwhile civil servant who's out on their ear following a failed reform, looking for a job at a London-based think tank!
Cheapest doesn't necessarily mean the best - RAF Fighter Command getting Gnats instead of Lightnings?
Cheapest compliant, remember - if a Gnat meets the requirement for a Lightning, the specification was very badly written. There are plenty of issues with this of course, as Red Admiral rightly identifies.

In reality, I'd want to consolidate down to 3 or 4, mostly by getting the existing groups to act like one company.
 
Why did you decide to split English Electric? What happens to the Canberra and P.1A?

The English Electric split mainly arose from a sense that the firm should focus on it original core strength - power generation - rather than airframe design. But it was also prompted by the events of late 1949. In his usual snit, Teddy Petter went AWOL in Dec 1949 before finally resigning in Feb 1950. I'm assuming that my MoS alter ego would known that EE's chief designer had or was about to decamp. But would the MoS be aware of Frederick Page true capabilities? Probably not. As such, safer to keep Petter's design team together ... but now bolstering Blackburn's design department.

I realize that I've failed to distinguish between Preston and Warton. But both would go to Blackburn. As Warton geared up for Canberra B.2 production, Preston's Vampire production is moved to Brough to keep the line busy (in the aftermath of the MoS effectively killing the B.48 Firecrest and the B.52's loss of T7/45 to Boulton Paul). In OTL, Blackburn absorbed General Aircraft in order to produce the GAL.60 Universal Freighter. 'm thinking that work could have been better suited to Bristol. [1]

I'm seeing the big B.101 Beverley and planned B.104 medium transport project as unwelcome distractions to naval aircraft design and production at Blackburn. That might also lead to some other re-arrangements of work. One thought is Blackburn production of the Fairey Gannet (in part compensation for the B.88/Y.B.1 being eliminated and to allow Fairey to focus on F.D.2 development and helicopter production).

Meanwhile, the P.1A design would continue at Warton, leading to the Lightning. But would it be the Blackburn Lightning? Regardless of namings, I like the idea of the aerodynamicist team of Frederick Page and Ray Creasey turning their collection attention to the embryonic B.103 Buccaneer

___________________________________

[1] Bristol Beverley work could be divided between Shorts Belfast-built fuselages and wings/empennage sub-contracted to Saunders-Roe (Anglesey) - a similar work split as was done with the Short Shetland.
 
I think the problem is not the companies but the customer. Britain had both military (RAF, RN and Army) and civilian (BOAC and BEA- both state controled) customers who chopped and changed their requirements while demanding too many specifications that other countries did not share.
This was compounded by the low numbers that were bought in the end. Add to that a tendency to panic buy US types when over specification had killed off the home grown product.
A better approach might have been to shadow the US with its larger production runs and drive a hard bargain on subcontracts.
West Germany had to do this with both the Luftwaffe and Lufthansa.
Picking winners is not easy even in the US with its private airlines and large companies.
The Boeing 707 had to compete with the Douglas DC8 and the Convair CV880 but once it became a USAF staple it scooped the pool.
Although the Boeing 727 and 737 were clear winners they had to compete with the Douglas DC9.
The UK ended up with more losers (Britannia, Comet, Trident, VC10) than winners (Viscount, 748, 146).
Lufthansa was able to pick winners (Boeings and Viscounts).
 
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The UK military sector offers a difficult landscape for picking winners.
The English Electric Canberra and Hawker Hunter stand out as winners. Both proved effective in their original roles and very versatile in other roles.
The most complex procurement of the period could have gone wrong badly if the Short Sperrin and the Vickers Valiant had been chosen and the more difficult Avro Vulcan and Handley Page Victor been abandoned. Hindsight might have just ordered Vulcans.
The Lightning achieved hardly any exports (Saudi and Kuwait barely count) and was marginal in its interceptor role with just two Firestreak/Red Top. On the other hand US contemporaries (Starfighter and Delta Dagger) were not much better.
The eventual British Aircraft Corporation (Lightning, Canberra, Viscount, 111) and Hawker Siddeley (Hunter, Harrier, 748) emerge on the back of the winners. The government projects aimed at amalgamating them are pretty unsuccessful (Concorde, Trident, VC10, TSR2).
Competition for the limited number of UK and export orders might have seen Avro, Hawkers, English Electric and Vickers as the only big companies to survive even without state intervention. Shorts can be left out because circumstances in N Ireland made their survival essential.
The nationalised then privatised British Aerospace has even fewer winners in its stable (Hawk and 146) so that by the 21 Century it is solely a military manufacturer. English Electric (Typhoon) and Hawkers (Hawk) survive.
 
Certainly the government could have supported the rationalisation more successfully.
It may come down to subsidising the movement of staff, which hits another 50's bugbear.......housing (how modern!)
 
The English Electric split mainly arose from a sense that the firm should focus on it original core strength - power generation - rather than airframe design. But it was also prompted by the events of late 1949. In his usual snit, Teddy Petter went AWOL in Dec 1949 before finally resigning in Feb 1950. I'm assuming that my MoS alter ego would known that EE's chief designer had or was about to decamp. But would the MoS be aware of Frederick Page true capabilities? Probably not. As such, safer to keep Petter's design team together ... but now bolstering Blackburn's design department.

I realize that I've failed to distinguish between Preston and Warton. But both would go to Blackburn. As Warton geared up for Canberra B.2 production, Preston's Vampire production is moved to Brough to keep the line busy (in the aftermath of the MoS effectively killing the B.48 Firecrest and the B.52's loss of T7/45 to Boulton Paul). In OTL, Blackburn absorbed General Aircraft in order to produce the GAL.60 Universal Freighter. 'm thinking that work could have been better suited to Bristol. [1]

I'm seeing the big B.101 Beverley and planned B.104 medium transport project as unwelcome distractions to naval aircraft design and production at Blackburn. That might also lead to some other re-arrangements of work. One thought is Blackburn production of the Fairey Gannet (in part compensation for the B.88/Y.B.1 being eliminated and to allow Fairey to focus on F.D.2 development and helicopter production).

Meanwhile, the P.1A design would continue at Warton, leading to the Lightning. But would it be the Blackburn Lightning? Regardless of namings, I like the idea of the aerodynamicist team of Frederick Page and Ray Creasey turning their collection attention to the embryonic B.103 Buccaneer

___________________________________

[1] Bristol Beverley work could be divided between Shorts Belfast-built fuselages and wings/empennage sub-contracted to Saunders-Roe (Anglesey) - a similar work split as was done with the Short Shetland.
Thanks for the detailed rationale. There is a fair bit here that makes sense.

It seems that Blackburn took on the GAL.60 because they needed work at Brough. I guess they thought it would be a short-term project to get it in the air and into production - but then redesigning for the Centaurus and MoS interference upping the payload requirement to 50,000lb delayed things by 3-4 years.
Ironically the Korean War would soon see them building Boulton Paul Balliols as a sub-contractor and other aircraft. Having them build Gannets is a good idea though.

General Aircraft Ltd had already begun diversifying into other area away from airframes. The GAL.60 was a hangover from the war. Only 1 prototype had been ordered and seems to have limped on with no real RAF desire to push on with development. The first production order didn't materialise until 1952.
So the choice would seem to be either to give the GAL.60 to a firm with space or to sacrifice it. Means losing the Beverley but something else would have turned up.

Blackburn had stalled in terms of good designs in about 1933... so anything that boosts their design team is worthwhile. I agree that Frederick Page's team would be a great asset.

There was perhaps another reason for Blackburn to acquire General Aircraft. General had been working with Prof. G. T. R. Hill on a supersonic variable sweep wing design. Blackburn took this work on after the merger and did some early VG wing designs around 1950-51 but then seem to have dropped the idea in the face of the aerodynamic and structural challenges. Presumably they lacked the R&D resources to really further this work and so Wallis' team at Weybridge slowly edged out a lead in this area.

I guess the Canberra is tricky, in 1950 it's still very much in development. But production was very soon spread wide across the industry (Avro, HP, Shorts) and later Shorts and Boulton Paul would pick up design work for conversions. So in a sense the Canberra became a 'national' project. So there could be a case once development of the first 5 marks were completed in leaving another design team (Shorts maybe) to do any further tinkering with new variants and upgrading.
 
Parts of Post 16.
West Germany had to do this with both the Luftwaffe and Lufthansa.
The Boeing 707 had to compete with the Douglas DC8 and the Convair CV880 but once it became a USAF staple it scooped the pool.
Although the Boeing 727 and 737 were clear winners they had to compete with the Douglas DC9.
For what it's worth Lufthansa was one of the few airliners that bought the Conway powered Boeing 707 (they were the first 5 of the 31 that it purchased) and they were important customers in the early days of the 727 and 737.

It purchased 54 Boeing 727s which were delivered 1964-79. It was also the second export customer (All Nippon Airways was first) and Lufthansa's first 727 was the 24th to be delivered overall.

Lufthansa was one of the launch customers of the 737 (with United) and the first 4 aircraft were delivered to Lufthansa and the 29 that it received 1967-71 represented about 10% of the 291 aircraft delivered to the end of 1971. (The 197 BAC.111s delivered to the end of 1971 don't look so bad in comparison.) The 30th Lufthansa Boeing 737 wasn't delivered until 1980.

It took a while for the 737 to become the clear winner over the DC-9 because MD delivered 648 DC-9s 1965-71 which was more than double the number of 737s delivered by Boeing. The Firm was catching up at the end of 1980 because the total number of 737s delivered had increased to 722 which was only about 80% of the 950 DC-9s delivered by MD to the end of 1980.

Of 1,136 aircraft delivered to the end of 1971 the market shares were MD 57%, Boeing 26% and BAC 17%. However, only 26 additional BAC.111s were delivered to the end of 1980 which mean that of the 1,895 aircraft delivered to that date the market shares were MD 50%, Boeing 38% and BAC only 12%. I think BAC would have sold a few more 111s to 1971 and a lot more to 1980 if Medway or a re-fanned Spey had been available.
 
... Ironically the Korean War would soon see them building Boulton Paul Balliols as a sub-contractor...

... There was perhaps another reason for Blackburn to acquire General Aircraft. General had been working with Prof. G. T. R. Hill on a supersonic variable sweep wing design. Blackburn took this work on after the merger and did some early VG wing designs around 1950-51 but then seem to have dropped the idea in the face of the aerodynamic and structural challenges. Presumably they lacked the R&D resources to really further this work ...

Blackburn sub-contracting on a Boulton Paul design is ironic indeed! Mind you, in the ATL, there would be a certain sense to naval specialist Blackburn producing the Sea Balliols.

As you say, Hill's VG work had great potential. With Fairey drifting off naval designs with the F.D.s, perhaps it would have made sense to pursue purely experimental VG designs with Blackburn ... with one eye on an operational VG carrier fighter, of course.
 
uk75 #16: the problem is not the companies but the customer.

For a 1950 AH I suggest 2 earlier PODs during Attlee's Labour (=Socialist) Govt, 7/45-10/51.
(Pause to guide non-Euro readers, that Euro mild-Left Parties favour a mixed economy:
* for a monopoly public good: Nationalised, because the cost to taxpayers of buying, then running enterprises is justified by avoiding the obscenity of private profit from public need;
* for any activity where competition is practical: free market enterprise/investment, rewarded by earned (and taxed) profit.
Whereas hard-Left sees profit as inherently contrary to public benefit: exploitative, burdensome.
Attlee's
lot were mild-Left: to take over the commanding heights of the economy, appointing a Nationalisation* of Industry Committee to choose "winners". That C'ttee chose Air Transport (oddly: not luxury liners), then addressed Air Manufacture, taking input from Cabinet Minister for Trade, 1930s hard-Left, 1941 UK Ambassador to USSR, 1942-45 Minister of Aircraft Production: Stafford Cripps, who urged Nationalisation of more than Shorts+Power Jets. Chairman Morrison decided not to waste money buying an industry already controlled 'cos it sucks at taxpayers' udders and jumps when Ministers say so*).

POD 1: If Attlee had Nationalised Air Manufacture in 1946 when he made 3 monopoly airline State Corpns (UK-Euro/S.America/the rest), then: Ministers, which means taxpayers, would have managed the rundown from >1Mn. Aero employees to...another number.
POD 2: The Bomb. In 1949, after Airlift, before Korea, while UK was in R&D on a copy of Fat Man and on 3 Medium Bombers to carry it:
Attlee was about to secure loan Bomb+B-47B from Truman, so removing cost of AW Independence...but Sov spies were uncovered on UK's AW programme, sending US/UK relations into the deep freezer (until post-Suez, post Sputnik). He must press on with the expense of AW Independence, ordered 25 Valiants, many Base-defending fighters and SAMs, and initiated production facilities for fissile weapons.

Churchill's Conservatives got back in, 10/51 unable to spend Korean cascades of cash allocated to UK Defence by Attlee and by Truman. Almost everything we tried to fly...failed, at least for awhile. That was not caused by source of capital (Ownership), or business structure. It was also not UK-peculiar: if RAF had ever received B-47B we would have done with them what USAF did...which was not much because it was useless, like most MOD 0 kit in those early days of to be Weapon Systems - UK's, US', USSR's. Meteor showers were a USSR secret weapon; Swift's craters helped drain the fens.

I doubt any structural overhaul would have caused UK Aero to build more better, sooner. Just as I doubt the near-total Nationalisation of Aero-France as having been instrumental in its commercial performance, nor FRG-Aero's private businesses with State investment benefit.
There is Luck in bringing the right stuff to market just when needed: Napolean chose Generals who he judged would be lucky.

(*amended 27/1/24: Socialisation Committee. Cripps' position was to buy, but H.Morrison decided the political priority of buying Aero was less than such other claims as Road Transport, so chose not to Nationalise).
 
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I have now done some diving and fleshed out the starting point of September 1950 with factory sites, design work that's going on and manufacturing work, whether that's assembling prototypes or production aircraft or other bits and pieces. Plus at the bottom is some forthcoming specs and requirements that the Air Ministry is polishing up for issuing within the next 6 months so probably too late to stop tendering before any reorganisation can be decided upon. So now all the runners and riders can be assessed as to what's going on - or what's not going for some companies. I've bundled the Hawker Siddeley group at the top this time.

I have recently read that in this period the MoS was keen to persuade companies to vacate the London/southeast area due to A-Bomb warfare worries, although it seems this wasn't a major issue, geographically they seemed to like Hampshire and Surrey the best and the Midlands.

Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Ltd

Armstrong Whitworth
Sites: Bitteswell, Leics; Baginton, Coventry
Design Work: Seaslug naval SAM, Meteor AW fighter, AW.58 transonic research to E.16/49
Manufacturing Work: Avro Lincoln, AW.55 Apollo, Meteor fighters & NF.11, earmarked for Sea Hawk production

A.V. Roe (Avro)
Sites: Chadderton, Manchester; Woodford, Stockport; Bracebridge Heath, Lincs (aircraft repair)
Design Work: Type 698 Vulcan to B.35/46, Type 715 feederliner, Type 716 Shackleton ‘Mk.3’
Manufacturing Work: Anson T.21, Tudor & Ashton, Shackleton, Athena T.2 (prototypes, no production order yet), Type 707, earmarked for Canberra production

Gloster
Sites: Hucclecote, Glos
Design Work: Javelin to F.4/48
Manufacturing Work: Meteor, Javelin (FF due late 1951)

Hawker
Sites: Kingston upon Thames, Surrey; Langley, Slough; Dunsfold, Surrey (under construction as airfield for Kingston & Langley); Squires Gate, Blackpool (under conversion for Hunter line, firm refused to move everything here)
Design Work: P.1067 fighter to F.3/48, P.1083 supersonic Hunter,
Manufacturing Work: Sea Fury FB.11 & T.20, P.1072 (rocket-powered P.1040 prototype, FF due late-1950s) Sea Hawk (serv entry due late-51, to be transferred to Armstrong Whitworth); P.1067 Hunter (FF due mid-51)

The Rest

Auster
Sites: Rearsby, Leics
Design Work: light aircraft, AOP.9
Manufacturing Work: light aircraft

Blackburn (General Aircraft) Ltd.
Sites: Brough, Yorks
Design Work: YA.7 to GR.17/45, Beverley, General Aircraft VG-wing concepts, HP.88 (aka Type 521 aka YB.2), B.83 & B.91 light naval ASW to NR/A.32
Manufacturing Work: YA.7 (last prototype)

Boulton Paul Aircraft
Sites: Wolverhampton
Design Work: P.119 jet trainer
Manufacturing Work: Wellington T.10 conversions, Meteor sub-contracts, P.111 (FF due late-1950), Balliol T.2 (prototypes, no mass production order yet), Sea Balliol T.21

Bristol
Sites: Filton, Glos; Weston-Super-Mare, Somerset
Design Work: Type 171 Sycamore development, Type 173 tandem helicopter to E.4/47, Type 175 Britannia to 2/47, JTV.1 ramjet test vehicle, Red Duster SAM to OR.1124
Manufacturing Work: Type 167 Brabazon, Type 170 Freighter, Type 171 Sycamore (HC.11 to be ordered in 1951)

Chrislea
Sites: Exeter Airport
Design Work: very little if any
Manufacturing Work: Ace, Skyjeep

de Havilland
Sites: Hatfield, Herts; Hawarden, Chester; Leavesden, Herts (DH Engines)
Design Work: Heron, DH.110 to F.4/48, Sea Venom, naval NF Venom to NR/A.30, Comet development
Manufacturing Work: Sea Hornet F.20 & NF.21, Dove, Vampire, Vampire NF.10, Sea Vampire F.21, Venom FB.1 early production & NF.2 prototypes, Sea Venom prototypes, Chipmunk T.10 (kits, assembled by Percival), Comet 1, DH.110 Vixen (FF due late-1951)
Airspeed
Sites: Christchurch; Portsmouth
Design Work: Ambassador variant
Manufacturing Work: Ambassador, Vampire T.11 prototype (FF Nov 50),

Elliott’s of Newbury
Sites: Newbury
Design Work: gliders
Manufacturing Work: gliders

English Electric
Sites: Preston & Samlesbury & Warton, Lancs
Design Work: Canberra variants, P.1 to F.23/49, Red Shoes SAM for Army
Manufacturing Work: Vampire, FB.5, Canberra prototypes & early production (first B.2 FF October 50)

Fairey
Sites: Hayes, Hamps; Heaton Chapel, Stockport; Ringway, Manchester
Design Work: Type Q Gannet to GR.17/45, Jet Gyrodyne, N.14/49 naval AW fighter (just cancelled), Blue Sky beam-riding AAM, Delta 2 to ER.103
Manufacturing Work: Vampire FB.9, Firefly Mk.6 naval aircraft & preparing to build AS.7 FF mid-1951), Type Q Gannet prototypes

Flight Refuelling Ltd.
Sites: Tarrant Rushton
Design Work: aerial refuelling equipment, conversions
Manufacturing work: Bristol Brigand T.4 radar trainer conversions

Folland
Sites: Hamble & Chilbolton, Hamps
Design Work: lightweight fighter concepts by Petter (no OR.303 yet issued), RTV.2 SAM testbed (leading to early Red Dean AAM work)
Manufacturing Work: RTV.2

Handley Page
Sites: Radlett, Herts
Design Work: HP80 Victor to B.35/46
Manufacturing Work: Hastings, HP.88 (aka Type 521 aka YB.2 – FF due mid-51), earmarked for Canberra production

Handley Page (Reading)
Sites: Reading, Berks
Design Work: HPR.3 Herald
Manufacturing Work: Miles M.60/HPR.1 Marathon, HPR.2 T.1 prototypes

Heston Aircraft
Sites: Heston Aerodrome
Manufacturing Work: conversions/repairs/overhauls

FG Miles
Sites: Redhill Aerodrome, Surrey (looking to move to Shoreham, West Sussex in 1951)
Design Work: M.77 Sparrowjet, other work
Manufacturing Work: very little, last 3 M.75 Aries

Percival
Sites: Luton, Beds
Design Work: Provost, P.70 naval ASW aircraft (PV), ramjet-powered helicopter concept (became P.74 in 1951)
Manufacturing Work: Prince, Sea Prince C.1 (& T.1 FF due mid-1951), assembly of DHC Chipmunk T.10, Provost T.1 prototypes

Portsmouth Aviation
Sites: Portsmouth
Manufacturing Work: conversions/repairs/overhauls

Reid & Sigrist
Sites: New Maldon, Surrey
Manufacturing Work: mainly instruments but converting RS.3 Desford into RS.4 Bobsleigh for prone-pilot research

Saunders-Roe (Saro)
Sites: East Cowes, IoW; Eastleigh (ex-Cierva site); Beaumaris, North Wales
Design Work: various civil and military flying boats, flying boat to OR.231, P.121 hydroski fighter, P.135 Duchess flying boat, Skeeter helicopter development
Manufacturing Work: SR.45 Princess, Skeeter prototypes

Scottish Aviation
Sites: Prestwick
Design Work: conversions
Manufacturing Work: Pioneer, conversions/repairs/overhauls

Short Brothers & Harland
Sites: Belfast
Design Work: flying boat to OR.231, SA.4 Sperrin, SB.1 swept-wing glider, ER.100 about to be issued for SB.5 for EE P.1 programme, SB.6 light naval ASW to NR/A.32
Manufacturing Work: Sealand flying boat, SB.3 (last prototype), SA.4 Sperrin (FF due mid-1951), earmarked for Canberra production

Slingsby
Sites: Kirkbymoorside, Yorks
Design Work: gliders
Manufacturing Work: gliders including Prefect TX.1

Vickers-Supermarine
Sites: Woolston, Chilbolton & South Marston, Hamps
Design Work: flying boat to OR.231, Type 525, Type 541 Swift, advanced Swift (to become Type 545)
Manufacturing Work: Attacker, Type 508 (FF due mid-1951); Type 541 Swift (FF due mid-1951)

Vickers
Sites: Weybridge & Wisley & Brooklands, Surrey;
Design Work: Viscount development, Type 660 Valiant to B.9/48, Valiant Mk.2 to OR.285 (selected in Nov 50), Blue Boar TV-guided bomb to OR.1059
Manufacturing Work: Valetta T.3, Varsity T.1, Type 701 Viscount, Type 660 Valiant (FF due mid-1951)

Westland
Sites: Yeovil, Somerset
Design Work: Wyvern S.4 naval attack, light naval ASW to NR/A.32, in talks with Sikorsky for S-55 licence
Manufacturing Work: Dragonfly HC.2 & civil WS-51

Forthcoming Requirements/Specifications for 1951
UB.109T/AST.1097 for unmanned short-range expendable bomber
ER.110T for VG-wing research aircraft
N.114T/NR/A.14 for naval 2-seat AW fighter
NR/A.17 for Vickers-Supermarine Scimitar
GD.197/51 for naval short-range SAM
OR.300 for Percival Pembroke
OR.301/F.124T for rocket interceptor
OR.303 for light interceptor (based on Folland proposals)
OR.312 for Intermediate Navigation Trainer
OR.313 for Maritime Reconnaissance Trainer
OR.1117 for IR-guided AAM
AST.202 for ramjet-powered 150-mile SAM
 
POD 1: If Attlee had Nationalised Air Manufacture in 1946 when he made 3 monopoly airline State Corpns (UK-Euro/S.America/the rest), then: Ministers, which means taxpayers, would have managed the rundown from >1Mn. Aero employees to...another number.
I have thought about POD 1. There had been state control of the industry since the formation of MAP in 1940 and before that from the Air Ministry in relation to the Shadow Factory Scheme in the 1930s. So it would take little leap for Attlee's government to have taken over the core of the industry between 1945-50. The result would probably be called 'British Aircraft Corporation' (ironically).

How that would work I am not sure. Technically it would make all the aircraft designers civil servants and would probably even out their pay if nothing else! Some would probably emigrate if they lost money, but competing against unemployed German engineers on the same market. Some might stay. The aviation world still had its pioneers alive and the prima donna designers of household fame - something the other nationalised industries didn't have to contend with (even with British Rail, BREL wasn't formed until 1970 to combine all the manufacturing and repair depots and even then strongly relied on private industry).
Would aero engines be included as well or a separate British Aero Engines Corporation formed? Missiles could be separated out into a different Corporation (the British Missiles of the film I'm All Right Jack maybe?).

Would design and production be separated?
The Ministry of Munitions had created National Aircraft Factories in 1917, MAP had regional controllers instead for coordination. So it could have rearranged production based on capacity rather than brand loyalty on a much wider basis. How well that would have worked is open to question, but the MoS was already thinking hard about workloads and capacity and abilities anyway so its little different.

If design is separated, how many design teams do you make? Do you make them focus on certain areas or can they all compete for the same requirements on a level playing field? How do you assign R&D facilities and ensure that they all have roughly equal access to cutting edge equipment?

What role does the Royal Aircraft Establishment - also under MoS control - play? Do they integrate more into the R&D facilities? Do they become the figurehead where the design teams coalesce, dare they risk a repeat of the Royal Aircraft Factory?

In short, lots of questions, lots of headaches, but not necessarily impossible given the Soviet OKB and Zavod organisation worked (in its own way).

POD 2: The Bomb. In 1949, after Airlift, before Korea, while UK was in R&D on a copy of Fat Man and on 3 Medium Bombers to carry it:
POD 2 is probably this thread as it stands, the biggest project is the V-Force and its notable that in 1950 there are still Hornets, Fireflies and Sea Furies in production, alongside early mark Meteors and Vampires. There is actually very little fighter development work ongoing beyond the Hunter/Swift beginnings and the V-Force consumes the efforts of 4 companies already.

There is Luck in bringing the right stuff to market just when needed: Napolean chose Generals who he judged would be lucky.
There is a big element of this I think. Sometimes trying to second guess the markets too much led to mistakes.
 
13 companies with only 10 design teams? Nope, the 3 companies without design teams are going to die, they're only good for subcontracting for production. Move the factories and workers if you have to. Edit: or merge the factories if they're actively producing. If the factory needs significant rebuilding due to wartime damages, you can move the factory someplace else to consolidate.

With total hindsight it's probably best to work out the desired end state and then work backwards.
Agreed.

Two helicopter makers, 8-10 aircraft makers.

I'd generally want to clump makers like this:
The simple list hides the already complex aviation groups that had existed since pre-WW2 in many cases. Internal rationalisations there might produce stronger more focussed design teams.

Hawker Siddeley:-
Armstrong Whitworth
Avro
Hawker
Gloster

De Havilland:-
Airspeed
De Havilland

Handley Page:-
Handley Page
Handley Page Reading (formerly Miles Aircraft)

F G MIles (new company producing light aircraft)

Blackburn & General Aircraft (companies merged 1949. the GA part wasn't dropped until later in the 1950s)

Percival (part of Hunting Group since 1944)

Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd (single company incorporating Vickers Aviation & Supermarine as separate design teams and product lines)

Heston (mainly a sub-contractor to other aircraft companies. Componenet supplier only after 1952)

Saunders Roe (acquired Cierva Autogyro Company in 1951 and with it the Skeeter helicopter project)
And Westland, building helicopters under license.

I choose Westland and Saro as the helicopter makers, but make sure Saro gets a production license for something as well. Maybe Hueys, maybe Chinooks. Basically to keep both sets of engineers involved in something involving helicopters. Both can also play in fixed wings if their engineering staff aren't busy, but concentrating on helicopters.

=====
Once the consolidation is done, there's the 3-4 Operational Requirements a year. Very loosely, both RAF and RN need:
  • Interceptors to defend the Home Islands
  • Bombers to take the fight deep to the enemy (may only be an RAF thing)
  • escort fighters to protect the bombers on the way there
  • fighter-bombers/attack planes to support the army/strike from carriers
  • AEW
  • ASW (may only be an RN thing)
  • Transports
That's 7 different basic types, not counting helicopters. Helo types we'd be looking at are:
  • ASW for RN
  • tactical transport for Army and Royal Marines
  • heavy transport (Chinook to Sea Stallion size) for RAF, Army and Royal Marines.
  • Attack helicopters after the 1960s for Army.
Can probably space those out a bit and add one helicopter OR to each year's ORs. Yes, I know the RAF runs the heavy helicopters for some odd reason.

In the 1940s and 1950s technology is advancing very quickly. The US had several fighter types that were obsolete by the time they made their service entry, for example. I don't think you're going to be able to avoid this.

So I would alternate RAF and RN for the Operational Requirements yearly.

Example: RAF Interceptor, Bomber, and Escort Fighter ORs plus tactical helicopter OR in 1951; RN Interceptor, Attacker, and Escort Fighter ORs plus ASW helicopter in 1952; RAF Fighter-Bombers, AEW, and Transports plus Heavy Transport Helicopter ORs in 1953; RN AEW, Shore ASW, Carrier ASW, and COD Transport in 1954; repeat cycle starting with RAF Interceptor, Bomber, and Escort Fighter ORs in 1954... Goal here is to be able to adopt a new type of aircraft about every 4-5 years.

The challenge is really the engines. You need much more fuel-efficient engines than the early jets were to make strategic jet bombers viable. You also need much more powerful engines to make carrier based jets viable. So there also need to be some developmental ORs or bonus targets in the works, too. So there will probably be some Interim contracts for a type of aircraft and then one that fully meets the OR.

Example: the Westland Whirlwind before the Gnome engine was available, or the Whirlwinds needing separate hunter and killer helos because engines weren't powerful enough to carry both the entire sonar set and torpedoes.
 
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Forthcoming Requirements/Specifications for 1951
UB.109T/AST.1097 for unmanned short-range expendable bomber
ER.110T for VG-wing research aircraft
N.114T/NR/A.14 for naval 2-seat AW fighter
NR/A.17 for Vickers-Supermarine Scimitar
GD.197/51 for naval short-range SAM
OR.300 for Percival Pembroke
OR.301/F.124T for rocket interceptor
OR.303 for light interceptor (based on Folland proposals)
OR.312 for Intermediate Navigation Trainer
OR.313 for Maritime Reconnaissance Trainer
OR.1117 for IR-guided AAM
AST.202 for ramjet-powered 150-mile SAM
So when I look at that list I go:
  • Leave the Trainers unchanged. They're pretty cheap and simple regardless.
  • Leave OR.1117/Firestreak. It produced a viable weapon at least. I don't think you'd want to make this any harder, and a simpler Falcon/Sidewinder weapon is a very different path.
  • Maybe pare back the SAMs into something less stretching; more focus on developing just a working system to gain experience rather than trying to jump a few decades ahead. Trying for more Land/Sea commonality would be good too.
  • I have difficulty seeing that UB.109 would really be missed given that existing combat aircraft, and increasing numbers of Canberras and then V-bombers could do the same short range conventional bombing mission. Can it after some initial concept design contracts suggest the guidance is just too hard and will take many years to mature.
  • ER.110; is this really needed alongside the Wild Goose models, wind tunnel testing etc.? Still plenty to learn about swept wings in general at this point let alone vg. Can it and continue on lower level research.
  • Combine NR/A.14 and .17 into a single aircraft programme: a naval, twin seat AW fighter and/or Strike aircraft. Hopefully able to do both at once, but probably different Mks e.g. one with AI radar and one without. Likely all twin engined. I have difficulty seeing that a radar-less derivative of Sea Vixen is appreciably worse than Scimitar...
  • Can the light interceptors/fighters, they're just too small and there didn't seem to be that much interest from UK anyway. Light fighters appear throughout history but they've generally got the same downsides; this time just avoid spending resources down this road. Fighters sized for single Sapphire/Avon and bigger would be more practicable based on the experience to date, and you know that AAMs are coming etc. Say someone gets a downer on the praticality of mixed jet/rocket propulsion. Put the money into developing better reheat for Sapphire and Avon instead.
 
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Forthcoming Requirements/Specifications for 1951
UB.109T/AST.1097 for unmanned short-range expendable bomber
ER.110T for VG-wing research aircraft
N.114T/NR/A.14 for naval 2-seat AW fighter
NR/A.17 for Vickers-Supermarine Scimitar
GD.197/51 for naval short-range SAM
OR.300 for Percival Pembroke
OR.301/F.124T for rocket interceptor
OR.303 for light interceptor (based on Folland proposals)
OR.312 for Intermediate Navigation Trainer
OR.313 for Maritime Reconnaissance Trainer
OR.1117 for IR-guided AAM
AST.202 for ramjet-powered 150-mile SAM
12 items, but not all of those are Operational Requirements.

Let's see here...
  • UB.109T can probably drop back to a research program, the issue is guidance. Without an accurate guidance system you need a nuclear warhead. When did the UK develop their bomb? 1952? It's also an Air Staff Target, not an Operational Requirement.
  • ER.110T could be dropped entirely, VG aircraft won't really be an issue for more than a decade. In any case, that's an Engineering Requirement, not an Operational Requirement.
  • I'd look at combining NR/A.14 and NR/A.17, making the Scimitar both an AW fighter and a striker. Or at least two highly similar airframes, single seat attacker and two seat AW fighter.
  • OR.300, 312, and 313 could possibly be merged. The Pembroke is a light transport so has the weight available to carry Maritime recon systems and advanced navigation systems.
  • OR.301 can just go away. Rocket aircraft are a non-starter, only really usable as point defense interceptors and even basic glide bombs make them of questionable utility.
  • OR.303 can also just go away, light interceptors are not viable. Bombers take big guns to knock down.
  • AST.202 can stay, long range SAMs effectively replace rocket interceptors and even light interceptors. It's also not an Operational Requirement.
I'd keep the others, bringing it down to 7 or 8 things and 3 or 4 of those are missiles. I'm not exactly willing to count missiles against the OR limit.
  • N.114T/NR/A.14 for naval 2-seat AW fighter merged with NR/A.17 for Vickers-Supermarine Scimitar
  • OR.300 for Percival Pembroke merged with OR.312 for Intermediate Navigation Trainer and OR.313 for Maritime Reconnaissance Trainer
  • GD.197/51 for naval short-range SAM
  • OR.1117 for IR-guided AAM
  • AST.202 for ramjet-powered 150-mile SAM
  • UB.109T/AST.1097 for unmanned short-range expendable bomber
  • ER.110T for VG-wing research aircraft
2 aircraft, 3-4 missiles, and one research project that doesn't have to happen this year.
 
Scimitar is originally a heavy cannon armed day fighter.
It gets the 'interim' Anti-ship nuclear delivery role pending the arrival of N/A.39.
This becomes N113.
N114 is dealt with by '54 ordering a single prototype Type 556 Scimitar variant (two seater, AI.18, Firestreak/Red Dean, reheated Avons) FAW.

DH110 carries on from. 1952 with expected ISD 1953 then '54, then '56 and finally '58.
 
I choose Westland and Saro as the helicopter makers, but make sure Saro gets a production license for something as well. Maybe Hueys, maybe Chinooks. Basically to keep both sets of engineers involved in something involving helicopters. Both can also play in fixed wings if their engineering staff aren't busy, but concentrating on helicopters.
Personally I would go with Bristol over Saro, just because Bristol had a couple of projects on the go and Saro seemed to be making a meal of the Skeeter. But yes, I do agree that if the decision was made to licence-build designs to get overseas know-how quicker then spreading it between two companies is wise. Bristol/Saro could licence Bell or Sud types (Siouxs or Alouettes) for example.

So I would alternate RAF and RN for the Operational Requirements yearly.
I like your categories and your rolling plan seems feasible and would work out ok I would think.

The challenge is really the engines. You need much more fuel-efficient engines than the early jets were to make strategic jet bombers viable. You also need much more powerful engines to make carrier based jets viable. So there also need to be some developmental ORs or bonus targets in the works, too. So there will probably be some Interim contracts for a type of aircraft and then one that fully meets the OR.
Yes, engines are a bit 'chicken and egg', does the airframe need drive the engine you want or do you design the airframe for what engine you have? Rationalised aircraft would probably rationalise engine choices a bit too and focus on the key winners.
Definitely ORs for research aircraft would crop up as bonus extras.

Maybe pare back the SAMs into something less stretching; more focus on developing just a working system to gain experience rather than trying to jump a few decades ahead. Trying for more Land/Sea commonality would be good too.
Agreed. This is a Stage Plan hangover - this would end up being Blue Envoy I believe. Less stretch would be wiser.

I have difficulty seeing that UB.109 would really be missed given that existing combat aircraft, and increasing numbers of Canberras and then V-bombers could do the same short range conventional bombing mission.
UB.109T can probably drop back to a research program, the issue is guidance. Without an accurate guidance system you need a nuclear warhead.
I never have liked UB.109. I'm unsure how much real design work got to industry, a lot of it seemed to be RAE sketching ideas. I agree it should be canned, the guidance tech just isn't there in 1951, and wouldn't be for another decade.

ER.110; is this really needed alongside the Wild Goose models, wind tunnel testing etc.? Still plenty to learn about swept wings in general at this point let alone vg. Can it and continue on lower level research.
ER.110T could be dropped entirely, VG aircraft won't really be an issue for more than a decade. In any case, that's an Engineering Requirement, not an Operational Requirement.
ER.110 predated Wild Goose slightly. ER.110 resulted in no hardware, but given Korea and other needs its open to whether this is really needed now.

OR.300, 312, and 313 could possibly be merged. The Pembroke is a light transport so has the weight available to carry Maritime recon systems and advanced navigation systems.
This is more or less what happened in real-life, some of them were dropped. The surplus Marathon was pressed into some of these but with no success. Pembroke for these makes complete sense.

OR.301 can just go away. Rocket aircraft are a non-starter, only really usable as point defense interceptors and even basic glide bombs make them of questionable utility.
This is a tricky one. Me 263 influence is very strong. Fast climb intercept is seen as necessary. For me the question is, could OR.301 be met sooner than F.23/49 (Lightning) and if not, could it beat Lightning's rate of climb. For me I'd say no. But rocket engine development feeds into stand-off missiles so there is some overlap and use that could come out of it. I'd maybe pick one or two companies for selective tender.

Combine NR/A.14 and .17 into a single aircraft programme:
Naval fighter development was a torturous mess. I do think the solution is to force the Admiralty to take DH.110 now and then move on to the next gen airframe, NA.39 is still 3 years in the future but there is no harm in combining AW and attack into one airframe. Scimitar could stay as an interim - I need to ponder this some more (cancelling Fairey's N.14/49 work may well have been a mistake).

Can the light interceptors/fighters, they're just too small and there didn't seem to be that much interest from UK anyway.
This was Petter's lobbying paying off. I agree its a distraction. Get Hunter and Swift working before mucking about with this kind of thing.
 
Rocket interceptor.

Dictator is radar Horizon.
If Detection is 240nm AT VERY BEST, then incoming speed dictates time for successful interception. In reality Detection could be 200nm maybe less.

Rocket fighter gets up high, fast and stays fast. Even on a turn to stern for a IR AAM shot.

Blue Envoy is compromise. Original is ARH and GCI to 200nm.
150nm and SARH is what's possible then.
75nm and SARH is what's achieved.
 
Rocket interceptor.

Dictator is radar Horizon.
If Detection is 240nm AT VERY BEST, then incoming speed dictates time for successful interception. In reality Detection could be 200nm maybe less.

Rocket fighter gets up high, fast and stays fast. Even on a turn to stern for a IR AAM shot.
Maybe there's a better threat assessment which says "this supersonic stuff is really quite hard" the threat will probably be subsonic bombers for a long time, maybe mild supersonic dash after this. Then a lot of the requirement goes away and allows for more achievable concepts.

I don't think that funding a rocket interceptor and LR SAM makes sense - they're both solutions to the same requirement; and in practice very niche.

Naval fighter development was a torturous mess. I do think the solution is to force the Admiralty to take DH.110 now and then move on to the next gen airframe, NA.39 is still 3 years in the future but there is no harm in combining AW and attack into one airframe. Scimitar could stay as an interim - I need to ponder this some more (cancelling Fairey's N.14/49 work may well have been a mistake).
I was just having a re-read and agree it's a mess. Interestingly the USN went straight from F3D (Vampire/Venom equivalent) to F-4 (way beyond Sea Vixen). I would think that there's room for a gun+rocket AW fighter if it can be developed in time. Almost just picking anything and sticking with it would be good enough.

I'd still fancy starting earlier and combing the AW fighter and Strike fighter into a single aircraft, multi variant approach to minimise resource drain and force consolidation. 556 instead of 110 is one approach I suppose, or earlier 110 adoption+ strike variant. Either feel like short service types (partly because the FAA kept crashing them) as for a supersonic follow-on 5 years later you're starting from scratch again on the airframe side.

I wonder whether pruning some the endurance requirement would enable one of the single Avon concepts to be viable instead - e.g. earlier Super Venom (or skip Sea Venom and straight to Super); or Blackburn B.89 or Westland W.37. I think I'd have more faith in dH though.
 
I'd still fancy starting earlier and combing the AW fighter and Strike fighter into a single aircraft, multi variant approach to minimise resource drain and force consolidation. 556 instead of 110 is one approach I suppose, or earlier 110 adoption+ strike variant. Either feel like short service types (partly because the FAA kept crashing them) as for a supersonic follow-on 5 years later you're starting from scratch again on the airframe side.
Well DH.110 was intended in all kinds of AW fighter, long-range fighter and fighter-bomber variants for the RAF and RN before the 1949 economic cutbacks chopped most of those prototypes out.

As things stand in this scenario, looking at it from autumn 1950 the DH.110 is pruned but still going for the RAF and the Admiralty is dragging its heels on a naval version and just about to issue NR.A/14 and has just authorised the Sea Venom as an interim AW fighter. DH is busy with getting Venom day fighters into production, AW Vampire just entered production, AW Venom barely off the drawing board. The Javelin is not quite yet the No.1 choice for the RAF, but within a few months will be. Fairey has literally only just stopped work on the single-engine N.14/49. The the designation soup that is Supermarine the Type 508 is at least 9 months away from flying, the Type 525 is on the drawing board. Attacker and 510 are lacklustre, 535 seems to be ok enough to make a fighter out of it as the Type 541.

So DH and Supermarine are up to their eyeballs in development work. P.1067 and Type 541 are crucial for the RAF and need ringfencing. There is no way of knowing if 508 and 525 will work or not. Tactical Red Beard is not even a dream requirement yet, so too early to think about that, Sea Hawk only just in production, yet to become a fighter-bomber.

So my choices would be:
1) Go with Sea Venom as the interim, scrap Vixen programme, just issue NR.A/14 to Fairey and ask them to come up with a AW fighter suitable to be a radar-equipped fighter-bomber, let 508 and 525 continue to see what comes up.
2) as 1 but scrap Supermarine efforts.
3) Scrap Sea Venom, go with Sea Vixen for IOC in 1954. Halt NR.A/14, recast it as a AW/strike fighter, issue later in 1951 to a rationalised industry for a new generation aircraft for 1959, let 508 and 525 continue to see what comes up.
4) as 3 but scrap Supermarine efforts.

I wonder whether pruning some the endurance requirement would enable one of the single Avon concepts to be viable instead - e.g. earlier Super Venom (or skip Sea Venom and straight to Super); or Blackburn B.89 or Westland W.37. I think I'd have more faith in dH though.
Could be possible for the next generation type, maybe with something a bit meatier than Avon.
 
Option 4 please, plus forcing RAF and FAA to have the same aircraft. Gets up to 500-600 aircraft rather than the split between Sea Vixen, Scimitar, Javelin. This starts the thinning down of design teams.

Let Supermarine focus on the super priority Swift, although this may still be a duffer. Worst that can happen is that Supermarine produce one mediocre aircraft rather than two.
 
This is where it gets vexing and poses severe problems.

These firms need to learn and ultimately learning is a product of doing and doing means mistakes and failures.

The reason Blackburn does so well on the Buccaneer is they failed on earlier efforts.
The reason Vickers Supermarine trot out among the top 2 OR.339 designs is because they had so much trouble with Attacker, Swift, and Scimitar.
Avro may not have messed up the Vulcan, but oh my did it teach them hard!
Avro got lucky, and that is rare.
The reason DH came up with sound concepts like DH.117, OR.339 and DH.126 is precisely because of the lessons learned from, Vampire, Venom, Comet, Valiant, V.1000 and Sea Vixen.

Gloster carried on with poor efforts and reaped the reward.

So we hit a thorny matter here. To learn how to do it well, one must make mistakes and that means funding such efforts.

So several duff aircraft are actually necessary.
 
Option 4 please, plus forcing RAF and FAA to have the same aircraft. Gets up to 500-600 aircraft rather than the split between Sea Vixen, Scimitar, Javelin. This starts the thinning down of design teams.

Let Supermarine focus on the super priority Swift, although this may still be a duffer. Worst that can happen is that Supermarine produce one mediocre aircraft rather than two.
Stick to the plan, DH.110 and Gloster can fly a single research machine.
 
With the benefit of hindsight the UK is good at making nice airframes (Hunter, Javelin, Sea Vixen, Lightning, Gnat, Delta, Bucaneer, Kestrel) that look good as test prototypes and wow the crowds at Farnborough but none of them are complete weapons systems.
This was attempted with TSR2 but at too high a price.
The Phantom seduced both the RAF and RN because it was a complete weapons system that could do everything they needed it to do. AFVG and Tornado are pretty much smaller more developed Phantoms.
So my test for an alternate UK staff requirement and UK industry would be to develop a British Phantom almost at the same time as the US one.
 
So several duff aircraft are actually necessary.
Yes, I think at this stage we're still at the point of funding 2 or more designs to prototype stage and seeing where things fall out. But we should be harder nosed about consolidating similar requirements, eliminating spurious ones, and only selecting a single type for large scale production. This provides both carrot (large scale production orders) and stick (design something good otherwise you don't get much other opportunity). Hopefully forces a rationalisation of the Industry, but in practise just eliminates some design teams and excess production facilities. Hopefully in producing better designs it forces the multi-companies to actually collaborate together to produce better.

e.g. Hawker Siddeley consolidates to 2 design teams in Surrey (Combat Air) and Manchester (Bombers) with the AW and Gloster sites gradually drawing down; those teams get detailed design work and some production only. de Havilland joins the group bringing Airliner experience, and Avionics. Maybe dH and AW guided weapon teams combine - it's a new area so a new site and team might work. So this group would have the following major projects ongoing:
  • Vampire tranisitioning to Venom
  • Hunter (and hopefully further developments with radar and AAMs along the 1109, 1100 lines flowing through from Vixen)
  • Vixen / Sea Vixen
  • Vulcan
  • Comet
 
Rocket interceptor.

Dictator is radar Horizon.
If Detection is 240nm AT VERY BEST, then incoming speed dictates time for successful interception. In reality Detection could be 200nm maybe less.

Rocket fighter gets up high, fast and stays fast. Even on a turn to stern for a IR AAM shot.

Blue Envoy is compromise. Original is ARH and GCI to 200nm.
150nm and SARH is what's possible then.
75nm and SARH is what's achieved.
Or, you build long range surface to air missiles, which is what historically took over the fast climb last ditch interceptor role. AST.202.
 
Strictly missiles should have stayed Royal Ordinance. Breaking up the team set the lot back years. Brakemine was a very solid basis for SAM development.
Long Shot a solid solution to AAM development.

Nothing precludes private submissions. But it would ease the burden on industry if the missiles efforts had never been palmed off on aviation firms.
EE despite having government funding for Luton, winning Thunderbird, still refused the IRBM effort. Correctly IMO.
DH rode to Sandys rescue and that toppled them more than any Comet crashes.

Agreed that while multiple prototypes are needed for practical assessments, picking the best and not funding production-isation of loosers, also ran and second place-ers is a logical position.
Nothing stops say Vickers Supermarine Type 545 still winning if they loose out to earlier Hawker Hunter.

Agreed also that design and drawing office staff need consolidation. Scale is needed. Move people or aportion tasks. Had DH the office staff DH.116 would have reached service and likely developed well.

Agreed also, that reheat was more logical to fund than Supermarine's twin engined cannon day fighter.

DH had a good team(s) with Mosquito, Hornet, Vampire/Venom.
DH.110 was a long hard path for DH but they achieved it. The chief problem is RAF walking away to Gloster's delta lure....

DH.116 best basis for supersonic fighter in 1952
DH.117 strong and practical submission,
OR.339 again solid,
OR.346 submission had a strong development path potential.
Keep them going.
They were also increasingly involved in Saro's F.177.

Saro Fighter team surprisingly good, bit of a sacrifice to loose that.

As I've said elsewhere in a thread on DH. They stood to be the major winner at the opening of the 50's.
 
But it would ease the burden on industry if the missiles efforts had never been palmed off on aviation firms.
EE despite having government funding for Luton, winning Thunderbird, still refused the IRBM effort. Correctly IMO.
Interestingly there are only four missile projects in 1950, AW is developing Seaslug as part of the '501 Group', Bristol is handling the JTV.1 ramjet test vehicle and Red Duster - which given they are developing the ramjets isn't a terrible idea, English Electric are doing Red Shoes and they are a much wider company than just aircraft, Fairey is developing Blue Sky. Folland are entrusted with the RTV.2 SAM testbed, Petter wasn't really interested in it but he began thinking about an AAM from it and this led to Red Dean - which flopped and was given to Vickers to flop again.

So there is perhaps a chance in this early period that the next gen missiles are handled differently, or only entrusted to companies with wider defence capabilities like EE and Vickers.

My company thoughts so far:
Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Ltd needs to be encouraged to consolidated, been operating as separate companies for far too long, technically Hawker acquired Gloster in the 1930s yet they still operate separate factories and design teams. Probably time to tell the management to start submitting joint bids to begin with, Hawker-Gloster and Avro as the two main teams seem best, leave AW's two factories as group manufacturing space to build whatever mass production types are needed.

Auster can pretty much be left alone to its own devices, its falling behind its US light aircraft competitors anyway, AOP still useful until the helicopter is proven for army use. It will eventually either adapt to modern private light aircraft designs or die. I'm not totally convinced a 1950s attempt at a BEAGLE would work, not based on the 1930s light engines Blackburn and DH are still putting out at any rate.

Blackburn does a lot of design work, doesn't do massively well, has Beverley but not coming up to scratch for naval types, has a skilled workforce but little in production - space here to sub-contract Korean War orders.

Boulton Paul, does a lot of design work, hasn't had big successes but Balliol looks big, skilled at conversion work, definitely worth an underachiever but probably not worth the resources needed to build an A-Team design staff, be better to keep them to powered controls and the like and use for special one-off jobs and conversions.

Bristol, a lot going on, get rid of Brabazon, keep Hafner's rotary team going as the only real home-grown helicopter chance, should remain one of the leading companies

Chrislea, withering away anyway. Bye bye.

de Havilland, a lot of work going on, probably too much work in design and production, might need a silent partner to take up the slack.

Elliott’s of Newbury, harmless glider work, not really a priority to worry about.

English Electric, new kid on the block, Canberra is vital, P.1 is a handy tool but will it make a good fighter? should we run with it now they are designing good kit or send the team elsewhere and let them just produce airframes.

Fairey, a lot of work, still a naval specialist, losing ground to Hawker and DH for naval fighters, maybe even to Supermarine, have some good ideas, lots of other aeronautical interests, should keep going for now. Certainly doing better than Blackburn.

Flight Refuelling Ltd., doing good work, the odd conversion work to fund AAR research seems ok.

Folland, doubts this should be supported, Petter concepts shop - mercurial but tempramental, can he be persuaded to get with a real company?

Handley Page, bomber firm, V-bomber so has to keep going despite no real civil work, are they too technical and missing the customer focus? Needs a partner, maybe takeover someone like Blackburn.
Handley Page (Reading) - sideshow stuff, could be easily folded into the main firm and Reading used as extra production capacity.

Heston Aircraft, already easing out into repair work.

FG Miles, I mean its the bro's money not ours...

Percival, keep going, good for lower-end stuff, could be the lighter end of the industry to replace the DH of old and Auster.

Portsmouth Aviation, repairs only, not much to see here.

Reid & Sigrist, no harm in Bobsleigh but no further work on airframes is desirable.

Saunders-Roe (Saro), lots going on, flying boats and helicopters, seems harmless enough assuming flying boats still matter, then whats left? Not enough with helicopters alone.

Scottish Aviation, a good company, lots of experience, Pioneer puts them into a manufacturer, should this be encouraged?

Short Brothers & Harland, can be kept going, some doubts over the design team, no real production chances for their own stuff, should really just be a production line - but one that's probably not cost effective given local labour issues but not much choice.

Slingsby, handy for gliders, should keep at that.

Vickers-Supermarine, lots going on, would benefit with Vickers absorbing V-S more fully, still vital for fighters alongside Hawker and DH.

Vickers, important firm, another main company but decent facilities are lacking, needs investment.

Westland, messing about with Sikorsky licences is useful but is it likely to be sustainable? No real aircraft chances, recent designs not winners and Wyvern development dragging on (3rd engine), omens not good, should it be merged?
 
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