Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How the F-35 Hollowed out the US Air Force by Bill Sweetman

Sintra said:
No.
The YF-23 was incapable of doing VSTOL or taking off/landing from/on a carrier, in other words it was entirely incapable of meeting the JSF program specifications, on top of that it was a huge, twin engined, bloody expensive aircraft and one that had lost the ATF competition to LM´s YF-22 at that.
If the JSF program got scraped because the chaps at the Pentagon prefered a land CTOL only, big, twin engined, extremely expensive, strike fighter instead... then the Raptor was already in service with the USAF.
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While I understand your points, if we're talking about fielding an air force that is comprised of the best stealth aircraft that money can buy, I would think that a duo of The F-22 & YF-23 would have been a far better choice than pairing The Raptor with The F-35.

*Shrugs*.
 
Joint Soviet Fighter said:
While I understand your points, if we're talking about fielding an air force that is comprised of the best stealth aircraft that money can buy, I would think that a duo of The F-22 & YF-23 would have been a far better choice than pairing The Raptor with The F-35.
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I mean, if you wanted the best Stealth Fighter, Just do F-23. Nuf said :D

F-22 is an awesome fighter bird that was limited by the fact that it wasn't as stealthy as its competitor (and still isn't.) That being said. If Congress didn't interfere there would be no F-35.

While most in the USAF would HATE to admit it. What they needed to do was just pay the US Navy to develop the Stealth fighters. Any US Navy Aircraft is AUTOMATICALLY capable of being a USAF Aircraft. If the US Navy AND the USAF are buying the same aircraft, unit cost and maintenance costs drops significantly. Of course if it fails to materialize it affects both services.


After all, TWICE in the history of supersonic Jet Fighters, NAVY aircraft were deemed superior to USAF's own designs and taken on hand. First, the F4D Skyray was "loaned" to the Air Defense Command because it was more capable of the then in service aircraft and much more capable than the F-102 in the state it was in (prior to gaining area rule) And then Later the McDonald F-110 Spectre *Cough Cough* F-4 Phantom.... Just Imagine what would have happened if the USAF went to the US Navy before starting their anti Foxbat programs and said "Hey we know the F-111B isn't working for you. What if we work with you on your new replacement (what became the F-14) and instead of the F-14 and F-15 we achived something that was beter for both services. But the problem is USAF tends to think THEY are the only ones that know what is best for them. And sometimes they are right... most of the time, the alternat path however seems better in hindsight.

Oh, please note, F4D Skyray was NOT area-ruled.... F5D (an Area Ruled F-4D with a longer forward fuselage) flew almost twice as fast on the same engine. F4D could outperform F-102 Delta Dagger as built, and was mostly comparable to production standard F-102s....
 
Past performance does not necessarily 'the future prepare'.

Air superiority as the baseline continues to be a self-licking ice cream cone ie when the plane's focus is the essentially protecting itself first and foremost. If the idea is to clear the sky of enemy air defense (SAM, AD fighters), a Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) in the form of a standoff B-1 bomb truck should be considered, especially for the number of HARMs, AAMs it carries.

Cost demands the most capable FB or FA first & foremost. AAMs provide AirSup and are just another payload. A gun, sure, Vietnam etc., but if a pilot ends up in gunfight/firball they have already lost, in a sense, as that action detracts from the A & B primary mission consuming time/fuel while also allowing adversary awareness.
 
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Find, Fix, Track, and Assess
Penetrating Counterair (PCA). Capability development efforts for PCA will focus on maximizing tradeoffs between range, payload, survivability, lethality, affordability, and supportability. While PCA capability will certainly have a role in targeting and engaging, it also has a significant role as a node in the network, providing data from its penetrating sensors to enable employment using either stand-off or stand-in weapons. As part of this effort, the Air Force should proceed with a formal AoA in 2017 for a PCA capability. Consistent with an agile acquisition mindset designed to deliver the right capability on the required timeline, this AoA will include options to leverage rapid development and prototyping in order to keep ahead of the threat.

Find, Fix, Track, and Assess
Stand Off Arsenal Plane. For this capability development, the Air Force will continue to partner with the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) on concepts utilizing long-range mission effects chains.

PCA. In addition to F2TA capabilities above, the penetrating capabilities of PCA will allow the stand-in application of kinetic and non-kinetic effects from the air domain.

B-21. Long-range strike against counterair targets is a critical part of gaining and maintaining air superiority. The penetrating capability of the B-21 will allow survivable and repeatable attack operations.
 
Thinking about it. https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/no-kill-switch

The European air forces picking the F-35 are trapped in a dilemma. The F-35 is the first mass produced stealth aircraft, available in large numbers for export. An apealing entry ticket to stealth, for sure.

On the other hand...

Lockheed-Martin has the full control over all the software for F-35 (is one of reasons why the jet is that expensive: constant maintenance and upgrades of software, which is so complex that the US government considers it a 'weapons system' on its own). Moreover, the software on export F-35s (except Israel's, of course), is 'dumbed down' - and it’s maintained in centralised fashion.
Lockheed-Martin has so much control over the software, that it can literally turn off single, selected F-35s. Own (those operated by US services) and/or those of export customers.

Sure, export customers have the option to disconnect their F-35s from the centralised software system. However, then the jet is also dumbed down: operational, but with much reduced capabilities.

Bottom line: as long as the USA are still friendly - and other people and nations doing what the USA demand - Lockheed-Martin is continuing to provide software updates for F-35s.
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That said, F-16s - and then especially such old examples like delivered to Ukraine - are not that advanced, nor connected to any similar kind of centrally-operated software systems, like F-35s are.
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So, may I ask : did Lockheed and the USG used the F-35 data fusion (between them all, and support platforms) - to take customer "hostages", via software upgrades ?
 
@Archibald How many of the export partners / customers do you think are technically able to provide their own software maintenance capability for an aerospace system of this scale and complexity? Then filter again for how many do you think are willing to pay for this?

If LM has control of a "kill switch" for all F-35s then I'd be much more worried about unfriendly countries being able to access this vs the US aircraft.
 
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@Archibald How many of the export partners / customers do you think are technically able to provide their own software maintenance capability for an aerospace system of this scale and complexity? Then filter again for how many do you think are willing to pay for this?
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I'm not denying this. I'm just saying that a) a F-16 didn't need that and b) it can be use as a restraint against the customer, perhaps for political reasons.
Also c) related: is a fly-alone F-35 "dumb" and "worthless" - since not in sensor fusion network with other F-35s (US and NATO) ? Once again, this can be used as a restraint against the customer, for political reasons. And F-16s had relative "freedom", compared to that...

Bottom line: can "F-35 sensor networking" be used as a restraint, for political reasons ?

(crap, so much repeating. This is the moment when my scholar english fails spectacularly)
 
My 4 cents

1) The "B" STOVL version was a bad idea. It's not needed on land (a 10° ski jump ramp halves takeoff run for high thrust/weight aircraft and arresting gear for routine use on land exists) and the tiny quantity of B version aircraft operating from medium-sized carriers does not justify the compromises made that badly affect the A and C versions. The Europeans could have bought F-35C for a CATOBAR carrier or used Rafales.

2) An even more unnecessary, unforced error is the existence of the "A" (USAF) version. It should not exist. The C version could have the adapter for the USAF method of midair refuelling ("boom" refuelling). The USAF should have operated the C version. 3 reasons for this: Less development costs, more simple spare parts supply and usability of USAF airframes to compensate for naval aviation attrition exceeding CVN attrition in wartime.

3) It should have used 2 F414 engines. To develop and introduce an entirely new engine was driven by R&D funds greed of the industry and by the STOVL version. Two engines helps with survivability, safety and allows roll control via thrust vectoring.

4) The avionics concept was great (DAS and HMD were troubled, though) and this is an age in which combat aircraft performance is driven by stealth, avionics and munitions. The huge costs can only be justified IF there's a good case for defeating Chinese with this. An air force with 300 well-upgraded F-4 Phantom II, enough spares, enough training, enough munitions and good support elements could wipe the floor with Russian air power. Nobody even needs the F-15/-16 to do so.
 
Agree on 1, most of the problems come from that decision including 3. But I disagree on 2. McD should have won what should have been a straightforward competition for basically a mini F-22 with a single F119 for the USAF. The Navy could have done another F-16/F-18 deal and picked up the loser (Boeing?) with say twin F414s (or better yet, YF-23 wins and the Navy picks up the NATF-23, so they just skip this competition entirely). The Marines are the clear losers here, perhaps the USAF could donate all their A-10s that then get navalized? They might be able to operate from an America class? Or just a new more advanced AV-8E
 
Desertfox said:
The Marines are the clear losers here, perhaps the USAF could donate all their A-10s that then get navalized? They might be able to operate from an America class?
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It would be tough to do so, considering the Hog is nowhere STOL as the OV-10s that operated from Tarawas.

I think the real killer is, why, if in an era where every facet of military spending faces massive scrutiny, is the Navy's Army's Air Force still allowed to exist? Or at least, due to the massive redundancy caused thereof, heavily micromanaged to the point they should just get a Harrier III and not new shiny stuff?

What really happened is that all Congress want in their involvement is "here I threw you a bone, just make do with it" and gave the services leeway to cook up some of the most horrific thing ever to compensate. I don't know if these people ever think of the fact that R&D cost is mostly upfront or near term so like, just stick to the previous plan (ASM, F-22 + F-16F, and a plethora of other stuff that got shelved).
 
yeetmahboi said:
I don't know if these people ever think of the fact that R&D cost is mostly upfront or near term so like, just stick to the previous plan (ASM, F-22 + F-16F, and a plethora of other stuff that got shelved).
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Can't help but feel that this is another one of the fruits of the GWOT era where everything seems good on paper (Zumwalt guns, LCS) but a poor choice in reality.

When the F-35 was being designed, I'm not sure people really knew what enemy we'd be facing in 2025 and beyond. If near peer conflict wasn't imminent and you're looking for greater commonality within branches and between allies to save costs, well F-35 would fulfill that pretty well.

The reality was that by the time F-35s were going into production, it was too little too late at that point even when we began to want to try to start returning to near peer conflict. For what it is, I think it's still a fine plane and has a solid place in the future force. Could it have been better? probably. Could it have been much better that it would make any significant difference? debatable. We would have had to keep making F-22s and develop the F-35 into something in the order of a naval F-22 to not feel as screwed as it feels right now and even then, there's no telling what kind of problems those programs run into.

Sensors wise, it's not much better or worse than what the J-35 offers to the Chinese. Kinematically, other things can do the shooting if need be as well. The only real time frame that the services would find the F-35's problems crippling is when it's the only option (which is now until 2035-ish). When 6th gens and CCAs join the mix, it'll be less of a problem. Come to think of it, whether its the military, the DoD planners, or industry, the US approach to air superiority seems to rest less and less upon heavily upon supersonice aircraft. There seems to be a deliberate choice to continue flying subsonic whether its manned or unmanned fighters, leaving the supersonic regime to be covered by niche air superiority fighters like the F-47 and F-22.

At the end of the day, it's not so much the aircraft that I find problematic as the single source software, one company IP ownership and the slow, packaged upgrades that I find to be more problematic. If that doesn't get fixed... well that's your entire force that's constantly lagging behind the peer in how quickly you can upgrade your aircraft.
 
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yeetmahboi said:
It would be tough to do so, considering the Hog is nowhere STOL as the OV-10s that operated from Tarawas.

I think the real killer is, why, if in an era where every facet of military spending faces massive scrutiny, is the Navy's Army's Air Force still allowed to exist? Or at least, due to the massive redundancy caused thereof, heavily micromanaged to the point they should just get a Harrier III and not new shiny stuff?

What really happened is that all Congress want in their involvement is "here I threw you a bone, just make do with it" and gave the services leeway to cook up some of the most horrific thing ever to compensate. I don't know if these people ever think of the fact that R&D cost is mostly upfront or near term so like, just stick to the previous plan (ASM, F-22 + F-16F, and a plethora of other stuff that got shelved).
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An F-16XL with F119s... and throw the money saved on more F-22s and a FB-23 equivalent.
 
Reddington777 said:
Sensors wise, it's not much better or worse than what the J-35 offers to the Chinese.
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This is an example where it is increasingly difficult to understand the capability of different fighters. e.g.

All AESA radars obviously aren't equally as capable as each other. But its basically impossible to tell from a picture.
 
Sferrin said:
I wonder if he acknowledges that without the F-35B the UK would not have aircraft carriers.
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I know it's been a year since you posted that, so your opinion may have changed. But I find it quite amusing that even with the F-35B the UK can barely operate their carriers. With their Lightnings regularly getting stranded somewhere or breaking down in general.
 
red admiral said:
All AESA radars obviously aren't equally as capable as each other. But its basically impossible to tell from a picture.
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You don't really need to know the relative capability of one plane over the other in any respect. If they are in the same class of technologies (cutting edge AESA arrays), working with more or less the same available space onboard, they essentially become the same class of weaponry and whatever advantages you have are going to be minor and easily mitigated by planning and tactics.

In a multi aircraft fight, distances close fast enough and geometries are complex enough that beyond first shot advantage, there's really no chance that an aircraft of similar class of capability is going to let you escape without being shot at - especially with multiple aircraft and, in the future, CCAs in the mix.

This is why I said that even the hypothetical twin-engined F-35 of a similar size and form factor isn't going to bring that much more advantage. If you want that greater capability gap and given that technology at the cutting edge isn't going to give you some magical power over other tech at the same cutting edge, then whatever benefit you can choke out of an aerial platform is going to come from the onboard capacity - and even then the returns can still be marginal.
 
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarplanePorn/comments/1oxf953/comment/np0djdu
View: https://sh.reddit.com/r/WarplanePorn/comments/1oxf953/comment/np0djdu/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web3x&utm_name=web3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button


The JSF program certainly wasn't perfect, but I think the development of the F-35B was overall more positive than the alternative of having no STOVL variant of the plane.
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Going to be a huge disagreement from myself and many others intimately familiar with this plane

The tradeoffs for STOVL are massive and pervasive every day and will continue to haunt the program for the rest of its life. Do you even know why the F-35 is proportioned the way it is? Despite being ~30k empty (A, the B and C are even heavier), it is only 51 feet long and 35 feet wide. Similar aircraft in that weight class - the F-15 and F/A-18E/F - are 60 feet long and 44 feet wide.

It's entirely because the Marine Corps had an absolutely ridiculous requirement to fit 6 JSF behind the tower of an LHA/LHD, and also the LHA/LHD elevator!

Here is a 2002 paper written by the Joint Program Office (JPO) titled "The Influence of Ship Configuration on the Design of the Joint Strike Fighter": https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA399988.pdf

Note that this was written in 2002, when they were knee deep in making those early hard design choices that cannot be easily changed later. The report spells it out VERY clearly what constrained the F-35B:

Unlike the CV variant, the JSF STOVL variant did not have a spot factor requirement levied upon it. Instead, the ORD specified a spotting requirement in operational terms. The USMC operators required that it be possible to park a total of six STOVL variants aft of the island on an LHA or LHD, such that none fouls the landing area and that any one of them can be moved without first moving any other. This requirement constrains the STOVL variant's wingspan to be no more than 35 ft.
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And

Additionally, compatibility with deck elevators may constrain an aircraft's length, width, or both.
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Table 2 shows LHD elevator lengths and widths, with 50 feet being the longest elevator size on a LHD.

The woes you've heard about heat and power generation issues and various upgrade issues come in no small part due to the fact that the constrained volume makes it extremely hard to pack more electronics in that space without causing massive heat and cooling issues. Ask anyone who has built a mini gaming PC what a challenge that is.

The B was so overweight and infeasible that they had to remove a ton of features which affected the A and C (in the misguided name of commonality) and delayed the program by years and increased costs:

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL30563

F-35B 3,000 lb. Overweight; Added Three Years/$6.5B
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A significant issue in early development, noted in Figure 2, was the weight of the F-35B variant. Because the F-35B takes off and lands near-vertically, weight is a particularly critical factor, as aircraft performance with low- to no-airspeed depends directly on the ratio of engine thrust to aircraft weight.
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The delay was exacerbated by the consolidation of the former JAST and ASTOVL programs, discussed in footnote 33. Normally, in a development program, the most technically simple variant is developed first, and lessons are applied while working up to more complicated variants. Because the Marine Corps’ Harrier fleet was reaching the end of life before the Air Force and Navy fleets the F-35 was designed to replace, in this case, the most complicated variant—the F-35B—had to be developed first. That meant the technical challenges unique to STOVL aircraft delayed all of the variants.
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What features were cut out just to make the B work?

Moreover, because the B does not share the same weapons bays as the A and C, it created a whole new platform requiring certification and weapons compatibility for, further complicating weapons integration on this jet.

And I mentioned weight - historically speaking, all fighters get heavier with age as we want to slap upgrades on the jet.

The B was so overweight that the B has smaller brakes than the A and the C. That's how far they had to cut just to save weight, to say nothing about accepting lower redundancy by removing some backup systems and accepting more single points of failure.

You think you can just easily slap upgrades on the A and C without blowing past the weight limits on the B? This of course further complicates upgrades for all the variants, as it adds another constraint that would otherwise not necessarily be a big factor.

All in all, it is a very very tough pill to swallow for the Air Force (who is buying 1000 A's) and the Navy (who already didn't want its program merged in with the Harrier-replacement - more on that below)

As per the current status quo, the F-35B is the only option for providing Japan, South Korea, the UK, and Italy (plus potentially Australia and Spain in the future as they both have light carriers but haven't ordered the F-35B yet) with a naval-based fifth generation fighter.
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South Korea canceled their program and Spain said no thanks

Australia also straight up said they are not replacing their F/A-18Fs with F-35s, despite buying them originally as a stop gap for a 4th squadron of F-35s. So zero chance of them buying the inferior B model if they're not even willing to buy more A's to replace the F/A-18Fs.

In fact, Australia follows the same trend as the UK as early adopters waffling and reducing their originally envisioned order of F-35s.

So cool, we got Japan and... Italy, which was already one of partner nations that was always likely getting B's to replace its Harriers anyways.

Absolutely not worth the tradeoff to the 1000s of A's and C's that we're relying on

Also, in case you missed it, the recent Marine Master Aviation Plan is changing its ratio of B's and C's from 5:1 to 2:1.

So after demanding - and getting - all these compromises on the F-35 to fit USMC requirements, they're now slowly backing away from that troublesome child?

--

Now, I mentioned the Navy's disappointing in the whole thing. Contrary to what Internet posters will keep saying, ASTOVL was not the one that JSF was merged into - ASTOVL in no way shape or form was botched by JAST/JSF. ASTOVL was the one merged into Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) which then became Joint Strike Fighter

Here's a contemporary (1997) report:

https://secwww.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/content/techdigest/pdf/V18-N01/18-01-Steidle.pdf

In the summer of 1993, the Secretary of Defense Bottom-Up Review acknowledged the Services’ need to affordably replace their aging strike assets to maintain the nation’s combat technological edge. In September 1993, during the presentation of the Bottom-Up Review, the Secretary of Defense formally announced his intent to cancel the Navy Advanced Attack Fighter (AF/X) and the Air Force Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) programs and create the Joint Advanced Strik Technology (JAST) Program. Together, the AF/X and MRF programs were unaffordable. In October 1993, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD[A&T]) approved the initial joint Service plan for the JAST Program as a comprehensive advanced technology effort to prepare the way for the next generation of strike weapon systems. After announcing his approval of the joint Service plan to the Congressional Defense Committees and requesting their support, the USD(A&T) formally established the JAST (now the Joint Strike Fighter, JSF) Program in January 1994.
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FY 1995 Congressional legislation merged the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Advanced Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) Program with the JSF Program.
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Here's a 2003 Congressional Research Service report:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA472774.pdf

The JSF program emerged in late 1995 from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which began in late 1993 as a result of the Administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs. Having affirmed plans to abandon development of both the A-12/AFX aircraft that was to replace the Navy’s A-6 attack planes and the multi-role fighter (MRF) that the Air Force had considered to replace its F-16s, the BUR envisaged the JAST program as a replacement for both these programs. In 1994, the JAST program was criticized by some observers for being a technology-development program rather than a focused effort to develop and procure new aircraft. In 1995, in response to congressional direction, a program led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft was incorporated into the JAST program, which opened the way for Marine Corps and British Navy participation. The name of the program was then changed to JSF to focus on joint development and production of a next-generation fighter/attack plane.
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Basically, the Navy had a long range strike platform in mind (AF/X) and the Air Force had a multi-role fighter program replacement (MRF) in mind. Their cancellation resulted in JAST, a technology sharing program that did not mandate a new platform.

In 1995, however, DARPA's ASTOVL program was merged into JAST, which then mandated a common platform - that program was renamed Joint Strike Fighter. As a result, we had three clashing sets of requirements:

  • Air Force wanted a cheap mass produced replacement for the F-16
  • Marine Corps and UK wanted a Harrier replacement - thus had to be lightweight for vertical landings but fancy expensive engine
  • Navy wanted a high-end strike fighter to replace what the A-12 had once promised
End result is that the A and B clashed the least - mass produced and lightweight and thus cheaper. The Navy's goals were thrown out, resulting in the Navy the least invested/caring of the program, as people will often tell you. So it is entirely correct to say that it was the STOVL/F-35B that affected JAST/JSF the most, because it was the one merged into a program that was never envisioned for it. Really hard to get a F-14/A-6/F-111/F-117/F-15E replacement in a Harrier-replacement form factor.
Copied to text for redundancy
 
Extracting the text from Reddit and copying it here, just in case it vanishes.

The JSF program certainly wasn't perfect, but I think the development of the F-35B was overall more positive than the alternative of having no STOVL variant of the plane.
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Going to be a huge disagreement from myself and many others intimately familiar with this plane
The tradeoffs for STOVL are massive and pervasive every day and will continue to haunt the program for the rest of its life. Do you even know why the F-35 is proportioned the way it is? Despite being ~30k empty (A, the B and C are even heavier), it is only 51 feet long and 35 feet wide. Similar aircraft in that weight class - the F-15 and F/A-18E/F - are 60 feet long and 44 feet wide.
It's entirely because the Marine Corps had an absolutely ridiculous requirement to fit 6 JSF behind the tower of an LHA/LHD, and also the LHA/LHD elevator!
Here is a 2002 paper written by the Joint Program Office (JPO) titled "The Influence of Ship Configuration on the Design of the Joint Strike Fighter": https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA399988.pdf
Note that this was written in 2002, when they were knee deep in making those early hard design choices that cannot be easily changed later. The report spells it out VERY clearly what constrained the F-35B:
Unlike the CV variant, the JSF STOVL variant did not have a spot factor requirement levied upon it. Instead, the ORD specified a spotting requirement in operational terms. The USMC operators required that it be possible to park a total of six STOVL variants aft of the island on an LHA or LHD, such that none fouls the landing area and that any one of them can be moved without first moving any other. This requirement constrains the STOVL variant's wingspan to be no more than 35 ft.
Click to expand...
And
Additionally, compatibility with deck elevators may constrain an aircraft's length, width, or both.
Click to expand...
Table 2 shows LHD elevator lengths and widths, with 50 feet being the longest elevator size on a LHD.
The woes you've heard about heat and power generation issues and various upgrade issues come in no small part due to the fact that the constrained volume makes it extremely hard to pack more electronics in that space without causing massive heat and cooling issues. Ask anyone who has built a mini gaming PC what a challenge that is.
The B was so overweight and infeasible that they had to remove a ton of features which affected the A and C (in the misguided name of commonality) and delayed the program by years and increased costs:
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL30563
F-35B 3,000 lb. Overweight; Added Three Years/$6.5B
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A significant issue in early development, noted in Figure 2, was the weight of the F-35B variant. Because the F-35B takes off and lands near-vertically, weight is a particularly critical factor, as aircraft performance with low- to no-airspeed depends directly on the ratio of engine thrust to aircraft weight.
Click to expand...
The delay was exacerbated by the consolidation of the former JAST and ASTOVL programs, discussed in footnote 33. Normally, in a development program, the most technically simple variant is developed first, and lessons are applied while working up to more complicated variants. Because the Marine Corps’ Harrier fleet was reaching the end of life before the Air Force and Navy fleets the F-35 was designed to replace, in this case, the most complicated variant—the F-35B—had to be developed first. That meant the technical challenges unique to STOVL aircraft delayed all of the variants.
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What features were cut out just to make the B work?
Moreover, because the B does not share the same weapons bays as the A and C, it created a whole new platform requiring certification and weapons compatibility for, further complicating weapons integration on this jet.
And I mentioned weight - historically speaking, all fighters get heavier with age as we want to slap upgrades on the jet.
The B was so overweight that the B has smaller brakes than the A and the C. That's how far they had to cut just to save weight, to say nothing about accepting lower redundancy by removing some backup systems and accepting more single points of failure.
You think you can just easily slap upgrades on the A and C without blowing past the weight limits on the B? This of course further complicates upgrades for all the variants, as it adds another constraint that would otherwise not necessarily be a big factor.
All in all, it is a very very tough pill to swallow for the Air Force (who is buying 1000 A's) and the Navy (who already didn't want its program merged in with the Harrier-replacement - more on that below)
As per the current status quo, the F-35B is the only option for providing Japan, South Korea, the UK, and Italy (plus potentially Australia and Spain in the future as they both have light carriers but haven't ordered the F-35B yet) with a naval-based fifth generation fighter.
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South Korea canceled their program and Spain said no thanks
Australia also straight up said they are not replacing their F/A-18Fs with F-35s, despite buying them originally as a stop gap for a 4th squadron of F-35s. So zero chance of them buying the inferior B model if they're not even willing to buy more A's to replace the F/A-18Fs.
In fact, Australia follows the same trend as the UK as early adopters waffling and reducing their originally envisioned order of F-35s.
So cool, we got Japan and... Italy, which was already one of partner nations that was always likely getting B's to replace its Harriers anyways.
Absolutely not worth the tradeoff to the 1000s of A's and C's that we're relying on
Also, in case you missed it, the recent Marine Master Aviation Plan is changing its ratio of B's and C's from 5:1 to 2:1.
So after demanding - and getting - all these compromises on the F-35 to fit USMC requirements, they're now slowly backing away from that troublesome child?
--
Now, I mentioned the Navy's disappointing in the whole thing. Contrary to what Internet posters will keep saying, ASTOVL was not the one that JSF was merged into - ASTOVL in no way shape or form was botched by JAST/JSF. ASTOVL was the one merged into Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) which then became Joint Strike Fighter
Here's a contemporary (1997) report:
https://secwww.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/content/techdigest/pdf/V18-N01/18-01-Steidle.pdf
In the summer of 1993, the Secretary of Defense Bottom-Up Review acknowledged the Services’ need to affordably replace their aging strike assets to maintain the nation’s combat technological edge. In September 1993, during the presentation of the Bottom-Up Review, the Secretary of Defense formally announced his intent to cancel the Navy Advanced Attack Fighter (AF/X) and the Air Force Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) programs and create the Joint Advanced Strik Technology (JAST) Program. Together, the AF/X and MRF programs were unaffordable. In October 1993, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD[A&T]) approved the initial joint Service plan for the JAST Program as a comprehensive advanced technology effort to prepare the way for the next generation of strike weapon systems. After announcing his approval of the joint Service plan to the Congressional Defense Committees and requesting their support, the USD(A&T) formally established the JAST (now the Joint Strike Fighter, JSF) Program in January 1994.
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FY 1995 Congressional legislation merged the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Advanced Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) Program with the JSF Program.
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Here's a 2003 Congressional Research Service report:
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA472774.pdf
The JSF program emerged in late 1995 from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which began in late 1993 as a result of the Administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs. Having affirmed plans to abandon development of both the A-12/AFX aircraft that was to replace the Navy’s A-6 attack planes and the multi-role fighter (MRF) that the Air Force had considered to replace its F-16s, the BUR envisaged the JAST program as a replacement for both these programs. In 1994, the JAST program was criticized by some observers for being a technology-development program rather than a focused effort to develop and procure new aircraft. In 1995, in response to congressional direction, a program led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft was incorporated into the JAST program, which opened the way for Marine Corps and British Navy participation. The name of the program was then changed to JSF to focus on joint development and production of a next-generation fighter/attack plane.
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Basically, the Navy had a long range strike platform in mind (AF/X) and the Air Force had a multi-role fighter program replacement (MRF) in mind. Their cancellation resulted in JAST, a technology sharing program that did not mandate a new platform.
In 1995, however, DARPA's ASTOVL program was merged into JAST, which then mandated a common platform - that program was renamed Joint Strike Fighter. As a result, we had three clashing sets of requirements:
  • Air Force wanted a cheap mass produced replacement for the F-16
  • Marine Corps and UK wanted a Harrier replacement - thus had to be lightweight for vertical landings but fancy expensive engine
  • Navy wanted a high-end strike fighter to replace what the A-12 had once promised
End result is that the A and B clashed the least - mass produced and lightweight and thus cheaper. The Navy's goals were thrown out, resulting in the Navy the least invested/caring of the program, as people will often tell you. So it is entirely correct to say that it was the STOVL/F-35B that affected JAST/JSF the most, because it was the one merged into a program that was never envisioned for it. Really hard to get a F-14/A-6/F-111/F-117/F-15E replacement in a Harrier-replacement form factor
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Now that's pretty interesting - and damning.

Bottom-Up Review
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This study unfortunate name makes me chuckle and giggle - every time. "Where the sun never shines" as they say...
 

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