The Future of the MBT

An idea that the current European ground battle area is predictive of future battlespaces, is crack smoke. Both sides are losing and in a way both sides are tactics and asset starved.
With a better asset to manpower ratio, the logical thing is increased substitution of human by machines. More drones, more standoff munitions.

One should note that robotics technology is actually high tech and expensive to develop. With an wartime budget.....

Teminator in 5 years (just enough time for the army to figure out the next gen powerpoints)
View: https://x.com/Tesla_Optimus/status/1995973133770350924
 
It drove all sorts of AFVs into minefields but that is not what qualifies as an assault in the context of American doctrine
Well, Ukraine tried to follow American doctrine in 2023...
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...and found it to be unworkable, because American doctrine basically stated "you don't break defenses, you circumvent defenses" and did not have provisions for the cases of long solid trench lines, with no way to circumvent them.
 
An idea that the current European ground battle area is predictive of future battlespaces, is crack smoke. Both sides are losing and in a way both sides are tactics and asset starved. The battlespace is more a ramshackle rumble than a teachable moment. The evolving C2 & and other software developments being the only exception.
You are hanging at last straw that "maybe it's just not a proper warfare, the True War su-re-ly should be fought other ways". The same arguments that German, British and French generals used in early 1910s, trying to dismiss the alarming examples of Russo-Japanese War and Balkan Wars - which clearly demonstrated that the battlefield becoming more and more static, maneuver meaning less and less. But since it went against what European generals wanted war to be, they just handwaved "it wasn't proper wars, those fighting sides were just incompeten and did not have tactical brilliance and fighting spirit of proper militaries".

Should I remind you how those excuses bite back in 1914-1918?
 
You are hanging at last straw that "maybe it's just not a proper warfare, the True War su-re-ly should be fought other ways". The same arguments that German, British and French generals used in early 1910s, trying to dismiss the alarming examples of Russo-Japanese War and Balkan Wars - which clearly demonstrated that the battlefield becoming more and more static, maneuver meaning less and less. But since it went against what European generals wanted war to be, they just handwaved "it wasn't proper wars, those fighting sides were just incompeten and did not have tactical brilliance and fighting spirit of proper militaries".

Should I remind you how those excuses bite back in 1914-1918?

I used to try and find this guy credible especially when it came discerning whether there was genuine Russian tactics in their maneuver. Then he started talking about Pokrovsk being taken.. 18mths and that place is still not consolidated.
As many as 12 Infiltration tactics infantry assaults a day most ending as I stated earlier, "a trip to Vallaha" . What tactics?
Like I said, Both sides are losing and in a way both sides are tactics and asset starved. The battlespace is more a ramshackle rumble than a teachable moment.
 
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As many as 12 Infiltration tactics infantry assaults a day most ending as I stated earlier, "a trip to Vallaha" . What tactics?
What tactics would US army use instead? Please don't start with "US army would not allow such situation to exist in first place"; we have no idea, would USAF be able to maintain airspace dominance against peer opponent. Use the situation you actually have; no airspace dominance, extreme level of electronic warfare, extremely large-scale standoff weapon use against even battlefied targets, frontline transparent for both sides.
 
Well, Ukraine tried to follow American doctrine in 2023...
View attachment 794436
...and found it to be unworkable, because American doctrine basically stated "you don't break defenses, you circumvent defenses" and did not have provisions for the cases of long solid trench lines, with no way to circumvent them.
I can remember a certain former CJCS saying before that offensive that the Ukrainians had a 90% chance of not being able to break said defensive belt, yet they tried anyway. There was no secret in that breach attempt as as many 15 ATGMS were found in fortifications near the breach site. Breachs are damn hard and iffy in the first place. Please see my posting from Justin Taylor on Breaches. The Ukrainian Breach attempt less than a stellar attempt. The notion that Estados Unidos directs the Ukrainians is empty.
 
I can remember a certain former CJCS saying before that offensive that the Ukrainians had a 90% chance of not being able to break said defensive belt, yet they tried anyway. There was no secret in that breach attempt as as many 15 ATGMS were found in fortifications near the breach site. Breachs are damn hard and iffy in the first place. Please see my posting from Justin Taylor on Breaches. The Ukrainian Breach attempt less than a stellar attempt. The notion that Estados Unidos directs the Ukrainians is empty.
So basically Western armored warfare doctrine did not have solution for breaching through non-circumventable defenses also. As I said, it just assumed that you ALWAYS could find a way around.
 
Let’s not mention the funding
Let's actually mention the funding mechanism because it's central to the ecosystem.
In Israel, the MoD financially assists defense startups, funds R&D, and the 3 major defense companies (Elbit, Rafael, IAI), which themselves own many smaller subsidiaries, all receive guaranteed R&D projects and manufacturing contracts.

Affordability is also baked into the R&D process. If you can do it with fewer or less exquisite components and compensate with a cheaper upgrade then go for it.

Manufacturing contracts are typically structured for long term and continuous development of the product.

Meaning they do not rely entirely on export success, and have some assured work and income. This in turn greatly de-risks things and allows them to sell to the MoD at very low prices. And it also lets them make lower export offers, making them highly competitive.

In wartime the MoD even gets to buy at more or less manufacturing costs.

Additionally, the MoD buys a lot of components ahead of manufacturing, which provides extra safety against market fluctuations and supply disruptions.

All of which eventually compute to a very low acquisition cost when compared to the general western defense market.
The Russians, in one the Chechen wars, was suffering around 7 RPGs from multiple ambush directions at a time. Urban canopy/canyon can be expected to present clouds of RPGs. An RPG sponge is still necessary to survive an urban jungle. these 'sponges' will need as much APS as possible but be ready to absorb. 'Curtain' based APS are start but shots from above down on the vehicle may require more projectile based APS than will be available on the vehicle. This is why a most advanced and lightened GCV size vehicle deserves a relook as does a CATTB-like form factor for a Future MBT..
What you describe seems to be more of a problem for engineering and air force than armor. Their job is to make the environment more permissive for maneuver. And armor makes the maneuver.

Tall buildings are great military assets. And great threats. If you can afford to take it down - do it.
Tanks are not deployed at the zero line as it'd get detected and destroyed by ranged fires. As such, front line forces do not get the help of tanks unless it is preplanned, and support from tanks at minimum takes the amount of time to cross artillery range. And artillery range have been increasing from 20km to some large number with ramjets shells and likes.

Patton reinforcing the bulge in 48 hours was considered an amazing feat while airpower works on different timetables.

Also in practice, the front screen is suppose to absorb opponent attacks, provide early warning, stall of time and perhaps die in the process. Not having a screen result in things like the 1st French Armored Division getting destroyed by panzers as they were on the front line and surprised when attacks hit.

Real organic fires are disposable assets like small UGVs and missiles that can be dug in and hidden to survive fires for long periods of time, and effective support fires are long range artillery, rockets and missiles where a battery can cover a wide front and deliver effects within 2 minutes.

As for airpower, all formations above the squad now can have organic aircraft, and networked communications reduce friction down to organization issues. AI enabled munitions like brimestone can area fire, as can conventional artillery as forces in cover is highly resistant while mobile forces are not.
I honestly have no idea what you're saying, except contradicting yourself over and over.
The Imperial Japanese would benefit tremendously from M1A2 given it is 80 years more advanced. I wonder if they could win the war with it.
Nope.
So we can agree that Russians should not use armor because they are too "incompetent" for it
They do not have the opportunity to effectively use armor because the assets supposed to create said opportunities are severely under-developed.
In any case, tanks does nothing in the context of Ukraine armored attacks. The IFV/APCs provide protected mobility which naturally lowers casualties, however the tanks can not and do not engage the casualty inflicting arms that are, mines, artillery and drone forces. Currently there is no rifleman covering the front with huge gaps that you can walk through, it is all indirect except in complex cover where line of sight is grenade range and cover is tough enough to resist aircraft glide bombs and tanks do nothing.
Tanks assist in a breakthrough and are meant for maneuver warfare. There has been no maneuver warfare in Ukraine for at least the majority of the war. There have been only a few limited instances of it.
Yes, Kursk showed that even the nation with the most tanks in the world can not allocate armor to most of the fight, and instead motorized infantry is used to plug the gap, with the ultimate counter attack conducted by the likes of north korean light infantry. The shock of newly mass deployed fiber optics guided drones that cut logistics to the salient means Ukraine couldn't hold the position.
Here's a basic principle of warfare:
Light infantry do defense better.
Mechanized units (and armor) do offense better.
Deploying mostly light infantry to defend the border area of Kursk actually made sense.
The low utilization of tanks is predictable, as tanks are not strategically mobile and require tank transporters and rail to move significant distances, while wheeled forces that can road march with far less prep and various medium weight formations were based on this.
"It's predictable"
*proceeds to list something entirely irrelevant*
The criticality of logistics for holding territory is also known in the Kherson campaign, where TBMs cutting bridges decided the fight. Interdiction can take ground when it can be completed. This can also be seen in the Kharkiv campaign, where armor formations are neutralized by sheer logistics failure.
Oh wow Russia and Ukraine having shitty logistics? Who could have thunk?
We can agree that T-55 armor penetration capability is sufficient then.
You're agreeing with yourself?
Good sensors, bad sensors, the drone gets initial spot. No one would attempt turtle tanks if the force is relying on tank sensors.
A drone getting the first spot always, is such a ghetto concept of warfare.
Vehicles based on failed doctrine and obsolete concepts can't be fixed without discarding it completely.
Wrong.
I believe the Zulus need to be fought by spearman, none of this machinegun BS. I believe the indians need to be fought by bows, none of this rifle and revolvers BS leading to the bow gap. I believe the Polish cavalry need to be fought by a reformed order of teutonic knights and none of this using Panzers against them, fires can not generate the SHOCK effect of cold steel.
This unironically, is why you fail to grasp the concept of the tank. You prefer old technologies to fight new threats. I prefer new technologies. The tank represents the new technology.
You prefer whataboutism to real analysis.
Commenters have eluded to and this uninformed opinion agrees w that there is 3 t problem which would be that would be true for any army in the world. Not enough 1.time 2.troops or 3.tech to solve this particular problem any time soon.
The tunnel system in Gaza was ultimately countered with few casualties and while achieving combat objectives. I think this proves there is a solution, and its basis is taking it seriously, investing in R&D, and proper training.
Well, Ukraine tried to follow American doctrine in 2023...
View attachment 794436
...and found it to be unworkable, because American doctrine basically stated "you don't break defenses, you circumvent defenses" and did not have provisions for the cases of long solid trench lines, with no way to circumvent them.
I see a picture of old western AFVs. I don't see a western doctrine here.

A lot of offensives in Ukraine failed because neither side put in the effort to properly concentrate forces and assets before committing to an offensive.
The idea of circumventing a defense isn't to actually drive around the trench line. But to find the weakest viable spot, concentrate efforts and quickly exploit it.

The primary western method of fires is air power. Large payloads, large warheads, hard to intercept. They are a maneuver enabler. They break defenses.

Toying with 40 year old Leopards and Bradleys isn't western doctrine. It's LARP.
 
What tactics would US army use instead?
Surly you are kidding
Please don't start with "US army would not allow such situation to exist in first place"; we have no idea, would USAF be able to maintain airspace dominance against peer opponent.
One either practices AD/A2 or they dont.
Use the situation you actually have; no airspace dominance, extreme level of electronic warfare, extremely large-scale standoff weapon use against even battlefied targets, frontline transparent for both sides.
Transparency for an entire tactical battlespace let alone a theatre battlespace is an illusion. A fully HARM & other anti-radiation equipt force would mow the ew threat.
 
So basically Western armored warfare doctrine did not have solution for breaching through non-circumventable defenses also. As I said, it just assumed that you ALWAYS could find a way around.
A breach is executed when there is no way around, so not sure what we are even discussing.

Miley said dont try it. They did. Alot more smoke, Fuel Air maybe a MOAB, BLU-82 or 2 or 3 or 4 etc. for starters.
 
You're right. But air dominance is the prerequisite for maneuver. Not a nice bonus.
And we are back on page one; how to fight a trench war with static frontlines if air dominance could not be achieved.

P.S. Also, many Russian/Ukrainean analytics suggest that "air dominance" now could be divided into two separate domains; "high air dominance" (manned planes, jet drones and high-characteristic cruise missiles) and "low air dominance" (FPV's, small drones, lotiering munitions). Control over "high air" does not imply control over "low air".
 
Miley said dont try it. They did. Alot more smoke, Fuel Air maybe a MOAB, BLU-82 or 2 or 3 or 4 etc. for starters.
Seriously, we tried all this with such things as dozens one-ton guided bombs drooped on Ukrainean positions, as well as extensive use of artillery. And? Same results; you could wreck the trenches, but drones would still block the armor assault.
 
And we are back on page one; how to fight a trench war with static frontlines if air dominance could not be achieved.
In that case the MBT becomes a less relevant asset and so it should not be discussed in this particular thread.

P.S. Also, many Russian/Ukrainean analytics suggest that "air dominance" now could be divided into two separate domains; "high air dominance" (manned planes, jet drones and high-characteristic cruise missiles) and "low air dominance" (FPV's, small drones, lotiering munitions). Control over "high air" does not imply control over "low air".
It's not a Russian/Ukrainian argument. It's a recognized reality. In the IDF we call the lower layer "close to ground" and roughly define it as 30m-300m.
I'm sure many other armies have some term for that.

The biggest kinetic differentiator between it and the higher altitude, aside from who operates it, is payload. The close to ground layer employs payloads measured in 0.1 - 100 kilograms.
The higher altitude layers employ payloads in 10 - 10,000 kilograms.

You use the lower level for ground-operated fires to target individual targets. The higher level allows breaking fortifications. Both are obviously essential.

So for the sake of future arguments I suggest we intend superiority in both when saying air superiority.
 
It's not a Russian/Ukrainian argument. It's a recognized reality. In the IDF we call the lower layer "close to ground" and roughly define it as 30m-300m.
I'm sure many other armies have some term for that.
Well, Russia, Ukraine and Israel are basically the only nations that have full experience of modern warfare right now.
 
Seriously, we tried all this with such things as dozens one-ton guided bombs drooped on Ukrainean positions, as well as extensive use of artillery. And? Same results; you could wreck the trenches, but drones would still block the armor assault.
Russia made serious improvements in air delivered firepower, but the UMPK kits are crude and its general employment leaves a LOT to be desired.
Few issues:
  1. Easy to intercept. A straight path means it's lower to ground and slower at the terminal phase. JDAMs fly higher and dive at their terminal phase making them more difficult to intercept.
  2. Too few. FABs are something you have to deploy in the hundreds every single day. In that frontline I'd say sometimes thousands are warranted.
  3. Not coordinated. The strikes have to be meaningful. If you got a target and it took you 24h to drop a FAB on it, there's a good chance you hit nothing relevant.
  4. Static. If strikes are still against static pre-determined targets and not in direct support of a maneuvering force, then you're missing out on a lot of potential.
 
Russia made serious improvements in air delivered firepower, but the UMPK kits are crude and its general employment leaves a LOT to be desired.
They are doing their job, aren't they? And "crude" is often synonymous with "optimised for mass production"

Easy to intercept. A straight path means it's lower to ground and slower at the terminal phase. JDAMs fly higher and dive at their terminal phase making them more difficult to intercept.
IRRC, JDAM did not demonstrate themselves to be much harder to intercept too; while I agree, that trajectories could be optimized, it's mainly a software matter, not hardware.

Too few. FABs are something you have to deploy in the hundreds every single day. In that frontline I'd say sometimes thousands are warranted.
Erm, they are basically used constantly. Including large salvoes and tight patterns.

Not coordinated. The strikes have to be meaningful. If you got a target and it took you 24h to drop a FAB on it, there's a good chance you hit nothing relevant.
Well, if you are trying to break the enemy defenses, the FAB's are mainly used against pre-determined targets anyway.

Static. If strikes are still against static pre-determined targets and not in direct support of a maneuvering force, then you're missing out on a lot of potential.
IRRC, they could be used for both, as well as JDAM.
 
They are doing their job, aren't they? And "crude" is often synonymous with "optimised for mass production"


IRRC, JDAM did not demonstrate themselves to be much harder to intercept too; while I agree, that trajectories could be optimized, it's mainly a software matter, not hardware.


Erm, they are basically used constantly. Including large salvoes and tight patterns.


Well, if you are trying to break the enemy defenses, the FAB's are mainly used against pre-determined targets anyway.


IRRC, they could be used for both, as well as JDAM.
Can be; potentially; just do this and that...
Fact of the matter is that right now they're not used in a manner that approaches western efficiency. Not even close.
It's not because they don't want to, but because there's a lot of work to be done to enable this.
These long processes allow both sides to effectively adapt before any specific threat becomes serious.
 
Can be; potentially; just do this and that...
Well, I could say the same for Tomahawk's, for example; fitting them with chaff/flare launchers seems to be obvious idea, but for some reason chaff/flare launchers of Russian Kalibr missiles were viewed as some kind of radical new solution)

Fact of the matter is that right now they're not used in a manner that approaches western efficiency. Not even close.
Please tell me, where Western JDAM's were used against near-peer enemy with excessively tight air defenses?

These long processes allow both sides to effectively adapt before any specific threat becomes serious.
Well, recall the problems with Excalibur shells, GLSDB's, ect., which were found to be jamming-vulnerable and which efficiency reduced greatly over years?
 
Well, I could say the same for Tomahawk's, for example; fitting them with chaff/flare launchers seems to be obvious idea, but for some reason chaff/flare launchers of Russian Kalibr missiles were viewed as some kind of radical new solution)
Dispensers take space, require more time to load on a missile before mission, and add a lot of pyrotechnics per munition. Using them is not "obvious", especially not on naval systems where it's sitting in a tube for a long time.

The Tomahawk already has a lot of defensive measures, each of which has their own costs, like low level flight, low signature, terminal maneuvers, subsonic speed etc. As opposed to just a crude supersonic missile.
Chaff/flares can be a logical compromise only if considered as part of a larger picture involving the full method of employment.

If the USAF/USN consider the Tomahawk to be sufficiently survivable within the planned permissivity of airspace, then no extra measures are needed.

For example if a certain air force anticipates air inferiority, then maximizing the survivability of each missile makes a lot of sense.
If another air force anticipates a level of air superiority, then investment per missile can be lowered to raise overall efficiency.

An example of measures is applying EW and other effects for SEAD, or outright DEAD, to permit weapons to fly more safely. Then you'd rather max out on fuel and warhead size.

For more survivable options, the US has the JASSM.

Please tell me, where Western JDAM's were used against near-peer enemy with excessively tight air defenses?
Does it honestly matter for this debate?

Well, recall the problems with Excalibur shells, GLSDB's, ect., which were found to be jamming-vulnerable and which efficiency reduced greatly over years?
SDB was built for employment from air, where an aircraft can apply its own effects to boost its efficiency.
The GLSDB is an afterthought. It uses a munition whose usefulness to Ukraine is limited (penetration focused), on a booster that brings up its range to something that may require a redesigned INS.
Add to it the variable which is on-the-field coordinates input, which we do not know how Ukraine does and which certainly could be problematic. If the launcher coordinates are disrupted by 1m, then even with perfect accuracy the INS would bring the SDB within 1m of target. Then you add the inherent drift.

INS are expensive systems, and putting them in munitions is no small matter. You can significantly reduce their cost by simply using an aircraft whose systems you can leverage. Not a luxury Ukraine has.

Excalibur is an old munition and whatever I just said is multiplied with it.
I personally do not believe in using munitions with Excalibur's form factor without adding a terminal guidance.
 
Well, Russia, Ukraine and Israel are basically the only nations that have full experience of modern warfare right now.
Israel hasn't faced a modern military power in almost half a century, lol.

And, in order to keep with this threads topic, it's reflected in their rather unique but fundamentally archaic indigenous tank. Which is largely unsuited for modern warfare with nimble, guided munitions, as it's exceptionally easy to disable the engine on the Merkava thanks to it's placement and an immobilized tank in this day and age is a dead tank. But lightly armed guerillas and civilians luckily tend to not engage tanks at all. But if they choose to, like on the October 7th, the Merkava and it's lauded APS proved just as vulnerable to drones as any cold war era tank.
 
Israel hasn't faced a modern military power in almost half a century, lol.
You are ignoring a basic fact of military conflicts and that is that none ever seeks power symmetry with an opponent. The vast majority of battles in human history were very one sided.

A nation's ability to overcome an opponent technologically and militarily is in a show of competence and hard work. Why would that be seen negatively?

Another thing you are ignoring is the emergence of asymmetric threats. Against a dedicated opponent that sees these developments and reacts, this shouldn't be a serious threat. But the core idea of the asymmetric force is to focus available energy on creating one specific type of challenge built around the opponent's weakness.

Therefore a military is judged on its ability to react to unique challenges posed even by non-peers with fewer resources.

MOUT is not considered relevant in Europe so European nations are not preparing for it. But if given the challenge of fighting an air war with Iran or doing MOUT like in Gaza or Mosul, they'd quickly realize how seriously under-equipped they are for the task.

Russia is not modern in many aspects when it comes to military power. But Europe is guilty of the same neglect Russia showed between the cold war and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, so Russia does actually pose a serious threat to Europe despite not being a peer adversary.
And, in order to keep with this threads topic, it's reflected in their rather unique but fundamentally archaic indigenous tank.
There is nothing archaic in the Merkava's design. In fact it does feature a lot of things that are quite innovative compared to contemporary designs, like having an APS a decade before anyone else and all-around armor which still none else really has.

I'm guessing you're talking about its front engine, which is not archaic at all. It was just a different approach at the time. Neither innovative nor outdated. It simply achieved a single goal of moving the ammo to the back, which gave it good survivability at the time.

Front engines are heavily featured in modern AFVs, and are positively considered for the next generation.
Which is largely unsuited for modern warfare with nimble, guided munitions,
Which is odd because the Merkava and Abrams probably have the most extensive combat record of modern western MBTs. And not surprisingly, the Merkava's combat record shows exceptional survivability even in the most hostile environments (for an MBT) imaginable.

Here's an Iranian Almas attack on a Merkava 4M-400.
The Almas is a copy of the Spike, which is one of the most dangerous ATGM any AFV can face today.
And yet it was intercepted and the tank remained intact.
On the other hand, the vast majority of western AFVs are without an APS.
as it's exceptionally easy to disable the engine on the Merkava thanks to it's placement and an immobilized tank in this day and age is a dead tank.
Maybe it is easier to disable its engine. Maybe not. But it's not easier to achieve a mobility kill on it.
You can achieve a mobility kill in many different ways. And honestly if you got an MBT in your crosshairs, you really want to hit just about anything except the engine. The reason why gunners are taught to aim center of mass is a dual one: Maximize hit probability, maximize damage.
But lightly armed guerillas and civilians luckily tend to not engage tanks at all. But if they choose to, like on the October 7th, the Merkava and it's lauded APS proved just as vulnerable to drones as any cold war era tank.
Yes except no. The reason is that it's false.
 
Let's actually mention the funding mechanism because it's central to the ecosystem.
In Israel, the MoD financially assists defense startups, funds R&D, and the 3 major defense companies (Elbit, Rafael, IAI), which themselves own many smaller subsidiaries, all receive guaranteed R&D projects and manufacturing contracts.
Playing stupid. Maybe not, I can’t say. Delete $3.8 billion and the open ended direct involvement and recalculate the budget.
 
G-AI
The U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, was officially established in 1981, though the concept began development in the mid-1970s, with its first rotations starting in 1982 to simulate large-scale warfare for brigades. So, as of late 2025, the NTC is about 44 years old, providing realistic, large-scale combat training for U.S. forces.

The breach is practiced frequently at the US Army National Training Center (NTC) because it is considered one of the most difficult combat tasks, and over 50% of attempted breach operations by battalion task forces at the NTC tend to fail. Observer/Controller/Trainers (OC/Ts) at the NTC have observed over a hundred breaching operations.
Key details about breach training at NTC:

  • Integrated into Rotations: Breaching operations are a standard and essential component of the realistic, large-scale combat operation scenarios that units face during their NTC rotations.
  • Rotation Frequency: The NTC conducts ten training rotations per year. Each rotation is an opportunity for a different Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to practice the breach, among other mission-essential tasks.
  • Repetitive Practice within a Rotation: During a single 14-to-21-day rotation, a unit may attempt the breach multiple times. If a unit fails the first attempt, they often get another chance at the breach the following day.
  • Focus on Proficiency: The frequent practice is designed to develop and test a unit's proficiency and standard operating procedures (SOPs), as the synchronization of assets and maneuver in time and space is crucial to success.
In essence, while there isn't a fixed "number per year" for a single unit, the NTC provides ample, iterative opportunities for units to practice and refine their combined-arms breaching capabilities during their time there, driven by the critical need to improve performance in this challenging mission area.
 
Now add the direct involvement in the missile/drone wars by assisting countries.
And the supplemental aid packages.
Added components of Israel's 2026 defense budget:
  1. Supplementals - $0.
  2. June war assistance (92 THAAD interceptors) - $1.28 billion.
  3. FMF - $3.3 billion.
Baseline - $34.8.
Combined - $39.4 billion.

What's your point?
 
Added components of Israel's 2026 defense budget:
  1. Supplementals - $0.
  2. June war assistance (92 THAAD interceptors) - $1.28 billion.
  3. FMF - $3.3 billion.
Baseline - $34.8.
Combined - $39.4 billion.

What's your point?
Plus $500 million for anti missile systems per yr

Roughly $12 billion from US last 2+ yrs in war aid(low side)

Costs of US munitions used in direct intervention over last 2 yrs?

A lot of that “genius military development” is being paid by someone else.
 
Plus $500 million for anti missile systems per yr
No that's for joint projects. Israel and the US share costs. If you want to add the American funding you have to subtract the Israeli funding.
Roughly $12 billion from US last 2+ yrs in war aid(low side)
That is not included in the 2026 budget.
Those are also supplements used in a fashion similar to FMF which is reserved entirely for US manufacturing, not R&D or Israeli manufacturing.
Costs of US munitions used in direct intervention over last 2 yrs?
Yes I included those. $1.2 billion in THAAD interceptors.
A lot of that “genius military development” is being paid by someone else.
No. That is a very silly thing to say. Are you not familiar with economics and industry and math?

The fact of the matter is that R&D and manufacturing work assurance are baked into the financial model of all tiers of Israeli defense industries. The US sometimes does this, sometimes it doesn't. In Europe that's very uncommon.

The unit price of a Mark 4 Barak was reported as $3.5 million in 2023 although the exact source is unknown. The latest given price of the Namer is $3 million.
That is obviously a much lower figure than what you can find someone paying for a Leopard or Leclerc or god forbid a Challenger. And definitely also lower than the Abrams.

You can try to use conspiracy theories and other silly arguments, but that is the fact. You cannot hide from it.
 
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No that's for joint projects. Israel and the US share costs. If you want to add the American funding you have to subtract the Israeli funding.

That is not included in the 2026 budget.
Those are also supplements used in a fashion similar to FMF which is reserved entirely for US manufacturing, not R&D or Israeli manufacturing.

Yes I included those. $1.2 billion in THAAD interceptors.

No. That is a very silly thing to say. Are you not familiar with economics and industry and math?
But Israeli use. That $12 bil wasn’t for the US.
Not incl costs of US weapons used in direct defense of Israel and fired by US military forces.

I’m very familiar with numbers and very familiar with bullshtt.
That US aid gets cut off and the Israeli budget goes sideways.
 
What about all the SAMs the USN has been firing in support of Israel? Those aint cheap.
I have no precise figure on them. If you can prove that this has any relation to MBTs I'll gladly put in the time to find it for you.
 
I have no precise figure on them. If you can prove that this has any relation to MBTs I'll gladly put in the time to find it for you.
All that cost not being incl frees up funds for MBT or any other development.

Are you not familiar with economics and industry and math?
 
But Israeli use. That $12 bil wasn’t for the US.
It actually was. You really need to educate yourself on how FMF works. It is a subsidy for local industries. In many cases, the return on investment is positive. Meaning you get more income than what you're investing.
The money doesn't leave the US. If Israel orders Arrow launchers, the money goes to Boeing. If it orders F-35s, the money goes to Lockheed.
And that brings industries into US soil, like that massive new manufacturing plant for Iron Dome interceptors they just opened.
Not incl costs of US weapons used in direct defense of Israel and fired by US military forces.
Yes I included these. You are displaying a worryingly low reading comprehension capability. Did you not see the words containing the information?
I’m very familiar with numbers and very familiar with bullshtt.
Why are you familiar with bullshit? Do not familiarize with it. Do not eat it. It is not healthy.
That US aid gets cut off and the Israeli budget goes sideways.
The Israeli budget actually went on for several years without US aid.
 
All that cost not being incl frees up funds for MBT or any other development.
The reported costs precede the war. No new unit cost data has been published since the war began.
The financial model also hasn't changed since then.
Are you not familiar with economics and industry and math?
Of course I am familiar. As demonstrated here, I am providing facts for your education. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Don’t need it. Is Hamas basing out of Canada now?
That is a topic for another thread if you like to discuss economy of narcotics, abuse of asylum status and such. No relation to MBTs.

A factory is part of an industry. It makes things, and it gets money. The money is paid as salaries to the workers, income and other taxes to the state, and finances R&D and operation for the owner.
Money is good, yes.

We agree! It’s not needed. So much more liberating to not be tied to someone else’s wallet.
Yes. Now what's your point about MBTs?
 

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