South Korea - ROK Navy - Surface Ships

Sounds like CIWS-2 is closer to Goalkeeper than Phalanx, and that's not necessarily a great thing. Goalkeeper was a lot heavier and needed space below the deck, while Phalanx sat on the deck and only needed power and cooling run to it.

If CIWS-2 is like Phalanx in that it sits on the deck and only needs power and cooling (and isn't too much heavier), it'd be just this side of trivial to replace the older Phalanx units. Bring a crane to the dock and a flatbed holding the CIWS-2 and having a space to drop the Phalanx. Phalanx gets disconnected from power and cooling and the deck mount, then picked up by crane and swung onto the trailer. Crane then picks up CIWS-2 and swings it back over to the ship and drops it onto the existing Phalanx base mount. Bolt it down and connect power and cooling, job's done in half a day.

Which also gives the ROK a bunch of Phalanx CRAM units.
 

Why the U.S. Should Support South Korea’s Naval Expansion | Center for International Maritime Security

By Ju Hyung Kim When people think about the U.S.-ROK alliance, they often envision the Korean Peninsula: joint ground drills, combined air exercises, and the perennial challenge of deterring a North Korean invasion. But the next chapter of this alliance is unfolding at sea. With the U.S. Navy...
cimsec.org cimsec.org

Excerpt:
South Korea is undertaking a deliberate and ambitious transformation of its navy into a blue water force capable of regional power projection. This evolution is not simply about prestige or symbolism. It is a calculated move rooted in geostrategic necessity. As tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait and Chinese naval power expands across the first and second island chains, Washington should see Seoul’s naval modernization not as redundant or overlapping, but as a critical force multiplier.

This is especially relevant in the Yellow Sea, where a better-integrated U.S.-ROK naval posture could significantly enhance sea denial capabilities South Korea’s geographic proximity to China’s northern coastline presents a strategic opportunity to constrain the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet, which is headquartered in Qingdao and tasked with defending China’s most vulnerable maritime approaches. By jointly developing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies focused on the Yellow Sea, the alliance could effectively impose strategic costs on China’s northern naval operations and blunt its access to the first island chain.
Click to expand...
 
The United States provided Australia and Japan with Aegis destroyer technology, but rejected South Korea's request.
n.news.naver.com

美, 호주·日에 준 ‘이지스함 기술’ 한국 요청은 거절

해군이 미국 측에 이지스함 핵심 체계 중 하나인 협동교전능력(CEC) 도입을 타진했으나 미 해군 측이 거절한 것으로 확인됐다. 19일 해군에 따르면 해군은 지난해 6월 미 해군 측에 북한 위협 대응을 위해 정조대왕급
n.news.naver.com n.news.naver.com
It has been confirmed that the South Korean Navy approached the U.S. side regarding the introduction of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), one of the core systems of Aegis destroyers, but the U.S. Navy declined the request.
 
supplement
The request for the introduction of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is solely between the Republic of Korea Navy and the United States Navy, and is not a formal intergovernmental request.
 

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