Should Britain have built a Boeing 707 lookalike?

[uk 75]

The story of Britain's jet airliner development is a sad one. The one exception in the 60s was the BAC111 although even here the Boeing 737 and Douglas DC9 took most of the sales.
Burying the engines in the wings (Comet and V100) or mounting them on the tail (VC10) seemed less successful with long range customers than fitting them in underwing pods (Boeing 707 and Douglas DC8).
The Trident failed where the superficially identical Boeing 727 succeeded worldwide.
A proposed HS134 podded Trident looks similar to the Boeing 757 bought later by British Airways.
Britain was not the only European country to be unlucky with its airliners. France had the Dassault Mercure and West Germany the VF614.
Being cynical it is only in the 80s.when Airbus manufactures a family of widebodied podded engined airliners that Boeing gets a rival.
Perhaps if Tridents and VC10s had been more like Boeings things might have been different.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

I think the greatest barrier to successful British commercial airliners are not the shape of the aircraft, but more fundamentally the ability to achieve economies of scale and produce in numbers.

Forcing BAOC and BEA to buy British is necessary if only because then British manufacturers can start producing in numbers (plus, if a country's flag carriers aren't purchasing an aircraft, what message does that send to other airlines?).

 

[Archibald]

VC-7, whatever it flaws...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

VC-7, whatever it flaws...

Wood's Scenario 1957 included a second-generation VC.7 with Medway engines in underwing pods in place of the first-generation aircraft's buried Conways.

 

[red admiral]

Forcing BAOC and BEA to buy British is necessary if only because then British manufacturers can start producing in numbers (plus, if a country's flag carriers aren't purchasing an aircraft, what message does that send to other airlines?).

But even with British operators you're still talking about the historical fleet size of "tens" which makes near little impact on follow-on purchase costs for other operators. It also makes little impact to the higher operating costs. The reasons are really industry / company structure and it's really difficult to see how to change these. "Cost" was/is a pretty alien concept for UK aerospace industry in the most part

I think that trying to focus on the short haul segment and trying to sell further to US operators would have had better returns i.e. where there has actually been measured success with 1-11 and 146. Trying to compete across the whole range of segments just loses lots of taxpayer money

 

[riggerrob]

Boeing benefitted from Operation Paper Clip and experience building B-47 and B-52 bombers along with the USAF SAC-finances first batch of KC-135 tankers.
Podded engines help stabilize wings in pitch, reducing the risk of flutter and allowing for lighter wing structures. Installing heavy engines well forward of the structural center makes entire engine/wing structure self-stabilizing in pitch and flutter … similar to the way that control surfaces (high speed airframes) have such heavy counter-weights that their center-of-gravity is forward of the hinge line.

 

[riggerrob]

……

Forcing BAOC and BEA to buy British is necessary if only because then British manufacturers can start producing in numbers (plus, if a country's flag carriers aren't purchasing an aircraft, what message does that send to other airlines?).

British airlines were forced to buy domestically by shortages of foreign exchange dollars/pounds/lira/francs, etc. With slower cash-flow, Dorian airlines could ill-afford to buy American-made airplanes.
Remember that Britain was bankrupted by two World Wars. In exchange for Lend-Lease Agreements, (Breton Woods Accords 1944) Britain was forced to agree to free-trade for her colonies. This eroded British manufacturers’ financial advantage and allowed American manufacturers to compete in those colonies, buying raw materials (e.g. bauxite ore) and selling finished products (e.g. complete airplanes).

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

British airlines were forced to buy domestically by shortages of foreign exchange dollars/pounds/lira/francs, etc. With slower cash-flow, Dorian airlines could ill-afford to buy American-made airplanes.

Ah no;- According to George Edwards CEO of Vickers, the VC7 (aka V1000) was killed by BOAC purchasing the B707 with RR Conway, after the use of RR Conway on VC7 had be denied by HMG. Ref “From bouncing bombs to Concorde” Edward’s Autobiography.

In other places, he makes it very clear that there was no buy British policy imposed by HMG. (Note - Trident)

As for podded engines making aeroplanes more popular in the sixties, it made absolutely no difference;- although podded engines made for a more efficient wing (thinner due to bending relief from the engine mass) the rear engined aircraft could be optimised for lower wave drag, hence achieving their lowest drag at slightly higher speed, while maintaining a parallel fuselage;- the VC10 was the fastest until the curvy Convair 990 came along, and despite cheap fuel until 1973, neither sold in the B707/DC8 volumes

Of course today with operations cost being king, nobody cares to go 5% faster burning a bit more Kerosene…… So they’re all podded twins.

 

[1635yankee]

The VC.10 was largely built to BOAC/BEA requirements. One of of the results of these specs was that the VC.10 had far too much wing. Then, because these specs resulted in an aircraft that cost too much to operate, they bought Boeing. One wonders if the British air transport industry had something against the British aviation industry.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Ah no;- According to George Edwards CEO of Vickers, the VC7 (aka V1000) was killed by BOAC purchasing the B707 with RR Conway, after the use of RR Conway on VC7 had be denied by HMG. Ref “From bouncing bombs to Concorde” Edward’s Autobiography.

If I remember correctly from "On Atlas' Shoulders" it was cancelled because it was too heavy and Chris Gibson wrote something along the lines of the VC.7 failed because it was a military transport aircraft turned into an airliner while the VC.10 succeeded because it was an airliner turned into a military transport.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

If I remember correctly from "On Atlas' Shoulders" it was cancelled because was too heavy and Chris Gibson wrote something along the lines of the VC.7 failed because it was a military transport aircraft turned into an airliner while the VC.10 succeeded because it was an airliner turned into a military transport.

It was only too heavy because it used Avon turbojets which, being more thirsty than turbofans, demanded a much larger fuel uplift for a given range.

The Boeing 707 was a military transport (fuel - Kc135) turned into an airliner, so is a winning formula. Indeed with all the tooling, factories, system supply infrastructure, tech pubs and development paid for, can be offered at a price which others can’t compete with.

 

[uk 75]

It took a European consortium to get enough domestic orders to take on Boeing.
Meanwhile no other US manufacturer has survived as a producer of large passenger jets.
The twin podded jet has become the standard design for airliners.
The UK was right in hindsight not to fund the BAC 311 or even its part of Airbus with public money. UK firms still compete as subcontractors to Boeing and Airbus at their shareholders' risk.
The market for small passenger and executive jets is now as aggressive with only a few companies able to compete.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It was only too heavy because it used Avon turbojets which, being more thirsty than turbofans, demanded a much larger fuel uplift for a given range.

The Boeing 707 was a military transport (fuel - Kc135) turned into an airliner, so is a winning formula. Indeed with all the tooling, factories, system supply infrastructure, tech pubs and development paid for, can be offered at a price which others can’t compete with.

IIRC, only the wings are shared between KC-135 and 707. 135 fuselage is a full seat smaller in diameter, 3+2 not 3+3.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

KC135 to 707, Another fuselage diameter is easy-peasy compared to starting from scratch on the whole darn thing.

I once knew an old gentleman Boeing Engineer, joined them in the mid fifties. He told me about the accepted job mobility in the US industry. He bought one property in central Calf and one in Washington state, and spent forty years yo-yo ing between them, in particular spending time at Douglas doing the DC8, after learning how to do his job at Boeing.

I laugh at he say/she say thing about US/Euro government funding;- its a get rich scheme for the lawyers.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It was only too heavy because it used Avon turbojets which, being more thirsty than turbofans, demanded a much larger fuel uplift for a given range.

That's new to me. I thought the VC.7 was designed around four Conway turbofans from day one.

The Boeing 707 was a military transport (fuel - Kc135) turned into an airliner, so is a winning formula. Indeed with all the tooling, factories, system supply infrastructure, tech pubs and development paid for, can be offered at a price which others can’t compete with.

The 1,010s Boeing 707s and 820 KC-135s were different aircraft built on separate production lines, which were developed from the Boeing 377-80. The 707 had a wider fuselage than the KC-135 which allowed 6-abreast seating instead of 5-abreast. Arguably, the decision to widen the 707s fuselage was what made it outsell the DC-8 despite loosing the production economies of scale that were likely to have arisen from being a civil version of the KC-135.

This explains why the USAF designation for the 707 was C-137 and Boeing's model number for the KC-135 was 717. E.g. the original Air Force One was a VC-137 and the E-3 Sentry was originally the EC-137. The original Air Force One would have been a VC-135 and the Sentry would originally have been the EC-135 if the 707 and KC-135 had really been the same aircraft.

I did start a "What if the Boeing 707 & KC-135 were the same aircraft" thread on Secret Projects in which the KC-135 had the 707s wider fuselage so the two aircraft were built on the same production line. I though that at least the USAF would have got a tanker that could carry more fuel in its primary role and more passengers & freight in its secondary role.

Edit: Ninja'd by @Scott Kenny

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

That's new to me. I thought the VC.7 was designed around four Conway turbofans from day one.

It comes directly from G Edwards, CEO of Vickers at the time & in overall charge of V1000/VC7;-, you won’t find a more authority primary source.

 

[Pirate Pete]

I recall reading that the then BOAC were against the VC.7, something about not believing that the plane fitted with Conway engines would not be able to make the range/fuel consumption figures claimed for it, but then went and bout 707’s fitted with the self-same engines!
regarding the VC.10, I think it was designed to operate from hot and high (foreign) ‘short’ runways, which the then 707 could not manage to operate from and it was very much designed to BOAC’s demanding requirement, then, oh surprise, a solution was found by lengthening runways!
The DH.121 (Trident) was a well thought out design originally, but then BEA for whom the plane was being designed for ‘panicked’ when passenger numbers dipped and they claimed that they would not be able to fill the aircraft and demanded it be made smaller.
All basically failing as programmes or commercially due to being designed to the specific requirements of a particular operator who never seemed to be able to ‘read the room’. Boeing etc, designed and built against a wider idea of operation and thus the British manufacturers got very little of the ‘pie’.

 

[Anderman]

It comes directly from G Edwards, CEO of Vickers at the time & in overall charge of V1000/VC7;-, you won’t find a more authority primary source.

Are the Avon and the Conway comparable thrust wise ?

 

[Hood]

Probably most of the arguments either way have already been covered in this recent(ish) thread:
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/which-airliner-should-have-been-built.40185/

I shall also link to a post I made on a VC-10 Vs 707 thread back in 2020 to save me retyping the whole thing again: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/vc10-vs-707.33659/#post-390723

 

[red admiral]

All basically failing as programmes or commercially due to being designed to the specific requirements of a particular operator who never seemed to be able to ‘read the room’.

I think it is optimistic to say that any of these aircraft would have been massive successes if those BOAC/BEA specific requirements (although they also applied to other operators) would have been removed. This rather ignores the superior design to cost and customer service approach of Boeing.

Many of the industry memoirs do tend to blame others rather than be proper retrospectives to learn from.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I recall reading that the then BOAC were against the VC.7, something about not believing that the plane fitted with Conway engines would not be able to make the range/fuel consumption figures claimed for it, but then went and bout 707’s fitted with the self-same engines!

Not according to George Edwards;-

From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde, Chapter 14 Titled “The Biggest blunder of all”

Page 118 - He clearly states VC7 with RR Conway would meet all its (both Military transport and BOAC… remember V1000 was an ECR A/C supporting the V force ) range payload requirements. However the government refused to release RR Conway for the project due to priority being given the HP Victor, making it inherently underperforming. uncompetitive, so the first prototype V1000 (RR Avon powered) was scrapped in November 55. On 24th October 56 it was revealed that BOAC had bought 15 B707 with RR Conway for £44m, £35m of which was paid in U.K. government dollars…..not really a buy British policy.

He notes that Derek Wood spread incorrect information in Project Cancelled concerning its range suitability for BOAC;- he uses the words “Smoke screen”

On page 120, he recalls meeting HMG minister H Watkinson, ten months after the cancellation of V1000. who asked if V1000 Conway could be reactivated, but Edward’s response was no, as he had just chopped it up. He uses the word “Farce” to describe this situation.

 

[Hood]

To echo Red Admiral's point - you need to take these autobiographies with a pinch of salt.
George Edwards was stretching the cloth because even the initial Type 716 design had R.Co.3 Conways. The design always had Conways on it and the RAF and MoS never considered anything less than having Conways on it.
It seems that the MoS cooked up the idea of some kind of Avon-powered V.1000 to entice BOAC away from Comets but they flatly refused to consider it - and it was not a Vickers initiative.
The V.1000 failed to meet the Air Ministry’s requirement to take-off unassisted in 2,000 yards in tropical conditions, even with R.Co.5 engines. Because of this and delays in developing the R.Co.5, the programme was cancelled.

The weight/take-off issue was blown out of proportion and in fact stemmed from several blunders in the specification drawn up by the MoS. That was neatly hidden when Minister of Supply Maudling stepped up in Parliament and claimed that the cancellation was due to lack of money, while the civil servants disingenuously pretended that the lack of any public mention of the specification errors was to spare the industry from any overseas sales harm, hence Edwards rather public comments about losing the Transatlantic market. There was a ton of smoke screening going on and Edwards has his own axes to grind.
Again - BOAC was absent from all this.

Now had Edwards come out and said V.1000 failed to meet the specifications it would have made Weybridge look like chumps, and adding the caveat "it was the MoS guv" would likely have pissed off Whitehall and contracts may well have slipped away from Vickers - remember the Swift debacle was still very fresh in the public memory of millions in taxypayers cash wasted on a crap fighter. So of course Edwards claims a rosy picture.

This is what I wrote in my Masters dissertation on the subject of the V.1000's cancellation after researching the files at Kew:

Aware of potentially negative public reactions, political manoeuvring began to ensure there could be no allegations surrounding the operational requirement. The new Minister of Supply, Reginald Maudling, admitted the extent Vickers had failed was ‘open to dispute’ and that the ‘operational need has changed in some measure.’ The Controller of Aircraft at the Ministry of Supply, Air Chief Marshal Sir John W. Baker, had accepted at an Air Council meeting on 27 July that the operational requirement was not met. However, Baker had reservations about using this as a reason for cancellation, informing the Under-Secretary of State for Air, Sir Maurice J. Dean, that the tropical take-off issue was, ‘very much matters of opinion and we cannot assert categorically that we are right and the firm is wrong.” Baker admitted that take-off problems had been foreseen from the beginning. A proposed 3,000 yard take-off concession was discussed but not included in OR.315 and a proposed clause allowing consultation over thrust augmentation agreed at the September 1952 Advisory Design Conference never appeared in the specification. The 3,000 yard concession was ruled irrelevant because it predated OR.315, but this raises the question why the concession was not added or studied further by the Air Ministry. Maudling thought Vickers could publicly dispute the decision and therefore agreed with the Secretary of State for Air, William De L'Isle and Dudley, to publicly announce that the delayed delivery justified cancellation, which would ‘carry conviction to the general public.’ The Air Council had not considered lateness unacceptable if other requirements were met, but the Ministry of Supply and Vickers agreement that the V.1000 was delayed enabled both ministries to use this as the official reason. There was also an element of Air Ministry vindictiveness against Vickers following the failure of the Swift, the Assistant Under-Secretary (Air) advising, ‘This is the second time Vickers have let us down within 12 months, and the firm ought to be left in no doubt as to the Air Ministry’s opinion.’ The Air Ministry was happy to dismiss the Swift and V.1000 as Vickers’ technical failures. However, like the Swift, design work had begun without an official requirement. The official V.1000 programme history confirms the Ministry of Supply had already carried out the tendering process and selected Vickers’ design before work on the operational requirement started in January 1952. OR.315 was not issued until August 1952 and the Ministry of Supply Specification C.132D was issued in December, two months after Vickers had received their contract. OR.315 was written around the V.1000 design but there is no explanation why the take-off concession was dropped or not subsequently studied given the awareness of possible problems. Maudling was prevented by the Air Ministry from including in the cancellation press statement a reference to the changed ‘strategic appreciation’ in an attempt to limit adverse publicity for Vickers and potential loss of exports. The Air Ministry was determined to prevent any public questioning of the operational requirement process. The lack of interest by British Overseas Airways Corporation in the commercial VC.7 version since 1952 and Treasury concerns over costs also prevented any attempts by the Ministry of Supply to save the programme.

 

[riggerrob]

The take-off performance was based upon a fully-loaded airliner taking-off from South Africa and flying non-stop to the UK.
The Trident 3B was powered by a trio of Spey 163 engines plus an RB.162 booster engine to assist take-offs.
A large part of the problem is that most of the inhabitable parts of sub-Saharan Africa are up on plateaus 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. For example, the capital Pretoria is 4,393 feet above sea level. Yes, it might have been possible to build airports down on the coast, but the coastal climate was deadly to whites/Europeans score the invention of modern medicines to curb malaria, dengue fever, etc. so few whites - who could afford long-distance air travel - lived along the coast.
The extra altitude plus mid-day heat raises density altitudes to ridiculous levels, severely reducing take-off performance which is why South African Air Force Shakletons and Buccaneers got booster rockets.

 

[1635yankee]

A large part of the problem is that most of the inhabitable parts of sub-Saharan Africa are up on plateaus 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. For example, the capital Pretoria is 4,393 feet above sea level. Yes, it might have been possible to build airports down on the coast, but the coastal climate was deadly to whites/Europeans score the invention of modern medicines to curb malaria, dengue fever, etc. so few whites - who could afford long-distance air travel - lived along the coast.

Clearly, areas at less than 3000 ft were -- and are -- inhabitable, even by white people. It's just, as you said, the people that the British air travel industry considered didn't live there. The airlines probably didn't care much about Britons living many places outside Belgravia.

 

[red admiral]

In doing market analysis then you probably want to focus on those people who can afford to fly, and the highest population density of these people. This is decades before the current mass market jet travel, with much smaller numbers of passengers and frequency of routes.

 

[Hood]

The Transatlantic market was big for BOAC, they often ran extensive winter schedules to the Caribbean via the USA and undertook a lot of charter work on their Stratocruisers and DC-7s. It wasn't all well-heeled travellers, although 'economy class' is relative of course.
Either way, BOAC knew it could fill seats on that route. Stuff like flying to (soon to be) ex-colonies was usual Flag Carrier work, the only question is how much those overseas routes should have affected aircraft development. Obviously you need the right kit to operate the routes but other airlines seem to have managed without specific developments like the VC-10, even in the US which has hot and high areas. The Boeing 707 was adaptable, yes you might have some restrictions to get around, but you knew it would fly most of the routes OK and that you wouldn't have to wait long before Boeing and P&W upgraded it with new model engines.

The VC.7 was likely fine for Transatlantic use, but the fact that the military transport version was struggling in the tropics didn't bode well once you factored in an airliner having more fixtures and fittings. There just wasn't the upgrade potential available if the airframe was on the borderline at the start of its life. Talk of reheated Conways was not reassuring (afterburners = £££££££).

 

[kaiserbill]

The take-off performance was based upon a fully-loaded airliner taking-off from South Africa and flying non-stop to the UK.
The Trident 3B was powered by a trio of Spey 163 engines plus an RB.162 booster engine to assist take-offs.
A large part of the problem is that most of the inhabitable parts of sub-Saharan Africa are up on plateaus 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level. For example, the capital Pretoria is 4,393 feet above sea level. Yes, it might have been possible to build airports down on the coast, but the coastal climate was deadly to whites/Europeans score the invention of modern medicines to curb malaria, dengue fever, etc. so few whites - who could afford long-distance air travel - lived along the coast.
The extra altitude plus mid-day heat raises density altitudes to ridiculous levels, severely reducing take-off performance which is why South African Air Force Shakletons and Buccaneers got booster rockets.

I agree with the altitude thing, but some things to consider:

The second and third most populous cities are on the coast, Cape Town and Durban.
You can throw the coastal cities of Port Elizabeth and East London in the mix too, meaning a lot of the population was in fact on the coastal plateau, even if Johannesburg (the largest city) and Pretoria are up at altitude.

The real issue was range.
The large piston and turboprop airliners had to stop to refuel somewhere between South Africa and Europe.
As did the early jets pre Boeing 747, such as the Boeing 707.

This range issue is why the very long runway at Upington airport in the Northern Cape was built, and commissioned in 1968.
At one stage, it was the longest runway in the world. (It might still be..too lazy to check)

At around 5km, it was designed for jet airliners such as the upcoming Boeing 747 fully loaded with fuel and passengers/cargo, and enabled a refuelling point for the coastal cities a bit closer to Europe, but at a lower altitude (800m) than Johannesburg Airport (1700m).

Even when longer range jets (Boeing 747, and especially the long range 747SP)came about in later years, the extra long runway at Upington allowed SAA to counter the ban on overflying parts of Africa, although Windhoek was more commonly used as it was closer.

But the gist of your post is true.
A lot of the testing for British jet airliners was done at Johannesburg for "hot and high" reasons.
Even the Concorde for example was doing just that in Johannesburg as late as in 1973, and 1976.
Upington hosted the Concorde in 1976, and no doubt the crew might have momentarily been tempted to try takeoff at maximum weight without the use of afterburner...
At maximum takeoff weight using afterburner, they would have barely used 2/3'rds of the runway there, which must have been a unique thing for them.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what its worth I've often thought about an alternative Brabazon Type I specification. That is instead of being for a turboprop powered transatlantic airliner it's for a turbojet powered transatlantic airliner. This can be the Point of Departure for developing a British Boeing 707 lookalike.

 

[alertken]

"Brabazon Committee" became a catch-all for subsidy by Ministry of (1/4/46) Supply to the Aero industry, seen as great white hope for bombed, broke UK in something to counter US' industrial scale. Only the Massey Ferguson tractor, Austin Californian and Land Rover might come close. We had turbines, US, then, did not, so MoS funded Rivers and Gods in hope something might match US Big Piston reliability. No-one 4/46 thought to hear market perceptions of UK air transport industry, 'cos we didn't have one. All Ministers knew was evidence by United A/L boss to Congress, that the transatlantic market might sustain a dozen a/c (not types: units). So, as well as turbines we had Empire, where revenue was Protected by cabotage. So MoS redefined Brabazon Type III (Empire), where piston Tudors, Hermes were underway, to be Type IIIC, funded 4/46 as Avro 693, 4xRR Clyde, then 4xASM Mamba; 11/46, 4xAJ65 (to be RR Avon, in wing root).

But 27/7/47 Avro (and HP) were preferred responders to the Medium Bomber, so Avro 693 was chopped. Bristol was at that time favoured and was not consumed on Bombers, so won (Vulcan)'s engine, already had Type 1/Transatlantic (Centaurus piston for Mk.I, Proteus planned for Mk.II), and bid a Proteus solution* to Type IIIC's successors, Medium Range and Long Range Empire, both met by Britannias. Which were unduly protracted. Some insemination moved from Avro 693 (and Tudors) to (1/12/45) Avro Canada C-102 Jetliner, itself to be protracted by priority on CF-100 fighter, and by RR on making Avon work for UK military types.

So: If MoS had rejected very weird wings for the Medium Bomber (staying with conventional Short Sperrin, Vickers Valiant), and/or
If C-102 had not been shackled, then:
Just about when the Korean fracas occurred, Comet 1 and portly Avros might be on order (in small batches) by, well, everyone.

(* amended 1730,2/1/24: T.175 began with, and was ordered for BOAC with Centaurus 28/7/49, changed 12/50 to Proteus).

 

[kaiserbill]

I think Hood hit the nail on the head.

The time frame we are looking at, design and decision wise, was a very different world than today. Hindsight from our vantage point is 20/20.

From a military and commercial travel aspect, Britain had to take into consideration the Empire routes when designing a long range platform.

A perusal of BOAC"s routes, and amalgamation history ( not only Imperial Airways Empire routes, but previous BSAA routes, and the far east) illustrates this.
The Empire routes, as well as the requirement to support the V bomber and other deployments to far flung colonial areas, fed into designs such as the VC7/1000.

The Brabazon Committees remit took major consideration into areas and resultant designs other than the North Atlantic route.

Of course, no one was to know that we were on the cusp of a very changed world within a decade or two.
Not only in the end of the British Empire, but also in the mode of transport.
An example would be my mother, who emigrated in the latter 1950's halfway around the globe by boat, just like the vast majority of people at that time had to do.

 

[red admiral]

That is instead of being for a turboprop powered transatlantic airliner it's for a turbojet powered transatlantic airliner.

But with the technology available then that isn't achievable? And wasn't historically until the early 1960s to do non-stop crossings. It seems a bit much for the Brabazon Cmte to predict 15 years into the future. In selecting and funding Comet 1 for lower goals they were already backing the highest risk option.

Given the timing, then the UK producing a 707 competitor is realistically VC-10? As we're really into early/mid 60s for 707 in numbers. Say in an alternate world Vickers do a better job of cost control on the VC-10 development? (roughly 80% UPC increase vs their fixed price contract with BOAC) allowing them to keep this initial order, market confidence, a more price competitive offer for other customers, and avoid government bail outs. Say maybe Vickers decide to make a loss on the initial order and subsidise from profits elsewhere in the group? Shock horror for the UK.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

But with the technology available then that isn't achievable? And wasn't historically until the early 1960s to do non-stop crossings. It seems a bit much for the Brabazon Cmte to predict 15 years into the future. In selecting and funding Comet 1 for lower goals they were already backing the highest risk option.

It went without saying that the aircraft built to the ALT-Brabazon Type I specification would have been a long-term project that wouldn't have come to fruition until the late 1950s. Which is why I didn't.

 

[zen]

VC.10 with Trinity (MPS, AEWACS, Tanker) and Transport might have shifted the dial slightly.

 

[red admiral]

It went without saying that the aircraft built to the ALT-Brabazon Type I specification would have been a long-term project that wouldn't have come to fruition until the late 1950s. Which is why I didn't.

But because it's so long term you can't bake in the technology advancements along the way. I think this is much more likely (inevitable?) to lay a turd like a Bristol Brabazon with jets or Vickers Victory bomber derivative than a viable 707 competitor. It's easy to see going back to scratch multiple times to accommodate swept wings, axial jets, better jets, more pax etc. in which case the POD may as well be mid/late 50s

VC.10 with Trinity (MPS, AEWACS, Tanker) and Transport might have shifted the dial slightly.

I think that less government/military investment might have been better e.g. the pax VC-10s were burdened with wing hard points for Skybolt. More military derivatives means more trade offs like this that increase operating costs for airlines. I think better for Vickers to focus on the airline market first, then make derivatives later for other purposes. But when the government is bankrolling you then obviously they get a vote in the requirements.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

But because it's so long term you can't bake in the technology advancements along the way. I think this is much more likely (inevitable?) to lay a turd like a Bristol Brabazon with jets or Vickers Victory bomber derivative than a viable 707 competitor. It's easy to see going back to scratch multiple times to accommodate swept wings, axial jets, better jets, more pax etc. in which case the POD may as well be mid/late 50s.

For what it's worth. If I write "Could the UK have sold more airliners after 1945?" the Brabazon Type III is given priority over the Type I. Therefore, the the first Bristol Britannia flies in September 1949 (possibly with Bristol Theseus or RR Clyde tuboprops instead of Proteus turboprops) and whatever was built instead of the Bristol Brabazon doesn't fly until August 1952 at the earliest. The latter would have been derived from work done on the V-Bombers.

 

[Rule of cool]

As I understand it the hot and high requirement gave the VC10 a wing and engine combination that could handle a larger (and therefore more commercially economical) fuselage in normal operations. Vickers proposed a 28' fuselage stretch that would have accommodated over 200 passengers in a single class layout in 1958 during the Eisenhower Recession and airline slump. BOAC executives said that they couldn't fill such a large aircraft, in fact they doubted they could use the VC10s on order, as a result Vickers only stretched the fuselage 13' for about 170 single class seats and worse 'cost per seat/mile' than the 707.

I can't help but think that if Vickers had gone ahead with the 28' 200+ seat Super 200, creating the world largest trans-Atlantic airliner for a few years in the med-late 60s, it would have picked up more than a hadful of sales from the 707 and DC8.