Royal Netherlands Navy 1945-1990 formerly Nuclear Powered Submarines for the Royal Netherlands Navy

The 1965 exchange rate was ~10 Dutch Guilders to 1 British pound, so SSNs would likely cost ~250 million guilders each using the first 5 British 'production' SSNs as a guide.

The 1965 Dutch defence budget was 2.71 billion Guilders, the Navy took about 25-30% of that (about 670-810 million Guilders) and the new capital equipment acquisition portion is usually 30-40% of that (about 320 million Guilders on the high end).

Stretch those numbers out over a 10 year program to build 5 SSNs and you have a 3,200,000,000G budget having to buy 2,500,000,000G worth of SSNs leaving only 700,000,000G for the rest of the Navy for that decade. SSNs are expensive.
FWIW Dutch Navy Estimates 1959-72 according to Janes 1968-69 to 1972-73
1959 - 345,000,000​
1960 - 390,000,000​
1961 - 445,000,000​
1962 - 564,000,000​
1963 - 542,000,000​
1964 - 627,000,000​
1965 - 660,000,000​
1966 - 702,000,000​
1967 - 727,000,000​
1968 - 775,000,000​
1969 - 824,000,000​
1970 - 936,000,000​
1971 - 998,000,000​
1972 - 1,135,000,000​

Total 9,670,000,000 guilders over 14 years for an average of 690,714,286 guilders a year.
 
I've got so much information on the RNLN because I've been doing research on it for an ASB thread on Alternatehistory.com FWIW.
 
How would the Netherlands etc. get around SecDef MacNamara's strong opposition to the sharing of nuclear submarine propulsion technology?

Apparently, he believed it provided an unacceptable pathway to nuclear proliferation, which he strongly opposed in favour of tight centralised US control of nuclear weapons.
Same case with Italy I would argue. You need one of the following:
  1. Britain being able to export PWR1 without being vetoed from the US. If the 1958 treaty is in place but Rickover had his way and stopped the export of a full reactor to the UK does the US still has a veto? How much of a diplomatic mess exercising that veto causes with Whitehall, Rome and the Hague? Can we derail the Polaris agreement earlier on so the British are forced to go independent?
  2. Have a French reactor around. Technically impracticalI don't see a way to move CAS-48 into the late 1960s.
  3. Have the US attempts to stop proliferation collapse, so there is no point denying close allies SSN technology. How you achieve that? Nuclear Sweden in the early 1960s causing a domino effect?
 
Britain being able to export PWR1 without being vetoed from the US.
RNLN nuclear submarines would still not be funded, because choices had to be made in any case.
 
Netherlands joining UK nuclear is part of a wider scenario IMO.
One that would see Broomstick on Type 82 and Sea Dart and ADAWS on Tromp.
Potentially Sea Wolf, maybe with a Dutch 'lightweight' computer system and guidance radar set.

In turn Anglo-Dutch depth charges and here is the curious potential. As back in this time RN Diesel Submarines still existed and continued to a resurrection with the Upholder class.
But RNLN could swing involvement here and put Dutch industry into deep involvement on the SSK side of Anglo-Dutch collaboration.
That's where reciprocal access to RN SSN program could be forthcoming.

That feeds consequences for a program of Anglo-Dutch centrifuges for HEU. Where their technology is a step up from gaseous diffusion.
And ultimately a specific nuclear depth charge of 12" or less diameter in the sub-kiloton range.
 
@Hobbes
Deugdelijke Schepen - Marinescheepsbouw 1945-1995 by S.G. Nooteboom, Europese Bibliotheek 2001, chapter 5: De nucleaire optie 1956-1972 describes how studies and planning for RNLN nuclear-powered submarines evolved.
Initially aiming for cooperation with the US Navy, with promises made by the Eisenhower administration. During the early sixties, financial difficulties for the scheme, as well as marked reluctance developing on the US Navy's part to share information with the RNLN. Later in the sixties, cooperation with the French Navy became a real possibility, but lack of funds ended that.
The scheme was dead in the water by 1972.
Does that book have anything in it about a class of helicopter cruisers or aircraft carriers to replace Karen Doorman and the De Ruyter class cruisers before it was decided to build the Tromp class DDGs and buy the 9 Atlantics? FWIW the combined crew of Karel Doorman and the De Ruyter class was about the same as 3 Invincibles.

And does it have any information on the frigate the RNLN planned to build before they built Leanders instead? Jane's 1960-61 and 1961-62 say 4 frigates of 3,500 to 3,800 tons standard displacement, powered with steam and gas turbines were in the new construction programme. 1962-63 and 1963-64 say 4 Leanders. 1964-65 onwards when say 6 Leanders. They also say that 4 frigates were initially planned to replace 4 ex-British destroyers and when it was changed to 6 frigates they were to replace the 6 ex-American destroyer escorts.
 
Does that book have anything in it about a class of helicopter cruisers or aircraft carriers to replace Karen Doorman and the De Ruyter class cruisers before it was decided to build the Tromp class DDGs and buy the 9 Atlantics?
Not a word.
The frigates - that is RNLN speak for ships other navies deem to be DDGs - Tromp and De Ruyter were to completely replace the two cruisers as flagships. Nooteboom writes about the financial burden of first acquiring Karel Doorman, then the cost of its big conversion in the fifties: a contributing factor to recurring delays in submarine construction.

does it have any information on the frigate the RNLN planned to build before they built Leanders instead?
Only the most general specifications, no designs. RNLN leadership was not completely satisfied with the 12 Holland- and Friesland-class destroyers, the decision to build to the Leander-design was made at the end of the fifties. Risk reduction.
 
More from Nooteboom.

- Logistical and political cooperation between partner nation (USA/France/UK) and the Netherlands would be needed for operating RNLN nuclear submarines, but: logistical cooperation between French and Dutch navies for the Atlantic MPAs wasn´t particularly satisfactory, I suspect this also played a role in the later Dutch P-3 buy.

- Of note: in communicating with the Dutch Ministry of Defence on operational aspects in 1972, RNLN Vice-Admiraal Doorenbos only mentioned the USA and UK as prospective partners.

- V-A Doorenbos: whichever nuclear submarine partner was chosen - USA, UK [or France] - the RNLN would be using, and paying for it, that partner's operational and logistical infrastructure, to the partner's benefit, but RNLN operational freedom would be restricted.

Funding is a theme that keeps surfacing in this story, with MoD and Navy continously aware of finite resources. How best to spend the money?
For the RNLN: no cruisers, no aircraft carrier, no nuclear submarines.
Instead: Tromp-, Kortenaer- and Jacob van Heemskerck-frigates, conventional Zwaardvis-submarines, MPAs.

Meer kon Bruin niet trekken.
 
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Just a few numbers:
  • The 1965 Dutch Defence Budget was about 2.6 billion Guilders
    • the Guilder to GBP exchange rate was about 10:1 in 1965.
  • The usual breakdowns likely occur,
    • the Navy gets about 25% (~650m Guilders/£65m)
    • 35-40% of that (~230-260m Guilders/£26m) is spent on capital equipment such as ships, subs and helicopters etc.
  • The RNs first 5 'production' SSNs averaged £25m apiece,
    • equating to 250m Guilders apiece.
  • Building the minimum viable SSN capability of 5 boats would require 1.25b guilders over 10 years,
    • 125m of the 230-260m capital equipment budget per year.
An SSN program would use up half of the RNLN's capital equipment budget for a decade to get the minimum viable capability.
 
Wasn't the 70's also the period when an Anglo-Dutch Frigate was on the cards?
 
What happens if the RNLN buys an RN SSN......in exchange the RN involves itself in the RNLN SSK as successor to the Oberons?

Instead of Upholders, Anglo-Dutch Walrus like SSKs.....
Could that alter the RAN decision on what became the Collins class?
 
Wasn't the 70's also the period when an Anglo-Dutch Frigate was on the cards?
FWIW an ASB thread I've been doing on Alternatehistory,com has made me think about the RN building Kortenaers instead of the Type 22. In that TL the RN and RNLN versions would be armed with NATO Sea Sparrow, but they'd fire modified Skyflash missiles. The TTL version of the Karel Doorman class would have it too and the TTL Type 23 would have VL Seaflash instead of VL Skyflash.
 
What happens if the RNLN buys an RN SSN.

I was wondering how this would happen. Cammell Laird built an SSN and 2 SSBNs in the 60s and all other RN nuke subs were built by Vickers, so there was a nuclear submarine capable yard available is the late 60s.
 
Intriguing thought on Cammel Laird, not great at submarines by then, but with more orders perhaps it might change.
With the availability of two yards, the submarine fleet can potentially expand at a more rapid rate.....
 
Nooteboom writes about the financial burden of first acquiring Karel Doorman, then the cost of its big conversion in the fifties: a contributing factor to recurring delays in submarine construction.
The following isn't in support of the above or to refute the above. It's background information.

I don't know how much she cost to buy, but I do know that the mean Vote 8 cost of a Colossus class aircraft carrier was £2.5 million.

According to the AI search that I did.
In 1948, the Pound Sterling to Dutch Guilder exchange rate was officially set at approximately 10.69 guilders to £1 sterling.
Therefore, the Dutch Government paid 26.75 million guilders for Venerable, if the British Government sold her at cost.

According to the AI search I did.
In 1957, the exchange rate for the British Pound to the Dutch Guilder was approximately 10.65 Guilders per Pound, or about £1 = 10.65 NLG.
According to the editions of Jane's I have access to Karel Doorman's 1954-57 modernisation was estimated to cost 11 million guilders and actually cost 25 million guilders. If the exchange rates are correct that's an estimated cost of £1 million and an actual cost of £2.3 million both rounded to the nearest £100,000.

If those figures are correct the Dutch Taxpayer got a bargain. That is, in comparison to the £20 million the British taxpayer paid to rebuild Victorious, the average of £10 million that it cost to build Albion, Bulwark & Centaur and the £17.5 million it cost to build Hermes.

If British shipyards were that good (and I suspect they weren't) they could have rebuilt all 6 Colossus class carriers the RN kept and the Majestic class ships Leviathan and Magnificent to the same standard as Karel Doorman with the money used to rebuilt Victorious IOTL.

These are the Dutch Navy Estimates 1947-58 according to Jane's
1947 - 375,007,220​
1948 - 327,224,589​
1949 - 323,771,380​
1950 - 314,809,510​
1951 - 270,000,060​
1952 - 347,200,000​
1953 - 323,000,000​
1954 - 325,000,000​
1955 - 321,110,000​
1956 - 342.312,000​
1957 - 352.770.000​
1958 - 363,793,000​

According to the above, 1,341.2 million guilders was spent in in the 4 years 1954-57 for an average of 335.3 million guilders. As I wrote before, the cost of Doorman's 1954-57 modernisation was 25 million guilders or 6.25 million guilders spread over 4 years.

FWIW the Dutch economy (if not the Dutch Government) got some of its money back because the shipyard that rebuilt Karel Doorman for the RNLN also rebuilt Minas Gerais (ex-Vengeance) 1957-60 for the Brazilian Navy.

Jane's 1960-61 says.
The ship was purchased for $16,000,000 and the reconstruction will cost $15,000,000.
But Jane's 1965-66 says.
The ship was purchased for $9,000,000 and the reconstruction cost $27,000,000.
The Pound Sterling was worth $2.80 throughout this period. Therefore, she cost £5.7 million to buy & £5.4 million to reconstruct according to Jane's 1960-61 and £5.7 million to buy and £3.2 million to buy and £9.6 million to reconstruct according to Jane's 1965-66.

According to the AI search I did 10.65 guilders were worth £1.00 in 1960. Therefore Minas Gerais cost: 60.9 million guilders to buy & 57.0 million guilders to rebuild according to Jane's 1960-61; and 34.2 million guilders to buy and 102.7 million guilders to rebuild accordingo Jane's 1965-66.
 
What happens if the RNLN buys an RN SSN......in exchange the RN involves itself in the RNLN SSK as successor to the Oberons?

Instead of Upholders, Anglo-Dutch Walrus like SSKs.....
Could that alter the RAN decision on what became the Collins class?
I was wondering how this would happen. Cammell Laird built an SSN and 2 SSBNs in the 60s and all other RN nuke subs were built by Vickers, so there was a nuclear submarine capable yard available is the late 60s.
Intriguing thought on Cammel Laird, not great at submarines by then, but with more orders perhaps it might change.
With the availability of two yards, the submarine fleet can potentially expand at a more rapid rate.....
If it helps conventional submarines of the Porpoise & Oberon classes were also built by Chatham Dockyard and Scotts/Scott-Lithgow. The former built 6 (including the 3 sold to Canada) and the latter built 13 (including the 6 sold to Australia and the 2 sold to Chile).
 
Intriguing thought on Cammel Laird, not great at submarines by then, but with more orders perhaps it might change.
I recently read an old thread about the quality of workmanship of post-war British warships. The Porpoise & Oberon classes along with the later Upholder class received considerable criticism from people claiming to be current or former RAN and RCN personnel for breaking down constantly. One former RAN officer claimed the only things that worked on their Oberons were the fridges so at least they had cold beer to drink. However, he also said that was because the fridges were American instead of British.
 
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According to the editions of Jane's I have access to Karel Doorman's 1954-57 modernisation was estimated to cost 11 million guilders and actually cost 25 million guilders.
Thank you for finding the estimated cost of converting Karel Doorman, my Jane's collection is rather more limited.
I took my copy of Drie-Cylinders Duiken Dieper by K.H.L. Gerretse and J.J.A. Wijn, revised edition, Van Soeren & Co 1993. It describes development, construction and operational use of the RNLN three-cylinder submarines.

The first two were laid down in 1954.
Dolfijn was commissioned in 1960, Zeehond in 1961.
In between Karel Doorman's conversion, started in 1955, had taken three years, its actual cost had risen to 45 million guilders. To avoid spending more than the Dutch MoD had allowed it to, the RNLN postponed the construction of the next two submarines. The RNLN then asked the US Navy to extend the loan of Walrus (ex-USS Icefish) and Zeeleeuw (ex-USS Hawkbill), the first of three such extensions of the loan of these two Guppy IB converted Balao-class submarines - the loan ended in 1971.
The savings satisfied the MoD's financial people for a while, but were a paper reality only.
Shipyard Wilton-Feijenoord in Rotterdam, with signed contracts in hand, had already started preparations for the next two. Financial compensation for W-F cost more than the originally projected construction cost, inflation causing another jump in cost for the last two submarines.
Eventually, both submarines were laid down in 1962, Potvis commissioned in 1965, Tonijn in 1966.
Gerretse and Wijn wryly note both submarines were paid for three times over.
 
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Nooteboom writes about the financial burden of first acquiring Karel Doorman, then the cost of its big conversion in the fifties: a contributing factor to recurring delays in submarine construction.
More background information about Karel Doorman which isn't intended to support or refute the above.

Complement
1,300 according to Jane's 1952-53 to 1956-57.
1,509 according to Jane's 1959-60 to 1964-65.
1,462 according to Jane's 1965-66 to 1968-69. 1965-66 says that 1,462 is the official revised figure.

1957-58 and 1958-59 aren't on Internet Archive and neither of my local reference libraries has them either.

Air Group

He capacity before she was rebuilt was 39 to 44 aircraft. However, she normally carried 19 fixed-wing aircraft and at least one helicopter.

I don't have access to Jane's 1957-58 and 1958-59, but the next two Jane's (1959-60 and 1960-61) say:
Capacity: 35 aircraft.​
8 Sea Hawks, 12 Avengers and 2 helicopters (total 22 aircraft) peace.​
12 Sea Hawks, 20 Avengers and 2 helicopters (total 34 aircraft) war.​

1961-62 says her capacity was 35 aircraft. Her official complement was 6 Sea Hawks, 6 Trackers, 4 HSS-1N Seabats and 2 helicopters* for a total of 18 aircraft.

1962-63 says her capacity was 21 aircraft. Her official complement was 6 Sea Hawks, 6 Trackers, 4 HSS-1N Seabats and 2 helicopters* for a total of 18 aircraft.

1963-64 to 1968-69 say her capacity was 21 aircraft. Her official complement of 8 Trackers and 6 SH-34J Seabats for a total of 14 aircraft.

Footnote
* The Sikorsky HSS-1N/SH-34J Seabat was a helicopter. I don't know, but suspect that the other 2 helicopters were utility machines for SAR and Vertrep. They could be either Sikorsky HO4S-3s or HUS-1/UH-34J Seahorses because some of the 12 S-58s acquired in the early 1960s were the utility version and the rest were the ASW version. Maybe @Arjen knows more on the subject.
 
@NOMISYRRUC Data from Hr. Ms. Karel Doorman - vliegveld in zee by Bert Brand, Lanasta 2005.
Sikorsky HO4S-3 helicopters were only used as plane guards from Karel Doorman.
Sikorsky HSS-1N helicopters were used for ASW from Karel Doorman.
The Dutch Korps Mariniers used HUS-1A utility helicopters.
 
If that is true there may have been restrictions on the UK selling US secrets to third parties, which is a pity because I like your thinking and it would explain why the RNLN didn't consider buying a British reactor IOTL because @Arjen wrote.
There are in fact such restrictions; they were one of the angles the US used to kill the potential Canadian purchase of nuclear submarines in the late 1980s.
How did the McMahon Act affect the sharing of nuclear submarine powerplants?
Utterly impossible under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which made it difficult even for the US Government to share information with US industry.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, passed after it was realised the 1946 Act was unworkable, made provision for sharing Restricted Data internationally, including research, development, or design of military reactors.
 
1957/57 J.F.S. shows:

(Capacity 39 to 44) Official complement: War: 20 Avengers, 12 Sea Hawks, 2 helicopters.
Peace: 12 Avengers, 8 Sea Hawks, 2 helicopters.

I don't have 1958/59 figures either....
 
Bert Brand (see reply #54) writes that Karel Doorman - until 1961, after conversion completion in 1958 - made most of its squadron journeys with 6 Seahawks and 18 Avengers (a mix of TBM-3W2 and TBM-3S2) embarked. From 1961 onwards the Seahawks and Avengers had made way for newer ASW aircraft: Sikorsky HSS-1N, Grumman S2F-1.
 
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Bert Brand (see reply #54) writes that Karel Doorman - until 1961, after conversion completion in 1958 - made most of its squadron journeys with 6 Seahawks and 18 Avengers (a mix of TBM-3W2 and TBM-3S2) embarked. From 1961 onwards the Seahawks and Avengers had made way for newer ASW aircraft: Sikorsky HSS-1N, Grumman S2F-1.
Re the Sea Hawks

According to "The Squadrons and Units of the Fleet Air Arm" by Theo Ballance, Lee Howard and Ray Sturtivant No. 860 Squadron reformed on 15th July 1950 and operated Sea Furies until disbanding on 15th June 1956 with its aircraft being transferred to No. 3 Squadron. It next reformed on 18th September 1957 and operated Sea Hawks until disbanding on 30th October 1964. Then it reformed as an ASW helicopter squadron on 4th October 1966. It operated Westland Wasps until converting to the Lynx between May 1979 and December 1980.

According to this website: https://kw.jonkerweb.net/index.php/en/nieuw-home

The RNLN acquired 47 Hawker Sea Furies between 1948 and 1952 including 25 built under licence by Fokker. The last 2 aircraft were withdrawn at the beginning of 1959.

The RNLN acquired 22 Hawker Sea Hawks which were delivered 1957-58. 4 were lost in accidents 1957-62 and the other 18 were taken out of service 1963-64.
 
Bert Brand (see reply #54) writes that Karel Doorman - until 1961, after conversion completion in 1958 - made most of its squadron journeys with 6 Seahawks and 18 Avengers (a mix of TBM-3W2 and TBM-3S2) embarked. From 1961 onwards the Seahawks and Avengers had made way for newer ASW aircraft: Sikorsky HSS-1N, Grumman S2F-1.
Re the Avengers

According to the Putnams on Grumman aircraft the MLD acquired 78 Avengers as follows:
  • 24 ex-USN TBM-3W2s received Dutch naval serials 16-101 to 16-124 upon beind delivered to the MLD in September 1953,
    • and were followed by
  • 34 TMB-3Ss (Dutch naval serials 1-1 to 1-34) delivered between January 1954 and May 1955.
  • 20 ex-Royal Navy Avenger A.S. Mk. 4s delivered in 1958 were given Dutch serials 21-20 to 21-39.
In MLD service, five TBM-3Ss and five Avenger A.S. Mk. 4s were converted as target tugs and were operated by 1 Squadron from Valkenburg.

Also based at Valkenburg were the two operational ASW units, 2 and 4 Squadrons, which regularly operated their Avengers aboard the carrier HRMS Karel Doorman.

The MLD phased out its Avengers in late 1960.
 
Bert Brand (see reply #54) writes that Karel Doorman - until 1961, after conversion completion in 1958 - made most of its squadron journeys with 6 Seahawks and 18 Avengers (a mix of TBM-3W2 and TBM-3S2) embarked. From 1961 onwards the Seahawks and Avengers had made way for newer ASW aircraft: Sikorsky HSS-1N, Grumman S2F-1.
Re the Trackers

According to the Putnams on Grumman aircraft the MLD acquired 45 Trackers from US and Canadian sources as follows:
  • 26 new S2F-1s delivered in 1960-61 (BuNos 147636/14765 and 147278/147293 which became MLD 146/171).
  • 2 ex-USN S2F-1s delivered 1962 (BuNos 136459 and 136576 which became MLD 172 and 173).
  • 17 ex-RCN CS2F-1s delivered 1960-61 (ex-RCN serials 1502/1507, 1511/1516, 1518, 1522/1524, and 1526 becoming MLD 180/196).
18 of the S2F-1s were upgraded by Fariey Canada to S-2N standards 1968-70, with 4 of these aircraft (MLD 151, 159/190, and 168) being modified in 1972 as US-2N utility aircraft.

S2F-1s were first assigned to 4 and 320 Squadrons at Valkenburg, with those from 320 Squadron being transferred to 2 squadron at the end of 1962, while the CS2F-1s went to 1 Squadron at Boch van Hato, Curaco, Dutch Antilles.

For operations aboard HRMS Karel Doorman, eight-aircraft detachments were regularly provided by 2 and 4 Squadrons until 1966.

During 1969, 2 Squadron became an operational conversion unit for Tracker, Neptune and Atlantic crews, but 1 and 4 Squadrons continued to fully ASW operations respectively from Hato (Dr Albert Plesman Airport) and Valkenburg.

Finally, 4 Squadron disbanded in 1971 when eight of its Trackers were transferred to Turkey, and 1 Squadron which had been re-equipped with S-2Ns in 1969, was deactivated on 1 August, 1974.

In the utility role, the four US-2Ns were operated by 5 Squadron at Valkenburg during the early 1970s, the last two being withdrawn from use on 1st October, 1975.
 
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Bert Brand (see reply #54) writes that Karel Doorman - until 1961, after conversion completion in 1958 - made most of its squadron journeys with 6 Seahawks and 18 Avengers (a mix of TBM-3W2 and TBM-3S2) embarked. From 1961 onwards the Seahawks and Avengers had made way for newer ASW aircraft: Sikorsky HSS-1N, Grumman S2F-1.
Re the Sikorsky Helicopters

According to this website: https://kw.jonkerweb.net/index.php/en/nieuw-home
  • One Sikorsky S-51 was operated from 18th December 1951 to 24th April 1959. Its serial was H-1 and its nickname was Jezebel.
  • 3 Sikorsky HO4S-3s entered service on 9th September 1953. H-4 (Delilah) crashed in 1959. H-3 (Cleopatra) crashed in 1962. H-2 (Salomé) was withdrawn in 1963.
  • 12 Sikorsky HSS-1N/SH-34Js were delivered 1960-63.
    • 6 crashed 1961-68.
    • The other 6 had their ASW equipment removed in 1966 and were converted to UH-34J.
    • Initially, all S-58s were assigned to No. 8 Squadron, but in August, 1967, the aircraft were transferred to No. 7 Squadron.
    • They were withdrawn 1970-72.
 
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I introduced Karel Doorman's conversion into this thread to point at one contributing factor to the limited budget available for RNLN nuclear submarines. Gerretse & Wijs, Nooteboom are explicit about it. The related decision to delay the laying down of Potvis and Tonijn added to the RNLN's financial woes, further threat to that budget.
With all the information about Karel Doorman presented here, I think the carrier's history deserves its own thread.
 
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I introduced Karel Doorman's conversion into this thread to point at one contributing factor to the limited budget available for RNLN nuclear submarines. Gerretse & Wijs, Nooteboom are explicit about it. The related decision to delay the laying down of Potvis and Tonijn added to the RNLN's financial woes, further threat to that budget.
With all the information about Karel Doorman presented here, I think the carrier's history deserves its own thread.

Similar happened to the RAN, the planned 2nd batch of 4 Oberon-class was cut back to 2 in order to buy a 2nd batch of 8+2 A4 Skyhawks. Subs and carriers are the offensive arms of a Navy.
 
I introduced Karel Doorman's conversion into this thread to point at one contributing factor to the limited budget available for RNLN nuclear submarines. Gerretse & Wijs, Nooteboom are explicit about it. The related decision to delay the laying down of Potvis and Tonijn added to the RNLN's financial woes, further threat to that budget.
With all the information about Karel Doorman presented here, I think the carrier's history deserves its own thread.
I've changed the name of the thread because I think we've got as far as we can with the submarines for the RNLN and was thinking of starting another thread about the RNLN in the Cold War. FWIW I think it's a pleasant change from the Anglo-American-British Dominion topics that dominate this forum.

Edit
I meant we've got as far as we can get with nuclear powered submarines for the RNLN.
 
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I've changed the name of the thread because I think we've got as far as we can with the submarines for the RNLN and was thinking of starting another thread about the RNLN in the Cold War. FWIW I think it's a pleasant change from the Anglo-American-British Dominion topics that dominate this forum.
With that in mind this is the Dutch 1951 Fleet Plan from Page 56 of Friedman's "The Postwar Naval Revolution".
6 Submarines​
1 Aircraft Carrier​
2 Cruisers​
12 Destroyers​
12 Large frigates​
5 Small frigates​
7 Coastal escorts​
65 Minesweepers​
6 Patrol boats​
1 Net-layer​

What the RNLN actually had according to Jane's 1960-61 was.
5 Submarines plus 1 fitting out and 2 planned.​
2 Dolfijn class​
Dolfijn commissioned July 1960 - replaced O 21 which was sold in 1958.​
Zeehond launched 20.02.60 - to replace O 27 which was struck at the end of 1959.​
2 "Walrus" Class (Ex-American Balao" Type) completed 1944.​
Converted to GUPPY class 1952 and transferred 1953.​
2 "Tijgerhaai " Class (Ex-British "T" Class) completed 1944-45.​
2 conventional submarines named Potvis and Tonijn to be built in the near future.​
It doesn't say so, but they were to replace the "Tijgerhaai" class.​
1 Aircraft Carrier - Karel Doorman - completed 1945 and modernised 1955-58.​
2 "De Ruyter" Class cruisers completed 1953 - both to be fitted with the Terrier SAM.​
12 Anti-submarine frigates (DDE).​
8 "Friesland" Class completed 1955-58.​
4 "Holland" Class completed 1954-58.​
11 Frigates of all types plus 4 planned.​
4 Fast Frigates converted from destroyers.​
3 "Piet Hein" Class completed 1943.​
British "S" class destroyers purchased 1945-46.​
Converted to fast frigates 1957-58.​
1 Ex-British Destroyer "Marnix" (ex-H.M.S. Garland) completed 1936.​
"G" class destroyer which served with distinction under the Polish flag for the greater part of the Second World War.​
Purchased by the Netherlands in 1947 and refitted 1948-49.​
Commissioned on 16.01.50 as seagoing anti-submarine training destroyer and training ship for engine-room personnel.​
Reclassified as a frigate in 1953.​
6 Frigates of the "De Bitter" Class (Ex-U.S. Destroyer Escort Type) completed 1943-44.​
Transferred to the RNLN 1950-51.​
1 Frigate (ex-minelayer type) "Willem Van Der Zann" completed 1939​
Built as a minelayer and re-rated as a frigate in 1953. But Jane's 1961-62 says she was commissioned as a depot ship on 19.01.61 and usesa which went into the reserve fleet.​
New Construction​
"Four new frigates will be built in the near future, one of which will be named "Van Speijk".​
Jane's 1961-62 says they were to replace the "Piet Hein" class.​
Jane's 1962-63 says they were to replace the "Piet Hein" class and the original Van Speijk which was scrapped in 1955.​
7 Corvettes​
1 Italian Corvette Type "Lynx" completed 1956.​
Built in Italy to the same design as the Italian Albatross class.​
6 Wolf class (U.S. PCE Type Escort Patrol Vessels) completed 1954.​
Built in the USA.​
68 Minesweepers and 5 Diving Tenders​
6 "Onversaagd" Class ocean minesweepers (U.S. AM Wooden Type) completed 1954.​
U.S. Agile class MSOs built in the USA.​
32 "Dokkum" Class coastal minesweepers completed 1955-57.​
British Ton class also known as the "NATO Coastal" built in the Netherlands.​
14 "Beemster"Class U.S. AMS Wooden Type coastal minesweepers completed 1953-54.​
U.S. Adjutant class MSCs built in the USA.​
16 "Van Straelen" Class inshore minesweepers completed 1960-61.​
They were a Dutch design built in the Netherlands.​
5 Ex-Coastal Minesweepers (U.S. BYMS Type) re-rated as diving tenders in 1958.​
5 "Balder" class Patrol Vessels (U.S. SC Type Submarine Chasers) class completed 1954-55.​
Built in the Netherlands to an American design.​
1 Boom Defence Vessel (Ex-U.S. AN Type Net-layer) Cerberus completed 1952.​
She was built in America too.​

Personnel
1960: 23,000 officers and ratings (including 4,325 officers and men of the Marine Corps).

Mercantile Marine
Lloyd's Register of Shipping: 1,950 vessels of 4,743,123 tons gross
 
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I think we've got as far as we can with the submarines for the RNLN
The RNLN three-cylinder submarines have a backstory that involves Dutch personnel who spent WW2 in the UK, proposing, among other activities, a two-cylinder cargo submarine to supply Malta. If I remember correctly...
 
Link to Message 66.
So the fleet the RNLN actually had in 1960 was quite close to the fleet planned in 1951. The major difference is that there were only 11 frigates (including Marnix and Willem Van Der Zann) instead of 17.

There was no underway replenishment capability, although that deficiency was about to addressed. Despite the large number of marines the only amphibious ships were 2 LSTs. One was the former LST 1034 of the LST(2) class built in 1944 and used as a seagoing store ship at Den Helder. The other was Pelikaan (ex-H.M.S. Thruster) of the LST(1) class completed in 1943 used as a store and accommodation ship at Den Helder.
 
The RNLN three-cylinder submarines have a backstory that involves Dutch personnel who spent WW2 in the UK, proposing, among other activities, a two-cylinder cargo submarine to supply Malta. If I remember correctly...
I meant we've got as far as we can get with nuclear powered submarines for the RNLN.
 
Thanks @NOMISYRRUC , I was thinking Warspite £21 million but had it in my head that an Oberon was like £4-5 million.

It's a great example of what cancelled for financial reasons actually means. We're not talking about 20 million or whatever project needing another 5 million to get it over the line, we're talking about an entire flotilla of diesel subs for a single SSN, and the minimum viable SSN capability of ~5 boats costing the same as CVA01 and CVA02.
Yet nuclear subs are THAT MUCH better than diesels.

22-knot speed of advance = 500 nautical miles per day. 6 days from Gander to London.
 
Yet nuclear subs are THAT MUCH better than diesels.

22-knot speed of advance = 500 nautical miles per day. 6 days from Gander to London.

Not just strategic mobility, but tactical as well. 30 knots makes for a tough torpedo solution and small no escape zones.

However £25m in the 60s is massive money in an absolute sense. For countries with big navies and budgets it can be absorbed, but for a middle power it distorts the whole force structure, like an elephant with tusks too big to weild.
 
Not just strategic mobility, but tactical as well. 30 knots makes for a tough torpedo solution and small no escape zones.

However £25m in the 60s is massive money in an absolute sense. For countries with big navies and budgets it can be absorbed, but for a middle power it distorts the whole force structure, like an elephant with tusks too big to weild.
France barely made it, as did the UK. Also, they did it while also building nuclear weapons en masse. I'm assuming that the RNLN was planning on skipping SSBNs and general nuclear weapon production, which would save some of their funds.

How did the Netherlands economy compare to the UK? Size-wise, I mean.
 

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