Royal Navy Requirement NA.47 but earlier and different.

[JFC Fuller]

Before the alternative piece, some actual history:

Prior to settling on the SARO P.177 for its high altitude fighter requirement the RN undertook a study that developed a considerably more demanding requirement that might be thought of as a mini OR.329. The following sortie profile for a collision course intercept was outlined:

1. Take-off and turn to climbing course - 0.5 minutes
2. Climb to 60,000ft with an end speed of mach 2 - 4 minutes
3. Cruise at mach 2 at 60,000ft - 2 minutes
4. Turn at 2G or more - 1 minute
5. Return to base / marshalling position - 17.5 minutes
6. Descent and landing - 25 minutes

Total sortie time would be 50 minutes, of which 3 minutes would be under rocket power. In addition to the above sortie profile it was considered that being able to perform 3G turns at mach 2 without a loss of speed, and an acceleration from mach 2 to mach 2.5 in 36 seconds, for a short burst at that speed, would be desirable. By contrast, the requirement for the P.177RN outlined a similar sortie but at mach 1.4 rather than mach 2.

The AI radar would have to be capable of detecting a mach 1.3 bomber (the expected threat was very roughly analogous to the Tu22) at a range greater than 22 nautical miles under jamming conditions. The aircraft would be under the control of Type 984 equipped ships for much of its interception. For a collision course intercept the air-to-air missile was expected to have a flight time of just twelve seconds but it had to be lethal against the expected threat.

Alternative history:

In reality this requirement does not appear to have made it to industry, but it is fun to imagine that it did and wonder what industry might have come up with. Trying to keep close to the stated requirement does create some significant constraints though. This would be a rocket fighter, so it would have to be configured in such a way that the rocket installation was practical, it was also to be single seat and would have to fit on RN carrier lifts (see the diagram attached of a Phantom on RN lifts for reference) and would have to have various devices to improve take-off and landing performance, e.g. blown flaps and jet deflection as actually included in the P.177 design. Whilst the requirement was more demanding, had it gone forward the RN would have had to have accepted an in-service date of 1965 (planned in-service date for the P.177RN was 1960). Having thought about this, two potential approaches come to mind:

Scaled-up P.177RN: The as chosen design hut scaled up, and built with the appropriate materials (e.g. ICI titanium 314A) to deliver the required performance. The obvious approach would be to design it around the full-size PS.52 Gyron. However, this poses some challenges, the P.177 was already approaching being maxed out length-wise at 50.5ft, with the addition of a folding radome and antenna could be included there is perhaps 2.5-3ft by which the basic design could be lengthened?

Single Seat DeHavilland DH.117 Derivative: It occurred to me that this design, to OR.329, has a very long radome and tandem seating. Some very crude estimates based on pixel counting of the images posted by @overscan (PaulMM) in the DH.117 thread suggest that the radome forward of the antenna gimbal is approximately 10ft and the space taken for the second crewman is approximately 4.5ft. Assuming the nose could be adapted to fold as in the F-4K and Buccaneer, and removing the second crewman allows 14.4ft to be removed from the 66.8ft fuselage length given in the brochure for a total of 52.3ft. That feels like something detailed design could remove, especially as center of gravity considerations and an undercarriage revision to single main wheels would require a redesign and backwards shift of the engine and undercarriage pods. A wing fold would also be necessary. Overall, this feels like an achievable way of getting at something that could meet the above outlined requirement.

Hawker did draw a P.1121 carrier derivative with side-by-side seating so that package could work, but the rocket requirement would be difficult to get right in that airframe - at least the P.1103 installations look less than ideal.

To be clear, this requirement would be much more likely to generate a British XF8U-3 than it would be a Phantomesque type. I am very curious to see what everyone else can come up with!

 

[zen]

Saro would have to refer to Supersonic Soak design P.163 for a full Gyron powered version. Though this would require a P.177 style solid nose and ventral intake.
But the nose fold could cut around 5ft.

The alternative I sketched as a twin Gyron Junior solution, back when I first came to this forum.

AWA could look at a major folding of tail and nose of their Supersonic Soaker to fit, but their widely spaced engine pods could be viewed as a problem.

Fairey might have to resurrect their alternative swept wing design for the rocket fighter and scale up. As I'm not convinced the tailless delta is going to convince.

Hawkers might be best served by retuning to their straight wing Starfighter like design.
Though had they examined a twin Gyron Junior or Avon version of P1103.......a rocket motor might fit at the base of the fin and a HTP tank along the spine.

However Hawker did actually produce a design to NR/A.47 directly against the Saro P.177 in Nov 1956 but unnumbered.
With a low sweep delta of cropped wing tips.
Two Blue Jay
Single Gyron Junior and a rocket motor.
Length 51ft
Span 30.5ft
Wing Area 430sqft
Fuel 1,215gal

Vickers Supermarine has a potential winner in the canard arrangement. But can it scale?
And fold?
But could the supersonic Scimitar derivatives do this job?
Outside of P.177, the P.576 is close to an in-production aircraft and potentially something achievable in the right time frame. They predicted service entry 1962 to '63.

Avro is a wildcard here, their F.155 study might have a lot going for it.

Blackburn had a rocket fighter offering, but I'm not sure it's worth enlargement.

Westland? No one took to the delane planform....

Shorts? A very chunky rocket fighter....Maybe they offer the F8U-III under license?
Or another aero-osoclinic wing like the PD.13.

DH could have the answer here.

 

[zen]

This treads a familiar and well debated subject. Bit I think it might prove useful to see this subject from the RN perspective and ask the AH question about what could have been done, when and why.

Namely Friedman reference to "a typical study" on the emerging NA.47 Which began as a process in September 1954.

I'll quote now so we can get to the gist of the matter.
This being about ADM 1/28006 a DND study of fleet fighter requirements for 1962-70. Dated 2 May 1955.
"A typical study assumed 3 standard modernised carriers operating within range of enemy light bombers, and screened by 3 Seaslug ships, so that the inner limit of the fighter zone was 20nm from force center.
Two baseline threats were 40 Mach 1.3 light bombers dropping free fall bombs from 60,000ft within Seaslug range, and a similar raid closing to just outside Seaslug range to drop Anti-ship Missiles.
Raids on this scale forced dependence on deck-launched interception, since it was impossible to maintain a large enough force on CAP.
This made for very fast climb essential (to 60,000ft in no more than 4 minutes, followed by a 2G turn) and favoured a rocket fighter."

"Analysis showed that about 90 mach 2 fighters could deal with a raid whose density was no more than about 6 per minute and unaccompanied by jammers"
A collision-course fighter (and weapon) could destroy a target at 100nm from force center, but a pursuit-course fighter would destroy it only between 20nm and 60nm from force center. "

"A pure turbojet Mach 2 fighter could intercept a Mach 0.95 bomber at 50,000ft with either technique (collision or pursuit course weapons/ interception course)......Even a 200nm warning afforded by Type 984 would be insufficient for interception by turbojet."

This rather explains why F.177 was adopted, and also why Scimitar FAW Type 556 was dropped.

What is obviously not visible to such a study and conclusions, is the realisation by 1957, that turbojets with reheat could achieve near rocket like climb rates and get fighters to operate at such ceilings.

That warning radar might extend against such high altitude threats to over 250nm, even to 300nm.
That AEW could project 'up threat' if the general direction of threat was known and that EW sensing equipment could potentially give such directional clues.

So perhaps the biggest of these 'what if' AHs for RN fighters is just having them realise in 1955 something like RB.106 "Thames" with reheat could get their fighter above 60,000ft in 6 minutes for ISD by 1962 or 4 minutes by 1965 and that with AEW direction 'up threat' by as much as 200nm which could extend warning to potentially 400nm. Giving a Mach 2 turbojet fighter enough time.
With AEW bouncing by datalink the information to the carrier to use it's computers to calculate the interception.

As such then had this realisation hit by late '54......then a RN requirement for a Mach 2 fighter powered by turbojets for IOC by 1962 is achievable.

Then NA.47 might have resulted in a rather different outcome.
Namely a design for a Mach 2 turbojet fighter that could operate from the major Carriers of the fleet.

This would pull the plug on rocket fighters, and not just for the RN, but the RAF. Not only taking F.177, but F.155 as well.

Now this could please UK75, because this makes the emergent F4 a contender as it does the F8U-III.

But this also makes Hawkers P.1103 more viable, and Fairey's 'interim' Gyron Delta II offering for the RAF viable.

 

[Rule of cool]

I once saw something similar for E1s and F8s, that the E1s couldn't make detections far enough away and F8s were too slow for deck launched interceptions to succeed.

These requirements are snapshots in time, especially in the 50s as the pace of technological change was so fast.

 

[Hood]

This being about ADM 1/28006 a DND study of fleet fighter requirements for 1962-70. Dated 2 May 1955.

Can I just double-check this reference?
ADM 1/28006 is a file on courts martials information for the press 1954-62!

I have however located a similar report (Air defence of the fleet: 1965-1970, dated 1959) on the Discovery catalogue as DSIR 23/26578 and is an Aeronautical Research Council paper.
Being post-Sandys and post-P.177 and pre-P.1154/Phantom it might be quite revealing. I intend to have a look at this on my next Kew visit.

There is a ADM 1/26009 which is a study on the integration of aircraft and missiles for fleet defences dated 1955-56. This file however has never been released (it was retained in 1985 under Section 3.4 and was due for review in 1994 but has never been released - who knows if it was ever reviewed?).

 

[zen]

Can I just double-check this reference?
ADM 1/28006 is a file on courts martials information for the press 1954-62!

Arrrggghhhh Friedman's typos!!!!
Literally every third data point is suspect!

I have however located a similar report (Air defence of the fleet: 1965-1970, dated 1959) on the Discovery catalogue as DSIR 23/26578 and is an Aeronautical Research Council paper.
Being post-Sandys and post-P.177 and pre-P.1154/Phantom it might be quite revealing. I intend to have a look at this on my next Kew visit.

Do let us know what you find.

There is a ADM 1/26009 which is a study on the integration of aircraft and missiles for fleet defences dated 1955-56. This file however has never been released (it was retained in 1985 under Section 3.4 and was due for review in 1994 but has never been released - who knows if it was ever reviewed?).

Oooo so if I live to 2055 I might just be on my deathbed knowing the answer?

 

[JFC Fuller]

I will try and summarise what is a very long story. It had been intended that the Scimitar Mk.II would succeed the Mk.I in production to meet a high-altitude fighter requirement, however, by early 1955 it was apparent it would be overweight and wholly incapable of meeting the future threat. Thats when the study Friedman references was undertaken, this produced a requirement that might be best described as a mini-OR.329, it was the inspiration for this thread. It was subsequently decided to adopt a navalised P.177 instead, it would be less capable than the originally identified requirement but could be ready much earlier than a new development.

The Supermarine Type 556 (NA.38) was intended to serve alongside the NA.47 type, the NA.47 would provide high-altitude interception whilst the NA.38 would provide air defence at medium to low altitudes. I have yet to identify the exact reason for the cancellation of the NA.38 but cost is most likely. The Type 556, on paper, would have been far more capable than the Sea Vixen but it would have run slightly later and there were some technical risks (e.g. it required supersonic blowing) so the RN was pushing to pursue both projects in parallel and stop Sea Vixen production as soon as the Type 556 was ready.

DSIR 23/26578 forms part of a huge body of study work undertaken from 1958 through to 1960 that ultimately lead to OR.346 and a several other requirements.

Post-war Royal Navy aircraft, and particularly air defence, development has been rather poorly served by the histories so far written. In part, I suspect, its because the story is so complex but also because it involves understanding ships and shipborne systems to really make sense of it, and that tends not to appeal to many people. I would like to correct this, and have a enough material to do so, but finding a publisher is challenging.

 

[zen]

Well I'll buy a copy that's for sure!

To be fair to the people and the times, they were bombarded with a host of changing technologies and emergent capabilities across a wide spectrum. Not to mention the secret and compartmentalised nature of much of this.
The US got to the right answer, but this is likely the product of the hoards of staff churning through the data. I doubt the UK defence establishment had that level of resources.

At several moments, it might have been possible to see what the future could be. But it's not a given that such a figure realising this could persuade enough of the right people at the right time.

 

[starviking]

Post-war Royal Navy aircraft, and particularly air defence, development has been rather poorly served by the histories so far written. In part, I suspect, its because the story is so complex but also because it involves understanding ships and shipborne systems to really make sense of it, and that tends not to appeal to many people. I would like to correct this, and have a enough material to do so, but finding a publisher is challenging.

That would be fascinating! I guess a big tome covering the ships and planes in some detail too would be perfect for it, but probably prohibitive in time and effort.

Done in parts in Project Tech style publications?

 

[Rule of cool]

Well I'll buy a copy that's for sure!

To be fair to the people and the times, they were bombarded with a host of changing technologies and emergent capabilities across a wide spectrum. Not to mention the secret and compartmentalised nature of much of this.
The US got to the right answer, but this is likely the product of the hoards of staff churning through the data. I doubt the UK defence establishment had that level of resources.

At several moments, it might have been possible to see what the future could be. But it's not a given that such a figure realising this could persuade enough of the right people at the right time.

This is so true, and why I tend to avoid pre-57 alternative history. Even good decisions usually don't last due to obsolescence.

A question I have about the study is the assumption that CAP won't cut it and DLI is the only solution would be based on the idea that a single fighter can only engage a single bomber? However the Sea Vixen Firestreak could in theory engage 4 bombers and more likely 2 in combat conditions, while the Red Top might allow the Sea Vixen to engage 3 bombers in combat conditions with the first being head on.

Does/did this capability, which only gets vastly more potent with the Phantom under development, swing the assumption back towards CAP?

 

[Hood]

Post-war Royal Navy aircraft, and particularly air defence, development has been rather poorly served by the histories so far written. In part, I suspect, its because the story is so complex but also because it involves understanding ships and shipborne systems to really make sense of it, and that tends not to appeal to many people. I would like to correct this, and have a enough material to do so, but finding a publisher is challenging.

I declare self-interest in Zen's OP. I am currently researching for my next book (the book after the next book) for Crecy, Wings Over the Fleet, which will be part of the Hikoki "Since 1945" series like Chris' books and my Teach for the Sky. Publication will be in 2025.
I hope to do justice to the air defence and strike aspects of FAA operations. I've already pulled fair bit a bit of material from Kew on fighters, with more planned. It is a complicated story - perhaps unbelievably convoluted when you consider the smallness of the force compared with the RAF. The Admiralty does seem to have made a meal of it - but when you have to design and build the optimum mobile airfield and then defend it yourself, it tends to make the task trickier!

 

[JFC Fuller]

I declare self-interest in Zen's OP. I am currently researching for my next book (the book after the next book) for Crecy, Wings Over the Fleet, which will be part of the Hikoki "Since 1945" series like Chris' books and my Teach for the Sky. Publication will be in 2025.
I hope to do justice to the air defence and strike aspects of FAA operations. I've already pulled fair bit a bit of material from Kew on fighters, with more planned. It is a complicated story - perhaps unbelievably convoluted when you consider the smallness of the force compared with the RAF. The Admiralty does seem to have made a meal of it - but when you have to design and build the optimum mobile airfield and then defend it yourself, it tends to make the task trickier!

A book idea similar to one I shared with you some time ago and a title adapted from Friedman’s Fighters over the Fleet…

 

[Hood]

A book idea similar to one I shared with you some time ago and a title adapted from Friedman’s Fighters over the Fleet…

Yes we did discuss some ideas for naval aviation books a couple of years back. Mine is similar in concept but also covering helicopters/anti-submarine and AEW roles etc., I suspect space will be lacking to cover in depth all the naval side (ships, combat systems etc.) so it won't necessarily be in as much depth as you are working on - perhaps more akin to the naval stuff from the BSP and Project Tech series condensed into a one-stop book.

 

[red admiral]

My experience with these sorts of studies is that the starting assumptions are generally more important than the actual analysis. From a historian perspective then you've also got to understand the context of who it was done for and when.

When you step back at it, you realise that the threat assumptions, the mission/task assumptions, and the technology assumptions are all laughably wrong...

I mean facing a raid of 40 low supersonic bombers? So that's basically the max the USSR could generate out of the whole Tu-22 fleet and they're all pointing at a UK only carrier group. Which is somehow floating in range doing something unspecified whilst in central Europe there's a bunch of tactical nukes being flung around as per Tripwire....

Then there's the likes of threat assessment e.g. adding an extra 20,000ft onto Tu-22 ceiling. Quite an impact if you only need to climb to 30ish kft.

You really need to use analysis to help you understand the problem and the drivers rather than rely on it to give you the answer. It's more about eliminating wrong answers.

To me the key points from the above study are for AEW (more warning for either CAP or DLI) and collision course weapons (hopefully multiple kills per fighter, reduced time, reduced fighter performance) are the key things to take from that study rather than the likes of rockets vs reheat.

Maybe Gannet AEW3 and Sea Vixen with upgraded radar and Blue Jay / Dolphin would have been fine? Maybe supersonic would have been better but then that sacrifices significant endurance.

 

[Hood]

Intelligence assessments are always tricky. For a while it was thought the Tu-22 was a Yakovlev programme for example!
Technical assessments were largely 'by eye' based on Western trends or snippets the Soviets released (usually for record breakers), so its no surprise that often the performance was over or under estimated. There was no reliable method of estimating production capacity and presumably it was assumed that totalitarian government meant unlimited cash to spend on churning out supersonic bombers at a time when even the USA was finding that an expensive prospect (B-58).
Given the timing, the Tu-16 and Tu-95 with early ASMs were the more likely danger.

I agree, two 40x aircraft raids seems overkill, but presumably number estimates came from WW2 experience - certainly from the Med in 1941-42 where waves of Ju 88s and SM79s were encountered, and equally it was the need for modern fighters to fight in the Med that caused the Admiralty to seek navalised-Swifts etc. to counter the perceived threat. Equally, putting up 90 fighters from three carriers in good time seems equally daunting.
Multiple kills per fighter would be key, expending up to 90 AAMs on just one raid alone would soon drain carrier stocks (ignoring of course the input from the Sea Slug ships, which assuming the May 1955 date of the study are probably assumed to be GW cruisers like the GW96 then under design rather than the smaller County which emerged).

I agree, AEW seems to be the must have from these studies.

 

[red admiral]

Intelligence assessments are always tricky.

It's definitely difficult to predict the future; for me that's then why you do sensitivity analysis on the results of these studies to get an understanding of where the break points are for different options.

e.g. the engine technology options are dependent on aircraft performance requirements which depend on warning time, weapon choice and threat.

 

[zen]

In 1955 vast tracts of the USSR were effectively a blank canvass marked "here be dragons".
Maps, some of which dated from Tsarist Empire, some by daring explorers venturing into Central Asia were all there was.

Spy satellites were a long way off and overflight by Reconasense Aircraft was limited. Both in numbers of flights and in range.

So assuming the worst was not unreasonable.

That you might see 20 bombers on an airfield in Ukraine and not know this was literally the entire bomber fleet. But in your ignorance assume that every such airfield had 20 bombers of that sort.
Worse you literally didn't know if there where airfields deeper in the Soviet hinterland, chock full of Aircraft. Beyond any means but espionage to even learn of, let alone get accurate figures on what was there.

Worse, US sources were adamant about a Bomber Gap, and played up the threat substantially.

 

[Rule of cool]

Just a word on AEW in the mid 50s; the likes of the EC121, Skyraider and Gannet AEW equipped with the APS-20 were limited to searching beneath them, for low level targets. The APS-20 had a detection range of ~85nm against bomber sized targets, and the height finder on the top of the EC121 had a range of ~60nm, As a result these aircraft generally flew at 3,000' to put that detection range on the horizon, although apparently crew learned if they flew at 50-300' they could bounce their later belly mounted APS-95 radar off the sea and detected medium altitude aircraft at 150 statute miles. None of this is useful against the high altitude, transonic threat that the study posits.

I don't know but suspect that the roof mounted APS-82 on the 1958 E1 could search for high altitude targets, but I recall that the detection range was ~110nm so it would need to be a long way from the carrier and in the right spot to be useful in this scenario.

The E2 solves this problem by 1965 I imagine, in theory of course as it did not work as advertised for years after it's introduction.

 

[Siberia]

Raids on this scale forced dependence on deck-launched interception, since it was impossible to maintain a large enough force on CAP.

Did it mention why it was impossible – number of aircraft carried, amount of fuel carried, some other reason?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Did it mention why it was impossible – number of aircraft carried, amount of fuel carried, some other reason?

Pretty sure it was missile capacity.

Most 1950s fighters only carried 4x missiles. Late-50s-Early-60s fighters like Phantom carried 4+4. And given missile reliability in that timeframe, you're probably talking about needing at least 2 missiles fired per bomber kill. So any given plane can only intercept 2 bombers.

Next, you need 8 aircraft to keep 2 up 24/7. So if your threat profile is 40x bombers incoming, you need 20 fighters up in order to shoot down all those bombers, which means 80 fighters onboard if you're doing this as CAP. Or just 20-30 fighters if you're mostly doing this as deck-launched intercept.

 

[Siberia]

Pretty sure it was missile capacity.

Ah, that makes sense. So not even perennial alternate history idea of larger carriers would likely make a difference to the thinking. Thanks.

 

[zen]

Ah, that makes sense. So not even perennial alternate history idea of larger carriers would likely make a difference to the thinking.

Depends on the magazines.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Ah, that makes sense. So not even perennial alternate history idea of larger carriers would likely make a difference to the thinking. Thanks.

Helps, in that you can have a larger air wing which means less pressure to force a deck launched interception. Also means you can have bigger aircraft which can haul more missiles, and more capable missiles at that (like F-14+Phoenix instead of F-4+Sparrow/Skyflash)

If you can get Phoenix class missiles and FCS (fire and forget plus locking onto as many targets as you have missiles at once), you can shift back to CAP intercepts, because now each plane is able to shoot down 4-6 bombers and you only need 7-10 planes airborne to cover that 40-bomber raid before they launch missiles.

 

[uk 75]

The other problem is that the arrival of the H bomb meant that a "general war" was expected to go nuclear very quickly.
Until it got Polaris the US Navy regarded its big carriers as a key means of delivering nukes to Russia and China.
The UK could only afford the V bombers (including TSR2).
British carriers were justified after Suez as a means of reacting to crises outside NATO. But even here nuclear proliferation to countries like China was feared and V bombers could deploy to Cyprus or Singapore faster than a carrier.

 

[zen]

As someone who did a bit of Requirements Engineering, the key takeaway is that solutions are presented to requirements and requirements are based on what we think the problem is and the 'environment' in which that is sited.

So in '55 the RN is looking at the need to potentially wage war in areas with few friendly airbase of sufficient capacity/capability. The carriers are the solution and in turn lead to the question "how do we defend these assets while we prosecute this war".

The concern is the USSR would 'loan' a fleet of bombers to provide a counter to this force.

Worst case analysis? 40 Supersonic Bombers armed with stand-off missiles equipped with nuclear warheads.

The answer is thus dictated by warning distance and response times, altitude and speed of the threat and performance thry expected to extract from systems.

What could have changed was what we'd call better AEWACS....and such was potentially something the UK could have had as it was proposed from late WWII.

Similarly we can see why Orange Nell emerges and why the concept of Navalised Blue Envoy morphed via Seaslug mkIII into NIGS.

 

[uk 75]

But what actual hardware did the UK missile industry get into service when compared with the USA by 1958?

 

[fishpond]

This treads a familiar and well debated subject. Bit I think it might prove useful to see this subject from the RN perspective and ask the AH question about what could have been done, when and why.

Namely Friedman reference to "a typical study" on the emerging NA.47 Which began as a process in September 1954.

I'll quote now so we can get to the gist of the matter.
This being about ADM 1/28006 a DND study of fleet fighter requirements for 1962-70. Dated 2 May 1955.
"A typical study assumed 3 standard modernised carriers operating within range of enemy light bombers, and screened by 3 Seaslug ships, so that the inner limit of the fighter zone was 20nm from force center.
Two baseline threats were 40 Mach 1.3 light bombers dropping free fall bombs from 60,000ft within Seaslug range, and a similar raid closing to just outside Seaslug range to drop Anti-ship Missiles.
Raids on this scale forced dependence on deck-launched interception, since it was impossible to maintain a large enough force on CAP.
This made for very fast climb essential (to 60,000ft in no more than 4 minutes, followed by a 2G turn) and favoured a rocket fighter."

"Analysis showed that about 90 mach 2 fighters could deal with a raid whose density was no more than about 6 per minute and unaccompanied by jammers"
A collision-course fighter (and weapon) could destroy a target at 100nm from force center, but a pursuit-course fighter would destroy it only between 20nm and 60nm from force center. "

"A pure turbojet Mach 2 fighter could intercept a Mach 0.95 bomber at 50,000ft with either technique (collision or pursuit course weapons/ interception course)......Even a 200nm warning afforded by Type 984 would be insufficient for interception by turbojet."

This rather explains why F.177 was adopted, and also why Scimitar FAW Type 556 was dropped.

What is obviously not visible to such a study and conclusions, is the realisation by 1957, that turbojets with reheat could achieve near rocket like climb rates and get fighters to operate at such ceilings.

That warning radar might extend against such high altitude threats to over 250nm, even to 300nm.
That AEW could project 'up threat' if the general direction of threat was known and that EW sensing equipment could potentially give such directional clues.

So perhaps the biggest of these 'what if' AHs for RN fighters is just having them realise in 1955 something like RB.106 "Thames" with reheat could get their fighter above 60,000ft in 6 minutes for ISD by 1962 or 4 minutes by 1965 and that with AEW direction 'up threat' by as much as 200nm which could extend warning to potentially 400nm. Giving a Mach 2 turbojet fighter enough time.
With AEW bouncing by datalink the information to the carrier to use it's computers to calculate the interception.

As such then had this realisation hit by late '54......then a RN requirement for a Mach 2 fighter powered by turbojets for IOC by 1962 is achievable.

Then NA.47 might have resulted in a rather different outcome.
Namely a design for a Mach 2 turbojet fighter that could operate from the major Carriers of the fleet.

This would pull the plug on rocket fighters, and not just for the RN, but the RAF. Not only taking F.177, but F.155 as well.

Now this could please UK75, because this makes the emergent F4 a contender as it does the F8U-III.

But this also makes Hawkers P.1103 more viable, and Fairey's 'interim' Gyron Delta II offering for the RAF viable.

As you guessed, the ADM 1 reference was a misprint. It should be ADM 1/26006. If you look in the TNA digital catalog, you'll see it.

 

[zen]

ACI (AWACS) aspect earlier?
Lancaster with larger aerial Fishpond 1944
Boeing C-97Stratofreighter conversion 1944
AWI (AEW) stabilised radar with height finding ?1945-50?

ASV mk.vi with larger dish 1946
Hamilcar X trials 1947 cancelled 1948 for financial reasons.
Studies in aerials fitted to Vulcan or Britannia 1954. Range 150nm.
System for 250nm considered too large for current aircraft.
1959 Avro Type 748 with AN/APS-96 for Sweden led to Type 768 for RN.
Unnamed Brough Study looking like scaled down Vought V-404.

Examination of Grumman G-123...
Too expensive!!! And it didn't fit!!!

FMICW 1961
NASR.6166 issued 1962
1964-65 desire for 12 EC-121Warning Stars.
1964 BEWARE (Britannia using Marconi S-Band)
1964
AST.387
ASR.387

1970 FMICW dropped and focus on UK AMTI or AN/APS.111
BEWARE dusted off and offered with AN/APS.111

And on and on, but what a mess of missed opportunities!

So just getting that 1954 Britannia option into service would have been transformative and a solid upgrade path into the 70's is quite conceivable.
But crucially it exerts influence on the Admiralty. That Brough Study looks like the answer....
That or the revised Gannet with rotordome.

 

[uk 75]

We bought in Douglas AEW for the FAA why not Grumman S2s. The US Navy have done all the work for us. What makes our pygmy carrier fleet so special
The RN needed to grasp reality and look at what the US Navy did with its Essex class, not hanker after building Forrestals.
We can see where CVA01 would have taken the RN by looking at the overblown Gordon Brown CVFs. Imagine an RN in the 70s and 80s with no S and T class SSN and only 6 T42.

 

[uk 75]

Eagle and Hermes with off the shelf Sidewinder equipped F8 Crusaders, Buccaneers and Seaking helos could have served into the 80s if the RN had not insisted on playing at being the USN.

 

[zen]

We bought in Douglas AEW for the FAA why not Grumman S2sS2s?

Cost and size. Too big and too expensive.

The US Navy have done all the work for us. What makes our pygmy carrier fleet so special

It acts in our interests, not theirs. The two interests are not the same.

The RN needed to grasp reality and look at what the US Navy did with its Essex class, not hanker after building Forrestals.

Not without longer drydocks.

We can see where CVA01 would have taken the RN by looking at the overblown Gordon Brown CVFs.

Not overblown, adequate to the criteria.

Imagine an RN in the 70s and 80s with no S and T class SSN and only 6 T42.

Bit off topic and looking like hijacking.

 

[uk 75]

you should know by now I do not hijack threads and am very relaxed about my own threads.
I am puzzled that S2 Tracers would be too heavy for Hermes
I still think the lean option of using F8s like France but getting them off the shelf could have kept Hermes and Eagle in service into the 80s.

 

[zen]

F8 with RB.106 would rather outperform USN standard aircraft.
Arguably this could have been proposed from '55.....and maybe entered service by 1960.
Like the Lightning, a period of where a scab on rocket pack would have followed before being ditched. Would have sufficed for NA.47 if downgraded.
But crucially F8 twin seater with a SARH AAM, would have met NA.38.

Proposing in '55 as Type 556 is cancelled....

 

[uk 75]

Remembering the UK slowest Phantoms I am inclined to go for straight USN Crusaders modified as little as possible.
Forget SARH AAMs. France managed without them and our carriers usually are part of a NATO force with US carriers fending off Bears etc.

 

[zen]

Remembering the UK slowest Phantoms I am inclined to go for straight USN Crusaders modified as little as possible.

That's because your a massive pessimist towards UK efforts and assume this would have the same problems as the F4.
Not justified really.

Forget SARH AAMs. France managed without them

I thought the AN F8s had R.530 capability

our carriers usually are part of a NATO force with US carriers fending off Bears etc.

An assumptions this would always be do and that what was, was adequate.

 

[Rule of cool]

I thought the AN F8s had R.530 capability

They did, IIUC they only had R.530s for most of their early careers.

 

[fishpond]

You know, of course, that there was an SARH Sidewinder on board F-8s, but also that it was not at all liked, and died.

I think the real question is whether and how the RN tried to sell its program to the British Government. It didn't do very well. The crunch came when the RN tried to pay for both the new carrier and SSBNs at the same time. I don't know what an SSBN cost at the time, but I'd bet it was not all that much less than a carrier. I think, from what has been written, that the crunch was why 'East of Suez' was abandoned. You then have the RAF attack on the carrier program, because without the nuclear deterrent, tis only important role was tactical air in Europe. CVA 01 was a direct threat to that. By the way, the Admiralty Secretary told the Board that the Government might well buy a 40,000 tonner but not the 50,000 plus CVA 01. Sometimes the best really does kill what is good enough at the time.

 

[Rule of cool]

The 4 R class SSBN cost 37-40 million pounds to build, the 5 Churchill-Valiant class SSNs 21-29 million pounds. IIUC the first 2 Invincible class cost 185 and 215 million pounds, plus whatever it cost to develop and build 28 Sea Harriers.

I have a value notion that the R class SSBNs didn't come out of the RN's budget alone, but were a separate 'strategic' line item before the budget was sliced up for the services. If this is true the SSBNs wouldn't have had a massive impact on the CVA01 programme.

 

[zen]

This thread is not about the carriers, bit about the system of defence by aircraft, perception of whst is needed and specifically the NA.47 that xame out of such processes.

If you want to talk the carriers, there are threads available.
Please do not try to hijack this thread away from it's topic.

I will happily discuss such carriers in the appropriate threads.

 

[fishpond]

Sorry, I forgot to add something. I don't have access to British defense budgeting information, but I know that the cost of modern armies escalated sharply postwar due to mechanization and the adoption of nuclear missiles. The number of formations (e.g.,, divisions) in Western armies declined sharply, partly because front line formations needed a lot more engineering support. I think that an underrated factor in British defense spending in the 1960s was the escalating cost of the British Army on the Rhine, which was needed not only as a deterrent to the Soviets but also as a way of convincing the Germans to stay in NATO (the big US Army in Europe had similar roles). With the advent of a strong MoD and a unified Defence Staff, choices had to be made between the services. I don't think the Admiralty ever really learned to play that game, or to convince successive Ministers of Defence that its out of area role was vital. The USN ran into the same problem with the Carter Administration, but it was able to fall back on other elements of a much less centralized US govderment, such as Congress. I don't think the RN had anything like that option. It was lucky to salvage ARK ROYAL and HERMES from the 1966 wreckage, and getting the INVINCIBLEs was almost miraculous.