In 1955 it was envisioned that the RN could achieve a Sea Based Ballistic Missile for launch from submarines, launching from North of Russia or in the Black Sea by 1965.
Superintendent of the Admiralty Gunnery Establishment assumed a 750nm (extendable to 1,000nm) range weapon would weight 90tons, be 90ft long of diameter 96 inches, required accuracy of 250-2,000yards.
RAE had abandoned plans for a 2,500nm range missile and was working on a 1,600nm single stage weapon. Using three transmitters 100nm apart for initial guidance.
DNO estimated 20 years to develop best possible weapon, and that a weapon based on existing technology would be available in 12 years for a 8 year life.
Had the UK been able to estimate a lightweight warhead available for 1963-64 in 1955, this might have swayed the decisions about such an effort. As it is just such a estimate by Dr Edward Teller in the US in 1956 that greatly assisted the process that led to Polaris.
Assuming such an estimate by the UK AWRE at that time, would shift focus towards a conceptual Ballistic Missile Submarine and draw efforts into this as a priority over carriers and bombers by the time of the Sandy's Defence Review.
This would perhaps have been based on the troublesome (but monumentally easier that LOx/Kerosene) HTP/Kerosene rocket motor and thus have been somewhat more 'soviet' in crudeness compared to Polaris. But of more valid relevance to the Deterrent than expenditure on new bombers or carriers.
Superintendent of the Admiralty Gunnery Establishment assumed a 750nm (extendable to 1,000nm) range weapon would weight 90tons, be 90ft long of diameter 96 inches, required accuracy of 250-2,000yards.
RAE had abandoned plans for a 2,500nm range missile and was working on a 1,600nm single stage weapon. Using three transmitters 100nm apart for initial guidance.
DNO estimated 20 years to develop best possible weapon, and that a weapon based on existing technology would be available in 12 years for a 8 year life.
Had the UK been able to estimate a lightweight warhead available for 1963-64 in 1955, this might have swayed the decisions about such an effort. As it is just such a estimate by Dr Edward Teller in the US in 1956 that greatly assisted the process that led to Polaris.
Assuming such an estimate by the UK AWRE at that time, would shift focus towards a conceptual Ballistic Missile Submarine and draw efforts into this as a priority over carriers and bombers by the time of the Sandy's Defence Review.
This would perhaps have been based on the troublesome (but monumentally easier that LOx/Kerosene) HTP/Kerosene rocket motor and thus have been somewhat more 'soviet' in crudeness compared to Polaris. But of more valid relevance to the Deterrent than expenditure on new bombers or carriers.
It's how you use it and how you store it that tends to be an issue and I'm still surprised it took till the mid-70s for someone to stumble on the fact that if you air-condition it in storage (40f/5c) it never decomposes at all and is perfectly stable. If the Brits had stumbled onto that fact alone in the late 40s early 50 history would likely have gone a bit differently...
