Rhodesia and the limits of British military power

[uk 75]

A short article about the UK considering military options to deal with Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 reveals how limited those options were.

Military chiefs reviewed plan to invade Rhodesia

Public record: State papers released from 1965 highlight dilemma facing fledgling Wilson government over thorny issue of UDI

www.independent.co.uk

The rest of the world, notably the US, were puzzled by London's inability to restore its rule over the White Settler regime in Salisbury. Prime Minister Wilson had the full support of Oppositon Leadet Heath for srrong action.

Douglas Hurd, later Foreign Secretsry, was a diplomat in those years and published a series of novels in the 1970d. The first covered a possible invasion of Rhodesia, later ones dealt with Scottish Independence and resistance to Chinese plans to get Hong Kong back. All three have an "alternate history" usefulness half a century later.

My reason for bringing Rhodesia up was that in 1965 the UK had a Division and Parwchute Brigade intended for overseas deployment plus substantial RAF airpower.

Yet in arguably the worst crisis since Suez in 1956 these forces were deemed to be of little use for military reasons. There were also political issues similar to those faced by France in Algeria.

It is no wonder then that British Governments finally realised the game was up and as the Economy tanked for the next twenty years the focus turned to Europe and NATO.

We tend to remember Suez but arguably Rhodesia was the nail in the coffin of UK military roles outside Europe.

 

[1635yankee]

One of the practical problems is that Rhodesia was landlocked, so the UK would need permission, possibly from Mozambique, then under Portuguese rule, and South Africa, an active supporter of Rhodesia.

I do not know enough about UK politics, but I suspect there were several powerful US politicians who were quite happy with the government of Rhodesia and would make US support of a British military intervention unlikely

 

[kaiserd]

Don’t think much depth can really be given to discussions re: Rhodesia without getting into politics to a degree not really in line with the focus of this forum.

I would note that Suez occurred a number of years before the minority-white declarations of Independence re: Rhodesia so that defining blow to the UK’s political and military standing had already taken place and its international and domestic impact absorbed. The UK’s response to Rhodesia was heavily influenced by the consequences of Suez so it is Suez that is clearly the much bigger event in regard to UK foreign policy and power projection.

 

[riggerrob]

May I add an American angle?
I was a child back during the 1960s and still remember how my entire town (Southern Quebec) was shocked by the news of President John F. Kennedy’s assasination.
I believe that much of the pressure to eliminate apartheid in Rhodesia and South Africa was a side-effect of Kennedy’s efforts to get Afro-Americans off the welfare rolls and into middle-class jobs.
To that end, the USA clandestinely supported the white gov’ts of Rhodesia and South Africa.
For example, Canadian artillery expert Dr. Gerald Bull was allowed to quietly help SA upgrade their artillery fire Neil he was “outed” by a journalist.

 

[uk 75]

I will stick purely to the military aspects of the Rhodesian crisis.
Although Suez was a political fiasco the military got lots of new equipment as a result of the shortcomings it revealed, notably assault ships and commando carriers for the RN and new transport aircraft for the RAF.
Despite Suez the UK stood firm in the Far East against Indonesia and intervened in Kuwait in 1961.
As the article in my post and comments point out, Rhodesia was too tough a nut for these forces to crack. Distance was also a problem though France and Belgium were able to intervene in Kolwezi on a much smaller scale some years later.
With the Indonesian confrontation out of the way and the lack of military solutions to Rhodesia the nails were in the coffin of British military presence outside Europe. But of course as we have noted before it was the disastrous state of Britain's economy that killed it off.

 

[uk 75]

Don’t think much depth can really be given to discussions re: Rhodesia without getting into politics to a degree not really in line with the focus of this forum.

I would note that Suez occurred a number of years before the minority-white declarations of Independence re: Rhodesia so that defining blow to the UK’s political and military standing had already taken place and its international and domestic impact absorbed. The UK’s response to Rhodesia was heavily influenced by the consequences of Suez so it is Suez that is clearly the much bigger event in regard to UK foreign policy and power projection.

Please explain how "the UK's response to Rhodesia was heavily influenced by the consequences of Suez".
Whatever the reasons for UK policy towards Apartheid South Africa (not relevant I suggest) I did not suggest that the military advice was the only reason for the UK not intervening militarily against Rhodesia. However, it pretty much said it could not be done. There were also strong suggestions that British servicemen would refuse to fight (as taken up in Hurd's novel), which are discussed in great detail online.
It is no accident that the Labour Government has grounds to doubt the wisdom of large military resources for out of area deployments based not on 1956 but on 1965.

 

[kaiserd]

How is this “sticking with the military aspects” per your comments above?

Is it being contended that Suez didn’t influence UK decision making and policy re: Rhodesia?

How is UK policy to Apartheid South Africa “not relevant” to UK policy to white-minority-rule Rhodesia (including, but certainly not limited to the fact that Apartheid South Africa provided support to Rhodesia)?

I will reserve other comments that may (or may not) be justified in this context to give the moderators an easier life.

 

[1635yankee]

May I add an American angle?
I was a child back during the 1960s and still remember how my entire town (Southern Quebec) was shocked by the news of President John F. Kennedy’s assasination.
I believe that much of the pressure to eliminate apartheid in Rhodesia and South Africa was a side-effect of Kennedy’s efforts to get Afro-Americans off the welfare rolls and into middle-class jobs.
To that end, the USA clandestinely supported the white gov’ts of Rhodesia and South Africa.
For example, Canadian artillery expert Dr. Gerald Bull was allowed to quietly help SA upgrade their artillery fire Neil he was “outed” by a journalist.

Actually, Kennedy and Johnson were attempting to get African-Americans be treated as equal citizens.

US foreign policy was fanatically anti-communist, with "communist" being defined to include just about any movement against dictatorial regimes that didn't identify as "socialist." The USSR, of course, would immediately support, then co-opt any movement against these regimes.

In the case of Rhodesia, geography is a major barrier: the country is landlocked. South Africa, one of the states bordering Rhodesia was a strong supporter of the Smith regime. Were the UK to try to go through Mozambique, I'm sure that South African forces would cheerfully attack British forces en route. Regardless of the barriers of domestic and international (primarily US) politics, the physical barriers to a British intervention were probably severe enough to render a military intervention unfeasible.

 

[uk 75]

In 1965 Mozambique was still a Portuguese Colony. Portugal itself was a dictatorship but a member of NATO.
Apartheid South Africa became more of a factor once Smith had succeeded in his UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence). I am not sure if it would have entered into a war against the UK.
The military report is still doubtful whether UK forces were sufficient to defeat Rhodesia even if they could transit into the country. Deploying the whole of UK 3 Division and 16, Para Brigade would still fall short of the five brigades thought necessary.

 

[Jemiba]

An interesting article at the start, but the discussion quickly lead to politics and was hampered by personal indispositions. The ratio of 9 posts to 4 reports speaks for itself !