RAND study: US-Chinese Air Superiority Capabilities 1996-2017

[GeorgeA]

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9858z3.html

Interesting discussion about relative capabilities over a twenty-year period in two scenarios: Taiwan invasion and Spratly confrontation.

Fun fact: RAND estimate is 30 wing equivalents for the US to achieve air superiority in the 2017 Taiwan case.

 

[Blitzo]

I think this brief uses the same research from the larger "China vs US scorecard" study released a while ago, I believe.


I can't remember if in this specific case they simulated whether both sides would try to attack each other's air bases -- which could shift the balance of airpower towards one side or the other in early stages of a conflict and potentially have such effects compound and result in a greater risk of losing air superiority altogether.
I also can't remember if (or how) they factored in the influence of force multipliers on both sides in such a conflict, as well as the vulnerability of both side's force multipliers... though I don't think they did, and I also remember they seemed to have gotten some glaring incorrect details on the Chinese side (miscounting KJ-200 in service numbers, as well as not even acknowledging the existence of KJ-500 and the various SIGINT, EW/ECM Y-8/9 variants that would obviously have a singificant role in any air campaign).


Still, even with those limitations, I think the general trend the study describes is correct.

 

[ynm]

What does the unit "wings" refer to?

 

[Blitzo]

What does the unit "wings" refer to?

They describe one wing as being 72 strong -- I assume they are referring to only wings made up purely of fighter aircraft in this case.

 

[ynm]

But there are differences between fighter like F22 and F18 (carrier based). With F18 the Chinese can outnumber US but with F22 it may be a different result.

30 F18s or 30 F22s?

 

[Blitzo]

But there are differences between fighter like F22 and F18 (carrier based). With F18 the Chinese can outnumber US but with F22 it may be a different result.

30 F18s or 30 F22s?

I checked the original report, here is what it came with:

Next, we used fifth-generation fighters in the 2010 and 2017 time frames. For 2010, we assumed that one wing (with the canonical 72 combat-coded aircraft) would be available to deploy to the theater, and, for 2017, we assumed that two wings could deploy. Although we did not attempt to differentiate the specific capabilities of the F-22 and F-35 for this study, our 2017 deployable force would likely consist of both types of aircraft.
[font=verdana, arial, helvetica, sans-serif]
Finally, we added fourth-generation fighters until the victory condition was achieved. Because we are examining a defensive counter-air mission, the primary U.S. aircraft types to consider are the U.S. Navy F/A-18 (C/D or E/F models, depending on the year) and the U.S. Air Force F-15C. As the results show, in some cases more aircraft are required than the planned quantities of these types; hence, additional aircraft types (most likely the U.S. Air Force F-16C) may be necessary[/font]

In other words, for the 2017 scenario where they say 30 USAF fighter wings would be necessary to defeat a surge being constantly on station, 2 of those wings would be "5th generation" while the rest would be 4th.... so 144 5th generation aircraft.

 

[Deino]

To admit even if I'm not completely thru I want to add one note:

Since it is reportedly based on the much larger report "The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017" (http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCkQFjABahUKEwiSosjZ1qHIAhWKPBQKHQQGDxo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rand.org%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Frand%2Fpubs%2Fresearch_reports%2FRR300%2FRR392%2FRAND_RR392.pdf&usg=AFQjCNE82lz8AXcmpA0nuA8G5yal-tmgzw&bvm=bv.104226188,d.d2s) I would like to mention that there are a few issues I do not understand ... which to admit, highly question its reliability:

On p.176 "Figure 7.4 Maximum Chinese Air-Launched ASCM Engagement Ranges, 1996 and 2017" they are comparing Q-5 armed with YJ-81 in 1996 in comparison to J-16 armed with YJ-62 for 2017. The point is neither in 1996 was a Q-5 able to launch the YJ-81 - it was simply never able to do so ! - and the YJ-62 is a coastal defence ASM not available as an air-launches missile.

So what reliability has this report if such blatant mistakes are included ??

Deino

 

[Blitzo]

To admit even if I'm not completely thru I want to add one note:

Since it is reportedly based on the much larger report "The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017" (http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCkQFjABahUKEwiSosjZ1qHIAhWKPBQKHQQGDxo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rand.org%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2Frand%2Fpubs%2Fresearch_reports%2FRR300%2FRR392%2FRAND_RR392.pdf&usg=AFQjCNE82lz8AXcmpA0nuA8G5yal-tmgzw&bvm=bv.104226188,d.d2s) I would like to mention that there are a few issues I do not understand ... which to admit, highly question its reliability:

On p.176 "Figure 7.4 Maximum Chinese Air-Launched ASCM Engagement Ranges, 1996 and 2017" they are comparing Q-5 armed with YJ-81 in 1996 in comparison to J-16 armed with YJ-62 for 2017. The point is neither in 1996 was a Q-5 able to launch the YJ-81 - it was simply never able to do so ! - and the YJ-62 is a coastal defence ASM not available as an air-launches missile.

So what reliability has this report if such blatant mistakes are included ??

Deino

Usually I would agree with you... and there are some other very large mistakes in their report such as not acknowledging the existence of all the ELINT and ECM/EW GX aircraft for any air campaign China would wage, not to mention getting the numbers of KJ-200 in service wrong and not acknowledging the existence of KJ-500... and not acknowledging Y-8GX6 for ASW discussions...


But there are also other parts of the report which are quite good, and so long as we accept the fact that they've made some mistakes, it is still possible I think to take the general conclusions and trends they've reached as useful, if not entirely accurate.