US speculation on a rudimentary Indian nuclear bomber force in 1972

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In 1972 the US speculated that if India had gone nuclear at that time, India could "use aircraft in its current inventory such as Canberras or reconfigured Boeing 707's or 747's, as delivery vehicles, but these would be a rudimentary affair, essentially for one-way missions."

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d300

300. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156, Washington, September 1, 1972 Washington, September 1, 1972

SUMMARY

Indian Capabilities/Intentions

(snip)

B. Political-Military. Until India possesses long-range bombers or missiles, an Indian nuclear decision would probably have only marginal impact on India's military capabilities. India could use aircraft in its current inventory such as Canberras or reconfigured Boeing 707's or 747's, as delivery vehicles, but these would be a rudimentary affair, essentially for one-way missions. Given China's air defense systems, and the distances between India and China's urban centers (approximately 1800 nautical miles from airfields in Assam to Shanghai and 1200 nautical miles to Canton), a rudimentary nuclear bomber force would face some difficulty in striking China's major cities, even if range were increased by air refueling. China's nuclear facilities would, however, present closer targets (only 800-1200 nautical miles) and would be within the existing range of Indian Canberra. At present, the Indians have no long-range bombers although there are indications they have unsuccessfully sought these from the Soviets. Unless India elects to develop or purchase a long-range bomber force, she will need intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to have an "advanced" delivery system capable of striking China's urban centers. The Indian space program can ultimately provide the basis for an IRBM, although India is at present a long way from possessing this capability. The space program aims at launching a satellite in the mid-1970's with foreign support and appears unlikely of being able to produce an Indian IRBM capability before the 1980's. Barring a policy shift, we doubt the Soviets would help India develop this capability; it is conceivable the French would be prepared to collaborate with the Indians. One defensive military use, which would not require an expensive and sophisticated delivery system, would be emplacing atomic demolition munitions (ADM's) in the Himalayan passes which constitute China's only direct land access to India. Considering the terrain of the border area and the type of threat (primarily ground) that China poses, ADM's could be considered favorably by the Indian military. Although this possibility has been discussed, we do not know what conclusions the Indian military has reached.


====================


http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d298


298. Special National Intelligence Estimate 31'72, Washington, August 3, 1972


Washington, August 3, 1972


INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS


AND THEIR LIKELY IMPLICATIONS


CONCLUSIONS


Indian Capabilities


5. Indian delivery capabilities, like the prospective weapons themselves, are modest. With respect to China they are marginal at best. A fleet of about 40 Canberra bombers with radius of about 1,000 nautical miles and a carrying capacity 5,000 pounds could reach India's closer neighbors, including most of Tibet and Sinkiang but not the heavily populated areas of China. India has no long-range bombers, but could conceivably, with extensive modifications, use some of its Air-India fleet of nine Boeing 707s and four 747s to carry weapons several thousand miles. All these aircraft would be vulnerable to Chinese air defense. In any event, the cost of a weapons system that used only current nuclear and delivery capabilities would not be great; the added expense of operating a program for the production of a few devices would probably be only $10420 million a year.
 
the chance that a India Boeing "Bomber" make true Chinese, Pakistani Air-defense are ZERO
and use of commercial airliner as Trojan Atomic bomber, The argument is self-contradictory with India mentality.

Wat to Hell were they smoking in US National Security ?
every sane person would see this speculation are feeble-minded...

...excepted politician!
 
The purpose of such reports is to outline the possible as well as the probable. Could India have found a way to use airliners as nuclear delivery systems? Perhaps; it's not impossible to imagine them modifying an airliner for crude external weapon carriage, for example.
Ad of course, ti's anyone's guess how good Chinese air defenses really were in the 1970s. They had a lot of distance to cover, and as the Soviets learned in the 1980s, any system can have a bad day.

But the report rightly points out that India's real options were buying or building long-range bombers or developing IRBMs (which is of course the route they actually picked).
 
In 1972, the US had the same concern over Taiwan's potential nuclear program.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d266

266. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 16, 1972.

SNIE 43–1–72

TAIPEI'S CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

The Estimate

Background

1. Late in the 1960s, the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) initiated an ambitious program for the procurement and operation of nuclear power facilities on Taiwan. Foreign sources have extended over half a billion dollars in loans and guarantees for this power program, and two reactors are now under construction on the island.

2. The evidence suggests that the generation of electric power is not the only serious interest that the GRC has in the nuclear field. Most of this evidence involves activities at the Chung-shan Science Institute (CSSI), established by order of Chiang Kai-shek shortly after the People's Republic of China (PRC) detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964.

(snip)

11. Delivery Capabilities. At this stage, there is no evidence of GRC efforts to develop a nuclear delivery system which would pose a credible threat to mainland targets. The GRC has purchased a short-range, surface-to-surface missile (the Israeli Gabriel Mark II), but this program would have little application to the development of a strategic missile. Jet fighter-bombers on Taiwan could reach the mainland with bombs weighing up to 2,000 pounds, but it is uncertain that the GRC could achieve a weapon this small in the early stages of a weapons program. Payload constraints might also rule out arming the Nikes on Taiwan with nuclear warheads for use as a surface-to-surface weapon against invasion forces in the Taiwan Strait. (This missile has a surface range of about 110 miles with a 1,000-pound warhead.) There are a few Boeing 707s and 727s in commercial use on Taiwan which might conceivably be used to deliver nuclear weapons. These aircraft would naturally be vulnerable to the PRC's air defense system.
 
Regarding the origins of India's bomber force:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Aircraft/Liberator.html

(h/t Mike Jetzer over on the Unwanted Blog.)
 
TomS said:
But the report rightly points out that India's real options were buying or building long-range bombers or developing IRBMs (which is of course the route they actually picked).
Is it? Shortly before the Agni I missile was first tested, India had already acquired a handful of Tu-142s - which were apparently considered close enough an approach to a strategic nuclear bomber that Ukraine's fleet of the type was later included in their US supported disarmament programme. Of course, this predates the above article and, some ECM equipment apart, survivability would not be much different to using a converted airliner, but I've always felt the Tu-142s received too little attention in typical discussions of India's nuclear capability.
 

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