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Secondly, uranium is not that highlly radioactive - it has a long half-life and is an alpha-emitter, so once in a blue moon it chucks out a big particle that doesn't make it very far from the source. Not easy to detect unless you are in the immediate vicinity. Especially since, thirdly, neither metallic uranium nor gaseous UF6 centrifuge feedstock are very mobile (i.e. easily dispersed a long way from the site of release by water or air, like the fission products in a nuclear reactor such as Chernobyl or Fukushima are).

Hex in particular is not very mobile. Hex is only a "gas" at 60C. At ambient temperatures it is a crystalline solid. If tanks holding hex were hit it would cool quickly and condense in a relatively small area - it would not leave the immediate area and be detectable through aerial sampling, etc.

I have seen a lot of commenters that seem to be under the impression that hitting the fissile material and/or feedstock was the primary objective. It was not. Iran has - within their agreements with IAEA, etc. - stockpiled material enriched to 20% or more. Uranium enrichment is sort of an inverse logarithmic effort. The first 10-20% is the hardest, getting progressively easier as the level of enrichment is increased.

The objective was to take out the centrifuges and related equipment. This prevents Iran from taking that stockpiled material that is 20% and enriching it to X% that would be appropriate for a weapon or naval reactor. It will take them a long time to rebuild the lost enrichment capability. Even just setting off bombs *near* the centrifuges would be a setback for the program. These machines operate at very, very high RPMs and require perfectly level floors, etc. Disrupting any of those things sets the program back.
 
Something interesting to think about, weren't there rumors of two Type 815A ELINT ships of the PLAN being active in the Persian Gulf and general area? If so, they will probably gathered some valuable intelligence with regards to how US forces conduct such operations.
Assuming that the US forces made any transmissions at all.

Of course, the ability to do an op like this without any detectable transmissions is a statement all by itself.



On the topic of spotters and photographers in the US seeing the B-2s depart and land, didn't the US learn anything? In the age of readily available drones, albeit short range ones, each of these people could be a potential threat. Although I had to admit, an Iranian or even Chinese spin-off of the Ukrainian operation would be quite ironic. Either way, people shouldn't be able to be anywhere close the airfields where such strategic assets are stationed. Seems like an unnecessary gamble. Especially in a politically divided united states.
Not much choice.

Cities grow up around military bases because that's where people with money are. You cannot get all the things needed for sanity on a US military base. There aren't many options for entertainment on base. Some thing needed for sanity/entertainment are not allowed to be sold on base (porn, remember that it's a terrible idea to sleep with people you work with in general, and it's actively illegal if you're in the same chain of command in the military)



The objective was to take out the centrifuges and related equipment. This prevents Iran from taking that stockpiled material that is 20% and enriching it to X% that would be appropriate for a weapon or naval reactor. It will take them a long time to rebuild the lost enrichment capability. Even just setting off bombs *near* the centrifuges would be a setback for the program. These machines operate at very, very high RPMs and require perfectly level floors, etc. Disrupting any of those things sets the program back.
Even moreso if the centrifuges happened to be running at the time the bombs went off. having the centrifuge rotor bump the housing as the shockwave passes through would be catastrophic.
 
Even moreso if the centrifuges happened to be running at the time the bombs went off. having the centrifuge rotor bump the housing as the shockwave passes through would be catastrophic.

In that any technician unfortunate enough to present near these centrifuges (In the same room) is likely to have been literally shredded by the resulting shrapnel from the disintegrating centrifuges :eek: .
 
Assuming that the US forces made any transmissions at all.

Of course, the ability to do an op like this without any detectable transmissions is a statement all by itself.
The B-2 IIRC has AINS or something similar so flying under radio silence would be fairly manageable, to the crew of course.
 
Hex in particular is not very mobile. Hex is only a "gas" at 60C. At ambient temperatures it is a crystalline solid. If tanks holding hex were hit it would cool quickly and condense in a relatively small area - it would not leave the immediate area and be detectable through aerial sampling, etc.

I have seen a lot of commenters that seem to be under the impression that hitting the fissile material and/or feedstock was the primary objective. It was not. Iran has - within their agreements with IAEA, etc. - stockpiled material enriched to 20% or more. Uranium enrichment is sort of an inverse logarithmic effort. The first 10-20% is the hardest, getting progressively easier as the level of enrichment is increased.

The objective was to take out the centrifuges and related equipment. This prevents Iran from taking that stockpiled material that is 20% and enriching it to X% that would be appropriate for a weapon or naval reactor. It will take them a long time to rebuild the lost enrichment capability. Even just setting off bombs *near* the centrifuges would be a setback for the program. These machines operate at very, very high RPMs and require perfectly level floors, etc. Disrupting any of those things sets the program back.


Jeffrey Lewis seems to be otherwise in agreement with you but strongly suspects that "Midnight Hammer" alone did not set actual weaponization back as much as JCPOA (or any of its later analogues) would've. Centrifuges seem to be more replaceable than I thought they were. The article above is worth reading but he goes into some more detail in a Bluesky thread which I'll quote in its entirety (as it stands so far, at least):

Jeffrey Lewis said:
Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 1/17

Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17

The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17

No one even knows where the HEU is now! IAEA DG Grossi says Iran moved it. Lil' Marco Rubio says nothing can move in Iran. But trucks are moving in Iran. Trucks and heavy equipment showed up at least two days ago to seal the tunnels to protect them. @planetlabs.bsky.social took a picture. 4/17

Trucks also showed up at the Fordow FEP the day before the strike, possibly to relocate sensitive equipment, and certainly to cover those entrances with dirt. Iran just isn't a no-drive zone at the moment. 5/17

To be fair, some Trumpkins acknowledge Iran still has the material. J.D. Vance says they're going to "have conversations with the Iranians about" it. The talking point is that the US has knocked out Iran's ability to further enrich it and convert it to metal, so its fine. 6/17

T'S NOT FINE. Yes, the strikes on the enrichment plants at Qom (Fordow FEP) and Natanz (PFEP and FEP) appear successful. But there has been no effort to strike the enormous underground facility next to Natanz where Iran can make more centrifuges and maybe do other things. 7/17

In 2022, Iran moved a centrifuge production line to "the heart of the mountain" there. This facility is huge -- we estimated 10,000 m2 or more -- and we don't really know what else it might house (like enrichment or conversion). 8/17 bsky.app/profile/arms...

Also, Iran recently announced a "new enrichment facility in a secure location" and told the @iaeaorg.bsky.social it was ready to start installing centrifuges. The IAEA was set to inspect the facility, near Isfahan, before the bombing. It hasn't been bombed AFAIK. 9/17 www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKwv...

Let me say again: Iran said it had a new enrichment facility. The IAEA was about to go see a new (empty) enrichment facility. But before that could happen, Israel struck other facilities in Iran -- but not the new one. See the problem? 10/17

This means Iran has retained 400 kg of 60% HEU, the ability to manufacture centrifuges, and one, possibly two underground enrichment sites. That is also to say nothing of possible secret sites, which opponents of the JCPOA used to invoke all the freaking time. 11/17

Let's say Iran decides to rush a bomb. Iran can install ~1.5 cascades a week. In six weeks, it could have 9 cascades of IR-6 machines. It would take those machines about 60 days to enrich all 400 kg to WGU. Altogether that's about five months although IMMV. 12/17

Look, I get it. Watching bombers conduct an >11,000 km precision bombing raid is awesome. I am the sort of wierdo who happily read a 528 page book about the first Black Buck raid of the Falklands War in 1982. I really do get it. 13/17 www.amazon.com/Vulcan-607-R...

But what does it say when two of the most amazing military operations in modern memory are still unable to fully eliminate Iran's nuclear program? I think that's proof that this is tactical brilliance may be in service of a foolhardy strategy. 14/17

RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER have not slowed the Iranian program nearly as much as the JCPOA. We hold diplomacy to much higher standards than bombing. The same people who endlessly complained about the JCPOA "sunsetting" are now happy to delay Iran's bomb by much less. 15/17

This is why I said the strike is about regime change. As late as May, DIA said Iran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program. When asked about that, Rubio said the intelligence was "irrelevant." It's only irrelevant if the problem is the regime, not the program. 16/17

We ought to judge this strike by its real purpose, not the legal camouflage of preemptive self-defense. If the strike leaves the current regime, or something very much like it, in power with a nuclear option then it will have been a strategic failure. 17/17

 
And the damage at Fordow may not be as great as hoped...

The Maxar frame confirms it: Fordow’s heart is still beating.

Despite the drop of at least 6 GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrators, the imagery shows that the damage pattern skirts the outer shell of the site. Crater geometry and spacing are consistent with volley-mode sequencing designed to minimize shock front overlap, but all visible penetrations hug the periphery, either due to mis-queued coordinates or deliberate decoying via the site’s curved adit network.The visible ejecta tells its own story. Opacity is low in the VNIR band, indicating a dust-only loft, no oxidized blast pattern, no epithermal signature, no heat venting. This means the warheads expended most of their energy in the overburden. No concentric spalling rings, no radial fractures exceeding 50 meters, and no post-strike IR bloom to indicate a breach of the core’s thermal envelope. The shallow subsidence patch at the upper center measures less than 10 meters across and under half a meter deep, nowhere near the magnitude required to indicate a cascade hall collapse.What is visible is denial work. Fresh spoil piles flank the tunnel mouths at the southern bend, light-toned and loosely compacted, indicative of rapid back-blading by engineering crews, not post-strike structural failure. This suggests Iran moved quickly to obscure ingress points, either to mask internal survivability or mislead further ISR analysis.The main enrichment halls, estimated at -90 meters below surface, remain sealed, pressurized, and likely electrically fed via alternate routing. What was damaged is surface infrastructure: access shafts, intake routes, possibly control galleries. All of it replaceable. None of it critical to cascade function.Washington may claim a show of force, but Fordow endures. The media got their mushroom dust, the Pentagon got its footage, and Iran got a live test of its subterranean resilience. The deeper program survives, untouched beneath 90 meters of mountain.

View: https://x.com/iwasnevrhere_/status/1936795685111656696
 

Jeffrey Lewis seems to be otherwise in agreement with you but strongly suspects that "Midnight Hammer" alone did not set actual weaponization back as much as JCPOA (or any of its later analogues) would've. Centrifuges seem to be more replaceable than I thought they were. The article above is worth reading but he goes into some more detail in a Bluesky thread which I'll quote in its entirety (as it stands so far, at least):



Just because there’s an underground centrifuge factory doesn’t mean the inputs needed for the factory can’t be targetted.

No inputs, no outputs.

And given Israeli and US air superiority over Iran, things like power, water, and roads to these sites can likely be taken out.
 
The objective was to take out the centrifuges and related equipment. This prevents Iran from taking that stockpiled material that is 20% and enriching it to X% that would be appropriate for a weapon or naval reactor. It will take them a long time to rebuild the lost enrichment capability. Even just setting off bombs *near* the centrifuges would be a setback for the program. These machines operate at very, very high RPMs and require perfectly level floors, etc. Disrupting any of those things sets the program back.
Agreed here. Even if the factory itself wasn't breached - which is not very likely, albeit possible - the shock from bomb hits likely disabled most of equipment. And with centrifuges such damage likely means "needed to be replaced".
 
Also wouldn't the sudden loss of electrical power if the facilities electrical substation is destroyed cause an uncontrolled shutdown of the centrifuges damaging and/or destroying them?
 
Also wouldn't the sudden loss of electrical power if the facilities electrical substation is destroyed cause an uncontrolled shutdown of the centrifuges damaging and/or destroying them?
I’d say it would depend on the setup. Normal centrifuges are stopped by switching off power. Someone more knowledgable may refute this./

Semiconductor production, on the other hand, is very susceptible to power loss, due to the long-term production process.
 
Interesting apparent planning mistake:
(the pilot is complaining he has some disparity b/w its target reference coordinates beyond simple magnetic and true disparity - Mag and True, refers to Magnetic and True coordinates - Mag being real world coordinates while True being chart ones)

View: https://youtu.be/Yi8Y9awTBRY
This is why you will need humans for precision strikes for a while longer.

It's all hard bed rock here and any cave-ins due to the small volume and network arrangement won't be visible with the naked eye.
The best you could tell now is how deep the explosions were due to strength, hence, size of the returned energy/pattern.

Anyhow, Iran likely has turned the centrifuges off and moved material and the centrifuges, too. Probably, as far back as since last week. Although, it seems the major effort was done recently due to warning signs and discussions. So at best the majority might have been damaged but cetainly not all.
 
I mean Iran might have just one—we all know about the Samson option if Tel Aviv is hit. Vela points to them and/or South Africa.

If I were an Iranian operative, I would prefer to try to smuggle it in—out of sight of air defenses.

A spy might place a gun-style inside a cement truck filled with lithium and hope for the best. Mike meets Salvage One. If it doesn’t work you still have Hiroshima…if it does work, Tel Aviv goes the way of an Atoll.

There is no hurry. Were I an Iranian…I’d wait for things to quiet down…then finish operation “Sarnath.”
If I were an Iranian operative I'd be in no hurry to ensure that large parts of Iran would turn into self-lightning glass-lined parking lots.

But then again, I don't suffer from Mullah's disease.
 
"Talk to us or we bomb more of your stuff".

To which their reply would be that the US bombed them despite engaging in talks before these events. Diplomacy is an art, and the people in charge aren't artists, they're not even qualified to be janitors.

I can wholeheartedly see this backfiring in the long term, given Iran's previous reluctance to actually take the necessary steps to gain nuclear weapons, this should have been their final wake up call that they should get to that point ASAP otherwise they'll never be save from antagonistic foreign powers trampling on their sovereignty. One would have thought a look towards Iraq or Ukraine should have made this clear already, but alas.

Coupled with the already surfacing doubts of the overall effectiveness of this attack, some going as far as calling it a tactical success but strategic failure. One cannot help but consider the possibility of this having been a premature and ill motivated show off force of the US with little substance all things considered.

So I'll definitely join the camp of people that isn't particularly impressed. Although from a technical point of view, the B-2 proved once again to be an invaluable asset in the US arsenal and the people that were involved in it's development and are involved in its operational deployment deserve a thumbs up, regardless of anything else. A vastly more impressive display of it's capabilities than launching AGM-158s at insurgents in Yemen.
 
On the topic of spotters and photographers in the US seeing the B-2s depart and land, didn't the US learn anything? In the age of readily available drones, albeit short range ones, each of these people could be a potential threat. Although I had to admit, an Iranian or even Chinese spin-off of the Ukrainian operation would be quite ironic. Either way, people shouldn't be able to be anywhere close the airfields where such strategic assets are stationed. Seems like an unnecessary gamble. Especially in a politically divided united states.

As Perun said in his analysis of Spiderweb…it’s a miracle that kind of strike did not happen in a western country first. The B-2 fleet is however unique for USbombers in that it is stored in a hanger; not sure how much impact it could absorb since it is just a whether/climate shelter, but it obscures the presence and precise position and would detonate any small munition with a large degree of stand off from the airframe.

Hopefully some kind of UAV/submunition protection is added to the new B-21 weather shelters.

The other large aircraft in US inventory are generally exposed though outside maintenance periods in a hanger.
 
It is interesting that the strikes do appear to have been moved up quite significantly. Just what changed in the space of less than 72hrs? On Friday the general consensus was that there would be a two week grace period before any strikes by the United States.

Some coverage from today:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-n...alth-bombers-mission-obliterate-iran-nuclear/




 
Even moreso if the centrifuges happened to be running at the time the bombs went off. having the centrifuge rotor bump the housing as the shockwave passes through would be catastrophic.

Presumably centrifuges have been spun down since this started. They are still some what fragile, but not nearly so much as when in operation. The attack against the Natanz electrical infrastructure at the very beginning of the war was almost certainly an attempt to destroy the cascades while running by interrupting power - the centrifuges cannot even wind down in an uncontrolled fashion without a lot of risk. The subsequent B-2 strike made that redundant of course.
 
The Iran conflict has created a “clear and present risk of energy attacks” that could stoke inflation in the West, analysts have warned, after the US strikes on Tehran’s nuclear sites.

RBC Capital Markets said Iran has a series of options for how it could disrupt the vital Strait of Hormuz shipping route, which carries a fifth of the world’s oil and gas supplies.

Analyst Helima Croft said it is not a “full closure or nothing” scenario, adding “multiple security experts contend that Iran has the ability to strike individual tankers and key ports with missiles and mines”.

She also suggested Iran could “exert serious pressure” on militias it backs in the Middle East.

She said: “To be sure, these militias were reluctant to come to the aid of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and may want to avoid anything that could lead them to the same fate as Hezbollah and Hamas.

“And yet, if the Iranian leadership believes that survival is at stake, it may exert serious pressure on the remaining proxies in Iraq and Yemen to provide much more material assistance.”

It comes after David Lammy warned Iran it would be a “mistake” to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.

The Foreign Secretary said he had urged his Iranian counterpart on Sunday to “be very careful about not escalating in response to the attack on their nuclear sites”.

Oil prices initially spiked during the first trading session since the US attacks but were last trading flat on the day.

Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg, said a protracted disruption of oil and gas exports from the Gulf region “seems unlikely” as it could anger some of Iran’s closest allies, including China.

He said: “Trying to throttle energy exports from the Gulf region would be a high-risk strategy for Tehran.”
 
It is interesting that the strikes do appear to have been moved up quite significantly. Just what changed in the space of less than 72hrs? On Friday the general consensus was that there would be a two week grace period before any strikes by the United States.

Some coverage from today:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-n...alth-bombers-mission-obliterate-iran-nuclear/





My guess is that the decision and timing were already made and statements to the contrary were to provide some operational security.
 
My guess is that the decision and timing were already made and statements to the contrary were to provide some operational security.
Possible, but seemingly both the State Department and the Pentagon were originally in favour of holding off for a fortnight.
 
If you don't want people around, an AFB with a town at the end of the runway was probably a poor choice for basing.
Actually, that might be more accurate as, "If you don't want people around, an AFB was probably a poor choice for basing."

Where there is a military base there will be a town, largely due to the humans which live and work on the base and the community which arises to provide services to them and their dependents as well as providing off-base housing and civilian contractor services to the base. Unless, of course, the base was placed by the town because the existing town was great for servicing the base.

Get rid of all the military humans and then, and only then, you can get rid of the town by the base gate.
 
I hope someone named a MOP after former Iranian hostage Bruce German.

“Mr. German, 44 years old, said he believed that the hostage crisis could make life difficult for other diplomats. ”There is just no way you can make an embassy safe from half a million angry people,” he said. Mr. German added that he would never take a foreign post where new security measures, now being planned, were not in effect. As for Iran, he said he would return there – ”only in a B-52.”
——————-
It was of course a B-2 but I think he’d approve.
 
Hopefully some kind of UAV/submunition protection is added to the new B-21 weather shelters.

I believe that will become an actual necessity for any strategic asset, be it silos or airfields where strategic bombers are stationed.

Either that or station them in hardened shelters far away from settlements and with constant surveillance should something suspicious show up one day.
 
Actually, that might be more accurate as, "If you don't want people around, an AFB was probably a poor choice for basing."

Where there is a military base there will be a town, largely due to the humans which live and work on the base and the community which arises to provide services to them and their dependents as well as providing off-base housing and civilian contractor services to the base. Unless, of course, the base was placed by the town because the existing town was great for servicing the base.

Get rid of all the military humans and then, and only then, you can get rid of the town by the base gate.

Edwards Air Force Base is pretty remote, innit? There are definitely facilities more remote than others. And having your most valuable assets stationed in more vulnerable areas, with plenty of non-military personelle around the general vicinity is just pretty strange in this day and age.

Especially when these assets are meant to be utilized in operations such as this one, or to conduct strikes in a WW3 scenario. Which makes them priority targets for any adversary of the US. One would imagine just handing a couple local kids several dozen drones and 50K each would do the trick. Show them some based sigma tiktok edits beforehand and tell them how they're tearing down the...*checks notes*...inequality that has been institutionalized in the US or some other catchy ideological BS if money doesn't suffice. I think people would be shocked how many are out there who would take up such an offer.
 
Possible, but seemingly both the State Department and the Pentagon were originally in favour of holding off for a fortnight.

The administration generally ignores outside advice. It is also possible the policy changed overnight, though an operation of this size has some minimal last minute staging time regardless of previous preparation.
 
Actually, that might be more accurate as, "If you don't want people around, an AFB was probably a poor choice for basing."

Where there is a military base there will be a town, largely due to the humans which live and work on the base and the community which arises to provide services to them and their dependents as well as providing off-base housing and civilian contractor services to the base. Unless, of course, the base was placed by the town because the existing town was great for servicing the base.

Get rid of all the military humans and then, and only then, you can get rid of the town by the base gate.

There are unpopulated bases in certain extreme conditions. Diego comes to mind, as well as the test sites in Nevada. Thule. Grand Forks is pretty sparse, located somewhat far away from the actual town.

But in general bases were located near populated areas or populated areas spring up around them, particularly driven by base economic activity.

The U.S. could likely disperse its bombers to more forward bases ahead of time for future strikes, though it is hard to conceal B-2s because there are exactly 20 (19?) surviving and one home base, and generally a need to store them under cover for any significant period of time. B-21 will increase first strike options.
 
I believe that will become an actual necessity for any strategic asset, be it silos or airfields where strategic bombers are stationed.

Either that or station them in hardened shelters far away from settlements and with constant surveillance should something suspicious show up one day.

It’s a necessity *now*. Just because the U.S. is not doing it yet does not mean it is not vulnerable. Even putting up driving range style netting would be better than nothing.
 
It’s a necessity *now*. Just because the U.S. is not doing it yet does not mean it is not vulnerable. Even putting up driving range style netting would be better than nothing.
We're on the same page regarding this topic then.

Operation Spiderweb and Operation Midnight Hammer (and it's coverage) certainly have quite the interesting implications for US strategic aviation going forward.

Furthermore, I simply see no other way to further decrease the threat by heavily restricting civilian drone usage tbh. At least long term, with regards to their dual use as civilian hobby toys and military applications they're more in line with an RC car that can double as a rocket launcher, rather than for example a kitchen knife which can slice and dice tomatoes but also people.

My thought when I saw the photos people took of the B-2s upon arrival and departure were that if you can see and follow it like that, you can engage it. Don't even need explosives, I figure a quadcopter getting sucked in by the intake wouldn't be kind to the engine.
 
It is being reported Israel hit the Fordo entrance points, implying the U.S. did not strike these as some reports initial implied. Seems curious the USAF would not have additional strikes to pepper the softer parts of the facility with smaller weapons.
 
They're hoping it'll hit the B-1 Lancer force first, since Congress won't let them divest early, so they haven't invested in anti-drone netting.
 
We're on the same page regarding this topic then.

Operation Spiderweb and Operation Midnight Hammer (and it's coverage) certainly have quite the interesting implications for US strategic aviation going forward.

Furthermore, I simply see no other way to further decrease the threat by heavily restricting civilian drone usage tbh. At least long term, with regards to their dual use as civilian hobby toys and military applications they're more in line with an RC car that can double as a rocket launcher, rather than for example a kitchen knife which can slice and dice tomatoes but also people.

My thought when I saw the photos people took of the B-2s upon arrival and departure were that if you can see and follow it like that, you can engage it. Don't even need explosives, I figure a quadcopter getting sucked in by the intake wouldn't be kind to the engine.

I do not see any mechanism for effectively enforcing that. Making them illegal just pushes them to the black market. Smuggling in a car or boat, or simply launching from offshore, would not be a major hurdle. Countermeasures need to be developed.
 
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