No Korean Emergency funding.

zen

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What if the UK either didn't get involved in the Korean War or the war didn't happen.
In turn no mad scramble to get things into production as they feared WWIII might kick off early.
 
May I offer a Foundation 101 before offering thoughts on: “never happened” and “not with UK”? The de-colonisation of E/SE Asia has been captured by revisionists, so I/we can't talk about its effect on UK aircraft programmes unless we have a consensus on context. I start from this perspective and would welcome input before I turn that into my take on the Q:

What Actually Happened:
9/45: Stalin angered by exclusion from Occupation of Italy and Japan, both having killed many Ivans. So he turns to open material support to Mao and to plausible denial in stirring Assymetric Warfare to ensure friendly replacements in ex-Japanese Occupied territory.

By late 1949: USSR has reduced its presence in Korea to a Naval base, US in the South to a training cadre. Nobody helped Neths. to stay in (more of) E.Indies; US helped Philippines to deal with Mao's Freedom Fighters. ANZ is helping UK deal with more in Malaya; US helps France 7/49 with P-63C Kingcobras to deal with more in Cochin China. By 6/50 Mao has tidied up Hainan and Tibet, leaving only Formosa, HK and Spratlies until he might have a Navy.

Kim the First sees a chance to push S.Rhee into the sea and asks Mao+Stalin for money & material, but not men. They agree and Kim invades, 25/6/50.

US Aid Programmes to 6/54 cascade vast money and kit to Allies. Most here know of end-items (RAF B-29/Neptune/Sabre, RN Avenger/Skyraider): we do not all know of part-funding of UK R&D and production (NATO Standard Types included Swift, Hunter, Venom) and some of us do not know of US supply, free, of factory plant and equipment - much of A300B's British and French structure was made off US machine tools put into Hawarden for Vampire, Filton for Venom, Toulouse for Aquilon (yes, really!)

What If: Case A: MacArthur stops at 38th. Parallel, 10/50 and does not push towards the Yalu.

Case B: No UN Resolution (because Molotov was in NY, 25/6/50, to veto), so:
UK takes the same position as it was taking on France-in-Vietnam: to ignore.
But US goes gung-ho (as JFK/LBJ would in 1964), quickly finding who are its friends.
 
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Case 0 is Kim getting a 'no'.

Case A....We're talking about MacAuthur here. Who trotted out the infamous line "let's push on to Peking". So getting him to stop at the 38th or the Yalu would not be easy.

Case B.....say Labour don't loose the election and the UN vote is vetoed.
US UK relations would not improve.
No move to supply troops is a possibility, leaving it to Australia and New Zealand. Possible logistics support. Only?
 
Case A: it was PLA entering N.Korea, 25/10/50 that caused US/UK to see this as the rehearsal room for WW3. The vast sums that soon came to UK Aero, part from UK, part from US taxpayers, created UK/GW - plant/equipment to implement 20-27 February,1950 “Burns/Templer” GW data Agreements; and UK/AW - by 6-8 December,1950: Truman/Attlee atomic inter-operation Agreement; and UK Strategic Bomber capability -9/2/51 production order for 25 Valiant (50% of all 104 would be US-funded); and 13 March,1952: MoS Super-Priority, under US/UK Combined Materials Resources Committees, for 6 aero Projects; 13/10/52 for Victor/Vulcan and, crucially, 3 civil types. That was the foundation for the industry we know and love today.

So: very simple: no MacArthur exceeding his Authority, driving to the edge of China, repelled, asking Truman to nuke them...then no favour for Air within a modest Defence Budget.
The industry would have emerged gently at the scale of Italy's...except, of course, that Italy's would not have emerged as it did, part-funded by US to build for WW3.
 
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"Nobody helped Neths. to stay in (more of) E.Indies"

Well Australia attempted to - it supplied large quantities of ex-WWII 25Pdr ammunition. Menzies, the Australian PM of the day decided that Sukarno and Co. were "Communist" (without proof) and decided it was better to keep the Netherlands in control. The Australian Union movement disagreed and attempted to block the loading of the ammunition and other stores in Australian ports. They were initially unsuccessful but stopped later shipments being loaded onto ships.
 
"Nobody helped Neths. to stay in (more of) E.Indies"

Well Australia attempted to - it supplied large quantities of ex-WWII 25Pdr ammunition. Menzies, the Australian PM of the day decided that Sukarno and Co. were "Communist" (without proof) and decided it was better to keep the Netherlands in control. The Australian Union movement disagreed and attempted to block the loading of the ammunition and other stores in Australian ports. They were initially unsuccessful but stopped later shipments being loaded onto ships.

And the Unions movement also was in favour of Sukarno, that "anti-colonialist", colonising West Papua. They attempted to block Neth. forces from Australian ports during the Papuan confrontation.
 
Well I don't buy the idea that UK industry and RAF /FAA would be building only license aircraft designs or buying from the US.
Domestic sourced would still happen, but it is plausible that there would be less of everything and some dropped or never started.
But what is another question.

GW...well had it stayed RO there's a case for Brakemine's further development and this GAP entering service. Knock-on effects down to Orange Nell and up to Blue Envoy.
 
Case B: well...cataclysmic.
Truman might have moved garrison Forces from Japan to S.Korea, 7/50 even against a USSR veto, but then what? Kim would have pressed on to contact, and would have done what he did: near-push US into the sea. Would MacArthur have been Authorised to move to Formed Force and, as he did, push him back to 38th.? Would AN Other have joined? Well, not France, embroiled already v.Communists in Vietnam, against the policy of the 2nd. (just) largest bloc (PCF) in the Assemblee Nationale. ANZ? See post 6. So, UK sulking, what then? 1951 an Election Year, Republicans sceptical about foreign entanglements. Truman could well have imposed stop at 38th. What then?

Well, NATO was at that moment merely a vague political entanglement. Ike SACEUR+Monty Deputy wef 1/1/51 took until 1/4/52 to set up SHAPE/SACLANT Command structure, North/Central/South, Ike by then President - which he won by committing as candidate: I will go to Korea (and sort it out). If UK had not been there, boots on ground, thus encouraging others, inc ANZ, to join the new Mission of International Law, well: let me not suggest excess UK influence, but our Cases could include early demise of NATO. I suggest the actual co-operations (GW/AW/money/kit) might not have happened. Divorce is not harmonious.
 
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In turn no mad scramble to get things into production

We all know what that mad scramble led to with the Supermarine Swift - more or less the final nail in the coffin of Supermarine's reputation as a fighter firm. Perhaps without the obscene rush, they develop the type into the sort of low-level fighter-recon airplane the FR.5 variant became, or it fills the niche of the G91. Without all the wasted effort which went into marks that were never accepted into full service, perhaps they've got time to go on and do other things which in real life never got off the drawing board.

With no obscene rush, there's no drive to go for three separate V-bombers in service and an unnecessary insurance policy (Sperrin) on the side. Valiant and Sperrin get the axe early, while Handley Page and Avro get trusted to get the Victor and Vulcan right.

On the other hand, maybe without the budget so drained by unnecessary bombers (Valiant, Sperrin) and wasteful fighters that never went anywhere (Swift), the Sandys slash-and-burn isn't as brutal several years down the road. F.155T probably fails from over-ambitiousness for sure, except maybe one or two Delta 3 prototypes as tech demonstrators, but a generation of interceptors which would have shared the F-4 Phantom's development timescale isn't completely stillborn the way it was in real life; so a proper AI radar with SARH illumination integrated from the very start is developed as a successor to AI.18.

What happens next gets a bit murky, because you have to look too far into an unknown future with only limited reliance on hindsight. With adaptable fast combat aircraft designed in 1956 reaching IOC in the early 60's, for argument's sake, does TSR.2 develop in anywhere near the way it actually did in real life? Or does the ability of a might-have-been late 1950's design to fill that niche (e.g. P.1121 or an outgrowth thereof, no longer struggling in the shadow of the Sandys axe) push back the need for a new strike/attack aircraft until Tornado's development cycle is ready to begin as it did IRL?
 
When Truman won the 1948 election he took it as a mandate to double down on his previous defense policy, (tax cuts and paying domestic programs and costs first with any leftover going to the military with most of that going to the Air Force and atomic weapons development) to the point where his Secretary of Defense flat out told the US Navy they were going to be shut down and the Marines disbanded. This obvious drawdown of the US military was pretty clear to everyone and a reason that Britain and France were moving towards an independent counter to the USSR. The fact the US needed them to be able to actually strike at the USSR should it come down to it wasn't reassuring either. While the US continued to wield the Atomic "big stick" it was a question if they would stay involved in European affairs or withdraw into some form of aggressive isolationism like they did after WWI. The "message" coming out of Washington was confusing at best.

(When Korea kicked off Truman ordered the Navy to blockade North Korea and while he was not amused by the reply of "with what?" he did own the fact that he'd put the Navy in that situation)

Secondary to that was the REASON that the US had drawn down in Korea being that MacArthur was well aware that Rhee wanted to go North as soon as he could and therefore was withdrawing "stored" materials from South Korea to Japan. (Actually a lot was dumped at sea as there was really no place to store them in Japan) The fear was that the US would get dragged into a Korean conflict if Rhee was given to much military materials. Tertiary was the fact that Kim outright lied to both Stalin and Mao that he already had the others permission and support to invade and neither checked with the other before Ok-ing the invasion. Stalin was willing to provide material support while China was disinclined to provide personnel Kim ruthlessly played Mao for having supported him directly with both men and materials during the Chinese’s civil war. While China would not directly participate they would also not allow Western forces any closer to the border. If the Kim failed China would push any invasion force back from the Yalu at the very least. Lastly MacArthur, (who it should have been obvious from his "expertise" on Japan prior to WWII had about a similar 'expertise' on China and Korea) was mostly informed by Japanese intelligence and outlooks on what the situation was in Korea and China so was more concerned with what Rhee would do than what Kim or Mao would do and therefore was more focused on keeping the South incapable of offensive action than pondering defensive action. He was caught looking the wrong way when thing kicked off.

A possible case to consider is that Dewey in fact does win the 1948 election since he was adamant and his platform was stated to be a complete reversal of the Truman policies. Defense spending would rise and taxes would go up to compensate. In addition US allies would receive more 'aid' in both money and material, (though the Rhee issue remains and Mac was actually right about that particular danger) and the US would be more proactive in the western "common defense" organization and policy. China still goes Communist in 1949 as it's far to late to actually effect that outcome but this means that South Korea won't seem as vulnerable to being 'picked off' as it was OTL. Further Stalin is going to be less willing to support Kim and despite what he owes Kim so is Mao with an obviously resurgent US military.

It's possible that Kim still gets the green light as any build up will still take time and as always Europe will remain the focus of US interest and attention. Dewey is not going to put up with Mac's "god-king" attitude though so it's possible that Mac gets HARD orders not to violate the 38th parallel limit but will be just as reluctant to consider the atomic option as Truman was. He will very much push for UN or at least "allied" participation in Korea but I see Mac being replaced sooner rather than later and more listening to the allies ideas than OTL.

Another key component in this case is what will Mao do if Mac isn't around to rant about going to Peking and nuking them till they glow? If the Allied forces stop short of the Yalu and make an effort to assure them they aren't going to invade then despite what he owes Kim Mao can plausible fortify the border and allow Kim a "North Korean" rump state that can be absorbed or dealt with later. If he can force or coerce the allies into mutual borders in or south of the mountains he's got an advantage and knows it so it works out somewhat better for him. But there IS the fact he owes Kim for support during the civil war and he will likely lose face for allowing an ally to fall even if it is that allies fault. And a bellicose and triumphant Rhee on the southern border is going to be an insult especially if Kim survives the debacle.

In context there will still be an “emergency” but the overall level may be less “panic” and more “controlled panic” J

Randy
 
AI.18 did get to the stage of being able to have an illuminator. Certainly would have, had a missile and fighter for it continued past '57.
By the 60's they felt they could achieve this for the AI.23.
They had several radar developments in train for the future of AI radar and this culimanated in a FMICW system flown in a modified Canberra.
Finally chopped with the death of the AFVG. But resurrected to help with the next gen system we know as Foxhunter.
 
With no obscene rush, there's no drive to go for three separate V-bombers in service and an unnecessary insurance policy (Sperrin) on the side. Valiant and Sperrin get the axe early, while Handley Page and Avro get trusted to get the Victor and Vulcan right.

The driver behind the V-Force was deterring the USSR and forming a credible nuclear strike option. The Korean War was not a direct driver in the insurance policy. I do agree though the Sperrin should never of gotten off the drawing board. A complete waste. The Valiant was not a waste, in fact it was ready soon enough and was reliable enough to be the primary test platform for Blue Danube and maintained that lead for the Grapple tests too. And of course did sterling work as a tanker and made in-flight refuelling a viable technique for the RAF. It would have been a brave civil servant to have forecast the future; delta or crescent wing, which would work the best? Hindsight is a lovely thing, at the time both looked capable but if you had a to back a winner the Victor was technically better but Avro was the stronger company and I think they can be forgiven for building in redundancy into the most important defence project of the era.

The Swift saga is a disaster from start to finish. But then the Korean War drive also meant other programmes went out of whack too, like taking Vicker's Squires Gate facility, turning it over to Hawker and retooling for mass producing Hunters that by the time it was ready wasn't needed, wasting a lot of capital investment. Would the MoS have had to lean quite so heavily on MDAP funding for projects like NA.39 if so much money hadn't been sucked up into rearmament schemes that proved to be temporary stopgaps?
Also naval programmes were affected too.
 
On the Swift saga.....really a lot of hard learning was the result. That's why Vickers Supermarine got the OR.339 proposal so right.
 
Time to hit the engine issue.

By end of '53 engines government got the right idea. Smaller lighter cheaper alternatives to Avon and Sapphire.
Result was
DH Gyron Junior scaled Gyron.
AS P.151
Bristol BE.30 to BE.33
And a RR offering of a scaled RB.106 possibly the RB.126 of 32"Diameter.

Failure to fund them bar the Gyron Junior left industry stuck with revised heavy complex Avon and Sapphire. Gyron Junior was a failure of an engine. Out of date, heavy and inefficient. Final nail in Bristol T.188 too thirsty.
Worse it had a rubber valve that clogged up with salt on Buccaneers.

Spey is later and a civilian product as market rejected Medway.

Twin engined fighter using such engines would hit the sweet spot for a carrier fighter. Did hit the sweet spot for carrier strike.
Single reheated versions were industry preference for mixed powerplant fighter/Attack.

Diameter was in range for reheated versions to fit Hunter (31"diameter jet pipe so fitting 33" reheat chamber do-able) or other Avon and Sapphire powered aircraft.

These were the right engines at about the right time. Successors would be turbofans.
 
The main problem for the UK in the postwar period was the survival of too many companies in the aviation business kept alive by the share out of military and civil project work to keep them going.
Had a way been found to consolidate them for a peacetime economy the undeniable skills and talent available would have gone into fewer and more realistic designs.
Absence of the Korean war splurge might have helped, but a political decision was needed to axe or amlgamate the industry. Perhaps a nationalised British Aircraft Corporation in1950?
 
Or at perhaps at least an “understanding” that, say, the group around Hawker was the UK de facto fighter firm, and the 2nd group another firm was the de facto bomber/ airliner firm, etc.
And a dose of greater realism in requirement setting and in the various stakeholders understanding of what was technically possible within required time and fiscal limits would have undoubtedly helped.
 
Ironically at least some of those projects arguably combined too many roles and taskings in an attempt to be more economical & cost-effective.
 
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