No Gloster Javelin!

[Archibald]

The Vautour was a terrific aircraft that never got a real chance to shine. With France, at least. The israelis were much less stupid.

The Armée de l'Air saw it as a B-26 with jet engines, NORDEN bombsight included - in 1958 and until 1978. The engines were not very good, the avionics were primitive.

Dassault saw it as a threat - imagine: with Breguet's Jaguar, it was the one and only non-Dassault FRENCH fast combat jet to enter service post 1945. Public aerospace companies one and only operational combat type.
But the Vautour ended squeezed between the Mirage III-C for air defense, III-E for ground attack, and Mirage IVA for nuclear strike. And post 1960 Sud Aviation was told to forget combat jet and focuse on everything else, except combat jets.

 

[Caravellarella]

Dear Boys & Girls, wouldn't a British licence-built version of the wondrous SNCASO Vautour have been a suitable substitute for the Javelin?

Terry (Caravellarella)

Could help myself when I saw your post:

Precisely what I was thinking of GTX!

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[zen]

If RAF stick with DH110...and perhaps that us because the RN stick with it through the lean times of '49.....

Then a lot more Vixens in various marks are built and it's career would be viewed as one of reasonable relevance for the period from 1956 to 1969....if not 1966.

Service entry '55-'56 would set up an interesting process for it's successor as that would be date of requirements to tender against.

Arguably this is F.155 and F.177 territory.
But since I think '54 analysis added that fleet defence with a Mach 2 fighter equipped with SARH AAMs for head on interception could achieve this at 200nm from centre of fleet.....
This is notably greater than the other concepts were projected to achieve.
Turn to stern chase intercept was depending either 30nm, 60nm or 90nm at best, and with AEW 'up threat' maybe to the limit of Type 984 radar.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In Post 38 I wrote.

My guess is that the loss of the first pair of prototypes after a combined total 17 months of flying delayed the Javelins entry into service. If I'm correct not cancelling WD814 and WD819 in 1949 would cancel some or all of that out.

For what it's worth the chapter on the Gloster Javelin in Putnams Royal Air Force since 1918 by Peter Lewis (Page 298 to 301) says.

A series of accidents with the prototypes delayed the introduction of the Javelin into service, but the first of them were issued to No. 46 Squadron at Odiham in February 1956.

How it delayed the type's into service is not explained. It could have been that reducing the number of prototypes from 6 to 4 meant that it took longer to complete the development flying. Or it could have been that the accidents revealed problems that had to be corrected by redesigning the aircraft and that time taken to do this delayed the Javelin's entry into service.

 

[Archibald]

Vixen. More Vixens. At least it had the aerodynamics mostly right, unlike that Javelin drag queen. And I thought the Javelin had taken over because of the DH-110 horrible crash in 1952... but it had its own prototype losses ? damn.
As for the Vixen, could have been in RN service by 1953, but ended in 1959 (facepalm).
And give a proper cockpit to the navigator, not that horrible darkened pit !

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As for the Vixen, could have been in RN service by 1953, but ended in 1959 (facepalm).

Unfortunately, the first aircraft carrier that was capable of operating it didn't enter service until 1955.

And it would have been a lower specification aircraft. Less powerful engines, less capable radar and no Firestreak missiles. On the other hand it would still have been a great improvement over the Venom night fighter and Sea Venom.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Squadron Patterns Plan J date 30.06.52

For what its worth these are the earliest RAF squadron patterns that I have which mention the Javelin.

It starts with the position at 30.06.52 when the World Wide totals for the Night Fighter Force were 136 aircraft in 13 squadrons with 12 or 8 aircraft. That is:

• 16 Mosquito NF.36 in 2 squadrons of 8;
• 72 Meteor NF.11 in 7 squadrons of 8 or 12, and;
• 48 Vampire NF.10 in 4 squadrons of 12.

The totals by Command were:

• 96 aircraft: in 9 squadrons Fighter Command;
• 24 aircraft in 2 squadrons in Second Tactical Air Force, and;
• 16 in 2 squadrons in Middle East Air Force.

This was to have expanded to 376 aircraft in 20 squadrons by 30.06.54 which was to have been maintained to 31.03.58 when the scheme ended. This would have consisted of:

• 264 aircraft in 12 squadrons of 22 in Fighter Command;
• 64 aircraft in 4 squadrons of 16 in Second Tactical Air Force;
• 16 aircraft in one squadron of 16 in the Mobile Reserve (for deployment in MEAF in war);
• 16 aircraft in 2 Squadrons in of 8 in Middle East Air Force, and;
• 16 aircraft in one squadron of 16 in Far East Air Force.

The first Javelin squadron was to have been formed (in Fighter Command) during the quarter ending 30.06.55 and the whole Night Fighter Force would have converted to Javelin all weather fighters by 30.09.57.

Squadron Patterns Plan K date 06.02.53

This plan deleted the Mobile Reserve and the squadron in FEAF. This reduced the peak strength to 344 aircraft in 18 squadrons which would not to be reached until 30.12.55 and be maintained until 31.03.58 when Plan K ended.

The Establishment of the RAF's Night Fighter Force at 31.12.53 was 164 aircraft in 13 squadrons with 16, 12 or 8 aircraft per squadron consisting of:

• 8 Mosquito NF.36 in one squadron of 8;
• 36 Vampires in 3 squadrons of 12;
• 112 Meteor NF.11 in 8 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft;
• 8 Meteor NF.13 in one Squadron of 8.

The totals by Command were:

• 84 aircraft in 7 squadrons Fighter Command;
• 64 aircraft in 4 squadrons Second Tactical Air Force; and
• 16 aircraft in 2 squadrons in Middle East Air Force.

The first Javelin squadron was to have been formed during the quarter ending 30.06.55 when there would have been one squadron of 22 in Fighter Command and the whole Night Fighter Force would have converted to Javelin all weather fighters by 30.09.57. This was the same as Plan J after deleting the squadrons in the Mobile Force and Far East Air Force.

Squadron Patterns Plan L dated 15.01.55

The establishment of the Worldwide Night Fighter Force at 31.12.54 was 240 aircraft in 14 squadrons of 16 or 8. They consisted of:

• 124 Meteor NF.11 in 7 squadrons;
• 92 Meteor NF.12/14 in 5 squadrons;
• 8 Meteor NF.13 in one squadron, and;
• 16 Venom NF.2 in one squadron.

Deployment was:

• 168 aircraft in 9 squadrons Fighter Command;
• 64 aircraft in 4 squadrons Second Tactical Air Force, and;
• 8 aircraft in one squadron Middle East Air Force.

The ultimate strength was to be 360 aircraft in 23 squadrons to be reached by 30.06.56 which was to be maintained until the plan ended on 31.03.60. Fighter Command was to have 288 aircraft in 18 squadrons of 16 instead of the 264 aircraft in 12 squadrons of 22 contained in the earlier plans. Second Tactical Air Force would still have 64 aircraft in 4 squadrons of 16. The squadron in MEAF was to have gone by 31.03.55 but would be replaced by a squadron of 8 aircraft in the Malta Command which had previously been included in the MEAF totals.

The Javelin was still to enter service in the quarter ending 30.06.55 when there was still to have been one squadron in Fighter Command, but now at an U.E. of 16 rather than 22 aircraft. The standard Javelin force would reach a peak strength of 352 aircraft in 22 squadrons on 31.03.59 when there would still be one squadron of 8 Venoms.

The thin-wing Javelin would enter service in the quarter ending 30.06.59 when there would be 48 in 3 squadrons in Fighter Command. There would be 264 standard Javelins in 17 squadrons and 96 thin-wing Javelins in 6 squadrons on 31.03.60 when Plan L ended.

I thought that I had some other documents that showed the thin-wing Javelin replacing the standard aircraft one-to-one by 31.03.62 or 31.03.63 but I haven't found them.

However That Isn't What Happened According To Squadron Patterns Plan L dated 30.01.57

At 31.12.57 the RAF should have had 360 night or all weather fighters in 23 squadrons according to the January 1955 version of Plan L. It actually had an establishment of 344 aircraft in 22 squadrons at that date according to the latest version of Plan L

Fighter Command should have had 288 aircraft in 18 squadrons consisting of 96 Venoms in 6 squadrons and 192 Javelins in 12 squadrons. It actually had 272 aircraft in 17 squadrons consisting of only 16 Javelins in one squadron, 128 Meteors in 8 squadrons and 128 Venoms in 8 squadrons.

Second Tactical Air Force did have the prescribed 64 Meteors in 4 squadrons. The Malta Command should have had 8 Venoms in one squadron and it actually had 8 Meteors in one squadron.

The first Javelin squadron had actually been formed in the quarter ending 31.03.56 instead of the quarter ending 30.06.55 as had been scheduled in Plans J, K and L (January 1955 version).

The Javelin only equipped one squadron of 16 aircraft at 31.12.56 and was 176 aircraft in 11 squadrons less than it should have been according to the January 1955 version of Plan L.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As I've spent several hours in "spreadsheet hell" working it out...

A total of 18 RAF squadrons used the Javelin, but the maximum strength was between January and December 1960 when there were 14 squadrons which included 10 in Fighter Command and 4 in RAF Germany.

The RAF still had a squadron of Meteor night fighters which was No. 60 in FEAF, which converted to Javelins in July 1961.

The squadrons in RAF Germany were due to disband during the first quarter of 1961 in accordance with both of the 1957 versions of Plan L. Nos. 3 and 87 disbanded in the early days of January 1961. However, 5 and 11 Squadrons were reprieved and remained in Germany until 1965 when they were disbanded and replaced by 2 Lightning squadrons transferred from Fighter Command.

29 Squadron moved to Cyprus in February 1962 where it relieved 43 Squadron which was flying Hunter FGA.9s which moved in turn moved to AFME to reinforce the 8 and 208 Squadrons.

7 of the 9 squadrons that remained in Fighter Command were disbanded as follows:

• 30.06.61 - 46 and 72 Squadrons
• 19.09.61 - 151 Squadron
• 17.11.62 - 33 Squadron
• 31.12.62 - 25 Squadron
• 31.03.63 - 85 Squadron
• 31.12.63 - 41 Squadron

That left 6 squadrons at 31.03.64 as indicated in Plan P up thread. The squadrons were:

• Nos. 23 and 64 in Fighter Command;
• Nos. 5 and 11 in RAF Germany;
• No. 23 in NEAF (Cyprus), and;
• No. 60 in FEAF.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Looking at the squadron patterns spreadsheets the RAF's plan in the late 1940s was that by 1957 the Year of Maximum Danger the Top Brass of the RAF wanted...

• All the single-seat/single-engine Short Range Day Fighter (SRDF) and Day Fighter/Ground Attack (DF/GA) squadrons equipped with the aircraft developed to meet Specification F.3/48 which became the Hunter.
• All the two-seat/two-engine Night Fighters (NF) squadrons equipped with the All Weather Fighter (AWF) developed to meet Specification F.4/48 which became the Javelin.

The Korean War and the resultant 1951 Rearmament Programme messed this up somewhat.

• The Hunter and Javelin were ordered into production before the prototypes could be properly tested which meant that the teething problems with the early versions were worse than they might otherwise have been.
• It also led to the Supermarine swept-wing research aircraft being turned into the Swift SRDF to supplement the Hunter and in this case putting it into production before the prototypes could be properly tested had particularly unfortunate consequences.
• Interim types such as the Meteor and Venom being built in larger numbers than previously intended and the money spent on that took away money that the RAF had intended to spend on the Hunter and Javelin.

Going back to the late 1940s/early 1950s the RAF ordered a series of high-speed research aircraft, which emerged as the English Electric P.1, Fairey Delta 2 and SR.53. It may or may not have intended that they would have be developed into operational fighters to replace the Hunter. However, the P.1 was developed into the Lighting and Plan L of January 1955 calls it a Short Range Day Fighter, which was to replace the Hunter in some Fighter Command squadrons by March 1960.

I think they had a two-stage plan for a Javelin replacement.

• Stage One was the thin-wing Javelin being developed to meet Specification F.153. This is shown as replacing some of the standard Javelins in the January 1955 version of Plan L. However, I still haven't found the documents that show it replacing all the standard Javelins in the RAF by 1962 or 1963
• Stage Two was the aircraft that would be built to meet Specification F.155.

As we know Spec. F.153 was cancelled as part of the Radical Defence Review of the middle 1950s and Spec. F.155 was cancelled as part of the Sandys Defence Review.

Two other victims of the Radical Review were the Hawker P.1083 Super Hunter (my name for it) and the Supermarine 545 Super Swift (also my name for it) which might have been conceived as "gap fillers" between the standard versions of these aircraft and the Lightning in the same way that the thin-wing Javelin filled the gap between the standard Javelin and F.155.

What they ended up getting was Hunter SRDFs converted to FGA/FR aircraft to replace the Venom & FR Swifts and a much smaller number of Lightnings than planned, that effectively replaced the Javelin in the AWF role.

I think they were working along the right lines. The problem was that the USSR wasn't behaving as expected by developing the A-Bomb, H-Bomb, ICBM and SAMs sooner than expected and the British economy wasn't up to the task of supporting armed forces that were capable of fighting "Wars of all temperatures."

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Had the thin-wing Javelin got to the flight testing stage would the lessons learned from its Olympus 21R engines have made it easier to design the Olympus engines for TSR.2 and Concorde?

 

[robunos]

How it delayed the type's into service is not explained. It could have been that reducing the number of prototypes from 6 to 4 meant that it took longer to complete the development flying. Or it could have been that the accidents revealed problems that had to be corrected by redesigning the aircraft and that time taken to do this delayed the Javelin's entry into service.

There's plenty of information out there, but basically the javelin had various aerodynamic problems, the most serious of which were elevator flutter, the aircraft involved losing both elevators completely, and a tendency to get into a deep stall, this time the aircraft crashed, with the loss of the pilot . . .

cheers,
Robin.

 

[zen]

In addition.....
Assuming various marks of DH.110 Vixen, then DH is building them over the course of many years with a design team adapting it.
So this also ties in with DH triumph scenarios.
What does this do to DH?

It would seem to deprive any financial and institutional energy for Type 556 Scimitar FAW variant. Leaving Supermarine potentially bereft of orders or future.
Although.....

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Had the thin-wing Javelin got to the flight testing stage would the lessons learned from its Olympus 21R engines have made it easier to design the Olympus engines for TSR.2 and Concorde?

Don’t know for sure;- the 22R problems originated from the deletion of the inter-shaft bearing, replacing it with a large diameter (high stiffness) shaft that unfortunately had some unpredicted resonance modes. The original inter-shaft bearing ran at tremendous rotational speed which had resulted in a low overhaul life on the Oly 201 & 301, not to mention some in service shaft failures.

Although I understand the 21R engine was run at an early design standard, there’s next to nothing published so I’ve never seen a description of it’s bearing/shaft architecture.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

How it delayed the type's into service is not explained. It could have been that reducing the number of prototypes from 6 to 4 meant that it took longer to complete the development flying. Or it could have been that the accidents revealed problems that had to be corrected by redesigning the aircraft and that time taken to do this delayed the Javelin's entry into service.

There's plenty of information out there, but basically the javelin had various aerodynamic problems, the most serious of which were elevator flutter, the aircraft involved losing both elevators completely, and a tendency to get into a deep stall, this time the aircraft crashed, with the loss of the pilot . . .

cheers,
Robin.

The elevator flutter certainly delayed the type’s entry into service, when a prototype was lost. However I believe the problem was solved when it did make it onto the squadron’s.

However there were quite a few lethal problems that were not;- One was the trim system integration with the power flying controls;- If the trim was in the wrong place for the airspeed, pilot couldn’t feel it with the control column load due to way the power flying controls operated. If he released his grip, it would near instantly transit to full end stop, The resulting manoeuvre was so violent it cause an catastrophe loss of control, if not an in flight break up.

Waterton’s book, The quick and the Dead, notes that there were not enough prototypes/pre development aircraft to adequately assess the Javelin given its complexity. It was one of the learnings to come out the program.

 

[Archibald]

"spreadsheet hell"

Sounds like swearing, something a comic character would shout loudly.

"Spread shit hell !" - when all shit from Hell, breaks loose and starts flowing all over the place ?

Something like "wow, shit has spread all over that place - it is a complete Hell !" but shortened.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

"spreadsheet hell"

Sounds like swearing, something a comic character would shout loudly.

"Spread shit hell !" - when all shit from Hell, breaks loose and starts flowing all over the place ?

Something like "wow, shit has spread all over that place - it is a complete Hell !" but shortened.

It's a phrase that I've used on Alternatehistory.com before, but as far as I can remember this is the first time I've used it here. I use it when I've been working on one of my spreadsheets and what I was doing was particularly difficult or time consuming or (usually) both.

In this case I was updating my RAF Squadrons 1950-70 spreadsheet.

I was checking and correcting the dates for the Javelin squadrons. Half the dates were wrong and making the corrections was a pain. It didn't help that the sources that I was using (RAFWEB and Lake's Flying Units of the RAF) often had different formation and disbandment dates for the squadrons so I had to make what's scientifically known as a "judgement call" over which one to use. A lot of the time wasn't the "spreadsheet work" itself, it was finding he right page in Lake's book and navigating my way around the RAFWEB website.

If I'd known how long it would have taken, I wouldn't have bothered because the effort wasn't worth the result.

 

[Pioneer]

Dear Boys & Girls, wouldn't a British licence-built version of the wondrous SNCASO Vautour have been a suitable substitute for the Javelin?

Terry (Caravellarella)

Could help myself when I saw your post:

Well, as you'd well appreciate GTX, the RAAF and RAN Royal had the fortitude to see the merit and versatility in the SNCASO Vautour II design.
The RAN via the Australian government contracting SNCASO and Vought to modify twenty four Vautour IIN's on the production line for carrier compatibility, as well as substituting the SNECMA Atar 101 turbojets for Rolls-Royce Avon RA.26 turbojects.......

(Note: Profiles done by the talented Jeremak, 2010)

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Caravellarella]

Dear Boys & Girls, wouldn't a British licence-built version of the wondrous SNCASO Vautour have been a suitable substitute for the Javelin?

Terry (Caravellarella)

Could help myself when I saw your post:

Well, as you'd well appreciate GTX, the RAAF and RAN Royal had the fortitude to see the merit and versatility in the SNCASO Vautour II design.
The RAN via the Australian government contracting SNCASO and Vought to modify twenty four Vautour IIN's on the production line for carrier compatibility, as well as substituting the SNECMA Atar 101 turbojets for Rolls-Royce Avon RA.26 turbojects.......

(Note: Profiles done by the talented Jeremak, 2010)

Regards
Pioneer

Dear Pioneer, the 5th pre-production Sud Vautour N09 was built with Rolls-Royce Avon engines (for comparison purposes perhaps, it was the fastest Vautour). The 3rd prototype Sud Vautour B003 was also built with Armstrong-Siddeley Sapphire engines.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Thin Wing Javelin was yet another example of Gloster’s timid management. It was barely supersonic and would have flown at about the same date as the F4 Phantom.

Most military aircraft are designed to meet specifications written by the customer. The Thin-Wing Javelin was not one of the exceptions.

Therefore, if anyone is to blame, it's the Air Staff and the Ministry of Supply for writing the operational requirement and specification respectively, rather than Gloster for designing an aircraft to meet them.

Does anyone know what the Thin-Wing Javelin's competitors were and why Gloster's aircraft was selected? I suspect that the Thin-Wing Javelin was the best of a bad bunch and/or it was the cheapest and/or would be in service the soonest.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Flicking through BSP:1 reminded me that Hawker's P.1057 was nearly given the green light, an order for three prototypes in July 1947 was short lived but there been funds it might have been seen through.
A DH.110 and P.1057 competition would have been a tougher choice, but Hawker winning might have affected the later Hunter too (which was arguably late on the scene anyway).

HS.1057 was favoured in some quarters.

Would not a delayed Hunter put more demand on Supermarine to fix the Swift or accelerate the Crescent Wing development?
Or perhaps some other firm's design chosen instead?

But there's an industrial dimension to this, too. Gloster and Armstrong Whitworth were both part of the Hawker Siddeley Group. Remember AW built both Hawker designed (Sea) Hawks, AND Gloster Meteor night fighters, so the capacity is there to allow for P.1057 in place of Javelin . . .

cheers,
Robin.

For what it's worth Armstrong-Whitworth also built 133 Javelin fighters between 1956 and 1958.

That's 31% of the 435 Javelins that were built according to "Putnams Gloster Aircraft since 1917" by Derek N James. That is 5 GA.5 prototypes, 407 Javelin fighters and 23 Javelin trainers.

Edit 30.08.22 - Typos corrected.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Gloster’s found themselves in what is now called a first movers dilemma. The success of the Meteor was only partially due to their contribution. The key enabler I.e the gas turbine was a fast moving technology and in these situations fortune favours the brave. The problem was Gloster’s weren’t very brave, indeed really complacent. The Javelin’s lack of performance step is best illustrated by the Meteor NF11-14 saga. These were developed as a cheap export version assuming the top of the line Javelin wouldn’t be available for some time. Except when the RAF looked at the performance of the NF Meteor and Javelin there wasn’t much difference, it was available, cheap so they bought 200 Meteor NF11 and NF14.

FWIW you're about 400 aircraft short.

595 Meteor night fighters were built out of 595 ordered although some these aircraft were delivered direct to Belgium and France.

Production was 355 NF.11 (including 3 prototypes), 100 NF.12. 40 NF.13 and 100 NF.14. They were all built by Armstrong-Whitworth which also designed them.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Most military aircraft are designed to meet specifications written by the customer. The Thin-Wing Javelin was not one of the exceptions.

Therefore, if anyone is to blame, it's the Air Staff and the Ministry of Supply for writing the operational requirement and specification respectively, rather than Gloster for designing an aircraft to meet them.

Well yes and no. The thin wing javelin came about when the MoS asked for a reconnaissance version of the Javelin. The improved fighter version was progressively cooked up from that starting point. I maybe wrong but I understand there was no competition. As such the specification was jointly derived. Of course the specification always forms a minimum and any progressive, hungry supplier would aim to meet and preferably exceed the requirements.

I’m passing on the comments of a chap that was there at the time and was deeply connected with the project… honestly take it or leave it.

 

[red admiral]

Most military aircraft are designed to meet specifications written by the customer.

Especially around this point, MoS often wrote requirements based on what the aircraft could actually achieve. Almost definitely in the single source cases.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Most military aircraft are designed to meet specifications written by the customer.

Especially around this point, MoS often wrote requirements based on what the aircraft could actually achieve. Almost definitely in the single source cases.

It seems like in a lot of cases, there was a two-stage requirements process. First the Air Ministry wrote an operational requirement saying they'd like (say) Mach 3 at 80,000 feet, and armament that can give 95% kill probability against a target at Mach 2 and 65,000 feet. The Ministry of Supply then puts that out to tender.

Industry then comes back offering a Tiger Moth with a Martini-Henry strapped to the top wing, built in a deprived area by a company that's light on work, or the Starship Enterprise but imported using scarce dollars. A decision is made, and the detailed requirement is written for the procurement of a Tiger Moth fitted with warp nacelles.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25

I'll have to do this in several posts.

This is the plan for Fighter Command at 1st April 1954.

​

Notes:

1. I have deleted the columns showing the forecast establishments at the end of June, September and December to make it easier to read.
2. The Javelin Mk 1 has A.I.17
3. The Javelin Mk 2 has the APQ-43 radar.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Part Two of Eight.

​

Notes:

1. I have deleted the columns showing the forecast establishments at the end of June, September and December to make it easier to read.
2. The Javelin Mk 1 has A.I.17
3. The Javelin Mk 2 has the APQ-43 radar.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Part Three of Eight.

​

Notes:

1. I have deleted the columns showing the forecast establishments at the end of June, September and December to make it easier to read.
2. In the original document the aircraft in Fighter Command were Short Range Day Fighters.
3. In the original document the Vampires & Venomns in 2nd T.A.F. were Day Fighters/Ground Attack and the Hunters & Swifts were Short Range Day Fighters.
4. In the original document the aircraft in MEAF (Levant & Aden) and FEAF were Day Fighters/Ground Attack.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Part Four of Eight.

​

This shows a requirement for 850 single-seat Javelins by 31st March 1959. That's more than twice the number of single-seat Javelins that were actually built. (435 Javelins that were built according to "Putnams Gloster Aircraft since 1917" by Derek N James. That is 5 GA.5 prototypes, 407 Javelin fighters and 23 Javelin trainers.)

In the preceding Plan K of 06.02.53 a total of 740 Javelins (all Mk 1s) were to be delivered to March 1958. That is 6 in 1954/55 (same as above), 179 in 1955/56 (same as above), 282 in 1956/57 (nearly the same as above) and 273 in 1957/58 (37 more than above). The total requirement to March 1959 in Plan K (Star) was 719 single-seat Javelins.

Except that the 273 in 1957/58 is crossed out and replaced by a handwritten note saying 237, which reduces the total to 704 and that's similar to the 719 single-seat Javelins in Plan K (Star).

This is the first squadron patterns to mention the Thin-Wing Javelin with 35 delivered in the 1958-59 financial year.

 

[Hood]

It seems like in a lot of cases, there was a two-stage requirements process. First the Air Ministry wrote an operational requirement saying they'd like (say) Mach 3 at 80,000 feet, and armament that can give 95% kill probability against a target at Mach 2 and 65,000 feet. The Ministry of Supply then puts that out to tender.

True, but in some cases the situation was reversed - such as ordering the Swift off the drawing board because the Type 541 looked good on paper, or writing up the OR for the V.1000 after the MoS had already sent out the tenders.

Things were looser in the early/mid-50s it seems, the post-Swift debacle and public airing of dirty laundry saw a general tightening up of this and a move to weapons systems to try and streamline the OR process (the Low Level Medium Bomber for example taking up 3 different ORs for the airframe, avionics and weapons alone!).

The Operational Requirements branch was also short of manpower, they couldn't handle all the load and the MoS were equally stretched so its no surprise things got out of synch.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Part Five of Eight.

In Post 25 I wrote.

I thought that I had a transcript from Plan L at January 1955 for the AWF force that showed all the squadrons in Fighter Command and overseas converted to the thin-wing Javelin by the end of March 1963. However, I can't find it.

I assume that all 18 SRDF squadrons in Fighter Command were scheduled to have Lightnings by March 1963 too. However, I have no evidence to support my claim.

I was wrong. It wasn't the January 1955 version of Plan L. It was a transcript of three appendixes to Plank K (Star).

Furthermore:

• Fighter Command's all-weather fighter squadrons converted to Thin-Wing Javelins by March 1963 instead of by March 1961.
• Six of Fighter Command's short range day fighter squadrons converted to "Standard" Javelins between April 1959 and March 1961.

This is Appendix "A" to Plan K (Star).

​

Notes

1. I have deleted the columns showing the forecast establishments at the end of June, September and December to make it easier to read.
2. The original Appendix "A" started at March 1955. I have added it to March 1954 to make it easier to compare it against the tables about Plan K (Star) that I've uploaded.
3. March 1954 to March 1956 it's exactly the same as Plan K (Star).
4. The totals for March 1957 and March 1958 are exactly the same as Plan K (Star). But:
   • The conversion of 2nd TAF from Meteors to Javelins was completed in March 1958 instead of March 1957.
   • Fighter Command had 5 squadrons of Venoms in March 1958 instead of none.
   • Fighter Command had 5 squadrons of Javelin Mk 1s in March 1958 instead of 9.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Post Six of Eight.

This is Appendix "B" of Plan K (Star).

​

Notes

1. I have deleted the columns showing the forecast establishments at the end of June, September and December to make it easier to read.
2. The original Appendix "A" started at March 1955. I have added it to March 1954 to make it easier to compare it against the tables about Plan K (Star) that I've uploaded.

These are the differences between Appendix "A" and Appendix "B" in Second Tactical Air Force



These are the differences between Appendix "A" and Appendix "B" in Fighter Command

​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Part Seven of Eight.

This is Appendix "C" to Plan K (Star).

​

Notes

1. I have deleted the columns showing the forecast establishments at the end of June, September and December to make it easier to read.
2. The original Appendix "A" started at March 1955. I have added it to March 1954 to make it easier to compare it against the tables about Plan K (Star) that I've uploaded.
3. March 1954 to March 1958 is exactly the same as Plan K (Star).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 25.

Part Eight of Eight.

Appendix "C" was the only one that had an aircraft production requirements section.

Aircraft Production Requirements of Appendix "C" and Plan K (Star).



Javelins Only

​

So early in 1954 the RAF had a production requirement for 1,289 Javelins of which 815 were "Thick Wing" and 474 were "Thin Wing".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

How about an All Weather Fighter version of the Canberra instead of the Javelin?

Link to Post 41 in the thread Choosing One V Bomber.

In the above it was suggested as an alternative to the Meteor and Venom.

 

[red admiral]

How about an All Weather Fighter version of the Canberra instead of the Javelin?

Probably wouldn't have been much worse/better than Javelin? Bit more flexible from the larger size to integrate different weapons and radars. Hopefully EE will be able to design a radome that doesn't leak when it rains.

Any idea on UPC difference between Canberra and Javelin though? In this era RDT&E costs are relatively low, and UPC differences really start to add up when you're buying many hundreds.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

How about an All Weather Fighter version of the Canberra instead of the Javelin?

Probably wouldn't have been much worse/better than Javelin? Bit more flexible from the larger size to integrate different weapons and radars. Hopefully EE will be able to design a radome that doesn't leak when it rains.

Any idea on UPC difference between Canberra and Javelin though? In this era RDT&E costs are relatively low, and UPC differences really start to add up when you're buying many hundreds.

I might if I knew what UPC and RDT&E meant.

• UPC = Unit Production Cost?
• RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation?

The short answers (in reverse order) are:

• RDT&E cost would probably be less than the Javelin and it would be in service before the Javelin.
• UPC would be about the same.

The long answers are:

RDT&E Costs

• The RDT&E cost of the avionics and armament of the AWF Canberra would be exactly the same as the Javelin because the AWF Canberra would have to have the same avionics and armament as the Javelin.
• As far as I know all Canberras had RR Avon engines (that is with the exception of a handful of early prototypes) and the Javelin had AS Sapphires.
  • My guess is that the AWF Canberra would still have Sapphire engines.
  • Changing to the Avon wouldn't save any money (and AFAIK time) because the Sapphire would still have to be developed for the Hunter Mk 2 & 5 and the Victor Mk 1.
  • On the other hand changing to the Avon wouldn't cost more because Avons of equivalent power to the Javelin's Sapphire engines were being developed at the same time "in the real world".
• This leaves the RDT&E cost of the airframe and the RDT&E cost of integrating the engines, avionics and armament into said airframe. The Canberra AWF's airframe would have been a modification of one that already exists and that was several years ahead of the Javelin's airframe to boot. So the Canberra AWF would almost certainly have been quicker and cheaper to design than the Javelin.
  • My guess is that redesigning the Canberra to take the Sapphire wouldn't have been difficult. Other aircraft (e.g. the Hunter) used both engines. I wouldn't be surprised if English Electric hadn't designed a Sapphire-powered Canberra "in the real world" in case there weren't enough Avons. Does anyone know if they did?
  • The Canberra may have been larger than the Javelin, but the latter aircraft was designed to fit the avionics (including the radar) and weapons but it would have been the other way around with the Canberra AWF. That is the designers would have had to find space for the avionics and weapons in an existing airframe.
    • However (according to the link below) the P.12 derivative of the Canberra (proposed in 1956) was to have an AI.18 radar and two Red Dean AAMs.
    • https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-story-of-the-canberra-p-12-all-weather-fighter-that-never-was/
    • The Canberra B(I) Mk 8 had four 20mm cannon in a gun-pack beneath the fuselage hand still had space to stow three 1,000lb bombs internally.
    • Therefore, it looks like the Canberra could have taken the AI.17 and APQ.-43 radars fitted to the Javelin and had the Javelin's armament, which was four 30mm ADEN cannon and four Firestreak AAMs or four packs of thirty-seven 2-in air-to-air rockets.

Unit Production Costs

• My guess is that the avionics (e.g. the radar) and armament (four 30mm ADEN cannon and four Firestreak/Red Top AAMs or four pacts of thirty-seven 2in air-to-air rockets) would be exactly the same.
• The cost of 870 Sapphires for 435 AWF Canberras would be the same as 870 Sapphires for 435 Javelins.
  • 870 Avons might be cheaper because it might reduce the unit cost of the Avon.
  • However (1). It might increase the unit cost of the Hunter F.2/5 and Victor Mk 1 by increasing the unit cost of the Sapphire. At least 1,220 Sapphires must have been built in the "real world" (150 for the Hunter, 870 for the Javelin and for the 200 Victor Mk 1) and fitting Avons to the "Javelin Substitute" would reduce the number of Sapphires built to 350. Therefore, if the AWF Canberra is to have Avons instead of Sapphires it should be "all or nothing" with the first 150 Hawker Hunters built by Armstrong-Whitworth and the 50 Victor Mk 1s having Avons instead of Sapphires too.
  • However (2). Rolls Royce couldn't build enough Avons to satisfy the "real world" demand for the engine and production had to be subcontracted to other firms. Therefore, Rolls Royce won't be able to build another 1,220 Avons "in this version of history" and the Firm would have had to subcontract their production to another firm. That firm would probably have been Armstrong-Siddeley. Would 1,220 Avons built by Armstrong-Siddeley cost less than 1,220 Sapphires built by Armstrong-Siddeley?
  • Having written that Armstrong-Whitworth did build 119 Hunter F.6s with Avon engines after it completed the contract for 150 Sapphire powered Hunters so it would make sense for the Firm to build Avon powered Hunters in the first place. On the other hand (as far as I know) the Sapphire-Hunter was better than the contemporary Avon-Hunter (i.e. Marks 1 and 4). Would the advantages have outweighed the disadvantages?
  • However (3). Fitting the first 150 AW-built Hunters, all 435 "Javelin Substitutes" and all the 50 Victor Mk 1s with Avons instead of Sapphires might have reduced the RAF's maintenance costs through standardisation.
• That leaves us with the production cost of the airframe.
  • English Electric built 631 Canberras and adding 435 "Javelin Substitutes" would increase the total to 1,066. Would that be enough to make it significantly cheaper than the Javelin? I simply don't know.
  • What I suspect is that production of the "Javelin Substitute" would have been subcontracted to other firms and (unless there was a reshuffling of the other production contracts) the firms would have been Armstrong-Whitworth and Gloster because not building the Javelin means they've got spare capacity.
  • This is because English Electric didn't have the capacity to build all the Canberras that the RAF wanted "in the real world" so production was subcontracted to Avro, Handley Page and Short & Harland. In "this version of history" the RAF wanted more Canberras than it did in the "real world" and English Electric's factories had the same capacity was no greater than it was in the "real world".
  • The only other factors that I can think of are:
    • (1) Was the Canberra airframe easier (and therefore cheaper) to make than the Javelin's? That is if it was built in the same numbers and in the same factory. That's a question that I don't know the answer to.
    • (2) Was it easier (and therefore cheaper) to fit the components, i.e. avionics and engines to a Canberra than a Javelin? I don't know the answer to that question either.

For What It's Worth

• I was thinking of R&D and production of the AWF Canberra being subcontracted to Armstrong-Whitworth because they did the R&D on the Meteor night fighter and the Firm built all of the 595 Meteor night fighters & 133 out of 435 Javelins.
• They'd build 1,030 AWF Canberras, which would consist of 595 built instead of the Meteor night fighters and 435 built instead of the Javelin.
• Some reshuffling of production within Hawker Siddeley would have been made to accommodate this.
  • 269 Hunters would be built by Gloster instead of Armstrong-Whitworth.
  • Volume production of the Hawker Sea Hawk might have been by Gloster instead of Armstrong-Whitworth.
  • These transfers from AW to Gloster would have been made to compensate the latter firm for not building 302 Javelins. My guess is that one Javelin equals two Hunters or two Sea Hawks because the Javelin had two engines instead of one and the Javelin also had more avionics, e.g. it had an AI radar while the Hunter and Sea Hawk didn't.

 

[red admiral]

Correct on UPC and RDT&E

I think a P.12 like concept is most likely. Nose radome for AI radar, gun pack in bomb bay. Maybe an extra underwing hardpoint as per B-57 to have 4xFirestreak?

Some Canberra's were fitted with Sapphires e.g. WX787. And then there's the B-57s with J65s. So either/or choice between Sapphire and Avon.

Agree that RDT&E costs lower for Canberra given existing airframe. I'd be really surprised if integration was harder. As you say, almost definitely need someone other than EE to do it due to workload.

I wouldn't have thought the impact on UPCs from more units would be much impact. The learner curve is usually really flat after 100-200 units. Probably much more impact from setting up a separate production line - but this was done anyway for bomber versions.

I thought Javelin might have a lower Airframe UPC than Canberra - but I'm not sure this is the case now. I think this information should be available. UPC is proportional to empty mass (for all else being equal) and they both have similar masses. I think Canberra probably structurally simpler and hence easier to build - no swept wing, simpler fuselage etc.

Seems like a win?

 

[Pioneer]

Discussions about the 1957 Sandys axing of the Manned Aircraft from the RAF always give the impression that many Hawker Hunters smoothly gave way to far fewer English Electric Lightnings.
But there was also

Gloster Javelin - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The Javelin has always seemed to me the aircraft we should have either avoided or replaced much earlier.
The US had the Northrop Scorpion we had the Javelin. Except the Jav only had 4 Firestreaks at the end of its career.
To be fair, noone else in Western Europe bothered with anything similar.

Avro Canada CF-100 Canuck?

Regards
Pioneer

 

[yahya]

Gentlemen, could you please enlighten a layman on Javelin's ECM and self-defense suite like chaff/flare and RHWR unless these were non-existent?

 

[Pioneer]

Sometime ago, I had the very artistically talented Clave at the Beyond the Sprues forum creat this English Electric/Government Aircraft Factory Canberra A(I)8 all-weather long-range interceptor profile for me, in response to a similar 'What If' RAAF Operational Requirement, so as to deal with the threat of Indonesian cruise missile totting Tu-16 Badger's.
To expedite development and curtail R&D in answering the threat, the RAAF cleverly incorporated the Hughes radar/FCS of the Avro Canada CF-100 Canuck, the fighter-like cockpit of the English Electric B(I)8, 4 x Aim-7 Sparrow AAM, 2 x wingtip pods of 29 x 70-mm (2.75 in) "Mighty Mouse" fin-folding aerial rockets, 2 x 30mm Aden cannons and a large fuel tank in the bomb bay.

Regards
Pioneer