No BAOR

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Cjc

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This was never particularly likely, but i think it would be a fun exercise to think how the British military would look if it had been focused on small wars out of Europe and naval matters during the cold war.

For example with Britain only planing on putting forces in Europe after the cold war goes hot there would probably be a big focus on light vehicles and transportation (not unlike France maby?).
 
I don't think that rapid deployment to Western Europe would need a major to equipment, the heavy equipment could go by land to and from the ports giving the shortest and most efficient sea journey. IIUC pre Channel Tunnel there were a lot of car ferries capable of moving heavy military gear over the short distances in the Channel and North Sea, after all the British had done this before, twice in fact!

Not having BAOR and RAFG in Germany would save significant money, especially foreign exchange, which should free up enough money to fund the CVA01s or 1952 fleet carrier or something similar.
 
Rule of cool said:
Not having BAOR and RAFG in Germany would save significant money, especially foreign exchange, which should free up enough money to fund the CVA01s or 1952 fleet carrier or something similar.
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On the other hand, it would likely deprive Britain of American technological support - because USA would clearly be pretty unhappy with such development. Also it would cause serious concerns in NATO about Britain real commitment. So the money saved on BAOR would likely go to nuclear deterrence (since US would not sell Polaris to Britain).
 
Dilandu said:
On the other hand, it would likely deprive Britain of American technological support - because USA would clearly be pretty unhappy with such development. Also it would cause serious concerns in NATO about Britain real commitment. So the money saved on BAOR would likely go to nuclear deterrence (since US would not sell Polaris to Britain).
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Yeah, as Cjc said it was never really likely, and the reasons you state is why.

Personally I think there is a reasonable post 57 DWP path for Britain to retain a strike carrier capability as well as a minor East of Suez position, limited to the Persian Gulf, even with a 4 division BAOR and strong RAFG. After all the decades long Armilla Patrol started a mere 9 years after the RN's Gulf base was closed.
 
Cjc said:
This was never particularly likely, but i think it would be a fun exercise to think how the British military would look if it had been focused on small wars out of Europe and naval matters during the cold war.

For example with Britain only planing on putting forces in Europe after the cold war goes hot there would probably be a big focus on light vehicles and transportation (not unlike France maby?).
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It all depends on the circumstances.
Withdrawal in the late 40's is difficult to justify and it's only as Germany stands up it's capability and France recovers that this could be entertained.
Then until the early 50's, there is Greece and Cyprus....

Even then the UK experience of WWII suggests that rather than withdraw, it might focus on it's immediate strategic interests. Which would be Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and France. Plus keeping Portugal independent.

Stationing forces in Northern Germany seems rather efficient in this perspective.
 
Rule of cool said:
Yeah, as Cjc said it was never really likely, and the reasons you state is why.

Personally I think there is a reasonable post 57 DWP path for Britain to retain a strike carrier capability as well as a minor East of Suez position, limited to the Persian Gulf, even with a 4 division BAOR and strong RAFG.
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That's sort of what I think. The differences are that the PODs are no 1966 Defence White Paper & no Mason Defence Review of 1974-75, but the defence cuts of 1967 & 1968 still happen. So HM Forces are the same size as they were in 1974 (with the crucial difference that 3 CVA.01 class strike carriers were built instead of the Invincible class) and the deployment was the same as it was in 1974.
Rule of cool said:
After all the decades long Armilla Patrol started a mere 9 years after the RN's Gulf base was closed.
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Although the base was closed, a few frigates continued to be deployed to the Persian Gulf until they were withdrawn under the Mason Defence Review, so the gap was nearer 3 years. I don't remember exactly.
 
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NOMISYRRUC said:
Although the base was closed, a few frigates continued to be deployed to the Persian Gulf until they were withdrawn under the Mason Defence Review, so the gap was nearer 3 years. I don't remember exactly.
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Armilla Patrol started in 1980.
 
IIUC in the 50s when Britain had conscription BAOR was about 80,000 strong, once conscription ended BAOR went to about 55,000 and remained abut there more or elss for the 60 and 70s How was 55,000 arrived at, and could a smaller number have been arrived at?

RAFG virtually collapsed, going from 12 fighter sqns, 7 FB & FR sqns, 3 interdiction sqns and 5 PR sqns in 1957 to 4 interdiction sqns, 2 FR and 3 PR sqns and 2 fighter sqns. However, there were a pair of FB sqns in transport command that could be chopped to RAFG, and the RAF was moving away from fighter-bombers to Canberras in the late 50s.

If RAFG can drop from 27 to 11 sqns why does BAOR only drop from 80k to 55k men and not 35k men?
 
When we had conscription, I dimly reccal a figure of 300,000 sustained.
By the 70's with professionalisation long since completed it stood at roughly 200,000.
By the late 80's to early 90's I think we held at 150,000.

Which from the 70's included deployment to Northern Ireland, peaking, I dimly reccal, in the 80's or was it early 90's at 11,000 personnel.

So we can assume two obvious points to scale back.
1957
1967
The latter is as strong a case, since By this time Germany was outperforming the UK economy and had fully stood up both it's military and it's industry.
 
In addition, from the mid '60s on, NATO's new flexible response doctrine was supposed to reduce the need for forward deployed, and indeed standing, forces. In practice though, it ended up (alongside McNamara 's 'Strategic Sufficiency' and other equally ill-advised policies) ceding the Soviets a major advantage in the early stages of any full-scale conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
 
Rule of cool said:
After all the decades long Armilla Patrol started a mere 9 years after the RN's Gulf base was closed.
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NOMISYRRUC said:
Although the base was closed, a few frigates continued to be deployed to the Persian Gulf until they were withdrawn under the Mason Defence Review, so the gap was nearer 3 years. I don't remember exactly.
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Rule of cool said:
Armilla Patrol started in 1980.
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And the last frigates in the Persian Gulf were withdrawn circa 1977 as part of the Mason Defence review of 1974-75 so it was about 3 years instead of 9.
 
Yellow Palace said:
In short, nuclear weapons. You can replace quite a lot of fighters with ten kilotons on an enemy airbase.

Which suggests a BAOR made up of two 'pentomic' divisions and not a lot else.
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Swinging finances towards nuclear weapons sustainment in larger numbers.
 
Yellow Palace said:
Which suggests a BAOR made up of two 'pentomic' divisions and not a lot else.
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From a quick look, I think from 1952 BAOR consisted of I Corps, with 3 Armoured and 1 infantry divisions and the Canadian Brigade group. There seemed to be a re-org in 1958-60, likely connected to the end of conscription, to 3 divisions and this seems to be the recognised strength of BAOR for the rest of the Cold War, with constant changes within that structure of course.
 
Yellow Palace said:
In short, nuclear weapons. You can replace quite a lot of fighters with ten kilotons on an enemy airbase.
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zen said:
Swinging finances towards nuclear weapons sustainment in larger numbers.
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The RAF was also moving away from fighter-bombers toward bomber-interdictors, both in general and as part of the turn to nukes, which will result in less units for the same number of personnel.
 
Let's take a BAOR PoD as UK Chiefs' Global Strategy Review, 15/7/52: Minsters had locked them away until they produced consensus, which was Massive Retaliation. US, too, adopted that as New Look, 30/10/53. NATO too, MC48, 19/12/54.

PM Attlee hoped to arm atomically with Lend/Lease Redux, loan Mk.5, but that option had been skewered by 1950 spy scandals. PM WSC funded Red Beard R&D, 7/52, Blue Danube production, 2/53, and the Bombers to deliver them. He, so easily, could have done what everybody else did: leave AW grotesque expense to US and assign all Defence Budget to warmware and iron.

Sov meddling caused 99 French Communist MPs to skewer 27/5/52 European Defence Community Treaty: the issue was rearming W.Germany: obvs. not with AW, but with (too) many fit young men. To overcome France's (logical) objection UK committed to (though never achieving) an 80,000 strong BAOR (a number , no core logic), to remind the new Bundeswehr to face the Elbe, not the Channel: “If (France is) to go to bed with the German tiger (it is essential Brits be) the bolster down the middle of the bed” E.Fursdon,EDC, a Hist, Palgrave, 1980,P243. All that caused UK Defence 51/52 to be 9.8%/GDP.

That dramatic uplift over newly-Allied FRG and Japan (1% by Law) was a factor in UK overstretch/decline if you wish.

UK could have done...no BAOR (well, who would be the bolster in the bed?); or no AW; or no East of Suez. Or not much Atlantic convoy protection; or...or. Any of those at, say 5% GDP during Korea, falling later, would have led to... a different world.
 
alertken said:
UK committed to (though never achieving) an 80,000 strong BAOR (a number , no core logic), to remind the new Bundeswehr to face the Elbe, not the Channel: “If (France is) to go to bed with the German tiger (it is essential Brits be) the bolster down the middle of the bed”
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Normally I like political decisions as Points of Departure for Alternative History, they only require the consent of a handful of people to make the decision and subsequent action different. However this is a double whammy of domestic politics and foreign affairs with a major impact on domestic politics, which makes this a complex PoD with which to make simple changes.
 

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