No 1956 Suez crisis: Impact on UK Defence Procurement

uk 75

uk 75

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If the 1956 Suez crisis had not happened (Macmillan Prime Minister instead of Eden so no military response to Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal) the following might have been the impacts on British Defence Procurement.
Royal Navy
Without experience of operating helicopters at Suez there might have been no conversion of Albion and Bulwark to Commando Ships.
The use of Fleet Carriers to support amphibious assaults might have been less important than their NATO North Atlantic role.
The need for a nuclear Deterrent independent of the US might not have seemed as crucial.
Royal Air Force
The limitations of the Canberra and Valiant strikes on Egypt would not have underscored the need for TSR2
Army
The concept of airportable brigades for the UK Strategic Reserve might not have emerged and 3 Division would instead have received equipment for reinforcing BAOR.

Generally Macmillan would have been more relaxed about withdrawing from Empire without the shadow of Suez and resources might have been directed at NATO sooner.
 
Suez was one among many nails in the 4th Republique coffin. Could butterfly away De Gaulle return; and doom France to civil war in the long term. Related to that Vietnam-like moral morasse called the Algerian war... and a maddening political instability worse than present day Belgium Italy and Israel together.
1946 1958 12 years 25 governments, one every 6 months.
I'm not blind dumb fan of De Gaulle - but on the Algerian morasse front he played smart, risked a lot including his own life, and took the correct long term decision(s). No way in hell France stayed there even with a military victory (at the cost of a moral defeat, even if FLNC fedayins were no angels either.)
 
No Suez would not have prevented development of the Commando carrier in the RN.

RN helicopters had been transporting troops around in Malaya since 1952 so that aspect wasn’t new. Friedman in British Carrier Aviation notes that in July 1956, the Admiralty Board authorised work on a commando conversion of a light carrier. Then the Suez crisis blows up and Ocean & Theseus, training ships which had each had a detachment of ASW helicopters aboard from early 1956 for trials, were called up to their wartime troopship role. Someone put two and two together and an exercise took place 29 Sept-12 Oct to study helicopter assault. That proved successful and was used operationally.

Then we have the 1957 Defence Review, and it becomes clear that Bulwark and Albion will become available for commando carrier conversion. Given their better command and control and radar facilities compared to a Colossus, they become the conversion of choice. Bulwark then begins conversion in Jan 1959.

Over on the other side of the Atlantic the same thing is happening. USMC studies for helicopter assault began in 1946. After various delays, the first hardware appears in May 1956 with the completion of the Thetis Bay CVE conversion and start of design work on the Iwo Jima class LPH. 1959 sees 3 Essex class LPH conversions enter service and the laying down of Iwo Jima.

So with no Suez what happens in the 1957 Defence Review? Either way I think we get a commando carrier, but maybe not based on Bulwark.
 
My argument about the carriers and commando ships is based on their "East of Suez" roles.
I think without the shadow cast by Suez a Macmillan government would have moved faster to get us out of this commitment. Paradoxical I know.
 
uk 75 said:
My argument about the carriers and commando ships is based on their "East of Suez" roles.
I think without the shadow cast by Suez a Macmillan government would have moved faster to get us out of this commitment. Paradoxical I know.
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But there is all that sweet delicious oil in the Gulf still to protect.
Iran 1958 and Iraq/Kuwait 1960 still going to need sorting out plus Malaysian Emergency is ongoing and the Konfrontasi with Indonesia comes up 1964-65, tons of reasons to stay EoS and to make sure the region stays stable.
Plus there is CENTO and SEATO commitments to back up too. Of course no Suez means a whole new chain of dominoes (unstoppable Nasserism across the Middle East? No change?) but too much stuff was already in motion, Suez was an unexpected road hump to be got over or around.
 
No Suez could mean no Simonstown accord, and easier transits to EoS. Impacts on the Iraqi Revolution, Sri Lankan expulsion of British forces, possibly Iran too.

Then again, Nasser being Nasser - he would probably find some way to needle the UK or West and start a conflict or Cold War.
 
Without Suez Crisis...

Deterrent carries on, as that relates to experience of 1945.

Defence Review is 1956.

Carriers remain focused on Strike North.

If Nasser humiliated, he may be removed.
If still 'successful', then dominos fall. Iraq, Yemen, Aden, 'Somalia'.
 
uk 75 said:
The limitations of the Canberra and Valiant strikes on Egypt would not have underscored the need for TSR2
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I would say that is inaccurate, I am working on an article to cover this but the Air Staff was obsessed by bombing accuracy from 1950 onwards, regardless of whatever theoretical NBC/NBS had or the visual bomb-sights of the Canberras, sizable efforts went into refining dropping accuracy, pathfinders, homing beacons, navigational aids and what we would today call smart weapons even before the V-bombers entered service and well before Suez.
The Valiant's poor showing was perhaps a bigger shock due to the amount of testing already undertaken to validate the system.

I think its perhaps too easy to read too into what was a week's worth of limited combat making use of available resources and doctrines. Operationally there were no doubt lessons to be learned, but it wasn't the kind of operation that had massive impacts, not when you consider the more drawn out counter-insurgency operations in Malaya and Borneo that were carving out some new niches on shoestring budgets at the extremity of supply lines and which actually lasted long enough to implement reforms and carry out operational research.
Suez validated some things like helicopter assault, but its not unlikely exercises would have done that anyway, indeed such thinking was already evident in Requirement NA.43 some 3-4 years prior.
Valiant inaccuracy was a fluke, soon Bomber Command was winning SAC trophies.

In any case with carriers it was a case of use them or lose them, without new roles the lighter carriers would have been pruned once helicopter ASW escort carriers had been killed as a concept by 1955.
 
Some recent threads on UK 50s 60s procurement make the discussions here worth a second look.
 
In the short term it helps the British economy because the recession that the Suez War created doesn't happen. For example, see this quote from the IWM website.
The canal was closed to traffic for five months by ships sunk by the Egyptians during the operations. British access to fuel and oil became limited and resulted in shortages. Petrol rationing was introduced in December 1956, lasting until May 1957.
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We'll still see abandonment of F.155 and probably F.177....though as per OTL it might linger on into 1958.

The declaration of DAW that SAMs be not good enough in '56 and Fighters still needed imply that what might happen, is specification of a supersonic FAW for both RAF and FAA.
A tactical platform for LRI is still likely, but we may see a more pragmatic approach. That initial OR range of 600nm might stick.

Though A5 Vigilante lurks here and TFX will happen and exert it's influence.

The debate between pure CVA and CV-GWS and the whole NIGS farago still goes on. But if DAW is politically backed, then CVA wins out earlier and NIGS's still dies.

But this could draw money into AEW.....

Interim is still going to be limited numbers of Lightning, Scimitar and Sea Vixen.
Javelin and Buccaneer proceed.

It's possible with a bit more cash in the coffers that Rule of Cool's Lightning scenario goes ahead.

Though it might also be the case HSA's private venture P.1121 lured along by certain RAF figures actually wins out.
 
Without the US quashing this independent (and, imho, rather ill-advised) military action, the other NATO members may have considered that their armed forces didn't exist for more than US-approved activities.
 
While virtually all of the factors that drove the 57 DWP were still occurring; US stopping MWDAP funding, ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads, increasing complexity of weapons platforms making them unable to be mass produced etc etc etc the lack of a Suez Crisis will have several impacts in British defence procurement.
  • There will be no immediate economic crisis, no run on the pound, no recession, no immediate oil shortage, no great desire to make big changes to save money.
  • There will be no fall of the Government, no Cabinet reshuffle and therefore no desire to drastically reform the MoD and produce a groundbreaking DWP within weeks of the new MoD assuming office.
  • There is be no great crisis of confidence that arose of the humiliating back-down at Suez, which made Britain somewhat wary of exerting itself on the world stage.
 
Walter Monkton, Eden's Defence Minister from 1955 to 1956. Only cabinet minister to oppose Suez.

Succeeded by Anthony Head, formerly Secretary of State for the Ministery of War (from 1951).

Reginald Maudling Minister of Supply from April 1955, refused to work under Harold Macmillan.
 
EwenS said:
No Suez would not have prevented development of the Commando carrier in the RN.

RN helicopters had been transporting troops around in Malaya since 1952 so that aspect wasn’t new. Friedman in British Carrier Aviation notes that in July 1956, the Admiralty Board authorised work on a commando conversion of a light carrier. Then the Suez crisis blows up and Ocean & Theseus, training ships which had each had a detachment of ASW helicopters aboard from early 1956 for trials, were called up to their wartime troopship role. Someone put two and two together and an exercise took place 29 Sept-12 Oct to study helicopter assault. That proved successful and was used operationally.

Then we have the 1957 Defence Review, and it becomes clear that Bulwark and Albion will become available for commando carrier conversion. Given their better command and control and radar facilities compared to a Colossus, they become the conversion of choice. Bulwark then begins conversion in Jan 1959.

Over on the other side of the Atlantic the same thing is happening. USMC studies for helicopter assault began in 1946. After various delays, the first hardware appears in May 1956 with the completion of the Thetis Bay CVE conversion and start of design work on the Iwo Jima class LPH. 1959 sees 3 Essex class LPH conversions enter service and the laying down of Iwo Jima.

So with no Suez what happens in the 1957 Defence Review? Either way I think we get a commando carrier, but maybe not based on Bulwark.
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Sometime in 1957 there was this happening:
"A suggestion made at a NATO Council meeting that HMS GLORY, HMS OCEAN and HMS THESEUS be considered for conversion into troop transports was not approved by the British government."
Click to expand...

So there is a good chance for the UK to get into the Commando Carrier game anyway - but possibly with the three Colossus class CVs named, instead of Albion & Bulwark.

Those two could either be more-fully modernized to operate at least Scimitars, Sea Vixens, and Gannets (to match Centaur) or possibly those 3 could be made into the RN version of the USN's SCB-27A/125 Essex class CVSs, with the ASW Gannets moving to those ships as the air wings of Ark and Eagle shed them in 1958-61 for their historic strike air wings (Vicky and Hermes operated strike air wings from completion on).

These ASW-focused CVS Centaur/Bulwark/Albion could carry more than the 6-4 AS.4 Gannets of the "general-purpose" air wings of the 1950s... maybe 10, with 10 Whirlwind HAS.7/Wessex HAS.1/3 and 4 or so Sea Venoms or Sea Vixens for CAP duties.

I don't really see them going much into the 1970s, unless they are sold to Australia & Canada after modernization, or get modified into Commando Carriers to replace G,O, & T.
 
If there's no Suez Crisis, I'd have to say that means that Nasser never tried to nationalize the Canal.

Because I don't see any way for the UK or France to NOT react when someone tries to be able to close off the primary supply route to Europe from India and Asia.
 
Well if Nassr had asked the Soviets, they'd have said don't do it.

Frankly he could have got away with a lot of other stuff if he'd left the canal alone
 
The general idea was that the former colonies could use their natural resources to grow economically, trade with their former masters on equal terms, and become democracies under the paternal authority of the United Nations.

The proof that the plan could not be more naïve and stupider is that only a few years after World War II most of the former colonies were either dictatorships armed with MiGs or non-aligned democracies armed with MiGs.

When they felt protected by the USSR and the United Nations, those dictatorships began to attack the Western world with economic abuses and terrorism.

But it all began in Suez, because of American ingenuity and Soviet cunning.
 
Let me take OP's No Crisis as assuming some UN-sanctioned steps to ensure Right to Innocent Passage through the Canal (even before seizing it 26/7/56 Nasser had caused Israeli ships to be barred, so next week might bar, say, UK).


So: Eden goes along with UN efforts. Let us assume they fail and while floundering, USSR does what it did in Hungary, 11/56; and that Eden's health causes a Tory contest, Butlerv. Mac.


RoC#14 has: “no Suez: no groundbreaking 4/57 DWP” and other actual Defence changes.


I suggest that if we take Mac as PM...no change whatsoever. It was his, not Sandys' DWP. Suez merely confirmed his position formed when Min of Def: ChancellorrMac+MoD.Monckton - PM 20/3/56: Defence: “little more than a façade” Proceedings/RAFHS,4,9/88,P11. ​
 
alertken said:
Let me take OP's No Crisis as assuming some UN-sanctioned steps to ensure Right to Innocent Passage through the Canal (even before seizing it 26/7/56 Nasser had caused Israeli ships to be barred, so next week might bar, say, UK).


So: Eden goes along with UN efforts. Let us assume they fail and while floundering, USSR does what it did in Hungary, 11/56; and that Eden's health causes a Tory contest, Butlerv. Mac.


RoC#14 has: “no Suez: no groundbreaking 4/57 DWP” and other actual Defence changes.


I suggest that if we take Mac as PM...no change whatsoever. It was his, not Sandys' DWP. Suez merely confirmed his position formed when Min of Def: ChancellorrMac+MoD.Monckton - PM 20/3/56: Defence: “little more than a façade” Proceedings/RAFHS,4,9/88,P11. ​
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Mac was right, Britain did need a major Defence review and I believe the majority of it was correct. In the particular case of aircraft development, the US MWDP funding dried up in 1956, so the money wasn't there for all the cool toys like F.155.

However IIUC Mac had made a couple of public statements in 1956 about the RAFs fighters not being fit for purpose, presumably for his envisaged reformed Defence policy. That said I believe that by 1956 the RAF was starting to replace fighter-bombers with Canberra interdictors, or at least planning to.

Another issue with Suez was the subsequent economic crisis, which I believe had a significant impact on the 57 DWP. For starters it was developed and published in 8 weeks during this economic crisis, which is a very short time and not the best headspace for drafting given the huge industrial and force structure impact. Maybe Mac would still want to cut 100m from the Defence budget, but without the crisis, but then again the number might have been smaller and the goal might have been to reach it during the forward estimates rather than immediately.

I don't think Mac would keep anything like the F.155 and other expensive stuff that the US was paying for at least in part. In the immediate short term this leaves the British with what is already developed and on order.
 
Hood said:
Valiant inaccuracy was a fluke, soon Bomber Command was winning SAC trophies.
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Did the Canberras and Valiants have access to radio navigation during their operations or were they reliant on internal systems during Operation Musketeer do you know?
 
Siberia said:
Did the Canberras and Valiants have access to radio navigation during their operations or were they reliant on internal systems during Operation Musketeer do you know?
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They were fully reliant on their internal systems. They were well out of range of radio aids like Gee-H.
Not all the Valiants were fitted with a complete NBS, however, owing to shortages of some items (serviceability rates were poor too).
 
Hood said:
They were fully reliant on their internal systems. They were well out of range of radio aids like Gee-H.
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Don't know why but I had assumed that ranges would have increased beyond 300 miles as with systems like Gee-H, a limit which puts the targets beyond what could be covered from Cyprus and Libya. I suppose they could have built a covert temporary site in southern Israel but it might be detected and rather undercuts the Franco-British public justifications. That also assumes the RAF would have felt the need.
 
There wasn't a Gee-H station in Cyprus at that time and seemingly the equipment wasn't available or wasn't asked for.
 
Some Caberras were fitted with the Blue Silk sideways looking radar for navigation outside GeeH coverage.
 

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