I've read the Athena document and find it puzzling. It has a series of "workforce directives" like a programmatic review, critical finance and infrastructure review, "invest in the Future" (their capitalization), "Igniting the Space Economy & Accelerating Scientific Discovery," and "Aero Consolidation." It also includes things like "internal war room creations" and "finance strike team" and engineering tiger team that seem hyperbolic.
It contains a lot of prescriptions for "fixing" NASA that are based upon misunderstanding of what NASA actually does, how it does it, and how it works with other actors. For instance, it seems to confuse NASA aeronautics (which is research-focused) with operating NASA aircraft. NASA actually has a lot of aircraft like the T-38s, Gulfstreams, U-2s, WB-57s, etc. that are not performing aeronautics research (as in improving aeronautics), but performing training, transportation, and non-aeronautics research.
It also makes statements about the field centers without really understanding what happens at different centers. Some of the shorthand descriptions about the centers don't indicate understanding of them. For instance, it mentions state management of Stennis. I don't think the authors realize that there are a bunch of other government activities at Stennis (like the Navy) and they might object. Centers are not just buildings and people, but facilities and knowledge. If you are going to "consolidate" the activities of different centers, how do you do that when facilities like wind tunnels and pressure chambers are located at specific centers? Either you shut them down completely, or you rebuild that capability at a new center location, which will be expensive. Similarly, if you centralize activity at a specific location, how many employees at the other centers are going to move to work there? An example is that a lot of aeronautics research is done at Langley in Virginia, and the document says it should be moved to Armstrong in the Mojave Desert. How many people at Langley are going to want to move to the other side of the country and live in a desert? A lot of the document is devoted to nuclear electric propulsion and suggests giving this mission to Marshall Space Flight Center, which does not have any expertise in the subject, or the facilities, to conduct nuclear-related research (that's up at Glenn in Ohio). The people at Marshall cannot do that work, but will the people at Glenn have to/want to move there? And what about all their equipment, much of which cannot be packed into the back of a U-Haul truck?
One of the strangest assertions in the document is that a goal is to "energize academic institutions to fund their own flagship missions." It also states that a goal is to "attract academic institution funding." Where do they think academic institutions get their money? Those kinds of statements indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of how things work in the science field. The few mentions of science in the document are really superficial. Earth science is mentioned separately because mainly the document seeks to eliminate it, and everything else--planetary, astrophysics, and heliophysics--is lumped into "other science." There's mention of speeding up the rate of scientific discovery, as if it's just a dial that can be turned to make the treadmill go faster, without recognition that it takes years for a spacecraft to reach a planet, years to analyze data, and years to design and build new instruments and spacecraft that have not been built before. There's mention of "bulk acquisition of launches, busses, operations, etc." which indicates a lack of understanding of how science missions work. For example, you cannot "bulk buy" busses or operations for spacecraft that do fundamentally different things. Software for science spacecraft is specifically written for those spacecraft. A bus that works in LEO may not be suitable to work at Jupiter, or for hosting a large optical system.
Whoever wrote this (and there are a few authors listed, although I've never heard of them) doesn't have a good grasp of NASA's organizational chart (it barely mentions directorates or divisions and there's no current NASA org chart in the document), or infrastructure. As a result, a number of the prescriptions don't make sense--"do this to fix that" when NASA already does the thing it recommends NASA do. While a lot of this is aspirational, it does not seem to recognize that many of the prescriptions in this document may not be within the power of the NASA administrator. Also, it is pretty clear that the new missions are going to go to centers in red states and centers in blue states are going to lose missions and people.
A lot of it seems to come from business management guidelines which may not really apply to a civil service workforce. There is discussion about changing the performance metrics for employees, and providing awards and rewards for them. NASA already does that. I'm not sure that the ideas in this document are consistent with how the government works. Can NASA have its own set of employee performance metrics that are different than those established for the entire civil service workforce? There are also goals, like having 5% of the workforce obtain the top rating, and then percentage goals for each of the other ratings, and only 5% at the bottom rating. There's calls for creating a "Starfleet Academy" and also establishing "tiger teams" and eliminating review panels unless they are for safety. (Again, this doesn't reflect reality. NASA runs a lot of review panels to select science grants. If those are eliminated, how will the agency perform that function?) There's a call for an agency-wide report on all agency expenditures, and also an agency-wide report on all agency infrastructure. The way it is written implies that the author(s) do not realize that NASA already has these things. They have, for instance, assessments of their infrastructure issues and maintenance deficiencies. It's not that they don't know what they are, the problem is that they don't have the money to address them. And there are plans in the document that seem to contradict each other. For instance, re-starting the voluntary retirement program while maintaining a hiring freeze. What happens if the people who choose to leave contain vital skills? How does the agency retain those skills if there is a hiring freeze?
Turning NASA into a nuclear mission agency is a major thrust, although there's no real mention of the involvement of the Department of Energy, which would have to buy into this (NASA cannot do it alone). The nuclear electric propulsion stuff is also confusing. I don't think the authors understand that electric propulsion doesn't get a spacecraft someplace fast. It only gets it there efficiently. (Also, for all that velocity you put in, you have to slow down when you get to your objective.) And adding nuclear power to electric propulsion may negate the efficiency because a nuclear system is heavy. There's a brief mention of hooking up an NEP spacecraft to a human spacecraft. What would that accomplish? I think there is confusion between NEP and NTP.
There is a 5-page (single space) "all hands speech" that the new administrator would give to the agency's employees that outlines all the goals and reads like there's a new sheriff in town. The gist of it is that he doesn't want NASA employees to rate the agency as the "best place to work" anymore, but the "hardest place to work." While the intention might be inspirational, saying that to a workforce that has lost 20% of its personnel and much of which has been under existential threat for 10 months seems like another way of saying that the beatings will continue until morale improves.
It's surprising that they didn't hire some people to write this who actually worked for NASA in the past and know what it does and how it is organized. That's the first step to fixing things.