M10 Booker Combat Vehicle / Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF)

[Kat Tsun]

Do you have a source for this?

https://dupuyinstitute.org/2018/10/12/artillery-surivability-in-modern-combat/
Trevor Dupuy worked on a DA sponsored study ("HERO") looking into casualties of the 1973 war. It was discerned from after action reports, unit reports, and battle damage assessments that M109 was not terribly survivable. Loss rates were higher than M114 towed guns in earthen revetments. The solution Artillery School came to was that there needed to be a replacement of M109 with higher protection standards. This resulted in various aborted attempts to make a M109 PIP in the 1980s.

The end result of this was the protracted development of the XM2001, which focused on a protection level comparable to M2A1 combined with a higher rate of fire and longer range based on the suppression missions demanded by Desert Storm. NATO joined in and this all resulted ultimately in the Pzh 2000 being the most protected, and only "shoot and scoot" survivable, howitzer in the world.

Ukraine is merely confirming prior observations, which were of limited utility due to the brief duration and small parcels of materiel in Yom Kippur, because the highest number of howitzer losses are coming from M109s, 2S1s, and 2S3s. Peonys are surviving by virtue of being very long ranged, as are the modern European L/52s for the most part, but this is only because the average Russian howitzer threat is a relatively short-ranged D-30.

Pzh 2000 is so far the only howitzer to see battle action in the D-30 range of fire and not actually die in tremendous numbers, which are due to its high protection level (14.5mm all around) and good mobility. The M2 Bradley is the standard by which future howitzers must be judged and M109 is, at best, an overburdened M113.

This study, and its cousins, forms the basis of all modern American/DOD "high intensity war" casualty planning.

And assuming so, what is you thesis for why?

Because the average self-propelled howitzer in U.S. Army is little better protected than an open top truck. It might stop 7.62x51mm on a good day. M109A7 has an applique kit which covers most of the hull and turret, but its mobility leaves much to be desired, so while it may survive the shoot but it will not be able to scoot. Because its tracks will broken by splinter or its engine disabled by a ICM grenade.

Pzh 2000 has the best of both worlds: high mobility to escape counter fire and armor protection to avoid being disabled during the escape. If you lack one, either armor or mobility, you die. That said the proliferation of reconnaissance-fire complexes might make Pzh 2000 obsolete. It is an unnatural shape and easily detected at long range even with relatively primitive single digit megapixel CCDs.

Towed guns likely have innate survivability against counter-battery fire because they are simple, present an incredibly small silhouette of target due to lack of enclosed volume, and their crew can hide in a dugout. The worst that might happen is an Excalibur impacts inside the revetment and destroys the limbers or something, but towed guns can also be recovered and put back into action faster than self-propelled pieces, at least if WW2 is any indication.

They can also be easily dummied up with decoy positions, using fallen trees or telephone poles, and camouflage netting. Convincing mechanized decoys in all spectra (radar, infrared, and visual) are expensive and impossible to produce in-situ. This is extremely important in the era of the electronic eye and near 24/7 real time multispectral surveillance.

Active protection systems that can intercept missiles that are of more sturdy construction and far faster than kamikaze drones have existed for years

It only took 20 years to buy Trophy and Iron Fist. If you're willing to wait another 20, the U.S. will have the best tanks of 2025 ready to defend Hawaii from the PLA in 2045 I guess?

I can guarantee that won't happen, because that entire turret doesn't work. The metal supporting the ammunition stowage is not thick enough to avoid deflecting while loaded, so the shells are not where the autoloader is trying to grab them. And there's no space to install thicker metal or stiffening pieces, either.

No space in the Stryker, at least without modification, which is why GDLS was panned back in 2009 or whatever by DA sure. The floor plate can be thickened, the turret raised, and the problem solved because the AMPV is a different hull working from a clean sheet...

The US military itself says that towed artillery has no future.

This is the same U.S. Army that thought ERCA's 58-caliber tube firing copper bands was a good idea based solely on vibes and then someone at lunch remembered Crusader had a copper band issue. Forgive me for thinking such, but institutionally speaking, the U.S. Army is completely senile with regards to artillery.

Towed pieces are pretty good in actual combat. CAESAR is nice too, even if that's a side effect of being one of the longest range pieces in the world. It still takes about as much time to limber up and mobilize as an M777, but it can't be easily disassociated from its prime mover. Peony's don't take beatings either, and they're completely open as well, but woe be the Peony that breaks a track. The benefit of a towed piece is that in practice it isn't much less mobile than a CAESAR or similar gun-on-a-truck, it's much harder to disable and easier to recover than a permanently affixed cannon, and it can use any old wagon if its assigned prime mover gets destroyed by counter-battery fire.

The only downside is you need about twice as many people to crew it. That's why the U.S. Army thinks towed guns don't have a future: it's too poor to afford soldiers and wouldn't be able to meet the recruiting goals anyway. Present TTPs are insufficient to preclude casualties in artillery units, though, provided they're in counter-battery range. The literal only reason we don't see more burned out CAESARs or whatever is because they're as long ranged as a Giatsint or Peony.

Put them on the line with the M109A5s and you'll start seeing burning trucks next to the tracks.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Which aren't in inventory, and won't be in inventory, since DA is moving forward with Trophy and Iron Fist. Check back in 25 years when they decide they need a new APS after losing 5,000 tanks and IFVs to FPV drones or Javelins or whatever. But hey, they'll be safe from Kornets and RPG-29s. At least until someone fires a third round, since most APS are only really good for about two shots before they're disabled, but I'm glad missiles are really hard to make...

...what do you mean the only defense firms consistently getting massive contracts over the past 10 years have been for ammunition?

I won't even try to defend the present state of our procurement system and the constant changes in direction which have resulted in such little progress. But the technology is feasible and it's what needs to be pursued. It makes a hell of a lot more sense than committing to fight like it's 1916 France but with the addition of drones. Of course, military leaders in the interwar period put a great deal of work into how to avoid fighting a future conflict like the war the Great War had been fought and incorporated all the technological improvements occurring. What you suggest seems to be more akin to abandoning any notion of maneuver warfare and doubling down on just digging more trenches and sending more cheap drones at the other guy in the hopes that maybe after 4 years of attrition you might win at the negotiation table. Basically, planning to fight the last war in the worst possible way.

Except it hasn't, and the U.S. Army just killed one of their most important air defense platforms for drone defense, obviously.

There are a lot of stupid decisions going on lately, I'm not going to defend ones that are clearly wrong.

A missile that barely exists in inventory isn't going to stop a $500 racing drone with a free ICM bomblet or PG-7VL for a nose. A 25mm PABM round for the Bradley would be nice, but that's too sensible. There's no more JLTVs, so say goodbye to 30mm PABM and M230LF, which would have provided SHORAD to mechanized troops if they had stayed in production.

And we should be working to correct these shortfalls, not doing away with our mechanized forces.

The Abrams hull line was shut down in 1995 and would require about 36 months to restart, assuming the hull production machinery is still in good condition, and the only bottleneck is ballistic welder training. This was discussed by BAE/United Defense back in 2018 as a way to scale orders in response to Crimea and the solution was to cancel DA orders and use those to fill Polish orders instead.

Anyway, by that time the war will be over, so it's a moot point.

So maybe we should do this sort of thing before the war starts? And even in a worst-case scenario are we not supposed to make the effort at all to build new MBTs, IFVs, etc.? "The war will be over by the time this stuff is ready" is just an excuse and is often proven wrong when wars take far longer than projected, like Ukraine.

Welcome to war, enjoy your stay.

Morale is important, and being told "Here are some trucks, go take that well defended position without heavy direct fire weaponry and armor protection beyond what can stop rifle caliber ammunition" will rightfully be seen as a suicide assignment versus an actual plan. Oh, sure they'll eventually have drone support and fire support, but that's not going to give much comfort to the light motorized unit being torn to shreds without much in the way to return direct fire. Of course, enemy drones and fire support will likely be showing up at the same time, and since we're not providing those poor unlucky bastards heavy firepower or decent armor, I doubt they're going to be provided with any effective anti-drone measures either. This is just using the poor bloody infantrymen as decoy targets for enemy positions to expose themselves when they open fire. Why don't we try using some UGVs as the decoys instead?

Hey, what has Ukraine been most commonly compared to?

Well, the Somme it isn't, besides there being trenches and misery the similarities end, but that's just war. It's more similar to the projected Pentomic battlefield but with hollow charge anti-armor missiles instead of nuclear bombs. If that's the narrative, then America should leave Asia while it still has that choice, because otherwise it's picking a fight it ostensibly doesn't want to win.

On that nuclear battlefield at least, you'd likely see some movement of devastated units versus going back and forth over a trench line.

What does it mean to leave Asia? Are we going to be fighting the ground war on the Chinese mainland? The prospective war with the PRC will be decided by the naval and air arms of the USA and PRC. Combat on land will likely be limited to small islands since I very much doubt Army of Marine units will land on Taiwan proper before it is taken and before the outcome of the war is determined.

The Russians were saying this as they drove their parade BMDs into Kyiv and Rosguard's riot police led the way.

One can write a very long list of all of the ways Russia's more-direct intervention and effort to take Kiev was poorly planned and poorly executed.

Thankfully the U.S. Army is quite big, and when the losses of armored forces mount, it will be able to revert rapidly to a sensible force of light motorized infantry backed by heavy armor reserves and small packets of task organized fire support vehicles of M1s or M2s. Ukraine is showing us that even this sort of mechanization isn't a panacea, but it works, unlike the 2014-2022 dynamic of "sending T-72/BMP battalions to their burning deaths with nothing to show for it".

There is nothing sensible about any of this.

I suspect we'll end up with a war in the latter half of 2027, maybe push it out to 2030 if there's another global recession, and all those factories we have now just won't be able to do anything due to the current administration's budget cuts. By the time they're fully staffed, and able to make weapons responsively again, we'll be signing the peace treaty. I'm sure GDLS and BAE know this, too.

Consigning ourselves to defeat like this would be stupid, maybe we shouldn't do that.

Right now the ball is in Chevy's court and they'll probably start ramping up ISV production for the IBCTs to transition. DOD has paid a ton of attention to how the Russians are fighting, and winning, in Ukraine. They're attacking in fireteam size units against mechanized infantry squad DFPs/trenches and being supported in their attacks by battalion level fire support groups. This is a shift from the last year's (or year before) assault detachments, but not a huge one.

If Russia wins this conflict (however that is determined), then it has been slow-motion victory at such a cost where desiring to replicate what's going on there is a fool's errand. There are far better ways to discover enemy positions than using infantrymen as bait. And all that to take some trench and move some slight distance in a massive country?

IBCTs replicating this type of "ultra light motorized" formation could see a lot of success in the reconnaissance-fires complex saturated battlefield, but we're probably getting to the point where individual soldiers "attacking" might be noticed at operational-tactical levels anyway, and destroyed by artillery. Eventually, we may see a reversion to marching to objectives several kilometers or miles away, but in multispectral battledress, and stopping every so often to avoid the electric gaze of ground search radar. That's a few decades out still, I think.

That's a very liberal definition of "success" especially when we could have far more suitable systems doing the reconnaissance.

Point is that mechanized armor like Bradleys and Abrams are too high profile and easily detected by even third rate armies like Russia. They're still necessary to have but not as an assault force, they're simply too vulnerable at the moment, and it isn't clear if there's any real path forward where they won't be. If there is, it's very far in the future, considering the M1s are just now getting anti-missile systems which existed in the 1990s.

That's why we need to modernize the armored/mechanized force, not discard it.

Anyway ask me after the 4th when Hegseth kills M1301, AMPV (for good this time), NGH, XM30, M230LF, FLRAA, and divests the GMVs.

Ask you what? I might ask what kind of drugs he must be on to call for many of the cuts he already has, but that's rather irrelevant.

 

[Josh_TN]

Nothing you posted was from Ukraine. You are asserting towed pieces work better in a drone environment, but only citing pre drone stats from conflict decades ago. How is that possibly relevant?

I myself will simply look to the absolute experts of modern anti UAV war: the Ukrainians. And they are producing SPHs, not towed pieces.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Nothing you posted was from Ukraine. You are asserting towed pieces work better in a drone environment, but only citing pre drone stats from conflict decades ago. How is that possibly relevant?

The rate of losses is comparable given the intensity of the conflict, and if anything, the losses of the unnaturally shaped self propelled gun would be higher than a towed piece in a drone saturated environment. The human eye is much better at detecting box-like objects than the irregular, fallen tree shape of a towed gun in a revetment and most assault drones are visual spectrum. For now.

If you want evidence for that then I suggest you consider Johnson's Criteria.

I myself will simply look to the absolute experts of modern anti UAV war: the Ukrainians. And they are producing SPHs, not towed pieces.

The Ukrainians aren't "experts" at "anti-UAV war" because they're actively losing to UAV backed ground gaining offensives. That's the point: whatever TTPs are necessary to defeat UAVs haven't been discovered yet. If Ukraine, or Russia, hasn't discovered them then it's not likely anyone else will have either because everyone else has even less experience in the matter.

What they have actually discovered is that the wars of the future will be eaters of troops and both have adapted admirably to this reality.

There are various open source intelligence outlets which have collated destroyed, identified materiel. In general, the majority of artillery losses are M109s or 2S1s and 2S3s for both sides from simple perusal of these outlets sources, which are typically BDA feeds from orbiting drones. If towed pieces were more often killed, we'd see that reflected in production of propaganda and photographs, but it isn't super common relative to the estimated deployed numbers of materiel.

Pzh 2000 is the most survivable artillery piece in Ukraine, hands down, but it isn't economical given the time constraints of imminent war with the PRC. Conversely, a towed gun with a 40-50 kilometer firing range might capture about 60-70% of that survivability, and can be produced quite literally within a year or two if asked. A great idea when you expect a war within the next two years or so.

And we should be working to correct these shortfalls, not doing away with our mechanized forces.

We have about 24-28 months until a major US-Chinese war breaks out by most DOD estimates. The longest ones I've seen so far are closer to 72-80 months, which might be enough to see a couple brigades equipped with XM30s, and the rest being M2A3s and -A4s. Assuming it survives the present administration and doesn't miss deadlines. Ouch. Unfortunately, DOD feels that the PLA's modernization schemes are accelerating rather than slowing in the post-COVID era.

This should be considered the baseline, with more time being a luxury rather than an expectation, and less time being the planning factor. So whatever can't be procured in that time (or ideally within a year or 18 months or so), or setup for full rate production 20-30 months after that, should be put on the back burner. We can get a nice stockpile of IMVs and MRAPs built up in that time, equip a few IBCTs, and have significant numbers of hot lines ready to go for the likely inevitable multi-year industrial war that would follow.

Well, we could have, I should say. The only good news is that we have a proven ability to surge IMVs and MRAPs that was demonstrated in GWOT, which shouldn't atrophy even if AM General is losing contracts, and we have a fairly responsive and diverse collection of light all-terrain vehicle manufacturers that can scale rapidly.

It'll be struggling with HMMWV and M113s for about a year before troops start getting JLTV -A2s and some sort of goofy IMV though.

Consigning ourselves to defeat like this would be stupid, maybe we shouldn't do that.

That seems to be the plan given the emphasis on armored systems that are at least a decade away, but we'll need to wait until next March-May to see what FY27 brings for things like XM30 and DLP.

That's why we need to modernize the armored/mechanized force, not discard it.

We likely don't have time to do that, and the armored forces we have right now mostly adequate anyway, since they won't be necessary for assaults.

Ask you what? I might ask what kind of drugs he must be on to call for many of the cuts he already has, but that's rather irrelevant.

How I feel about the state of the US in winning its fight with the PLA. Thankfully the submarine force hasn't been touched, but that's probably only because DON hasn't released their budget for FY26. That's happening today, actually.

 

[Josh_TN]

The rate of losses is comparable given the intensity of the conflict, and if anything, the losses of the unnaturally shaped self propelled gun would be higher than a towed piece in a drone saturated environment. The human eye is much better at detecting box-like objects than the irregular, fallen tree shape of a towed gun in a revetment and most assault drones are visual spectrum. For now.

If you want evidence for that then I suggest you consider Johnson's Criteria.

Ok, so you not possess relevant data.

The Ukrainians aren't "experts" at "anti-UAV war" because they're actively losing to UAV backed ground gaining offensives. That's the point: whatever TTPs are necessary to defeat UAVs haven't been discovered yet. If Ukraine, or Russia, hasn't discovered them then it's not likely anyone else will have either because everyone else has even less experience in the matter.

What they have actually discovered is that the wars of the future will be eaters of troops and both have adapted admirably to this reality.

Wars cause casualties; how revelational. You might want to compare WwII or even 1973 vehicle casualties with the current conflict; I think you will find that high tempos of operation between near peers generate large casualties regardless of the specific technology involved.

There are various open source intelligence outlets which have collated destroyed, identified materiel. In general, the majority of artillery losses are M109s or 2S1s and 2S3s for both sides from simple perusal of these outlets sources, which are typically BDA feeds from orbiting drones. If towed pieces were more often killed, we'd see that reflected in production of propaganda and photographs, but it isn't super common relative to the estimated deployed numbers of materiel.

That is an incredibly simplistic analysis that ignores how many systems of each type were fielded and also where they were fielded and how they died. You have not posted any detailed data supporting your contention. You might be right, but I’ve seen no data to indicate that, and again: Ukraine is producing an SPH, not a towed piece. Either they know something you don’t or they are wasting a vast amount of resources.

 

[shin_getter]

The danger is not primarily FPV drones, it’s the ISR UAVs that allow FPV drones to focus on large units or worse, call in artillery.

The "transparent battlefield" claim to armor issues is kinda funny. In a omniscient battlefield with WW2 weapons, only heavy armor survive as ambushing infantry, light vehicles and AT-guns are easily dispatched. (as many who war gamed this would know)

Good sensors favors longer effective weapon range and good protection, and the tank was the longest ranged precision fire platform in ww2 with effective protection. In the modern era, precision fires shifts out to 40km with tube (increasing with ramjet shells) and 70 to 150+km with rockets while frontal armor means nothing with top attack being available for everything.

The thing is that sensor coverage isn't perfect and that is why infantry can still survive, drones penetrate air defenses all day and counterbattery and SEAD fight lasts years. Tanks simply is the vehicle with the worst stealth for its very shortest weapon range category and just awful at hiding. Other 40+ton weapon vehicles are now shooting 20+ km not trying to find LOS at 1.5km.
--------------------

With no effective armor and active defenses on the battlefield, the survivability strategy is taxing opponent sensing capability. For this tactic, what is needed is:
1. Low signature
2. Large numbers
3. Speed
4. *Disruption of enemy sensor-shooter loop

And thus we see motorcycle and scooter infantry. From a tech perspective, what is needed is drone-air superiority, EW superiority, and UGV to disrupt opponent kill chain and lower losses of friendly forces. With low signature platforms only relative small disruption to sensor-shoot loop enables success, while high signature platforms with ineffective protection takes far more effort.

I think there are stats about how 70% of casualties are now from drones. Who even cares about machineguns who itself is easy target to drones.

Until someone invents Terminators, you'll need men with rifles to hold ground... As V. Zaluzhnyi pointed out several years ago, after reading a seminial Soviet textbook, the problem is that the affordability and lethality combination of drones create the conditions where trench warfare is a necessity. The way out is unclear, if there even is one, and it is unlikely to be found before the next war.

We may not recognize capture of territory until men are there to plant the flag, however drones can kill the trenches and holes and interdict.

Figure out a way to increase drone density, persistence and effective range (over opponent's effective ranges) and the territory is controlled. Needed technology:
- Spectrum independent way to operate large drone forces
- Landed drone combat complex, drone force that lands in hostile territory, persist and conduct self defense.
- Drone air superiority (to shrink opponent drone threat)

Current drone forces are still an "air force" in that it is transient. Despite numbers, 5~10km range with spectrum limits doesn't provide coverage like ground forces, even if it were superior to all air recon in symmetric war previously.

 

[Josh_TN]

There will still need to be protected vehicles that support troop movement, but I think this will tend to emphasize IFVs rather than MBTs. Direct fire just is not nearly as useful anymore - it used to offer unique levels of precision compared to indirect fire, but that is no longer the case. MBTs in particular suffer from focusing their protection schemes on the frontal arc, which was already becoming a questionable practice in MOUT environments.

There will likely still be MBTs, but protection will be more evenly applied and some form of local hard kill system applied along with multi spectral detection systems. I think we will also soon see hybrid propulsion as standard along with active thermal camouflage. The high expense of vehicles so equipped probably reduces there numbers and forces the use of UGVs as soon as they are practical, but I think both remote control and full automated systems to support that are still a ways off.

 

[TinWing]

The lesson to be learned from the M10 Booker is that you need to budget for an armored recovery vehicle variant, bridging equipment and even on base bridge infrastructure when you set the requirements for a light/medium tank.

 

[joshjosh]

Was there ever any acknowledgement by the DOD that IBCTs would need additional equipment (transports, wreckers, bridging) to accommodate the Booker? I can find no discussion of this anywhere but this forum. I don't recall any congressional testimony by the Army discussing this. I also can't find any program of record for new equipment to accommodate the Booker.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Was there ever any acknowledgement by the DOD that IBCTs would need additional equipment (transports, wreckers, bridging) to accommodate the Booker? I can find no discussion of this anywhere but this forum. I don't recall any congressional testimony by the Army discussing this. I also can't find any program of record for new equipment to accommodate the Booker.

Everything I've heard the Chieftain talk about was that the MPF was supposed to use the same engineering support as the IBCT already had. Same bridges that HEMTTs need, use the HEMTT Wrecker for recovery, and whatever HET and trailer the HEMTTs used for long-distance hauling. (HEMTTs have terrible fuel economy, like 2 MPG. 300 mile range and 150gal fuel tanks)

 

[fightingirish]

The first production model of the M10CV Booker combat vehicle, designated PD01, has officially joined the museum collection at Fort Benning.
Source (X fka twitter) :

https://twitter.com/x/status/1964700489137951008

View: https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1964700489137951008

 

[Dilandu]

After seeing new Chinese "lightened" tank on parade, US Army should REALLY reconsider the decision to cancel the Booker.

 

[yeetmahboi]

After seeing new Chinese "lightened" tank on parade, US Army should REALLY reconsider the decision to cancel the Booker.

No. It's neither economically nor doctrinally feasible to do so. The conventional power of the USmil lies in its logistics/recon-strike force which Booker wouldve had little impact on. And we're way past the 80s when copying each others move is the norm-the US is now clearly weaker in its industrial capacity saves for next gen dev cycles.

Until Lima gets M1A3 running there's no reason to commit to new heavy armour. Keep the funds for strategic systems and drones. And better pays/services.

The discourse on towed vs SP earlier on this thread is also absolute irony.

 

[Josh_TN]

After seeing new Chinese "lightened" tank on parade, US Army should REALLY reconsider the decision to cancel the Booker.

Why? It’s not like they will be landing in Shanghai.

 

[Ainen]

After seeing new Chinese "lightened" tank on parade, US Army should REALLY reconsider the decision to cancel the Booker.

Should it?
Frankly, booker now looks awfully like ZTQ-15 performance at ZTZ-100 weight.

I.e. Booker was (and perhaps remains) sensible as an IBCT asset (less so for newly relevant infantry division level operations).
But not when compared to the new Chinese tank, and, unlike it, it's a new vehicle which is completely out of touch of battlefield realities.

 

[Scott Kenny]

After seeing new Chinese "lightened" tank on parade, US Army should REALLY reconsider the decision to cancel the Booker.

No, Booker is about 10 tons too heavy.

 

[Rastmust]

We don't happen to have any interior pictures/renders of this, do we? Can't find anything at all.

 

[GruntFox]

Should it?
Frankly, booker now looks awfully like ZTQ-15 performance at ZTZ-100 weight.

I.e. Booker was (and perhaps remains) sensible as an IBCT asset (less so for newly relevant infantry division level operations).
But not when compared to the new Chinese tank, and, unlike it, it's a new vehicle which is completely out of touch of battlefield realities.

It isn't out of touch with battlefield realities. In a shocking twist of fate, it's surprisingly grounded in reality.

The Booker is the answer to a problem with the Stryker Brigades: they need firepower but can't run with M1s, and the less said about the Stryker AGS, the better. The design better reflects the modern battlefield than one would assume. 30mm is so common that it's basically the new base requirement for armor protection. Given the West's voting public's general inability to stomach casualties, that armor is going to be fitted on from the start. The 105 is the minimum for fire support work these days, and it has expansion capability for future modernization and new addons...

The surprising thing is that... the USSR/Russia isn't wrong when it fitted a 100mm demo gun onto the BMP-3.

Here's what Maj. Gen. (ret.) Patrick Donahoe said about these 'reforms': As a former Deputy Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division, I saw up close that the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) couldn't fight on the modern battlefield. It was too slow, too vulnerable, and lacked firepower. The Army had a fix. Until this week.The plan was smart:•ISVs to move rifle squads quickly•LRVs to give Cavalry squadrons mobility and sensors•M10 Bookers to restore firepower to the dismounted fightIt wasn't perfect, but it made the IBCT relevant again.Now the Army has canceled the M10. The LRV is nowhere in sight. And what's left? An "MBCT" concept with no protected firepower, no recon platform, and a few light vehicles. This isn't transformation. It's disarmament.The M10 solved a real problem. So did the LRV. Killing the platforms without replacing the capability isn't reform. It's regression.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1918669131932454968

View: https://x.com/PatDonahoeArmy/status/1918669131932454968

[note, X deleted the tweet, but I've quoted it from a Spacebattles thread on this]

At least one person I regularly talk with says, 'He's (Hegseth) got to be a plant.'

 

[Scott Kenny]

At least one person I regularly talk with says, 'He's (Hegseth) got to be a plant.'

The whole damn point of the MPF was that it was supposed to use the HEMTT wreckers and bridges, the same gear that is already native to Infantry brigades.

It's 10 tons too heavy for that, it required M88 ARVs and HETs.

 

[Ainen]

It isn't out of touch with battlefield realities. In a shocking twist of fate, it's surprisingly grounded in reality.

By current battlefield reality I mostly mean swarms of angry bees, already numbering in hundreds pee vehicle if so necessary(and that's before sci fi terminator swarms). Otherwise it's of course a sensible(if overweight) vehicle. But this "otherwise" is too big of an otherwise.

Difference between Chinese new gen AFVs and the rest is simple: their sensor setup strongly imply they're meant to shoot drones in time, both individually and as a formation.

It isn't unique per se - KF51 shown the same back in summer 2024. But only as an expo piece of questionable status (Italians appear to develop a way more grounded, and therefore wrong, 2023 variant).

 

[yeetmahboi]

Stryker as a whole since it's conception is hopelessly ignorant of operational reality tbh. It prides itself on strategic air mobility which doesn't really matter because AMC doesn't have enough planes to commit to heavy lift and some C-17s slugging along is not going to change the direction of the theater. Pokrovsk officially fell in a week's worth of combat but when the RuArmy debussed trains of loaded BMPs and fighters, Rubicon gained low alt air control and established MSRs it was over for the defense. Pretty much a beachhead on Normady scenario. Again this is probably 2-3 days into the start of the meatwave armour attacks and the rest is clearing out pockets in the city.

The only people who should have wheeled heavy armour is Tier 3 special duty regiments playing COIN or operational breaches on the FLOT tbh. Pretty much an inverse of the DRG tactics, use high speed armour to bypass timing and overload local defense, establish a holdout and wait for reinforcement or draw attention and retreat.

In any case, I'd say Booker is an OK execution on a flawed premise. When you fight on self imposed wincons like fuel burn instead of operational goals you're destined to lose anyway.

The whole damn point of the MPF was that it was supposed to use the HEMTT wreckers and bridges, the same gear that is already native to Infantry brigades.

It's 10 tons too heavy for that, it required M88 ARVs and HETs.

It's extremely funny to consider because if we look at the evolution of the turtle T-72s it's pretty much a guarantee that Booker and Abrams will suffer the same fate. But with how MSHORAD and MPF is planned out, their operational density, all being brigade level assets, we can ascertain that they will only face intense combat on a blue moon as commanders hogs all of them to the backline and the infantry and ol Abrams and Humvees do the heavy work on the FLOT. So why don't we just use Abrams in lieu of grift title worthy self propelled gun games, which itself is a proven commodity and still 10 times better!

I wouldn't say that MPF is a grifting scheme, that I reserve for Anduril but the whole CONOPS is giga dubious and looks more to be out of the COD/Warthunder camp than HOI4 or Bloons' tower defense tbh. And the latter spawns better strategists.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It's extremely funny to consider because if we look at the evolution of the turtle T-72s it's pretty much a guarantee that Booker and Abrams will suffer the same fate. But with how MSHORAD and MPF is planned out, their operational density, all being brigade level assets, we can ascertain that they will only face intense combat on a blue moon as commanders hogs all of them to the backline and the infantry and ol Abrams and Humvees do the heavy work on the FLOT. So why don't we just use Abrams in lieu of grift title worthy self propelled gun games, which itself is a proven commodity and still 10 times better!

I wouldn't say that MPF is a grifting scheme, that I reserve for Anduril but the whole CONOPS is giga dubious and looks more to be out of the COD/Warthunder camp than HOI4 or Bloons' tower defense tbh. And the latter spawns better strategists.

MPF exists for the purpose of giving Infantry brigades/divisions an assault gun that doesn't need Abrams support equipment.

Infantry Brigades/Divisions don't have any Abrams. At all. Anywhere in their organization. It's MPF or nothing.

What you're really proposing is to only have Heavy Brigades/Divisions in the US Army.

 

[yeetmahboi]

What you're really proposing is to only have Heavy Brigades/Divisions in the US Army.

What I'm advocating for is better combined arms training (and disband the Stryker force). Look at MSHORAD deployment. They are going to be the premier of US Army air defense for the coming years and it's a Stryker battalion attaching to an armour assault brigade and maybe a supporting light infantry force.

We are seeing this play out in a nascent form in Ukraine. Turtle tanks hold choke points and lock down broad areas supported by drone surveillance and dug in LP/OPs, and in some richer battalions acoustic and radar/EM UGS, preventing aggressive interdiction. FABs and long range UAVs strike defenders on rotation to strike down manpower and moral. Light scouts (DRGs) probe the defense and exploit undermanned sectors to permeat through the FLOT, reinforced by UAV/UGV logistics. Assault armour (BMPs) then pour in to smash the fragmenting defense, supported by vanguard and often diretc support light infantry on armoured trucks and Tigrs whom also hold, patrol and reinforce captured territory. The Pantsirs and Tors and ZSUs are weirdly absent in these ops though. Maybe some nepo babies sold them.

And looking at Pokrovsk, which I have mentioned a few times already on this site, alot of the issues when the armour attacks started boils down to disjointed mission planning and systemic political influences that kickstarted the rather frantic and frequent "meatwaves" resulting in flashy FPV footages of smoking trainwrecks. To be fair the Russians stomached the losses and had more than enough to reinforce the assaults, and their own drone ops were excellent in flushing out the dug in defense, backtracking alot of UA's drone controllers and pummelling droners and artillery. But then the Russians never had much to learn in the theory of interdiction and counter-interdiction, and they only began so in large scales in 2022. And then they had piss poor mission planning and coordination thorough that was carried by their industrial and demographics might and often very competent radio electronic combat troops and experienced lower echelon combat officers.

The US Army however, on paper, is much better. Pretty much every major combat operations in the 2000s till now is either from them or the Turks/Kurds or the Israelis. Fallujah 2nd could fight for the title of the best combined arms ops the world have seen. They have honed deconfliction for over 20 years of fighting, more if you include the legacy of Vietnam. SOCOM led the forefront of counter radio controlled threats (IEDs, VBIEDs and UAVs). They also wont embezzle these stuff.

It's pretty weird when on singular fields it's either Israel or the US Army heading first by a decade of experience but they seemingly can't just adopt combined arms at a time when it's the most needed (and it's not like they haven't done that, splendidly at that!)

*1: It's true that there are terrains the Abrams might not be able to reach in time, but that's a failure of logistics and combat engineering more than anything. And very few circumstances can be exempted (ZTQ-15/Zorawar esqes).

 

[Scott Kenny]

What I'm advocating for is better combined arms training (and disband the Stryker force).

The US Army is currently split into 3 brigade types

1. Armored Brigades are fast and have all the tanks in the Army. They don't have enough infantry to hold terrain.
2. Infantry Brigades are (relatively) slow and have no tanks. They can hold terrain just fine.
3. Stryker Brigades have 2 jobs:
   1. fast-moving infantry able to keep up with the tanks and hold the ground the Armored Brigade just took, and
   2. fast-moving assault guns and infantry to reinforce leg infantry.

I'm not sure there are enough Abrams hulls in inventory to do what you want. Plus, how are you going to quickly hold the ground the Armored Brigades took? Air Assault lift?

 

[yeetmahboi]

I'm not sure there are enough Abrams hulls in inventory to do what you want. Plus, how are you going to quickly hold the ground the Armored Brigades took? Air Assault lift?

There are aplenty, you just got to be creative with it. Lel.

The current army is still populous enough that I think when push comes to shove they can muster the manpower to stage two major operations in one theater. At least if we reduce the segregation constant in Ukraine by a factor of ~10, accounting for better mission planning and availability, better air defense, recon, EW support and fires, and assume a front 100kms wide, then two battalions, one on standby, could fill in for most purposes.

The light infantry can just trail behind debussed armour infantry some 100 metres to clean and hold.

 

[GruntFox]

The US Army is currently split into 3 brigade types

1. Armored Brigades are fast and have all the tanks in the Army. They don't have enough infantry to hold terrain.
2. Infantry Brigades are (relatively) slow and have no tanks. They can hold terrain just fine.
3. Stryker Brigadeshave 2 jobs:
   1. fast-moving infantry able to keep up with the tanks and hold the ground the Armored Brigade just took, and
   2. fast-moving assault guns and infantry to reinforce leg infantry.

I'm not sure there are enough Abrams hulls in inventory to do what you want. Plus, how are you going to quickly hold the ground the Armored Brigades took? Air Assault lift?

The poster you're talking to is very ignorant of realities.

Is the Booker perfect? No. Is it needed? Absolutely.

Though I'm seeing that the US military, with the programs Hegseth has either canceled or tried to cancel, is understanding that its old 'light infantry' setup is suicidal and that you'll need a more European-style 'everyone is motorized from the onset' model.

 

[yeetmahboi]

The poster you're talking to is very ignorant of realities.

Is the Booker perfect? No. Is it needed? Absolutely

Or you can just quote me. I don't mind the remarks but I do mind how anyone can justify either Stryker or Booker.

is understanding that its old 'light infantry' setup is suicidal and that you'll need a more European-style 'everyone is motorized from the onset' model.

So the Army doesn't have trucks or Humvees?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Is the Booker perfect? No. Is it needed? Absolutely.

Not if it requires gear from the Armored Brigade engineering battalion to move from point A to point B.

Though I'm seeing that the US military, with the programs Hegseth has either canceled or tried to cancel, is understanding that its old 'light infantry' setup is suicidal and that you'll need a more European-style 'everyone is motorized from the onset' model.

You do know that the Infantry Brigade has enough trucks to move the entire brigade, right? And has been since 2001?

 

[GruntFox]

Not if it requires gear from the Armored Brigade engineering battalion to move from point A to point B.

Hence why I said it's not perfect. The sad thing is that the West's inability to stomach casualties is part of the reason everything is getting so heavy (basically, you need more armor, which adds weight).

You do know that the Infantry Brigade has enough trucks to move the entire brigade, right? And has been since 2001?

Trucks are not viable for moving the brigade; you need APCs, aka armored boxes that can at least shrug off battle rifle rounds and artillery shrapnel.

That's been part of the new entry requirements for a while now.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Trucks are not viable for moving the brigade; you need APCs, aka armored boxes that can at least shrug off battle rifle rounds and artillery shrapnel.

That's been part of the new entry requirements for a while now.

1) the trucks currently have that much armor.
2) If you need more armor, that's for the Armored Brigades, not the Infantry Brigades.

 

[yeetmahboi]

1) the trucks currently have that much armor.

Yeah, trucks and MRAPs with B-kits has practically IFV level armour for 20 years now. FTTS hinged on basically reusing FCS modular armour tech to fortify resupply convoys to borderline invulnerability against small arms and RPGs. We can assume the Army got much better stuff now, even if not always available.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Was there any confirmation about the logistics-related problems the M10 Booker had beyond the usual clickbait articles and videos that don't necessarily have sources for their "facts"? For example, the claim that two could not be carried by a single C-17?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Was there any confirmation about the logistics-related problems the M10 Booker had beyond the usual clickbait articles and videos that don't necessarily have sources for their "facts"?

That it needs M88s and HETs for transport and recovery has been confirmed by The Chieftain.

For example, the claim that two could not be carried by a single C-17?

Haven't found confirmation on that, though I will note that IMO the better load planning is one M10 and then however much fuel and ammunition will reach the carrying weight of a C17. Fly 4x C17s and deliver a platoon of M10s plus all the fuel and ammunition they'll need for a month or three. 14x C17s for a Company.

 

[Scott Kenny]

During the design phase, every new capability added should have been evaluated and formally approved, and the Army should have reviewed and signed off on these configurations. Why, then, did the final, approved product ultimately fail to satisfy the Army?

Because the army doesn't know how to manage a program.

 

[yeetmahboi]

During the design phase, every new capability added should have been evaluated and formally approved, and the Army should have reviewed and signed off on these configurations. Why, then, did the final, approved product ultimately fail to satisfy the Army?

To clarify, the product did sastify the Army enough that they chose to bought it, but offers no intrinsic improvement to combat capability that OSD/Hegseth saw viable enough to retain.

Everyone insists Booker do the job of Ontos or Sprut-SD when by physical metrics it is a T-72A, which brings into question why does anyone need a particularly obese post applique light tank that needs borrowing HBCT's equipments to bring into operation in the first place. Not that its supposed alternatives would've fared any better, Sprut is exceptionally horrible in blowing up from a tandem charge light AT like MAAWS and no APS to avail with. But the standard infantry company already has stuff like MAAWS, pretty high velocity on its own, 50cal and 240s and 40mm and 60 mortars, and will get quads that can place accurate nades onto the enemy camo-ed foreheads. MPF offers a well armoured HV 105mm platform, which is cool for 2010s threat environment but will get absolutely slaughtered if dropped into Ukraine or Gaza. Which is nothing to gloat about because much better armoured tanks like Leos or T-90 rigged with a roof still gets blown up by a swarm or a 500kg bomb. The threat simply shifted, or advanced, and needs counters in the form of new tactics. Mortars are now much more lethal with lower cost guided munitions and drones to correct gun laying. Drones themselves are literally flying VBIEDs. Everyone has AMRs with laser ranging and thermal/NVs.

So to tie it altogether, a Booker is no more effective than an Abrams, needs the same exact tractor to bring it into the AO, is still an attached armour asset, so doctrinally not too different from an Abrams. Yes, it's cheaper to operate, but you needs to pay for all that goes before, whereas the old guy is still there jacked for work.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Everyone insists Booker do the job of Ontos or Sprut-SD when by physical metrics it is a T-72A, which brings into question why does anyone need a particularly obese post applique light tank that needs borrowing HBCT's equipments to bring into operation in the first place.

Exactly.

The US really needed an "M9": bigger than the M8 because there's more stuff in the tank these days (see the Chieftain's hatch episode on the M8-base MPF thing), not as big as the M10.

 

[Firefinder]

Exactly.

The US really needed an "M9": bigger than the M8 because there's more stuff in the tank these days (see the Chieftain's hatch episode on the M8-base MPF thing), not as big as the M10.

Issue you forgetting.

Like many other people here.

Is that the US Army has something call Ergonomics Standards.

Aka making sure the vehicle will not. Oh I don't know...

Fucking kill you by sitting in it with the Engine running.

Which is pretty fucking hard to do. *Stares at the British and Russian pointly*

Which includes how big people are while wearing 20 to 30 pounds of Kit like Bulletproof vests.

Believe the Standard is full kit in the tank for like 36 hours. IE standard NBC battle length.

Which is something that been hard confirmed by the Ukraine War, Ukrainian far prefer even the ancient Leopards A1s to the newer T64s for long duration duties to say nothing of the newer NATO tanks. Straight up more comfortable and you are more alert longer.

The sizes you need to do that, as well all the other bullshit a modern vehicle needs to do its thing, results in a vehicle that's going to be roughly a M10 size.

The only way to really cut sizes is by cutting crew.

But since the whole fucking idea was to make it easy to transfer people between the M1 and M10 with minimum retraining.

Which was an issue with the Stryker MGS.

You kinda can't cause until there is more then 10 M1E3s or what ever they are calling it.

There's 600 4 Man M1s in service.

So it needs to be 4 man which instantly hard caps the minimum size to bout 30 tons before adding all the rest of the shit

 

[Scott Kenny]

Issue you forgetting.

Like many other people here.

Is that the US Army has something call Ergonomics Standards.

I suspect that the Booker is not the smallest track that still passes the Ergo Standards.

 

[DeltaGreen]

That is to say, the Booker’s only real problem is that it is too heavy. This sounds especially unfortunate, because it is a problem that could have been avoided in a very simple way: by setting a firm weight limit from the very beginning.

I also have another question.
A few years ago, the Booker seemed to be described as an assault gun and as some kind of fire support vehicle, but these two concepts appear to be somewhat different. My personal understanding is that an assault gun should be a vehicle that fights continuously on the front line alongside infantry, and therefore it naturally needs sufficient survivability, APS and adequate armor.

A fire support vehicle, by contrast, sounds like something that would operate slightly farther from the front line and provide fire support when opportunities arise.

If the Army was unsure, or wanted both at the same time, then that seems to be exactly the light tank concept it claimed to reject.

So which one did the Army actually want at that time?

 

[yeetmahboi]

Is that the US Army has something call Ergonomics Standards.

Aka making sure the vehicle will not. Oh I don't know...

Fucking kill you by sitting in it with the Engine running.

Blowing stuff out of proportions like this is what gets you the Booker.

Ergonomics doesn't equate directly to fightability, rather, it is a factor among others. Obviously so, since shirtless insurgents in a T-54 can massacre full kit armoured detachments given the circumstances. Gritty Vietcongs and jihadists can fight, no worse than a Tier 1, given the circumstances. Tactics is about making that circumstances go in your way, so you sacrifice for less in tertiary fields and get more important stuff like TRICARE or satcom.

The Booker can have a worse designed hatch or less internal space, and it's fine, because it's better that there is more Bookers than a bigger Booker. People fought in garbage holes, from US survivability standpoint, before, and it's never a massive detriment, and often times wins or loses boils down to who spotted the other before, who has better info and henceforth repositioned to ambush or hold firm, or simply, who had more forces to spare.

But the Army asked for what it wanted and got what it wanted. A "light tank/assault gun" that's quite well armoured and spacious in the guts so that on the occasion it's hit the crew doesn't die. It has a big 105mm because that is all they have to work with. GIGO to some extent.

Naturally Booker would be better if it's facing only light rifle and MGs and a couple holed in patches of mines and RPGs, a bare Booker would naked tank what would slaughter a bare M8, but it's crap in the long run if you have to spend 10 times the cost to fiddle with a toy that is essentially a glorified tracked AML-90 or Rookiat, not to mention all the associated cost that would naturally go up with a more complex platform.

That being said it's kinda weird why the Army asked for a 40t tracked design, especially the tracked part. The old 3x3 LAV AVGP refitted with a low pressure 90nmm turret and new NERAs and an APS could prove a reasonable baseline to work from. Crews could transition straight from the MGS. AFAIK Cockerill offers a 90mm turret, pretty proven and Moog could ask for licensing if needed.